By Graeme Newman (Author), Frank Simonds (Author)

What does it mean to “win” a war that consumes a generation?

Saving France brings together two of the most vivid contemporary accounts of the First World War—Frank H. Simonds’s They Shall Not Pass (1916) and The Great War (1915)—and reframes them through a powerful new introduction by Graeme R. Newman. Written in the shadow of Verdun, when the fate of France and the outcome of the war still hung in the balance, Simonds’s works capture the immediacy, uncertainty, and human cost of modern industrial conflict.

At the center of this volume stands the Battle of Verdun—one of the most brutal and निर्णative struggles in military history. Through eyewitness reporting and sharp geopolitical analysis, Simonds reveals not only how France held the line, but what that endurance required: the sacrifice of a nation’s youth, the transformation of war into machinery, and the emergence of total war as a defining feature of the modern age.

Newman’s penetrating introduction places these texts in a broader analytical frame, confronting the enduring questions of the war:
Who really won? Who saved France? Could the catastrophe have been avoided? And what lessons—if any—were learned?

This edition goes further, drawing connections between the First World War and the conflicts of the twenty-first century—where questions of war economics, alliance systems, national endurance, and civilian cost remain as urgent as ever.

Saving France is not simply a historical reprint. It is a critical re-examination of war itself—its causes, its consequences, and its troubling continuity into the present.

For readers of military history, international relations, and the sociology of war, this volume offers both a gripping contemporary narrative and a sobering reflection on the true price of “victory.”

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.218.

by Graeme Newman (Author), David Jordan (Author) Format: Kindle Edition

The Great War – “According to Darwin”
Reprinting War and the Breed by David Starr Jordan
Edited with a new introduction by Graeme R. Newman

What if the devastation of modern war could be understood—not just politically or morally—but biologically?

Written in the midst of the First World War, War and the Breed is a provocative and deeply controversial attempt to interpret global conflict through the lens of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Jordan argues that war does not strengthen nations, as often claimed, but instead weakens them at their very roots—systematically eliminating the strongest and most capable individuals while leaving the least fit to shape future generations.

This Read-Me.Org edition, newly introduced by Graeme R. Newman, situates Jordan’s argument within both its historical moment and our own. The introduction critically examines Jordan’s interpretation of Darwin, the rise of eugenic thinking, and the troubling assumptions about race and heredity that underpin much early twentieth-century social science. It also draws powerful connections to modern warfare—where the technologies, actors, and consequences of conflict have changed, but its human costs remain enduring.

This volume invites readers to grapple with urgent and unsettling questions:
How have scientific ideas been used to justify—or critique—war?
What are the long-term human consequences of mass conflict?
And what does the Great War still teach us about violence, power, and the fate of nations today?

A compelling blend of historical text and contemporary analysis, The Great War – “According to Darwin” is essential reading for anyone interested in war studies, political thought, and the complex relationship between science and society.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.185..

by Graeme Newman (Author), Will Irwin (Author), K. A. Bratt (Author)

What is war? Is it a contest of armies, a failure of diplomacy, or something far more pervasive—a condition that engulfs entire societies, economies, and ways of life?

This provocative volume brings together two of the most penetrating early twentieth-century explorations of modern conflict: The Next War and That Next War?. Written in the aftermath of the First World War—when the scale and nature of warfare had changed irrevocably—these works confront a world struggling to understand what had just occurred, and what might come next.

In The Next War, Will Irwin delivers a gripping and urgent analysis of how industrialization, science, and total mobilization transformed war from a clash of armies into a devastating force directed at entire populations. His warnings about chemical weapons, aerial bombardment, and the erosion of moral restraint read today with startling clarity and foresight.

Nearly a decade later, Major K. A. Bratt’s That Next War? expands the inquiry, examining the strategic, and psychological dimensions of future conflict. Moving beyond immediate aftermath, Bratt explores the rise of air power, ideological struggle, global tensions, and the uneasy balance between democracy and militarism in a rapidly changing world.

Together, these two works form a powerful intellectual dialogue—one grounded in lived experience, the other in strategic foresight. Framed by a substantial new introduction by Graeme R. Newman, this edition situates both texts within the longer history of modern warfare and draws out their enduring relevance to the twenty-first century.

At a time when war continues to evolve—through technology, geopolitics, and new forms of power—this volume asks a question that remains as urgent as ever: not simply when the next war will come, but what war has become.

A Read-Me.Org Classic Reprint. Carefully prepared for contemporary readers, this edition preserves the original texts while offering new insight into their historical significance and modern implications.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.237.

by Graeme Newman (Author), S. Eardley Wilmot (Author), Robert Borden (Author)

What if the next world war does not look like the last two?

At the turn of the twentieth century, military thinkers struggled to imagine the wars that were coming. On the eve of catastrophe, some warned that new technologies, global commerce, and fragile political systems were making large‑scale conflict more likely—and more devastating—than ever before. Few listened. Fewer understood.

World War Three? revisits those moments of foresight and failure to ask a question that now confronts the twenty‑first century: have we once again misunderstood the nature of the next war?

Drawing on two remarkable but often overlooked works—Captain S. Eardley‑Wilmot’s The Next Naval War (1894) and Sir Robert Borden’s The War and the Future (1917)—this volume examines how earlier generations anticipated, experienced, and struggled to comprehend the transformation of warfare. One book speculates before disaster strikes; the other reflects from within it. Together, they offer a framework for understanding modern conflict in an age of global interdependence, precision weapons, cyber operations, and contested sea lanes.

Edited and introduced by Graeme R. Newman, World War Three? places these historical perspectives in direct conversation with contemporary dilemmas:

• Can a major war be fought—or even won—without large armies on the ground?

• What happens when commerce, communications, energy supplies, and undersea infrastructure become primary battlefields?

• Do missiles, drones, and digital networks change the meaning of “war,” or merely its appearance?

• Are today’s geopolitical crises isolated events, or symptoms of a changing world order?

From maritime chokepoints and missile warfare to economic coercion and the limits of international institutions, this book offers guided speculation grounded in history. It does not predict dates or battlefields. Instead, it explores how wars begin, how they expand, and how societies repeatedly fail to recognize their early forms.

Written for readers interested in history, strategy, international relations, and contemporary global risk, World War Three? is both a warning and an invitation—to think more clearly about the conflicts of the past before they reappear, transformed, in the future.

Is the next world war inevitable—or has it already begun under other names?

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.152.

Edited and Introduced by Graeme R. Newman. The Immediate Causes of the Great War by Oliver Perry Chitwood

What if the real story of World War I is not the past—but the present?

This boldly reimagined edition places a powerful new introductory essay by Graeme R. Newman at the center of the book, transforming a classic documentary history into a searching inquiry into how wars are made—then and now. Drawing on Oliver Perry Chitwood’s original 1918 compilation of diplomatic correspondence, ultimatums, and state papers, this volume reconstructs the fatal chain of decisions that led Europe into catastrophe. But it does more: it asks what those decisions reveal about the world we inhabit today.

Newman’s extended introduction reframes the Great War not as a closed historical episode, but as a recurring pattern of international behavior. Nationalism, alliance systems, economic rivalry, and the language of “defensive” war are examined not only in their early twentieth-century form, but in their modern equivalents—from the conflict in Ukraine to instability in the Middle East, and the global role of the United States. The essay confronts a central paradox: that leaders who claim to preserve peace may, under pressure, construct the very conditions that make war inevitable.

At the heart of the book remains Chitwood’s original method—letting the documents speak. Here are the voices of statesmen, ambassadors, and governments as they justify, accuse, negotiate, and ultimately fail. Read in light of Newman’s analysis, these documents become more than historical artifacts; they are case studies in escalation, miscalculation, and the limits of diplomacy.

Making War – Then and Now is both a primary source reader and a contemporary critique. It reveals how quickly order can unravel, how fragile peace can be, and how familiar the pathways to conflict remain. For readers seeking not only to understand the origins of World War I but to grasp the enduring mechanics of war itself, this edition offers an unsettling and necessary perspective.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.189.

by A British Statesman (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction) Format: Kindle Edition

Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders brings E. Alexander Powell’s gripping eyewitness account of the First World War into sharp contemporary focus, reframing one of the earliest narratives of the conflict through the lens of civilian suffering and the ethics of modern warfare.

Written in 1914 at the very outbreak of hostilities, Powell’s Fighting in Flanders remains one of the most immediate and vivid journalistic records of the German invasion of Belgium and the rapid, chaotic campaigns that swept across Flanders. As an American war correspondent moving with Allied forces, Powell witnessed firsthand the destruction of historic towns, the flight of refugees, and the transformation of peaceful European landscapes into scenes of devastation. His reporting captures not only the movement of armies, but the profound human cost borne by civilians caught in the path of industrial war.

This new Read-Me.Org edition, retitled Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders, highlights a central and enduring theme in Powell’s work: the deliberate and incidental targeting of civilian populations during wartime. From the burning of Louvain to the mass displacement of Belgian families, Powell documents events that helped shape early international outrage and contributed to the evolving laws of war. His account stands at the intersection of journalism, moral witness, and wartime narrative—revealing how the First World War blurred the boundaries between combatant and non-combatant in ways that continue to resonate today.

Carefully prepared for modern readers, this edition preserves Powell’s powerful prose while offering a clean, accessible text suitable for contemporary publication standards. It is an essential volume for readers interested in World War I history, the origins of total war, and the enduring question of how civilians become targets in conflicts across time.

A compelling blend of reportage and historical insight, Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders invites readers to revisit the opening chapter of the Great War—not as distant history, but as a warning that remains urgently relevant

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.143.

by Talbot Mundy (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

Of Colonial Pride: When India Fought in Flanders presents a vivid and compelling account of one of the most overlooked chapters of the First World War—the arrival and service of Indian troops on the Western Front. Originally published as When India Came to Fight in Flanders, Talbot Mundy’s work brings readers directly into the early months of the war, when soldiers from across the Indian subcontinent were deployed to the muddy, mechanized battlefields of Belgium and northern France.

Blending frontline observation with narrative intensity, Mundy captures the shock, endurance, and courage of these men as they confronted a new kind of warfare far removed from their homeland. From trench conditions to battlefield engagements, the book offers a rare contemporary perspective on the experiences of Indian regiments who played a critical role in holding the line during some of the war’s most desperate moments.

This newly titled edition, Of Colonial Pride, invites modern readers to reconsider the story within its broader historical context. It highlights not only the bravery of Indian soldiers, but also the complex realities of empire, identity, and loyalty that shaped their service. Mundy’s account reflects the attitudes of his time—admiring, yet often filtered through the lens of imperial thinking—making this volume both a gripping wartime narrative and an important historical document.

For readers of military history, colonial studies, and World War I, this book offers a powerful and thought-provoking look at the global dimensions of the conflict. It stands as a testament to the contributions of Indian soldiers whose role in the war deserves far greater recognition.

This Read-Me.Org edition has been carefully prepared for contemporary audiences, preserving the original text while presenting it in a clear, accessible format for today’s reader.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.216..

by A British Statesman (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction) Format: Kindle Edition

Behind every war lies a story not told in headlines, speeches, or patriotic slogans. How Diplomats Make War lifts the veil on the hidden machinery of international conflict, exposing the calculated maneuvers, secret agreements, and political intrigues that turn disputes into devastation.

Written in 1915 by an anonymous insider known only as “A British Statesman,” this remarkable work offers a rare, unflinching examination of the diplomatic system at the height of the First World War. Drawing on deep knowledge of European politics, the author dismantles the comforting myths that wars are fought for the people, revealing instead how they are engineered by a small circle of officials, financiers, and power brokers operating far from public scrutiny.

With sharp wit and devastating clarity, the book traces the role of treaties, alliances, and the so-called “balance of power” across a century of European history—from the aftermath of Napoleon to the crises that plunged the world into modern industrial warfare. It exposes how secrecy, propaganda, and the relentless expansion of armaments create a self-perpetuating cycle in which preparation for war becomes its very cause.

This new Read-Me.Org edition, edited and introduced by Graeme R. Newman, situates the text within both its historical moment and its continuing relevance. More than a century later, its insights remain strikingly contemporary, challenging readers to reconsider the relationship between governments, diplomacy, and the human cost of global conflict.

At once a historical document and a powerful critique of political power, How Diplomats Make War is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just why wars happen—but who truly makes them.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.257.

By Tina Won Sherman
Why GAO Did This Study The Threat Screening Center, administered by FBI, is responsible for managing the terrorist watchlist. In recent years, Members of Congress have raised questions about how nonfederal entities use the terrorist watchlist. GAO was asked to examine the use of the terrorist watchlist by nonfederal law enforcement entities. This report examines (1) nonfederal entities’ reporting of terrorist watchlist encounters to FBI and opportunities for improvement and (2) steps FBI has taken to ensure nonfederal entities’ awareness of watchlist policies through outreach and state-led trainings. GAO reviewed watchlist policies and training resources for nonfederal entities and collected encounter data for fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed nonfederal law enforcement officials in four states selected based on the number of encounters and other factors. While not generalizable, these interviews provided insights into officials’ awareness of policies and training. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2025. Information on encounter data and official FBI instructions on handling watchlist encounters that FBI deemed sensitive has been omitted.What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FBI (1) seek information to understand the extent to which nonfederal law enforcement entities are consistently reporting terrorist watchlist encounters, (2) develop a communication plan to improve its outreach efforts, and (3) develop a process to review state efforts to instruct NCIC users about watchlist policies. FBI concurred with the recommendations.

By Jason Blazakis

This research briefing by Jason Blazakis examines how advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs) could be exploited to support terrorist financing activity. The report argues that LLMs could act as powerful “force multipliers” by lowering barriers to persuasion, coordination and financial deception and that these technologies risk reshaping the economics of terrorist fundraising by enabling scalable, personalised and culturally tailored appeals at unprecedented speed. 

The report assesses how AI-enabled tools could be used for generating fundraising narratives or outreach materials as well as used to help enable assisted fraud, cyber theft and improved concealment of proceeds. It compares how leading LLM providers, including OpenAI, Google and Anthropic, address terrorism and illicit finance within their published policies, highlighting notable differences in regulatory specificity and enforcement approaches. To test whether these policies translate into practice, the author conducted limited baseline prompt testing across the three major LLM models offered by these companies, examining whether they refused overt requests related to terrorist fundraising and money laundering. 

By  Nora Beauvais

This is the OECD’s fourth benchmarking report examining the policies and procedures related to terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) online, with a focus on transparency reporting, of the world’s top 50 most popular online content-sharing services (the “popular services”). Like the third edition, this report also covers the 50 online content-sharing services that terrorist and violent extremist groups and their supporters exploit or rely upon the most (the “intensive services”). The first three reports provided a benchmark against which this fourth report assesses relevant developments. Terrorist and violent extremist actors continually adapt their methods to technological developments. As governments and online platforms increasingly take measures to curb the dissemination of TVEC, terrorists and violent extremists make adjustments to avoid content moderation. On mainstream online platforms, for example, they have been developing tactics to evade automated detection tools. Meanwhile, sustained efforts by large platforms to combat TVEC have also caused a “displacement effect” whereby terrorists and violent extremists turn to alternatives (e.g. cloud platform websites, decentralised web technology, niche alt-platforms, and terrorist-operated websites). Transparency reporting on TVEC online is crucial to assess the evolution and magnitude of the threat, evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of online platforms’ policies and actions to tackle this problem, as well as their impact on human rights, and build an evidence base to support policymaking and regulatory frameworks. The key findings of this report are: 1. The popular and intensive services are more diverse, both ideologically and geographically. The TVEC landscape is multi-faceted, encompassing a wide range of ideologies, from terrorist groups to violent extremist political movements and lone actors, and it is spreading across different types of contentsharing services and geographical regions. For the first time in this report series, the popular services’ list includes a gaming service. This is noteworthy because gaming services are increasingly used by terrorist and violent extremist actors. In addition, three Indian platforms have joined this ranking. As for the intensive services’ list, it features a self-proclaimed anarchist website for the first time and covers a wider spectrum of geographic regions and languages.2. Overlap between the popular and intensive services remains low, highlighting the need to look at the TVEC landscape more comprehensively. Only ten services appear on both the popular and intensive lists, compared to 11 in the third benchmarking report. However, many policy discussions and responses still tend to focus on the largest platforms. Paired with the finding that the intensive services tend to be less transparent than the popular services (see below), the takeaway is that neglecting smaller but intensive services risks under-scrutinising or even turning a blind eye to a core part of the problem.3. The evidence shows mixed results regarding the clarity of the popular services popular services’ definitions of TVEC, while most of the intensive services’ still do not define or even expressly prohibit TVEC. On the one hand, the definitions related to TVEC in the popular services’ policies and procedures are, overall, clearer than in the previous report. Services are using more comprehensive descriptions of TVEC and related concepts, but new gaps among the services’ approaches have emerged, with a proportion of them still using vague terminology (18%) or having become less precise. On the other hand, 60% of the intensive services still do not define or explicitly prohibit TVEC, or they simply have not established any governing documents. 4. Transparency reporting on TVEC reveals new gaps among popular services and remains rare among intensive services. Seventeen of the popular services now issue transparency reports with specific information on TVEC, as compared to just five in the first edition, 11 in the second, and 15 in the third of this series. This represents the slowest year-to-year growth rate to date. For the first time in the series, one of the services (present on both the popular and the intensive services lists) that previously issued transparency reports with TVECspecific information ceased this practice. In addition, three of the four newest Services to issue transparency reports on TVEC provide very limited information, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, there is still significant heterogeneity among the popular services’ reporting approaches, which continues to make data aggregation and cross-platform comparisons difficult, if not impossible. Among the intensive services, only six issue transparency reports on their policies and actions concerning TVEC, against 8 previously, and the vast majority (5 of 6) also appear in the popular services list. The scarcity in transparency reporting on TVEC among the intensive services may be explained by the fact that many of them are operated by terrorist and violent extremist groups and supporters, or by free speech “absolutists” who deliberately let TVEC flourish on their platforms. 5. Content moderation approaches continue to pose risks for privacy, freedom of expression and due process. Continuing a trend that began during the COVID-19 pandemic, popular services rely more heavily on automated tools to detect and remove TVEC, which has generally increased the removal of lawful content and unjustified censorship. Furthermore, half of the intensive services remain opaque regarding their approaches to content moderation; and most of them either have no notifications and appeal mechanisms in place, or do not provide any information in this regard. This raises questions regarding their efforts to ensure the respect of privacy, freedom of expression and due process.6. New online safety laws and regulations are creating an increasingly fragmented transparency reporting landscape. As new online safety laws and regulations come into force, content-sharing services are facing new obligations to issue transparency reports in multiple jurisdictions, and they face different reporting requirements in each of them. To conclude, this report highlights the need for more precision in the Services’ governing documents; more consistency in the metrics and methodologies used to prepare transparency reports; more transparency in their content moderation approaches; and more efforts to ensure due process and to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms.

By Bàrbara Molas

The word “doxing” (sometimes “doxxing”) is made up of the words “dropping dox” whereby dox, an abbreviation of the word “document”, refers to personal information (Strandell, 2024). Doxing, or revealing personal information in the online public space with the general intent of causing harm, is increasingly being used in modern armed conflicts. For example, Ukraine’s military has released private information of over 100,000 Russian soldiers, including alleged war criminals and FSB officials, in multiple doxing campaigns (Jensen and Watts, 2022). On the other hand, hackers from Russian hacker group RaHDit have published data on more than 3,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces mercenaries (Rossa Primavera, 27 July 2024), in addition to leaking information on 7,700 Azov soldiers (Al Mayadeen, 28 August 2024). Another group of Russian hackers, EvilWeb, leaked data from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), including IP addresses, emails, and encryption keys of SBU employees (URA, 29 September 2024). Finally, members of the Russian hacker project “NemeZida” revealed the identities of 800 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers who participated in the attack on the Kursk region, including representatives of the 82nd Airborne Assault Brigade, the 61st Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as about 200 foreign mercenaries from Israel, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Syria (URA, 29 September 2024). In a non-conflict environment, doxing may serve the purpose of extorting, silencing, controlling, or serving the public interest (Snyder 2017, p. 438; Anderson 2021, pp. 208-9; Li 2023, p. 368). In short, the role of doxing in today’s strategies to gain or retain power over enemy actors or rival factions is prominent and more relevant than ever before. This raises questions over the nature and legitimacy of doxing, including what (and who) exactly is that doxing involves, what makes a particular case of doxing ethically acceptable, or whether the practice should be seen as a crime or as a means for anti-repression activism.In order to shed light upon such questions, this literature review provides findings on academic discussions around doxing, from its conceptual or theoretical understanding to its real-life forms and implications. It does so by assessing a total of 17 peer-reviewed research papers published in the time span of 10 years (2014-2024). The contributions include approaches to the subject by scholars from the Social Sciences, the Data Sciences, and Public Health, located across North America, Europe, and Asia. Selecting the material involved open-source methodology (OSINT), with keywords including both scholarly and culturally sensitive vocabulary, especially in relation to state surveillance and the misuse of data sharing. For example, “dox” AND “antidox”, “doxing” AND “legal”, “doxing” AND “vigilantism”, or “doxing” OR “doxed” AND “security” as well as “doxing” AND “malicious” retrieved relevant sources. Due to part of the academic discussion on doxing being morality-based, namely whether it is “good” or “bad”, which is an inherently subjective assessment, research contributions were not disregarded based on their moral assessment, thereby allowing for this review to be nuanced and whole-encompassing. As a way to complement scholarly contributions with some preliminary data on the subject of doxing, the discussion following the literature summary includes data from semi-structured interviews with individuals who have been, or are, victims of doxing. In particular, such conversations took place with combatants, humanitarian workers, and journalists active in conflict zones, specifically in Ukraine. The incorporation of real and direct testimonies to doxing allows for a more nuanced grasp of the nature and impact of the practice, and helps fill out some gaps found in the literature, namely state-sponsored and/or state-supported doxing in the context of war. Indeed, among the existing literature, the only scholars that address the subject of doxing and conflict are Jensen and Watts from Brigham Young University and the United States Military Academy, respectively. While their work illustrates the use of doxing on enemy soldiers, it does  so focusing solely on Ukraine’s current tactics against Russian soldiers. This analysis contributes to such work by adding evidence on pro-Russia combatants’ doxing tactics against pro-Ukraine individuals in the area and abroad. This literature review contains a summary of findings, which includes a chronological content analysis of the scholarly contributions to the subject together with data from the above-mentioned interviews. Such an analysis is followed by a brief discussion, designed to stress points of agreement and disagreement between the authors, namely around conceptual approaches to doxing, its ethical use, and its legality. It ends with a conclusion section synthesising the results of the literature review and highlighting where our project, “Anti-Dox: Identifying, Evaluating, and Countering Disinformation in Times of War”, hopes to contribute to current debates on the subject. Ultimately, this analysis aims to situate the project into an evidence-based conversation in which doxing is considered a form of harmful information spread, characterised by actors employing manipulation tactics to advance political, military, or commercial goals.

By Mia Doolan,  Katie Cox,  Kiran M. Sarma

This is the protocol for a Campbell Systematic Review. This review will address two aims: (1) A qualitative synthesis ofliterature on the composition of online far right propaganda, and (2) A quantitative synthesis of literature examining the impactof exposure to online far‐right propaganda on audiences. These syntheses will be guided by the following specific objectives: (i)What is the content (i.e. themes) of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (ii) What is the structure of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (iii) What is the context ofthese messages (i.e., where, when and by whom were they posted?) (iv) What impact does exposure to online far‐rightpropaganda have on audiences with reference to the radicalisation of opinion and/or action.

Campbell Systematic Reviews Volume 21, Issue 4 Dec 2025

By Bibi van Ginkel, Tanya Mehra, Merlina Herbach, Julian Lanchès, and Yael Boerma

This study examines a pressing and highly topical challenge: how to assess online content that may undermine democracy, threaten national security and public safety, or infringe upon the rights of others—while safeguarding freedom of expression. The central question it explores, the specific challenges identified, and the recommendations it puts forward should not be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated within a broader and increasingly complex societal and political context. A range of systemic developments shapes the environment in which this work takes place: the rise of online radicalisation, particularly among children and young adults; the expanding influence of large technology platforms and the tensions this creates with rule-of-law-based democratic societies leading to a global trend toward both techno-libertarianism and techno-authoritarianism; and the evolving role of governments as they seek to reconcile the imperatives of security, safety, and national interest with those of privacy, human rights, and minority protection. These challenges are compounded by the unprecedented speed and scale of online information dissemination, growing concerns about disinformation and foreign influence, and the urgent need to strengthen societal resilience and media literacy. While this study does not address each of these systemic issues in depth, they form the essential backdrop against which its findings and proposals should be understood.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2025. 208p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

SYNOPSIS
In 2026, intensified geopolitical competition and rivalries will influence and shape the global threat environment. In parallel, non-state armed groups driven by religious, ethnic, and hard-line ideologies will threaten both governments and social harmony in various countries around the world.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore. 2025.

By The Council of Europe

Although the misuse of new technologies by terrorist actors has been a major concern for some time, the capabilities offered by (and the availability of) a range of new and emerging technologies – including gaming platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), artificial intelligence (AI) and 3D-printed weapons – have heightened these fears even further. An analysis of how and why terrorists adopt new technologies suggests that it remains highly context specific, with the extent and speed of innovation affected by internal factors (for example strategic, structural and individual factors) and external factors, particularly relationships, resources and the effects of counter-terrorism. In combination, these factors can encourage or inhibit the adoption of new technologies by terrorist actors, resulting in significant variations in the adoption and use of key technologies of concern. Terrorist actors in or affecting Europe have adopted (or are beginning to adopt) many of these technologies. Social media platforms, small or micro platforms, terrorist-hosted websites and gaming or gaming-adjacent platforms are all playing critical roles in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Emerging technologies used in this process include the decentralised web, the dark web and, most recently, generative AI. Although many terrorist attacks in Europe use a low-tech modus operandi, technology plays a key role in their preparation, planning and subsequent promotion. Propaganda and instructional material – typically stored and shared online – play a prominent role in shaping attack targets and methodology. For example, the emergence of 3D-printed weapon usage by terrorist actors in Europe has been fuelled by instructional materials developed by an active online subculture. Other far-right online subcultures have also encouraged the live-streaming of attacks and sharing of manifestos online. Terrorist actors in Europe use a range of licit and illicit activities to fund their attacks and radicalisation and recruitment activities, some of which (but not all) require the use of new technologies. These include mobile payment systems, online exchanges and wallets, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer online funds transfers and the solicitation of donations on social media platforms. Simultaneously, terrorist actors outside Europe, notably ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/Daesh, are increasingly encouraging donations via virtual assets, driving a rise in the presence of virtual assets in European terrorist financing arrests and prosecutions. Interviews with national, regional and international experts identified lessons learned and good practices when responding to terrorist misuse of new technologies. These include reducing the lag between terrorist exploitation of new technologies and counter-terrorism responses to it (through horizon scanning exercises and greater information sharing), the criticality of multistakeholder approaches, the importance of identifying and managing human rights-related risks, and the benefits of greater strategic clarity, which can lead to a focus on desired outcomes, rather than the steps required to reach them

By Renushka Madarie, Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg&Christianne de Poot

Previous quantitative studies applying Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to cybercrime victimization produced mixed results. Through semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity experts, the current study aims to qualitatively reevaluate the applicability of RAT to cyber-dependent crime, specifically data theft from organizations. An in-depth assessment of environmental factors appearing to affect data thieves’ actions resulted in concrete operationalizations of theoretical concepts. Importantly, we highlight the distinction between target selection and strategic choices made during the attack. Furthermore, RAT appeared to be as relevant, if not more, for explaining offender actions during an attack as for the initial convergence of offenders and digital targets.

DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025

By   Eugenio Benincasa

Recent revelations of Chinese government-backed hacking show a recurring pattern: prominent hackers behind groups such as APT17, APT27, APT41, Flax Typhoon, and Red Hotel—monikers given by cybersecurity researchers for groups with similar tactics—trace their roots to a broader community of early elite hackers, known as “red hackers” or “Honkers” (红客, Hong Ke). Active in online forums during the mid-1990s and 2000s, these hackers operated independently but often aligned with state interests, targeting foreign entities perceived as hostile to China, including the US, Taiwan, and Japan. The author’s analysis builds upon prior research into China’s red hacker groups.

Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich . 2025. 74p.

By Canada. Minister of Finance and National Revenue,

Canada has a robust Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing (AML/ATF) Regime that contributes to its efforts to combat transnational organized crime and is a key element of its counter-terrorism strategy. It comprises 13 federal departments and agencies with policy, regulatory, intelligence, and enforcement mandates. The federal Regime works with provincial and municipal counterparts and over 38,000 Canadian businesses with reporting obligations under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), known as reporting entities, to prevent, detect, and disrupt financial crime.

An accurate, nuanced, and up-to-date understanding of risks, informed by an assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, is the foundation for applying a risk-based approach to combatting these financial crimes in Canada. This includes balancing priorities of protecting the integrity of Canada's financial system and the safety and security of Canadians, respecting privacy and other rights of people in Canada, and mitigating regulatory burden and unintended consequences that may be faced by industry and the clients to whom they provide services.

The 2025 Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in Canada is a comprehensive assessment of the most pressing money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities in Canada. It assesses inherent risks and discusses the mitigation measures put in place to respond to them. Findings are informed through consultations with federal government authorities and external stakeholders, including provincial and territorial governments, the private sector, non-profit organizations, and international partners.

The purpose of this report is to support evidence-based policymaking, resource allocation, and priority setting for public authorities, and to support private sector businesses and non-government organizations to apply focused and proportionate measures to mitigate risks.

Ottawa: Canada. Department of Finance 2025. 126p.

by C. Nabokoff (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

The Ordeal of a Diplomat is a vivid and penetrating memoir by Constantin Nabokoff, a senior Russian diplomat who served in India and London during the final years of the Russian Empire and the First World War. Writing with candor and intellectual clarity, Nabokoff recounts his experiences at the heart of imperial diplomacy as long-established political structures gave way to revolution, war, and the collapse of old alliances. His narrative blends personal observation with acute political insight, illuminating the misunderstandings, rivalries, and illusions that shaped international relations on the eve of the modern world. At once a historical document and a timeless meditation on power, loyalty, and misjudgment, the book offers a rare insider’s view of diplomacy conducted amid global crisis and enduring relevance for readers interested in international affairs today.