By  Nora Beauvais

This is the OECD’s fourth benchmarking report examining the policies and procedures related to terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) online, with a focus on transparency reporting, of the world’s top 50 most popular online content-sharing services (the “popular services”). Like the third edition, this report also covers the 50 online content-sharing services that terrorist and violent extremist groups and their supporters exploit or rely upon the most (the “intensive services”). The first three reports provided a benchmark against which this fourth report assesses relevant developments. Terrorist and violent extremist actors continually adapt their methods to technological developments. As governments and online platforms increasingly take measures to curb the dissemination of TVEC, terrorists and violent extremists make adjustments to avoid content moderation. On mainstream online platforms, for example, they have been developing tactics to evade automated detection tools. Meanwhile, sustained efforts by large platforms to combat TVEC have also caused a “displacement effect” whereby terrorists and violent extremists turn to alternatives (e.g. cloud platform websites, decentralised web technology, niche alt-platforms, and terrorist-operated websites). Transparency reporting on TVEC online is crucial to assess the evolution and magnitude of the threat, evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of online platforms’ policies and actions to tackle this problem, as well as their impact on human rights, and build an evidence base to support policymaking and regulatory frameworks. The key findings of this report are: 1. The popular and intensive services are more diverse, both ideologically and geographically. The TVEC landscape is multi-faceted, encompassing a wide range of ideologies, from terrorist groups to violent extremist political movements and lone actors, and it is spreading across different types of contentsharing services and geographical regions. For the first time in this report series, the popular services’ list includes a gaming service. This is noteworthy because gaming services are increasingly used by terrorist and violent extremist actors. In addition, three Indian platforms have joined this ranking. As for the intensive services’ list, it features a self-proclaimed anarchist website for the first time and covers a wider spectrum of geographic regions and languages.2. Overlap between the popular and intensive services remains low, highlighting the need to look at the TVEC landscape more comprehensively. Only ten services appear on both the popular and intensive lists, compared to 11 in the third benchmarking report. However, many policy discussions and responses still tend to focus on the largest platforms. Paired with the finding that the intensive services tend to be less transparent than the popular services (see below), the takeaway is that neglecting smaller but intensive services risks under-scrutinising or even turning a blind eye to a core part of the problem.3. The evidence shows mixed results regarding the clarity of the popular services popular services’ definitions of TVEC, while most of the intensive services’ still do not define or even expressly prohibit TVEC. On the one hand, the definitions related to TVEC in the popular services’ policies and procedures are, overall, clearer than in the previous report. Services are using more comprehensive descriptions of TVEC and related concepts, but new gaps among the services’ approaches have emerged, with a proportion of them still using vague terminology (18%) or having become less precise. On the other hand, 60% of the intensive services still do not define or explicitly prohibit TVEC, or they simply have not established any governing documents. 4. Transparency reporting on TVEC reveals new gaps among popular services and remains rare among intensive services. Seventeen of the popular services now issue transparency reports with specific information on TVEC, as compared to just five in the first edition, 11 in the second, and 15 in the third of this series. This represents the slowest year-to-year growth rate to date. For the first time in the series, one of the services (present on both the popular and the intensive services lists) that previously issued transparency reports with TVECspecific information ceased this practice. In addition, three of the four newest Services to issue transparency reports on TVEC provide very limited information, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, there is still significant heterogeneity among the popular services’ reporting approaches, which continues to make data aggregation and cross-platform comparisons difficult, if not impossible. Among the intensive services, only six issue transparency reports on their policies and actions concerning TVEC, against 8 previously, and the vast majority (5 of 6) also appear in the popular services list. The scarcity in transparency reporting on TVEC among the intensive services may be explained by the fact that many of them are operated by terrorist and violent extremist groups and supporters, or by free speech “absolutists” who deliberately let TVEC flourish on their platforms. 5. Content moderation approaches continue to pose risks for privacy, freedom of expression and due process. Continuing a trend that began during the COVID-19 pandemic, popular services rely more heavily on automated tools to detect and remove TVEC, which has generally increased the removal of lawful content and unjustified censorship. Furthermore, half of the intensive services remain opaque regarding their approaches to content moderation; and most of them either have no notifications and appeal mechanisms in place, or do not provide any information in this regard. This raises questions regarding their efforts to ensure the respect of privacy, freedom of expression and due process.6. New online safety laws and regulations are creating an increasingly fragmented transparency reporting landscape. As new online safety laws and regulations come into force, content-sharing services are facing new obligations to issue transparency reports in multiple jurisdictions, and they face different reporting requirements in each of them. To conclude, this report highlights the need for more precision in the Services’ governing documents; more consistency in the metrics and methodologies used to prepare transparency reports; more transparency in their content moderation approaches; and more efforts to ensure due process and to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms.

By Mia Doolan,  Katie Cox,  Kiran M. Sarma

This is the protocol for a Campbell Systematic Review. This review will address two aims: (1) A qualitative synthesis ofliterature on the composition of online far right propaganda, and (2) A quantitative synthesis of literature examining the impactof exposure to online far‐right propaganda on audiences. These syntheses will be guided by the following specific objectives: (i)What is the content (i.e. themes) of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (ii) What is the structure of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (iii) What is the context ofthese messages (i.e., where, when and by whom were they posted?) (iv) What impact does exposure to online far‐rightpropaganda have on audiences with reference to the radicalisation of opinion and/or action.

Campbell Systematic Reviews Volume 21, Issue 4 Dec 2025

By Bibi van Ginkel, Tanya Mehra, Merlina Herbach, Julian Lanchès, and Yael Boerma

This study examines a pressing and highly topical challenge: how to assess online content that may undermine democracy, threaten national security and public safety, or infringe upon the rights of others—while safeguarding freedom of expression. The central question it explores, the specific challenges identified, and the recommendations it puts forward should not be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated within a broader and increasingly complex societal and political context. A range of systemic developments shapes the environment in which this work takes place: the rise of online radicalisation, particularly among children and young adults; the expanding influence of large technology platforms and the tensions this creates with rule-of-law-based democratic societies leading to a global trend toward both techno-libertarianism and techno-authoritarianism; and the evolving role of governments as they seek to reconcile the imperatives of security, safety, and national interest with those of privacy, human rights, and minority protection. These challenges are compounded by the unprecedented speed and scale of online information dissemination, growing concerns about disinformation and foreign influence, and the urgent need to strengthen societal resilience and media literacy. While this study does not address each of these systemic issues in depth, they form the essential backdrop against which its findings and proposals should be understood.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2025. 208p.

By Mohamed Bin Ali, Sabariah Hussin and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani

Recent years have shown that extremist worldviews are no longer limited to specific ideologies, regions, or grievances. Whether driven by Islamist militancy, far-right conspiracies, or historical grievances, the dissemination of radical beliefs today is shaped by a deeper and more fundamental issue: extremist epistemology, especially regarding how individuals come to know, filter, and reinforce what they believe to be true.

COMMENTARY

At the heart of radicalisation lies an epistemology that rigidly filters information, dismisses contradictory evidence, and resists alternative perspectives. Quassim Cassam and Olivia Bailey have described this as a “closed-minded worldview” that replaces open inquiry with ideological purity. In this view, epistemology refers not to formal theories of knowledge, but to the everyday frameworks and practices by which individuals justify their beliefs and decide what to believe or reject.

When a person becomes epistemically closed off – often through social media echo chambers or ideological networks – their epistemic autonomy is compromised. They no longer analyse evidence critically, instead relying on trusted sources or in-groups to determine what qualifies as “truth.” This vulnerability is what extremist groups exploit, online and offline.

Self-radicalised individuals – including those in Singapore detained under the Internal Security Act for plotting attacks or attempting to travel to conflict zones – often fell into these epistemic traps. Although the content they consumed may have varied, their radicalisation process was similar: they entered epistemic environments that made violence appear not only justified but also necessary.

These environments often revolve around radical ideologies that reinforce extremist epistemology by offering binary moral frameworks that simplify complex realities and by providing emotionally resonant certainties about the future – such as promises of martyrdom or apocalyptic triumph. These approaches help define individuals as they seek clarity, purpose, or control amid uncertainty.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 5p.

Attempts to influence elected officials and municipal administrations.

By David Andersson, Anna Horgby and Albin Östervall

This is a study of undue influence exerted by actors and groups constituting a systemic threat in Sweden, including undue influence against elected officials, political parties and decision-making bodies. The study also sheds light on what forms undue influence can take against municipalities. Particular focus is on actors and groups connected to organised crime.

English summary of Brå report 2025:4 Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) -2025. 14p.

By Newton D. Baker, Edited by Ciolin Heston

Newton Diehl Baker’s Why We Went to War, published in 1921, is one of the most important contemporary American explanations of the nation’s entry into the First World War. Baker, who served as Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921 under President Woodrow Wilson, occupied a unique position at the very center of America’s wartime transformation. Once known as a progressive mayor of Cleveland and a disciple of Wilsonian reform, Baker became, almost overnight, the chief administrator responsible for raising, training, and mobilizing an army that grew from a modest peacetime force into one of the most formidable fighting powers of the modern age. His book represents both a justification and a reflection—part political defense, part historical testimony—on why the United States took the fateful step of joining a conflict from which it had long sought to remain apart.

For modern readers, Why We Went to War should be approached both as a primary document and as an act of persuasion. Baker was not an impartial historian; he was a participant and advocate, a defender of Wilsonian ideals at a moment when those ideals were under attack. His words reveal not only the official reasoning of the Wilson administration but also the mindset of a generation of progressives who believed that the United States, through sacrifice and leadership, could help reorder the world toward democracy and peace.

In the end, Baker’s book is as much about America’s identity as about the Great War. It reflects a moment when the nation stood at the crossroads between its traditional reluctance to become entangled in European affairs and its emerging role as a world power. To understand why the United States entered World War I is to understand not only the international provocations of the time but also the ideals, anxieties, and ambitions of a nation coming of age on the world stage.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p. 165.

By Human Digital, Ali Fisher and Arthur Bradley

Gore-related websites enable the hosting and sharing of illegal videos, including those produced by proscribed terrorist entities. The websites are numerous, free to access, provide no user or child safety features, and have seen a growth in visitor numbers in recent years due to ongoing conflicts. Most gore-related websites offer download and social media share functionality, allowing for graphic content, including thousands showing terrorist violence, to be shared across social media. Gore-related websites and the content they host have been largely avoided within academic study and practitioner responses, particularly in relation to counterterrorism and online harms such as violence fixation. This report provides a starting point for understanding the utility the websites provide to terrorist and violent extremist actors and the harms the content hosted on the websites present to children. The report is particularly pertinent in the UK context due to the recently passed Online Safety Act and growing public concern about the availability of graphic violent content in light of the Southport attacker’s reported online behaviours.

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2025  69p.

By Galen Lamphere-Englund

GIFCT hosts Working Groups annually to bring together international experts across sectors to work together in helping tech companies counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation online. GIFCT's GCoP Working Group ran from May 2024 through January 2025, with the aim of providing a space to share insights and feedback on how gameplay spaces could evolve safety work, review safety policies, tools, and practices, and anticipate evolving safety risks. The following document, Interventions for Countering Violent Extremism on Gaming Surfaces, is a series of explanations that detail various intervention strategies, structured across three stages of Prevent, Detect, and React. Each stage outlines specific interventions that gaming platforms can implement, organized by clearly described objectives (“How”) and supported by real-world examples with links to resources (“Case Studies”). Many thanks to the 2024 GIFCT GCoP members for sharing their expertise, particularly to Linda Schlegel (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; PRIF) and Rachel Kowert, Ph.D. (Discord) for their helpful suggestions. How to Use This Resource Each section below presents a strategic goal (Prevent, Detect, or React), specific objectives that support that goal (such as “Design Games and Gaming Experiences With User Safety in Mind”), and practical case studies with linked resources. The examples given should be seen as illustrative, not exhaustive. GIFCT’s academic research arm, the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), regularly shares the latest research related to gaming and gaming-adjacent platforms, which can be found here. Additionally, the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN), where GIFCT is a founding member, distributes resources here. GIFCT offers tailored guidance and support to any online gameplay company seeking to prevent TVE from exploiting their platform.   

(Washington, D.C.: Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, Year 4 Working Groups. 2025. 28p.

By Aleksandar Srbinovski | Trpe Stojanovski

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been concern that the conflict may act as a source of illegal arms flows into Europe, following the pattern of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. To be sure, the risk is significant. The conflict in Ukraine is the most protracted mechanized war in Europe since the Second World War, and materiel of all descriptions has flooded into the battlefield. There are now millions of unregistered weapons circulating in civilian Ukraine, many of which are trophy weapons collected from the battlefield, and the situation is similar in Russia, which has seen a spike in gun-related violence in regions adjoining the occupied territories.1 The prospect of these weapons falling into the hands of organized criminals in Europe and beyond is a major risk to countries’ internal security. But with this heightened attention there is a danger of tunnel vision. The conflict in Ukraine is only one risk among many. The illicit firearms market in Europe is diverse, with multiple sources, paths to market and types of weaponry for sale; from Soviet-era stockpiles to cutting-edge 3D-printed guns. This report maps out the illicit firearms dynamics in three countries to the south-east of Europe – gateways for illicit weapons into the EU and elsewhere but which have distinct ecosystems in their own right – Türkiye, Greece and Bulgaria. For organized crime, these three countries serve multiple purposes: transit routes, consumer markets and points of origin for a variety of illicit flows along the so-called ‘Balkan route’. In recent decades, the flow of illicit drugs (particularly heroin) and migrants through these countries has dominated global headlines, especially in light of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. But the movement of illegal firearms – and their threat to Europe – has been little discussed in comparison. The one exception is the issue of gas guns originating from Türkiye, which have grown in popularity among criminals in Europe because they are cheap and low risk to transport as legal unconverted weapons.2 Close to the point of sale they can be converted into lethal firearms. But as this report makes clear, converted gas and blank guns are just one issue among many in the region, each with their own criminal dynamics. This report considers the illicit arms markets of each country and how they are interconnected. This analysis is intended to complement two previous reports, ‘Smoke on the horizon’, which described trends in arms trafficking in Ukraine and assessed the marketplace for illicit weapons in Europe, and ‘Tomorrow’s fire’, which mapped how arms trafficking in Europe may develop depending on the outcome of the Ukraine conflict.3 Taken together, these three reports provide a holistic view of how the European illicit firearms market interacts with its south-eastern flank, and how it may evolve in the future. This report highlights how complex the illicit arms markets are in Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye, and the cultural, criminal and political factors that must be taken into consideration in assessing the risk. It also spotlights the responses that these countries have formulated, including through international forums and joint operations. Finally, the report offers a series of recommendations that aim to integrate analysis of the region into the broader picture of European threats.

Geneva: Rhw Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2025. 49p.

By NADINE SALMAN , SARAH MARSDEN , JAMES LEWIS

This report synthesises and critically analyses the existing research that has considered whether and how political contention and protest relate to radicalisation and terrorism. It draws on social movement theory perspectives to provide insights into what informs group and mass radicalisation and what constrains them, and what impact state responses have. AIMS This review seeks to address the following primary research questions: 1. What factors, features, or events are linked to violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 2. What factors, features, or events constrain the potential for violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 3. What are the mechanisms that help explain what facilitates or constrains opportunities for violence in social movements? 4. How do different state and policing responses affect the potential for violence and extremism in social movements? METHODOLOGY This research adopts a rapid evidence assessment (REA) approach, synthesising knowledge on specific topics in line with the research questions from KEY FINDINGS This REA identifies several potential drivers for violent and extremist escalation within social movements, as well as potential factors for de-escalation. The literature reviewed highlights the complex and interacting nature of movement characteristics, mobilisation contexts, and the influence of external actors, namely countermovements and state responses. Key findings identified in this review are summarised in a table for each major section, loosely based on the EMMIE framework for evidence relating to crime prevention interventions (Johnson et al., 2015). The EMMIE framework summarises the overall effect, direction, and strength of the evidence;1 the mechanisms or mediators it activates; relevant moderators or contexts, including unintended effects; implementation considerations; and economic costs/benefits (Johnson et al., 2015). Since the findings of this review are not solely concerned with interventions, the latter two considerations are not summarised here. These tables therefore highlight the factors identified, their overall effects on violence and/or extremism, any identified mechanisms and/or moderators, and the strength of the evidence from the literature base. Movements are informed by their socio-historical contexts and internal dynamics, the factors set out in the tables therefore represent general trends in the research rather than firm indicators of movement behaviour. The effects identified below should not, therefore, be interpreted as suggesting a direct causal relationship between a given factor and the likelihood of violence/ extremism, but instead as evidence of how these factors have impacted the dynamics within certain contexts and mobilisations. MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS Different movement characteristics, including factors relating to movement structure, resources, and composition, as well as ideological factors, may contribute to an increased potential for engaging in or rejecting violence. Understanding the characteristics of a given movement is therefore an important first step when understanding how and why violence is produced.

Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF, UK.The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2025. 44p.

By Aileen van Leeuwen and Amy-Jane Gielen

Executive Summary The Dutch National Training Institute against Radicalisation (Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan Radicalisering, ROR) offers a broad range of training programmes on radicalisation and extremism for first- and second-line professionals from various sectors who may encounter these phenomena in their work. The one-day introductory training is the most frequently delivered course, with over one hundred sessions held in 2023. To assess the introductory training’s longer-term impact (six months after completion), the ROR commissioned an independent impact evaluation by the International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT). The evaluation targeted all participants – first- and second-line professionals from various fields – who attended ROR’s introductory training between 14 November and 21 December 2023. The final report was delivered in August 2024. The design of the impact evaluation was based on the Kirkpatrick evaluation model, which provides a framework for measuring training outcomes. Additionally, a results monitoring framework was created to provide an overview of the intended outcomes, relevant indicators for tracking change over time, the methods used to collect data for each indicator, and the frequency of data collection. The evaluation employed a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative as well as quantitative indicators and research methods. The evaluation included three measurement points: a baseline prior to the training, a post-training measurement immediately after, and a follow-up conducted six months later. Three rounds of surveys were administered (N=235, N=221, N=88), followed by interviews with former participants six months after the training (N=8). In addition, two training sessions were observed, a focus group was held with stakeholders from the ROR and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), and a document analysis was carried out by the research team. Based on this data, the evaluation was able to answer the three key research questions guiding the study. 1. What is the expected and actual impact of the ROR introductory training on participants’ foundational knowledge, perceived ability to respond to signs of radicalisation and extremism, and intention to embed knowledge within their own organisations in the longer term (6 months)? Overall, the impact evaluation shows highly positive results, indicating that expectations and learning objectives were largely met for the majority of participants. At the end of the training, 90 percent of participants reported that the course met or exceeded their expectations. Only a small minority found the training either too basic – due to extensive prior knowledge – or difficult to follow because they struggled to connect it to their daily work. Foundational knowledge Both the ROR and the participants expected the training to strengthen participants’ foundational knowledge of radicalisation and extremism. The results strongly support this. • Firstly, the findings confirm that the training reached the right target audience – namely, professionals who are not yet experts on radicalisation and extremism and have had limited prior exposure to these topics. • Secondly, the content of the training was well-aligned with participants’ knowledge levels: those with limited prior understanding found it accessible, while those with more background also gained new insights. Participants reported a better grasp of the complexity of the topic, more practical tools, and a more nuanced understanding of radicalisation. • Thirdly, a statistically significant increase in knowledge was observed among participants, which was sustained after six months. The comparative analysis revealed that participants from the security domain with a secondary vocational education background (the Dutch so-called MBO-level) had the lowest baseline knowledge and experienced the most difficulty engaging with the content. This underscores the need for tailored approaches by trainers to better match participants’ prior knowledge and learning needs. While this customisation improves accessibility, it may lead to slight variations in training delivery and, ultimately, in participants’ knowledge outcomes.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 9p.

By Méryl Demuynck

The intentional spread of false or misleading information to inflict harm, commonly referred to as disinformation, raises unprecedented challenges in today’s digital age. This phenomenon becomes even more concerning when strategically leveraged by violent extremist actors to disseminate hateful narratives, incite violence, and recruit followers. While both disinformation and violent extremism are widely recognised as critical global threats, their intersections have however received limited scholarly and political attention. Drawing on findings from a multiyear EU-funded project, this policy brief seeks to address this gap and raise awareness on the complex dynamics and potential harms associated with disinformation propagated by extremist actors. Building on a cross-country mapping, with a particular focus on Boko Haram factions in Nigeria, it outlines the enabling conditions, defining features, and potential harmful impacts of such disinformation. The brief concludes by offering evidence-based recommendations to enhance the capacity of policy-makers and practitioners to assess, prevent, and mitigate its adverse effects.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 27p.

By J.M. Berger

This report compares two large random samples of Twitter accounts that tweet in English: one taken just before Elon Musk acquired Twitter in October 2022, and one taken three months later, in January 2023. It also examines several related datasets collected during the period following the acquisition, a period in which, the study found, new accounts were created at a record-breaking pace. Some extremist and conspiracy networks created accounts faster than the baseline rate, probably because changes to Twitter’s trust and safety policies had been announced. In the context of these policy announcements, the study examines some reinstated accounts, with mixed results. Despite the loosening of several content policies, accounts that automated the sending of tweets (‘bots’) saw activity drop sharply during the period of the study, with many bot accounts being suspended or deactivated, while others voluntarily curtailed their activity in light of the API changes announced. Deactivated accounts were dominated by sex- related content and apparent financial spam or scams, often coupled with automated tweeting.

Oxford. UK: VOX-Pol Institute, 2024. 80p.

Editors: Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project Marcin Zaborowsk

Central Europe represents a fertile ground for extreme right-wing ideologies (XRW), some of which are openly preaching intolerance and even violence. Similar to the western part of Eurppe. Central Europe has been affected by global dynamics related to the expansion of populism and XRW to a considerable extend. There are, however, also some specific conditions in the formerly communist Central Europe that are setting the region aside from other parts of Europe. These conditions are historical, economic, and ethnic in nature. With most of the region subjected to foreign communist domination during the second half of the 20th century, nationalism, sometimes in extreme forms, remains a strong under-current within the nations of Central Europe. With interwar Czechoslovakia (1918- 1938) being historical exception, Central Europe had practically no tradition of democracy prior to 1989. Also, whilst most of Western Europe went through the period of cultural changes in the 1960s, the Communist states of Central Europe were stuck on the wrong side of the iron curtain and isolated until 1989. Finally, although Central European nations are often historically heterogeneous, there is little experience of recent migrations into the region, especially from the outside of Europe. Whilst democratic transitions in the formerly communist Central Europe were achieved relatively smoothly, these processes were considerably helped by the international context and the conditionality of NATO and EU enlargements. For much of the current post-Cold War history Central Europeans were guided through the process of post-communist transitions by externally imposed criteria and requirements. The process was entirely voluntary as Central Europeans were keen to join the EU and NATO, hence, ready to meet the conditions set out by these institutions. Most importantly, this conditionality were also supporting stability and predictability of the domestic transitions in Central European states. However, this inevitably led to some shallowness of the process with the candidate states hurriedly setting up institutions and mechanisms that would satisfy NATO and EU. Today, with these countries being members of the EU and NATO, the stabilizing role that the conditions during the accession processes played is no longer available while democratic norms and institutions remain very fragile. The combination of all these factors means that XRW ideologies have find sizable constituencies in Central Europe. The salience of the phenomenon is compounded by the relative inexperience and sometimes the lack of legal instruments to address this issue in the states of Central Europe. In this report we chose to focus on four middle and smaller size Central European nations: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Three of the four were formerly parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire whilst Bulgaria spent half of the previous millennium under Ottoman domination. All the four were members of the Soviet block until 1989 (Czech Republic and Slovakia as a one state) and today all are members of the EU and NATO. Although XRW movements remain outside mainstream politics in all four countries, all have powerful populist movements which tend to operate in symbiosis with the respective XRW movements.

Bratislava Slovakia : GLOBSEC, 2023. 64p.

By Stephen Reimer

Extremism and terrorism motivated by far-right ideologies has captured the attention of policymakers and much of the public as an urgent threat to peace, security and democracy across much of the Western world. This has not escaped the notice of practitioners of counterterrorism financing (CTF), many of whom see the far right as a natural extension of the global terrorist-financing threat. Although there is enthusiasm for immediately and directly applying CTF tools and responses to far-right fundraising and related financial activities, the ability of the CTF regime to suitably respond to this threat has been largely assumed. Through an analysis of the operational and organisational financing behaviours of the contemporary far right, this paper finds this financing threat to be largely incompatible with the CTF regime and identifies several shortcomings in the regime as it stands. The vast majority of far-right violence emits meagre financial signals before an attack is carried out, which is incongruous with a CTF regime that depends on financial institutions to spot overt red flags in transaction data. Further, the CTF regime’s reliance on terrorism designations and resultant sanctions to financially isolate groups is at odds with the far right, whose organisational structures are unprecedentedly fluid and adaptable to such restrictive measures. In the absence of clearer direction from states, the private sector (especially operators of online platforms) has responded to pressure to independently ‘cut off’ perceived far-right ideologues and agents from accessing their services. Although laudable in their intention, such responses have precipitated several adverse consequences, including the spoiling of opportunities to collect financial intelligence on individuals and networks that could feed into more effective disruption efforts. In recalibrating the CTF regime to make it more suitable for the far-right threat of today, this paper makes the following recommendations: • To increase the likelihood of pre-attack financial signals being identified by financial institutions and used for preventative purposes, states should broaden public–private collaboration in the form of multiagency ‘fusion cells’ involving social services, health, education, security intelligence services and financial institutions for real-time intelligence sharing on persons of interest • To maximise the near-term effectiveness of far-right terrorism designations for disrupting finance, states should provide their private sector (particularly financial institutions) with detailed lists (including names and identifying information) of real or legal persons linked to designated far-right groups to aid implementation. • In recalibrating their national CTF regimes to meet the threat posed by the far right, states should reclaim authority and safeguard freedom of expression by denying private sector actors a free pass to make decisions, largely on the basis of reputation, about what constitutes violent extremism, as opposed to merely distasteful ideology. • In building CTF regimes fit to combat far-right financing, states should include oversight mechanisms to forestall the abuse of anti-financial crime measures for authoritarian ends. Responding to far-right mobilisation using financial tools could also set dangerous precedents for authoritarian onlookers if not done transparently

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2023), 20p.

By Hans-Jakob Schindler

.The report outlines the current mechanisms set up in Germany to mitigate the risks emanating from the financing of terrorism, violent extremism, and non-violent extremism. These present three basic challenges for investigators: a restrictive legal basis and significant administrative limits on the ability of the security authorities to collect and analyze information concerning the financial operations of extremist entities; gaps in financial transparency and a wide distribution of relevant data; administrative and investigative silos as well as competing investigative priorities. The example of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities in Germany demonstrates that these challenges result in a lack of available information concerning the underlying financial structures of extremist entities. The report concludes with a range of policy recommendations to adjust the current legal and administrative mechanisms, increase financial transparency concerning associations and non-profit entities and establish more cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

berlin: Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) 2023. 15p.

By Alexander Ritzmann

Key Findings  Research conducted by CEP Germany in September 2022 shows that a large portion of the “who’s who” of the (violence-oriented) German extreme-right are still present and active on Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. They use those platforms to promote their merchandise stores, martial arts associations, music labels, bands, and prepper organizations to fund their extremist activities, reach new customers, and recruit new members. These key actors are the foundation of the (transnational) violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) milieus in Germany.  The terms of service of Facebook, Instagram and YouTube state that they will “not allow” white supremacy actors to use and benefit from their platforms.  This research builds on a CEP policy report from November 2021, which documented that many of the key right-wing extremist actors in Germany are active on major social media platforms. These key actors are pursuing a strategy of “extreme normalization,” where they no longer carry out explicitly illegal activities on mainstream social media to avoid being permanently blocked from the platforms.  CEP provided their research findings to Facebook and YouTube directly 13 months ago. The same global social media companies publicly commit to work against hate speech, extremism and terrorism e.g. at the EU Internet Forum, the Christchurch Call To Action, and the United We Stand Summit.  Why is this a serious problem? The described key right-wing extremist actors do not only promote dangerous conspiracy narratives like the “Great Replacement” or “White Genocide”, which postulates that a Jewish-led elite seeks to destroy the “white race” by means of mass migration of “non-whites”, feminism and LGTBQI+ rights. They also build the “Erlebniswelten” (spaces for collective experiences) like music concerts and festivals or mixed martial arts tournaments to further expand the reach of extreme-right milieus in Germany, which can lead to increasing political violence and stochastic terrorism. .

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project, 2022. 6p.

By William Allchorn, Nigel Bromage, Bethan Johnson, Alexander Ritzmann, and Hans-Jakob Schindler

This study outlines and analyzes the financial strategies and activities of key right-wing extremist (RWE) organizations and actors in the United Kingdom (UK) and in Germany. The research focused on legal as well as (potentially) illegal financial activities and on key actors (individuals/ groups) with systemic relevance to the UK’s and Germany’s RWE milieus who have been active for a significant amount of time and have a significant track record of (being suspected or convicted) of relevant crimes as well as individuals who are likely to operate across national borders. 2. As identified in a 2020 CEP report1 on the transnational connectivity of key RWE actors in six countries, right-wing extremists apply various strategies for generating income streams. These can be classified as: 1) self-financing/ donations/crowdfunding/membership fees/ cryptocurrencies, 2) concerts and music festivals, 3) commercial activities like merchandise stores/web-shops, 4) combat sports events, 5) purchase of real estate for investment purposes and to establish “safe spaces,” and 6) organized/ financially motivated crimes, including money laundering. 3. Some of these financial strategies do generate significant amounts of income, as shown in another CEP report on RWE financing patterns and networks in 2021.2 A significant portion of the generated funds are in cash. In this context, illegal activities such as tax evasion or money laundering could present a weakness in these financial activities that offer potential opportunities for disruption by law enforcement and tax authorities if investigative priorities are set appropriately. 4. The objective of this study is to inform policymakers and practitioners working on the prevention and countering of right-wing extremism/ terrorism as well as financial crime with the goal of enhancing the understanding of the RWE financial strategies and to encourage further cooperation between relevant government agencies and civil society organizations.

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2023. 31p.

By Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann and Marco Macori

In an in-depth study in 2020, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), commissioned by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, analysed the transnational connectivity of the violent rightwing extremist (vXRW) and terrorist movement in five European countries and the US.1 It argued that in particular since 2014 a new leaderless apocalyptic transnational vXRW and terrorist movement emerged, which is responsible for a growing amount of violence in all countries at the centre of the study. The study also outlined that all governments had developed a variety of countermeasures, ranging from prevention and countering violent extremist (P/CVE) approaches, approaches with a focus on executive and intelligence-led measures to mixed strategies which integrated P/CVE with an increase in executive capacities as well as legal and administrative changes. However, the study argued that due to the growing transnational connectivity of right-wing extremist and terrorist networks, both offline in physical networking hubs as well as online through specific online ecosystems, transnational measures and mechanisms would be an effective, complementary tool to national strategies and tactics. From the analysis of the study, five main issue areas emerge, in which further transnational cooperation and coordination could be achieved to mitigate the threat emanating from this movement: (1) The further development of a common understanding and legal concepts, better capturing the terrorist nature of this developing threat. (2) Development of a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the various online ecosystems that underpin and connect the networks within this transnational movement and the deployment of already existing capacities, which are currently geared to counter Islamist terrorism online. (Topic of this briefing paper) (3) More in-depth analytics concerning the financial activities and transnational commercial connections of the vXRW and terrorist movement to allow for the potential adjustment of existing global counter terrorism financing mechanisms. (4) Greater awareness and the development of appropriate countermeasures focusing on the training activities within the vXRW movement, in particular paramilitary training. (5) The further development of P/CVE approaches and concepts on a local, national and transnational level, based on lessons learned. Throughout 2021, CEP, in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, will address these issues in a series of virtual events, bringing together relevant national and multilateral policy stakeholders. These events will be accompanied by a series of short reports, outlining the main operational and policy issues. Building on the discussions with relevant stakeholders, these papers will contain a range of concrete policy recommendations.

CEP Policy Brief

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2021. 16p.

By Alexander Ritzmann, Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler, Dr Thorsten Hindrichs, Maximilian Kreter

The financial structures of violent right-wing extremist organisations and actors in Germany are broad and multifaceted. Currently, there is a lack of up-to-date and in-depth analyses of the various financial strategies employed by these groups and individuals as well as their different sources of income. It seems like the “follow the money” approach, which has been successfully deployed against organised crime and in the prevention and fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism, has not been adopted with regard to violent right-wing extremism. A part of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, in particular those actors that are closely integrated into wider transnational networks, seem to have professionalised their financial strategies. Interestingly, a superficial analysis of publicly available data concerning the business models and legal formats chosen by violent right-wing extremist entrepreneurs may give the impression that a discernible strategy is absent. However, it is important to note that large segments of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, especially those that are transnationally linked, are highly networked with discernible structures connecting the various nodes. Deploying the “Administrative Approach”, developed by the European Union to fight organised crime, could be an effective tool in the fight against right-wing extremist organised crime. This methodology targets the interface between illegal and supposedly legal activities and income of criminal actors and networks. For example, local authorities could carry out coordinated tax audits as well as controls concerning the adherence with building codes and fire protection regulations targeting companies and businesses of right-wing extremist entrepreneurs that are directly linked to convicted felons who are part of the same ideological network. The study identified 38 relevant business entities in Germany that are involved in the production and dissemination of violent right-wing extremist music. Interestingly, although the overall music market in Germany is characterised by high levels of competition, this subsegment does not seem to display economic or ideological conflicts and functions in a cooperative manner, with various stakeholders linked to each other. Right-wing rock concerts are both lifestyle events as well as marketplaces and function as central networking hubs of the overall movement. Therefore, a clear distinction between the social networks of the right-wing rock music scene and those of the violent right-wing extremist scene can only be made in a very abstract sense. Due to the intricate and opaque business relationships on both the national and transnational levels of the (legal) German right-wing rock music market, it is of utmost importance to further investigate the key stakeholders within this milieu. These actors should be conceptualised not as individual economic entities or individual perpetrators but as representatives of the right-wing terrorist networks that operate in the background. Extremist right-wing rock music can be a profitable business in Germany due to the increasing professionalisation of production, dissemination and event management. These financial structures will continue to thrive so long as they are led by professional entrepreneurs who are not effectively confronted by government authorities.

New York, Berlin, London: 2021. 41p.