By  Nora Beauvais

This is the OECD’s fourth benchmarking report examining the policies and procedures related to terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) online, with a focus on transparency reporting, of the world’s top 50 most popular online content-sharing services (the “popular services”). Like the third edition, this report also covers the 50 online content-sharing services that terrorist and violent extremist groups and their supporters exploit or rely upon the most (the “intensive services”). The first three reports provided a benchmark against which this fourth report assesses relevant developments. Terrorist and violent extremist actors continually adapt their methods to technological developments. As governments and online platforms increasingly take measures to curb the dissemination of TVEC, terrorists and violent extremists make adjustments to avoid content moderation. On mainstream online platforms, for example, they have been developing tactics to evade automated detection tools. Meanwhile, sustained efforts by large platforms to combat TVEC have also caused a “displacement effect” whereby terrorists and violent extremists turn to alternatives (e.g. cloud platform websites, decentralised web technology, niche alt-platforms, and terrorist-operated websites). Transparency reporting on TVEC online is crucial to assess the evolution and magnitude of the threat, evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of online platforms’ policies and actions to tackle this problem, as well as their impact on human rights, and build an evidence base to support policymaking and regulatory frameworks. The key findings of this report are: 1. The popular and intensive services are more diverse, both ideologically and geographically. The TVEC landscape is multi-faceted, encompassing a wide range of ideologies, from terrorist groups to violent extremist political movements and lone actors, and it is spreading across different types of contentsharing services and geographical regions. For the first time in this report series, the popular services’ list includes a gaming service. This is noteworthy because gaming services are increasingly used by terrorist and violent extremist actors. In addition, three Indian platforms have joined this ranking. As for the intensive services’ list, it features a self-proclaimed anarchist website for the first time and covers a wider spectrum of geographic regions and languages.2. Overlap between the popular and intensive services remains low, highlighting the need to look at the TVEC landscape more comprehensively. Only ten services appear on both the popular and intensive lists, compared to 11 in the third benchmarking report. However, many policy discussions and responses still tend to focus on the largest platforms. Paired with the finding that the intensive services tend to be less transparent than the popular services (see below), the takeaway is that neglecting smaller but intensive services risks under-scrutinising or even turning a blind eye to a core part of the problem.3. The evidence shows mixed results regarding the clarity of the popular services popular services’ definitions of TVEC, while most of the intensive services’ still do not define or even expressly prohibit TVEC. On the one hand, the definitions related to TVEC in the popular services’ policies and procedures are, overall, clearer than in the previous report. Services are using more comprehensive descriptions of TVEC and related concepts, but new gaps among the services’ approaches have emerged, with a proportion of them still using vague terminology (18%) or having become less precise. On the other hand, 60% of the intensive services still do not define or explicitly prohibit TVEC, or they simply have not established any governing documents. 4. Transparency reporting on TVEC reveals new gaps among popular services and remains rare among intensive services. Seventeen of the popular services now issue transparency reports with specific information on TVEC, as compared to just five in the first edition, 11 in the second, and 15 in the third of this series. This represents the slowest year-to-year growth rate to date. For the first time in the series, one of the services (present on both the popular and the intensive services lists) that previously issued transparency reports with TVECspecific information ceased this practice. In addition, three of the four newest Services to issue transparency reports on TVEC provide very limited information, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, there is still significant heterogeneity among the popular services’ reporting approaches, which continues to make data aggregation and cross-platform comparisons difficult, if not impossible. Among the intensive services, only six issue transparency reports on their policies and actions concerning TVEC, against 8 previously, and the vast majority (5 of 6) also appear in the popular services list. The scarcity in transparency reporting on TVEC among the intensive services may be explained by the fact that many of them are operated by terrorist and violent extremist groups and supporters, or by free speech “absolutists” who deliberately let TVEC flourish on their platforms. 5. Content moderation approaches continue to pose risks for privacy, freedom of expression and due process. Continuing a trend that began during the COVID-19 pandemic, popular services rely more heavily on automated tools to detect and remove TVEC, which has generally increased the removal of lawful content and unjustified censorship. Furthermore, half of the intensive services remain opaque regarding their approaches to content moderation; and most of them either have no notifications and appeal mechanisms in place, or do not provide any information in this regard. This raises questions regarding their efforts to ensure the respect of privacy, freedom of expression and due process.6. New online safety laws and regulations are creating an increasingly fragmented transparency reporting landscape. As new online safety laws and regulations come into force, content-sharing services are facing new obligations to issue transparency reports in multiple jurisdictions, and they face different reporting requirements in each of them. To conclude, this report highlights the need for more precision in the Services’ governing documents; more consistency in the metrics and methodologies used to prepare transparency reports; more transparency in their content moderation approaches; and more efforts to ensure due process and to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms.

By Bàrbara Molas

The word “doxing” (sometimes “doxxing”) is made up of the words “dropping dox” whereby dox, an abbreviation of the word “document”, refers to personal information (Strandell, 2024). Doxing, or revealing personal information in the online public space with the general intent of causing harm, is increasingly being used in modern armed conflicts. For example, Ukraine’s military has released private information of over 100,000 Russian soldiers, including alleged war criminals and FSB officials, in multiple doxing campaigns (Jensen and Watts, 2022). On the other hand, hackers from Russian hacker group RaHDit have published data on more than 3,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces mercenaries (Rossa Primavera, 27 July 2024), in addition to leaking information on 7,700 Azov soldiers (Al Mayadeen, 28 August 2024). Another group of Russian hackers, EvilWeb, leaked data from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), including IP addresses, emails, and encryption keys of SBU employees (URA, 29 September 2024). Finally, members of the Russian hacker project “NemeZida” revealed the identities of 800 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers who participated in the attack on the Kursk region, including representatives of the 82nd Airborne Assault Brigade, the 61st Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as about 200 foreign mercenaries from Israel, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Syria (URA, 29 September 2024). In a non-conflict environment, doxing may serve the purpose of extorting, silencing, controlling, or serving the public interest (Snyder 2017, p. 438; Anderson 2021, pp. 208-9; Li 2023, p. 368). In short, the role of doxing in today’s strategies to gain or retain power over enemy actors or rival factions is prominent and more relevant than ever before. This raises questions over the nature and legitimacy of doxing, including what (and who) exactly is that doxing involves, what makes a particular case of doxing ethically acceptable, or whether the practice should be seen as a crime or as a means for anti-repression activism.In order to shed light upon such questions, this literature review provides findings on academic discussions around doxing, from its conceptual or theoretical understanding to its real-life forms and implications. It does so by assessing a total of 17 peer-reviewed research papers published in the time span of 10 years (2014-2024). The contributions include approaches to the subject by scholars from the Social Sciences, the Data Sciences, and Public Health, located across North America, Europe, and Asia. Selecting the material involved open-source methodology (OSINT), with keywords including both scholarly and culturally sensitive vocabulary, especially in relation to state surveillance and the misuse of data sharing. For example, “dox” AND “antidox”, “doxing” AND “legal”, “doxing” AND “vigilantism”, or “doxing” OR “doxed” AND “security” as well as “doxing” AND “malicious” retrieved relevant sources. Due to part of the academic discussion on doxing being morality-based, namely whether it is “good” or “bad”, which is an inherently subjective assessment, research contributions were not disregarded based on their moral assessment, thereby allowing for this review to be nuanced and whole-encompassing. As a way to complement scholarly contributions with some preliminary data on the subject of doxing, the discussion following the literature summary includes data from semi-structured interviews with individuals who have been, or are, victims of doxing. In particular, such conversations took place with combatants, humanitarian workers, and journalists active in conflict zones, specifically in Ukraine. The incorporation of real and direct testimonies to doxing allows for a more nuanced grasp of the nature and impact of the practice, and helps fill out some gaps found in the literature, namely state-sponsored and/or state-supported doxing in the context of war. Indeed, among the existing literature, the only scholars that address the subject of doxing and conflict are Jensen and Watts from Brigham Young University and the United States Military Academy, respectively. While their work illustrates the use of doxing on enemy soldiers, it does  so focusing solely on Ukraine’s current tactics against Russian soldiers. This analysis contributes to such work by adding evidence on pro-Russia combatants’ doxing tactics against pro-Ukraine individuals in the area and abroad. This literature review contains a summary of findings, which includes a chronological content analysis of the scholarly contributions to the subject together with data from the above-mentioned interviews. Such an analysis is followed by a brief discussion, designed to stress points of agreement and disagreement between the authors, namely around conceptual approaches to doxing, its ethical use, and its legality. It ends with a conclusion section synthesising the results of the literature review and highlighting where our project, “Anti-Dox: Identifying, Evaluating, and Countering Disinformation in Times of War”, hopes to contribute to current debates on the subject. Ultimately, this analysis aims to situate the project into an evidence-based conversation in which doxing is considered a form of harmful information spread, characterised by actors employing manipulation tactics to advance political, military, or commercial goals.

By Mia Doolan,  Katie Cox,  Kiran M. Sarma

This is the protocol for a Campbell Systematic Review. This review will address two aims: (1) A qualitative synthesis ofliterature on the composition of online far right propaganda, and (2) A quantitative synthesis of literature examining the impactof exposure to online far‐right propaganda on audiences. These syntheses will be guided by the following specific objectives: (i)What is the content (i.e. themes) of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (ii) What is the structure of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (iii) What is the context ofthese messages (i.e., where, when and by whom were they posted?) (iv) What impact does exposure to online far‐rightpropaganda have on audiences with reference to the radicalisation of opinion and/or action.

Campbell Systematic Reviews Volume 21, Issue 4 Dec 2025

By Bibi van Ginkel, Tanya Mehra, Merlina Herbach, Julian Lanchès, and Yael Boerma

This study examines a pressing and highly topical challenge: how to assess online content that may undermine democracy, threaten national security and public safety, or infringe upon the rights of others—while safeguarding freedom of expression. The central question it explores, the specific challenges identified, and the recommendations it puts forward should not be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated within a broader and increasingly complex societal and political context. A range of systemic developments shapes the environment in which this work takes place: the rise of online radicalisation, particularly among children and young adults; the expanding influence of large technology platforms and the tensions this creates with rule-of-law-based democratic societies leading to a global trend toward both techno-libertarianism and techno-authoritarianism; and the evolving role of governments as they seek to reconcile the imperatives of security, safety, and national interest with those of privacy, human rights, and minority protection. These challenges are compounded by the unprecedented speed and scale of online information dissemination, growing concerns about disinformation and foreign influence, and the urgent need to strengthen societal resilience and media literacy. While this study does not address each of these systemic issues in depth, they form the essential backdrop against which its findings and proposals should be understood.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2025. 208p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

SYNOPSIS
In 2026, intensified geopolitical competition and rivalries will influence and shape the global threat environment. In parallel, non-state armed groups driven by religious, ethnic, and hard-line ideologies will threaten both governments and social harmony in various countries around the world.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore. 2025.

By The Council of Europe

Although the misuse of new technologies by terrorist actors has been a major concern for some time, the capabilities offered by (and the availability of) a range of new and emerging technologies – including gaming platforms, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), artificial intelligence (AI) and 3D-printed weapons – have heightened these fears even further. An analysis of how and why terrorists adopt new technologies suggests that it remains highly context specific, with the extent and speed of innovation affected by internal factors (for example strategic, structural and individual factors) and external factors, particularly relationships, resources and the effects of counter-terrorism. In combination, these factors can encourage or inhibit the adoption of new technologies by terrorist actors, resulting in significant variations in the adoption and use of key technologies of concern. Terrorist actors in or affecting Europe have adopted (or are beginning to adopt) many of these technologies. Social media platforms, small or micro platforms, terrorist-hosted websites and gaming or gaming-adjacent platforms are all playing critical roles in the radicalisation and recruitment process. Emerging technologies used in this process include the decentralised web, the dark web and, most recently, generative AI. Although many terrorist attacks in Europe use a low-tech modus operandi, technology plays a key role in their preparation, planning and subsequent promotion. Propaganda and instructional material – typically stored and shared online – play a prominent role in shaping attack targets and methodology. For example, the emergence of 3D-printed weapon usage by terrorist actors in Europe has been fuelled by instructional materials developed by an active online subculture. Other far-right online subcultures have also encouraged the live-streaming of attacks and sharing of manifestos online. Terrorist actors in Europe use a range of licit and illicit activities to fund their attacks and radicalisation and recruitment activities, some of which (but not all) require the use of new technologies. These include mobile payment systems, online exchanges and wallets, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer online funds transfers and the solicitation of donations on social media platforms. Simultaneously, terrorist actors outside Europe, notably ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)/Daesh, are increasingly encouraging donations via virtual assets, driving a rise in the presence of virtual assets in European terrorist financing arrests and prosecutions. Interviews with national, regional and international experts identified lessons learned and good practices when responding to terrorist misuse of new technologies. These include reducing the lag between terrorist exploitation of new technologies and counter-terrorism responses to it (through horizon scanning exercises and greater information sharing), the criticality of multistakeholder approaches, the importance of identifying and managing human rights-related risks, and the benefits of greater strategic clarity, which can lead to a focus on desired outcomes, rather than the steps required to reach them

By Renushka Madarie, Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg&Christianne de Poot

Previous quantitative studies applying Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to cybercrime victimization produced mixed results. Through semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity experts, the current study aims to qualitatively reevaluate the applicability of RAT to cyber-dependent crime, specifically data theft from organizations. An in-depth assessment of environmental factors appearing to affect data thieves’ actions resulted in concrete operationalizations of theoretical concepts. Importantly, we highlight the distinction between target selection and strategic choices made during the attack. Furthermore, RAT appeared to be as relevant, if not more, for explaining offender actions during an attack as for the initial convergence of offenders and digital targets.

DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025

By   Eugenio Benincasa

Recent revelations of Chinese government-backed hacking show a recurring pattern: prominent hackers behind groups such as APT17, APT27, APT41, Flax Typhoon, and Red Hotel—monikers given by cybersecurity researchers for groups with similar tactics—trace their roots to a broader community of early elite hackers, known as “red hackers” or “Honkers” (红客, Hong Ke). Active in online forums during the mid-1990s and 2000s, these hackers operated independently but often aligned with state interests, targeting foreign entities perceived as hostile to China, including the US, Taiwan, and Japan. The author’s analysis builds upon prior research into China’s red hacker groups.

Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich . 2025. 74p.

By Canada. Minister of Finance and National Revenue,

Canada has a robust Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing (AML/ATF) Regime that contributes to its efforts to combat transnational organized crime and is a key element of its counter-terrorism strategy. It comprises 13 federal departments and agencies with policy, regulatory, intelligence, and enforcement mandates. The federal Regime works with provincial and municipal counterparts and over 38,000 Canadian businesses with reporting obligations under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), known as reporting entities, to prevent, detect, and disrupt financial crime.

An accurate, nuanced, and up-to-date understanding of risks, informed by an assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, is the foundation for applying a risk-based approach to combatting these financial crimes in Canada. This includes balancing priorities of protecting the integrity of Canada's financial system and the safety and security of Canadians, respecting privacy and other rights of people in Canada, and mitigating regulatory burden and unintended consequences that may be faced by industry and the clients to whom they provide services.

The 2025 Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in Canada is a comprehensive assessment of the most pressing money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities in Canada. It assesses inherent risks and discusses the mitigation measures put in place to respond to them. Findings are informed through consultations with federal government authorities and external stakeholders, including provincial and territorial governments, the private sector, non-profit organizations, and international partners.

The purpose of this report is to support evidence-based policymaking, resource allocation, and priority setting for public authorities, and to support private sector businesses and non-government organizations to apply focused and proportionate measures to mitigate risks.

Ottawa: Canada. Department of Finance 2025. 126p.

by C. Nabokoff (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

The Ordeal of a Diplomat is a vivid and penetrating memoir by Constantin Nabokoff, a senior Russian diplomat who served in India and London during the final years of the Russian Empire and the First World War. Writing with candor and intellectual clarity, Nabokoff recounts his experiences at the heart of imperial diplomacy as long-established political structures gave way to revolution, war, and the collapse of old alliances. His narrative blends personal observation with acute political insight, illuminating the misunderstandings, rivalries, and illusions that shaped international relations on the eve of the modern world. At once a historical document and a timeless meditation on power, loyalty, and misjudgment, the book offers a rare insider’s view of diplomacy conducted amid global crisis and enduring relevance for readers interested in international affairs today.

By FLORE BERGER

Cattle rustling is a major driver of conflict and instability in the Sahel and West Africa. The two groups posing the biggest threat in the Sahel are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel).

These violent extremist organizations (VEOs) rely on cattle rustling as a stable source of income, using the proceeds to fund their operations and acquire necessary resources like weapons. Beyond this, they embed themselves within the broader livestock economy and, in areas where they hold significant influence, they even protect herder communities from looting by other conflict actors – gaining legitimacy in the process. Even further from their traditional operation’s zone in Mali and Burkina Faso, cattle rustling is still a critical aspect to the conflict.

JNIM in particular continues to expand further south, but it is not just territorial expansion – it’s a shift in logistics. JNIM relies on cross-border supply chains, including livestock looting and trafficking, to sustain operations and entrench their presence.

Geneva, SWIT:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime ,

2025. 40p.

By FABIAN ZHILLA

Returning foreign fighters and military-trained individuals in the Western Balkans often come from police, military or paramilitary backgrounds. Many use their skills for criminal activities, making them a potential security threat in the region. Their role in organized crime and violent extremism varies from country to country. In Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, these individuals are primarily engaged in transactional relationships with criminal networks, driven by mutual benefit. In Kosovo and Serbia, however, they have stronger connections to radical and extremist groups. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia and Montenegro, criminal activity often intersects with radical political rhetoric. This policy brief calls for a strategic, cooperative and integrated approach to tackling this issue.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025, 31p.

By Ruggero Scaturro | Giorgio Fruscione

Violent extremism and organized crime are closely linked in the Western Balkans, but remain under-researched. This study identifies 34 criminal groups that overlap with extremism: 24 violent far-right extremist groups and 10 violent religious extremist groups. Violent far-right extremism is a better documented phenomenon because of its links to nationalist politics and high-ranking government officials. Violent religious extremism gained momentum in the 2010s, rooted in the instability that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Groups within both factions are involved in illicit activities, posing a major security threat to the region. This study highlights their criminal connections and advocates for a unified approach to tackling violent extremism and organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2025. 45p.

By John Jupp, Matthew Garrod

One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years post peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organised criminal and cross-border activities. And yet, little scholarship has been dedicated to examining the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland or to accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organised crime and their dynamic interactions with organised criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this increasingly important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organised crime interaction theoretical model designed specifically for application to Northern Ireland in order to shed new light on the evolution and current complex linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond. The Northern Ireland model, which both builds on and departs from crime-terror models in existing scholarship, reveals a vast array of domestic and transnational ‘activity assimilation’ and ‘alliances’, as well as other forms of interactions including ‘conflicts’ and different gradations of ‘transformation’. The article concludes that national terrorism-organised crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models that are abstract and designed for universal application. Northern Ireland presently faces a serious threat to its security and stability posed by the nexus between terrorism and organised crime, and numerous challenges need to be urgently addressed if it is to be combatted. Understanding the organised crime-terrorism nexus at the present moment could not be more vital. Indeed, Brexit and potential implications for the Irish border present by far the most important challenge to the Good Friday Agreement since its adoption and, as a corollary, ensuring that paramilitary groups do not utilise their capacity to re-engage in acts of terrorism. As part of the initial steps towards a solution to some of these challenges, the Northern Ireland model therefore represents a useful tool that could be harnessed, and built upon, by policy makers and government agencies for defining and mapping out the terrorism-organised crime nexus in Northern Ireland.

Falmer, East Sussex, UK: University of Sussex. 2023. 50p.

By SAŠA ĐORĐEVIĆ

Over the past decade, thousands of euros in profit (both legal and illegal) have flowed into and been generated within the Western Balkans to fund violent extremism. While violent religious and far-right extremism share similarities, their financing methods differ in complexity. Cash remains the primary means of moving funds on both sides, aided by the region’s informal economy. Religious extremist groups tend to rely on simpler financial methods and are less dependent on illicit profits. In contrast, violent far-right groups use a mix of legal and illegal funding sources, employing more sophisticated financial strategies. This policy brief examines the financial foundations of violent extremism in the Western Balkans with the aim of strengthening institutional efforts to combat it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2025. 32p.

By Markos Zografos

The Muslim Brotherhood is an organization that was founded in Egypt 1928 with the goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate. The ideological influences of Wahhabism and Salafism and the socio-political atmosphere of the early 20th century that saw the strengthening of Western colonial expansion and the weakening of Islamic influence in the Middle East set the stage for the organization’s establishment. Ideologically, Wahhabism and Salafism, two purist movements constructed respectively in the late 18th and 19th centuries, called for the removal of what Wahhabists and Salafists perceived as corrupt influences that contaminated a “pure” and “true” Islam. The basic concepts of Islamic purity in Wahhabism, which provided a foundation for Salafism to build upon, asserted the need for an Islamic caliphate to expand in opposition to the Western-influenced governments that embraced religious pluralism. Wahhabism and Salafism thus created an enveloping ideological framework that spawned many 20th century jihadist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood became one of these jihadist organizations—arguably the most significant one. Since its establishment in 1928, it has expanded its influence into multiple political, non-governmental, and non-state organizations with far-reaching global influence, including but not limited to the Iranian regime after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah, Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State (ISIS), as well as several NGOs in present-day North America and Europe. Hand in hand with the drive to construct an Islamic caliphate that would ensure the practice of what the Muslim Brotherhood perceived as a pure and true Islam free from foreign influences, as well as the view that Western expansion posed a threat to Islam’s influence in the world, key Brotherhood members also advocated the evilness of the Jewish people and the need for their eradication. A recurring perception among Muslim Brotherhood members is that Jews conspired behind the West’s ideological and colonialist expansion in order to weaken Islam. Likewise, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 significantly exacerbated the genocidal antisemitic rhetoric and practices of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to this day the Brotherhood has been active in slandering and taking hostile actions against Jewish people and the State of Israel in particular. In his book, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Ziad Abu-Amr identifies three key periods in the Muslim Brotherhood’s development: (1) the period of “insurrection” (1928-1949), which were the years of its establishment by and rule under its founder, Hasan al-Banna; (2) the period of “ordeal” (1949- 1967), which followed the assassination of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood’s persecution in Egypt by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, during which it underwent an intellectual resurgence mostly through Sayyid Qutb’s writings, until his execution in 1967; and (3) the period of “differentiation” (1967-present), which is characterized by the renewed vigor of Qutb’s ideas and jihadism in general due to his execution, the exit of the Muslim Brotherhood from its persecution in Egypt, and the further This paper presents an examination of the Muslim Brotherhood and its connected organizations. It aims to show the stages of the Muslim Brotherhood’s development, how the Brotherhood connects to its offshoot organizations, the injustice and violence that occur when any of these organizations manage to gain enough power in order to carry out jihad and enact sharia law, and the rhetoric and practice of Jew hatred in each of the organizations and their key members. In addition, it aims to show how genocidal antisemitism is a core ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood that can be traced throughout its history and the history of its offshoots.

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES no. 4/2021

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2021. 71p.

By Lev Topor

Arguments made by white supremacists to explain, promote, and gain support for their ideology fall into five categories: religious arguments, biological arguments, cultural arguments, arguments based on “protectionism,” and arguments relating to freedom of speech. Furthermore, while nationalism can lead to differences and conflicts between nations, global support for white supremacy can act as a common glue, uniting even historical adversaries, such as Americans and Russians. To explain and exemplify these phenomena, the pseudo-philosophical and pseudoscientific arguments in support of white supremacy are examined in the light of historical, social, and political trends, which all develop the concept of global white supremacy. Thus, while religious arguments in support of white supremacy date back thousands of years, “protectionist” arguments have become more prominent in the wake of terror events in the twenty-first century. They have also entered the mainstream as populists argue that “self-defense” is the only rational response to such threats. Ironically, it is the main idea behind each one of these arguments that ultimately serves to nullify it.

ISGAP’s Occasional Paper Series ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

By John P. Sullivan

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

REVISTA DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO MILITAR, 2021.

By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Daniel Byman and Riley McCabe

In the wake of Israel’s blistering military response against Hezbollah, the group is facing a cash shortfall at a time when it has lost key leaders, fighters, weapons, stockpiles of cash and gold, communication systems, and infrastructure. On top of that, it has to contend with a new Lebanese government that is beginning to do its part to implement the November 2024 ceasefire. As Hezbollah seeks to recover, it is certain to look to criminal enterprises—including laundering drug money—to fill the gap, as it has in the past after less severe financial crises. Nor is the risk limited to terrorist financing alone.

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025. 17p.