By The Council of Europe

Although the misuse of new technologies by terrorist actors has been a major concern for some time, the capabilities offered by (and the availability of) a range of new and emerging technologies – including gaming platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), artificial intelligence (AI) and 3D-printed weapons – have heightened these fears even further. An analysis of how and why terrorists adopt new technologies suggests that it remains highly context specific, with the extent and speed of innovation affected by internal factors (for example strategic, structural and individual factors) and external factors, particularly relationships, resources and the effects of counter-terrorism. In combination, these factors can encourage or inhibit the adoption of new technologies by terrorist actors, resulting in significant variations in the adoption and use of key technologies of concern. Terrorist actors in or affecting Europe have adopted (or are beginning to adopt) many of these technologies. Social media platforms, small or micro platforms, terrorist-hosted websites and gaming or gaming-adjacent platforms are all playing critical roles in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Emerging technologies used in this process include the decentralised web, the dark web and, most recently, generative AI. Although many terrorist attacks in Europe use a low-tech modus operandi, technology plays a key role in their preparation, planning and subsequent promotion. Propaganda and instructional material – typically stored and shared online – play a prominent role in shaping attack targets and methodology. For example, the emergence of 3D-printed weapon usage by terrorist actors in Europe has been fuelled by instructional materials developed by an active online subculture. Other far-right online subcultures have also encouraged the live-streaming of attacks and sharing of manifestos online. Terrorist actors in Europe use a range of licit and illicit activities to fund their attacks and radicalisation and recruitment activities, some of which (but not all) require the use of new technologies. These include mobile payment systems, online exchanges and wallets, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer online funds transfers and the solicitation of donations on social media platforms. Simultaneously, terrorist actors outside Europe, notably ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/Daesh, are increasingly encouraging donations via virtual assets, driving a rise in the presence of virtual assets in European terrorist financing arrests and prosecutions. Interviews with national, regional and international experts identified lessons learned and good practices when responding to terrorist misuse of new technologies. These include reducing the lag between terrorist exploitation of new technologies and counter-terrorism responses to it (through horizon scanning exercises and greater information sharing), the criticality of multistakeholder approaches, the importance of identifying and managing human rights-related risks, and the benefits of greater strategic clarity, which can lead to a focus on desired outcomes, rather than the steps required to reach them

By Renushka Madarie, Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg&Christianne de Poot

Previous quantitative studies applying Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to cybercrime victimization produced mixed results. Through semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity experts, the current study aims to qualitatively reevaluate the applicability of RAT to cyber-dependent crime, specifically data theft from organizations. An in-depth assessment of environmental factors appearing to affect data thieves’ actions resulted in concrete operationalizations of theoretical concepts. Importantly, we highlight the distinction between target selection and strategic choices made during the attack. Furthermore, RAT appeared to be as relevant, if not more, for explaining offender actions during an attack as for the initial convergence of offenders and digital targets.

DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025

By   Eugenio Benincasa

Recent revelations of Chinese government-backed hacking show a recurring pattern: prominent hackers behind groups such as APT17, APT27, APT41, Flax Typhoon, and Red Hotel—monikers given by cybersecurity researchers for groups with similar tactics—trace their roots to a broader community of early elite hackers, known as “red hackers” or “Honkers” (红客, Hong Ke). Active in online forums during the mid-1990s and 2000s, these hackers operated independently but often aligned with state interests, targeting foreign entities perceived as hostile to China, including the US, Taiwan, and Japan. The author’s analysis builds upon prior research into China’s red hacker groups.

Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich . 2025. 74p.

By Canada. Minister of Finance and National Revenue,

Canada has a robust Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing (AML/ATF) Regime that contributes to its efforts to combat transnational organized crime and is a key element of its counter-terrorism strategy. It comprises 13 federal departments and agencies with policy, regulatory, intelligence, and enforcement mandates. The federal Regime works with provincial and municipal counterparts and over 38,000 Canadian businesses with reporting obligations under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), known as reporting entities, to prevent, detect, and disrupt financial crime.

An accurate, nuanced, and up-to-date understanding of risks, informed by an assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, is the foundation for applying a risk-based approach to combatting these financial crimes in Canada. This includes balancing priorities of protecting the integrity of Canada's financial system and the safety and security of Canadians, respecting privacy and other rights of people in Canada, and mitigating regulatory burden and unintended consequences that may be faced by industry and the clients to whom they provide services.

The 2025 Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in Canada is a comprehensive assessment of the most pressing money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities in Canada. It assesses inherent risks and discusses the mitigation measures put in place to respond to them. Findings are informed through consultations with federal government authorities and external stakeholders, including provincial and territorial governments, the private sector, non-profit organizations, and international partners.

The purpose of this report is to support evidence-based policymaking, resource allocation, and priority setting for public authorities, and to support private sector businesses and non-government organizations to apply focused and proportionate measures to mitigate risks.

Ottawa: Canada. Department of Finance 2025. 126p.

by C. Nabokoff (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

The Ordeal of a Diplomat is a vivid and penetrating memoir by Constantin Nabokoff, a senior Russian diplomat who served in India and London during the final years of the Russian Empire and the First World War. Writing with candor and intellectual clarity, Nabokoff recounts his experiences at the heart of imperial diplomacy as long-established political structures gave way to revolution, war, and the collapse of old alliances. His narrative blends personal observation with acute political insight, illuminating the misunderstandings, rivalries, and illusions that shaped international relations on the eve of the modern world. At once a historical document and a timeless meditation on power, loyalty, and misjudgment, the book offers a rare insider’s view of diplomacy conducted amid global crisis and enduring relevance for readers interested in international affairs today.

By FLORE BERGER

Cattle rustling is a major driver of conflict and instability in the Sahel and West Africa. The two groups posing the biggest threat in the Sahel are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel).

These violent extremist organizations (VEOs) rely on cattle rustling as a stable source of income, using the proceeds to fund their operations and acquire necessary resources like weapons. Beyond this, they embed themselves within the broader livestock economy and, in areas where they hold significant influence, they even protect herder communities from looting by other conflict actors – gaining legitimacy in the process. Even further from their traditional operation’s zone in Mali and Burkina Faso, cattle rustling is still a critical aspect to the conflict.

JNIM in particular continues to expand further south, but it is not just territorial expansion – it’s a shift in logistics. JNIM relies on cross-border supply chains, including livestock looting and trafficking, to sustain operations and entrench their presence.

Geneva, SWIT:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime ,

2025. 40p.

By FABIAN ZHILLA

Returning foreign fighters and military-trained individuals in the Western Balkans often come from police, military or paramilitary backgrounds. Many use their skills for criminal activities, making them a potential security threat in the region. Their role in organized crime and violent extremism varies from country to country. In Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, these individuals are primarily engaged in transactional relationships with criminal networks, driven by mutual benefit. In Kosovo and Serbia, however, they have stronger connections to radical and extremist groups. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia and Montenegro, criminal activity often intersects with radical political rhetoric. This policy brief calls for a strategic, cooperative and integrated approach to tackling this issue.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025, 31p.

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

Violent extremism and organized crime are closely linked in the Western Balkans, but remain under-researched. This study identifies 34 criminal groups that overlap with extremism: 24 violent far-right extremist groups and 10 violent religious extremist groups. Violent far-right extremism is a better documented phenomenon because of its links to nationalist politics and high-ranking government officials. Violent religious extremism gained momentum in the 2010s, rooted in the instability that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Groups within both factions are involved in illicit activities, posing a major security threat to the region. This study highlights their criminal connections and advocates for a unified approach to tackling violent extremism and organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 45p.

By John Jupp, Matthew Garrod

One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years post peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organised criminal and cross-border activities. And yet, little scholarship has been dedicated to examining the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland or to accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organised crime and their dynamic interactions with organised criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this increasingly important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organised crime interaction theoretical model designed specifically for application to Northern Ireland in order to shed new light on the evolution and current complex linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond. The Northern Ireland model, which both builds on and departs from crime-terror models in existing scholarship, reveals a vast array of domestic and transnational ‘activity assimilation’ and ‘alliances’, as well as other forms of interactions including ‘conflicts’ and different gradations of ‘transformation’. The article concludes that national terrorism-organised crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models that are abstract and designed for universal application. Northern Ireland presently faces a serious threat to its security and stability posed by the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, and numerous challenges need to be urgently addressed if it is to be combatted. Understanding the organised crime-terrorism nexus at the present moment could not be more vital. Indeed, Brexit and potential implications for the Irish border present by far the most important challenge to the Good Friday Agreement since its adoption and, as a corollary, ensuring that paramilitary groups do not utilise their capacity to re-engage in acts of terrorism. As part of the initial steps towards a solution to some of these challenges, the Northern Ireland model therefore represents a useful tool that could be harnessed, and built upon, by policy makers and government agencies for defining and mapping out the terrorism-organised crime nexus in Northern Ireland.

Falmer, East Sussex, UK: University of Sussex. 2023. 50p.

By SAŠA ĐORĐEVIĆ

Over the past decade, thousands of euros in profit (both legal and illegal) have flowed into and been generated within the Western Balkans to fund violent extremism. While violent religious and far-right extremism share similarities, their financing methods differ in complexity. Cash remains the primary means of moving funds on both sides, aided by the region’s informal economy. Religious extremist groups tend to rely on simpler financial methods and are less dependent on illicit profits. In contrast, violent far-right groups use a mix of legal and illegal funding sources, employing more sophisticated financial strategies. This policy brief examines the financial foundations of violent extremism in the Western Balkans with the aim of strengthening institutional efforts to combat it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 32p.

By Markos Zografos

The Muslim Brotherhood is an organization that was founded in Egypt 1928 with the goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate. The ideological influences of Wahhabism and Salafism and the socio-political atmosphere of the early 20th century that saw the strengthening of Western colonial expansion and the weakening of Islamic influence in the Middle East set the stage for the organization’s establishment. Ideologically, Wahhabism and Salafism, two purist movements constructed respectively in the late 18th and 19th centuries, called for the removal of what Wahhabists and Salafists perceived as corrupt influences that contaminated a “pure” and “true” Islam. The basic concepts of Islamic purity in Wahhabism, which provided a foundation for Salafism to build upon, asserted the need for an Islamic caliphate to expand in opposition to the Western-influenced governments that embraced religious pluralism. Wahhabism and Salafism thus created an enveloping ideological framework that spawned many 20th century jihadist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood became one of these jihadist organizations—arguably the most significant one. Since its establishment in 1928, it has expanded its influence into multiple political, non-governmental, and non-state organizations with far-reaching global influence, including but not limited to the Iranian regime after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah, Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State (ISIS), as well as several NGOs in present-day North America and Europe. Hand in hand with the drive to construct an Islamic caliphate that would ensure the practice of what the Muslim Brotherhood perceived as a pure and true Islam free from foreign influences, as well as the view that Western expansion posed a threat to Islam’s influence in the world, key Brotherhood members also advocated the evilness of the Jewish people and the need for their eradication. A recurring perception among Muslim Brotherhood members is that Jews conspired behind the West’s ideological and colonialist expansion in order to weaken Islam. Likewise, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 significantly exacerbated the genocidal antisemitic rhetoric and practices of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to this day the Brotherhood has been active in slandering and taking hostile actions against Jewish people and the State of Israel in particular. In his book, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Ziad Abu-Amr identifies three key periods in the Muslim Brotherhood’s development: (1) the period of “insurrection” (1928-1949), which were the years of its establishment by and rule under its founder, Hasan al-Banna; (2) the period of “ordeal” (1949- 1967), which followed the assassination of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood’s persecution in Egypt by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, during which it underwent an intellectual resurgence mostly through Sayyid Qutb’s writings, until his execution in 1967; and (3) the period of “differentiation” (1967-present), which is characterized by the renewed vigor of Qutb’s ideas and jihadism in general due to his execution, the exit of the Muslim Brotherhood from its persecution in Egypt, and the further This paper presents an examination of the Muslim Brotherhood and its connected organizations. It aims to show the stages of the Muslim Brotherhood’s development, how the Brotherhood connects to its offshoot organizations, the injustice and violence that occur when any of these organizations manage to gain enough power in order to carry out jihad and enact sharia law, and the rhetoric and practice of Jew hatred in each of the organizations and their key members. In addition, it aims to show how genocidal antisemitism is a core ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood that can be traced throughout its history and the history of its offshoots.

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES no. 4/2021

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2021. 71p.

By Lev Topor

Arguments made by white supremacists to explain, promote, and gain support for their ideology fall into five categories: religious arguments, biological arguments, cultural arguments, arguments based on “protectionism,” and arguments relating to freedom of speech. Furthermore, while nationalism can lead to differences and conflicts between nations, global support for white supremacy can act as a common glue, uniting even historical adversaries, such as Americans and Russians. To explain and exemplify these phenomena, the pseudo-philosophical and pseudoscientific arguments in support of white supremacy are examined in the light of historical, social, and political trends, which all develop the concept of global white supremacy. Thus, while religious arguments in support of white supremacy date back thousands of years, “protectionist” arguments have become more prominent in the wake of terror events in the twenty-first century. They have also entered the mainstream as populists argue that “self-defense” is the only rational response to such threats. Ironically, it is the main idea behind each one of these arguments that ultimately serves to nullify it.

ISGAP’s Occasional Paper Series ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

By John P. Sullivan

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

REVISTA DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO MILITAR, 2021.

By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Daniel Byman and Riley McCabe

In the wake of Israel’s blistering military response against Hezbollah, the group is facing a cash shortfall at a time when it has lost key leaders, fighters, weapons, stockpiles of cash and gold, communication systems, and infrastructure. On top of that, it has to contend with a new Lebanese government that is beginning to do its part to implement the November 2024 ceasefire. As Hezbollah seeks to recover, it is certain to look to criminal enterprises—including laundering drug money—to fill the gap, as it has in the past after less severe financial crises. Nor is the risk limited to terrorist financing alone.

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025. 17p.

By Peer Schouten & James Barnett

Conflict maps often depict who controls what territory, with the Sahel frequently shown as divided among jihadists, bandits and militias. Yet such maps obscure how armed groups actually operate. We propose a more nuanced model that distinguishes core areas of presence, areas of tribute extraction, and raiding frontiers – capturing how these actors interact with communities in varied and shifting ways. Why maps matter Conflict maps of Nigeria show a worrying picture: virtually the whole national territory is under control of some non-state armed actor. Boko Haram controls the northeast, jihadists and bandits the northwest, and they are divided from the separatists in the south by a belt that is under the sway of farmer and herder militias.1 The rest of the Sahel doesn’t fare much better, with vast swathes of territory typically marked as under the control of armed groups.

While perhaps useful to raise the alarm on the often-dire humanitarian situation in these areas, such maps convey a treacherously wrong impression of how armed actors interact with communities across space.3 The Sahel is a huge, often sparsely settled space, in most of which it makes no sense for armed groups (or states for that matter) to try and establish a permanent presence – particularly given the oftenmodest capacities most groups dispose of.4 This dissonance is important, because policy is made and public opinions are shaped based on maps.motorbikes, typically just before planting and around harvest time, to extract their due. Because farmers are mostly left alone the rest of the year, this is hardly captured by the permanent and exclusive territorial control suggested by conventional maps.

Current conflict maps exaggerate the extent of armed group control by equating sporadic violence with territorial control. This misrepresentation risks distorting threat assessments and misguiding humanitarian and security interventions. The proposed radial model offers a more precise tool for policy and programming. By distinguishing between areas of direct control, tribute extraction and episodic raiding, it helps target interventions to where communities are most vulnerable or most governed by non-state actors. This spatial framework is relevant to conflicts across the Sahel, Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Redrawing the maps of these conflicts, based on how armed groups actually interact with populations, can enable more context-sensitive strategies, be they for peacebuilding, civilian protection or engagement with local actors.

Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 2025. 5p.

By Newton D. Baker, Edited by Ciolin Heston

Newton Diehl Baker’s Why We Went to War, published in 1921, is one of the most important contemporary American explanations of the nation’s entry into the First World War. Baker, who served as Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921 under President Woodrow Wilson, occupied a unique position at the very center of America’s wartime transformation. Once known as a progressive mayor of Cleveland and a disciple of Wilsonian reform, Baker became, almost overnight, the chief administrator responsible for raising, training, and mobilizing an army that grew from a modest peacetime force into one of the most formidable fighting powers of the modern age. His book represents both a justification and a reflection—part political defense, part historical testimony—on why the United States took the fateful step of joining a conflict from which it had long sought to remain apart.

For modern readers, Why We Went to War should be approached both as a primary document and as an act of persuasion. Baker was not an impartial historian; he was a participant and advocate, a defender of Wilsonian ideals at a moment when those ideals were under attack. His words reveal not only the official reasoning of the Wilson administration but also the mindset of a generation of progressives who believed that the United States, through sacrifice and leadership, could help reorder the world toward democracy and peace.

In the end, Baker’s book is as much about America’s identity as about the Great War. It reflects a moment when the nation stood at the crossroads between its traditional reluctance to become entangled in European affairs and its emerging role as a world power. To understand why the United States entered World War I is to understand not only the international provocations of the time but also the ideals, anxieties, and ambitions of a nation coming of age on the world stage.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p. 165.

By Kodili Henry Chukwuma

Offers a critical examination of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy as a political activity of identity construction

• Draws upon archival material to offer a discursive analysis of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy

• Considers the construction of terrorist threat and identity considering specific colonial and post-colonial histories, realities and agency

• Explores the official discourse on counter-terrorism as produced by Nigeria’s federal executive

• Examines the productivity and effects of the official discourse

  This book critically engages with Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy as a means of identity construction. Drawing on a wealth of archival materials, Kodili Chukwuma analyses how the federal government articulates and justifies its counter-terrorism policy against specific ‘terrorist’ groups such as Boko Haram in order to construct Nigeria's identity. He argues that the designation of particular terrorist threats as a new form of terrorism in Nigeria – and beyond – enables state counter-terrorism interventions. Revealing the complexities of Nigeria's counter-terrorist strategy, this book sheds new light on critical terrorism and critical security studies in a key postcolonial context.

  Edinburgh University Press, 2025. 216p.

By Drevon, Jerome

The Syrian regime unleashed unprecedented violence to suppress large-scale non-violent protests amid the Arab uprisings. Hundreds of armed groups formed throughout the country to defend the protesters and fight back. However, in contrast to other conflicts previously dominated by al-Qaeda and Islamic State, the two largest Syrian Jihadi groups, Ahrar al-Sham and then Jabhat al-Nusra, rejected global jihad and began to cultivate new ties with the population, other armed opposition groups, and even foreign states. This strategic shift is a response to the Jihadi paradox--a realization that while Jihadis excel at leading insurgencies, they fail to achieve political victories. In From Jihad to Politics, Jerome Drevon offers an examination of the Syrian armed opposition, tracing the emergence of Jihadi groups in the conflict, their dominance, and their political transformation. Drawing upon field research and interviews with Syrian insurgents in northwestern Syria and Turkey, Drevon demonstrates how the context of a local conflict can shape armed groups' behavior in unexpected ways. Further, he marshals unique evidence from the Arab world's most intense conflict to explain why the trajectory of the transnational Jihadi movement has altered course in recent years.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 

By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.