By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Johanna Kleffmann, Swetha Ramachandran, Noah Cohen, Siobhan O'Neil, Mohammed Bukar, Francesca Batault, Kato Van Broeckhoven,

Key Findings • The labelling of banditry as “organized crime,” “unknown gunmen,” or, more lately, “terrorists” has distorted this multi-faceted and still poorly understood phenomenon. Likewise, some of the frames that have been applied to banditry – particularly the farmer/herder conflict or Hausa/Fulani tensions – do not appear to fully align with local communities’ understandings of today’s evolution of banditry. Simplistic categorization and narrow lenses for understanding banditry may contribute to inappropriate or insufficient policy and programmatic responses. MEAC’s survey unearths some of the lived experiences with bandits and sheds light on the nuances of the phenomenon and its profound impact on communities. • Community perceptions of bandit groups corroborate earlier research depicting them as comprised of largely distinct, organized groups, albeit with shifting configurations and subject to fragmentation. Bandit groups operate in highly mobile, armed, and largely forestbased units that use quick-strike attacks on motorbikes against communities. Their motivations are primarily perceived as economic/financial by victims, including the notable subsection of the sample of Fulanis who have been victimized by bandits. • For the surveyed communities, weapons are the most recognizable feature of bandit groups. This bears critical implications for the potential for escalation of violence, further proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition including in the neighbouring regions, community violence reduction efforts and future DDR programming. • Victimisation experiences differ considerably with gender, age, and location in the North West. While physical violence and killings disproportionately affect adult men, sexual violence appears to especially affect women and girls (although it likely remains underreported). Variations of victimization across states indicate the volatile and dynamic nature of overall banditry presence and violence. • Banditry violence has profound and pervasive effects on the physical safety, access to income-generating activities, education, and mobility of residents in the northwestern communities surveyed. The perceived intensity and frequency of attacks are on the rise, with one in three respondents reporting experiencing weekly attacks in recent years. Close to two-thirds of respondents have family members who have been attacked by bandits.

Findings Report 36,

Geneva, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ., UNIDIR, 2024,43p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has emerged as a major international security threat, orchestrating or inspiring attacks abroad following a Taliban clampdown on its home turf. Although its strikes have fallen in number in 2025, its offensive could resurge. Why does it matter? Despite the recent lull, IS-KP might reactivate commanders willing to carry out attacks abroad or coordinate with other ISIS branches to launch them. Even a small number of highprofile operations – such as the March 2024 mass shooting and arson in Moscow – can cause numerous deaths and have major international repercussions. What should be done? Coordination among security services has improved, particularly in intelligence sharing and rendition. There are strong reasons not to resort to military action, but more could be done in terms of collaborating with the Taliban and Syrian governments, redefining the global anti-ISIS coalition’s law enforcement role, and supporting Central Asian countries.

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°183

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 28p.

By Michelle Sydes | Lorelei Hine | Angela Higginson4 | James McEwan | Laura Dugan | Lorraine Mazerolle3

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map (EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and non‐ government websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022. Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location. Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool. Main Results: The systematic search identified 63,763 unique records. After screening, there were 70 studies eligible for the EGM (from 71 documents), of which two were systematic reviews (assessed as moderate quality), 16 were randomised controlled trials, and 52 were strong quasi‐experimental studies. The majority of studies (n = 58) reported on policing interventions. Limited evidence was found related to courts or corrections interventions. The impact of these interventions was measured by a wide variety of outcomes (n = 50). These measures were thematically grouped under nine broad categories including (1) terrorism, (2) extremism or radicalisation, (3) non‐terror related crime and recidivism, (4) citizen perceptions/intentions toward the criminal justice system and government, (5) psychosocial, (6) criminal justice practitioner behaviours/attitudes/ beliefs, (7) racially targeted criminal justice practices, (8) investigation efficacy, and (9) organisational factors. The most commonly assessed outcomes included measures of terrorism, investigation efficacy, and organisational factors. Very limited research assessed intervention effectiveness against measures of extremism and/or radicalisation. Authors’ Conclusions: Conducting high‐quality evaluation research on rare and hidden problems presents a challenge for criminal justice research. The map reveals a number of significant gaps in studies evaluating criminal justice responses to terrorism and radicalisation. We conclude that future research should focus attention on studies that consolidate sound measurement of terrorism‐related outcomes to better capture the potential benefits and harms of counter‐terrorism programs, policies and practices which involve criminal justice agencies.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 19(4). 2023. 53p.

By Ellie Rogers

Content moderation is becoming an increasingly prominent feature of legislation to increase the safety of online spaces. One aspect of this debate is moderating borderline content in the context of terrorism and violent extremism (borderline TVEC). For content moderation approaches to be proportionate in respecting users’ rights whilst improving the safety of online spaces, transparency is crucial. This importance is recognised within recent legislation such as the Digital Services Act and the Online Safety Act. However, legislation does not provide direct requirements for transparency surrounding the moderation of borderline TVEC. As a result, there are concerns that transparency reporting will continue to focus on removals of content that is illegal or violative in nature. This article argues that there needs to be more transparency surrounding the moderation of borderline TVEC. Through a review of the literature, this article discusses the importance of increased transparency surrounding the moderation of borderline TVEC, and demonstrates the ways in which current legislation, tech company policies and content moderation processes are not conforming to transparent practices in the context of borderline TVEC moderation.

Internet Policy Review, 14(3)., 2025.

By Thomas Renard and Méryl Demuynck 

The nexus between migration and terrorism is a contentious subject. Attacks conducted by immigrants or by terrorists infiltrated within migration flows have raised legitimate concerns among the population and policy-makers. Yet, reductive narratives and political ideology have resulted in a simplistic and biased perception of this phenomenon. As a result, public immigration and counter-terrorism policies are poorly informed. This research, conducted by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), seeks to offer a robust, evidence-based analysis of the migration-terrorism nexus. Through an interdisciplinary approach that integrates an extensive literature review, the analysis of an original dataset, semi-structured interviews, and detailed case studies, the report interrogates the multifaceted dynamics of this relationship. It aims to uncover the nuanced ways in which migration and terrorism intersect, providing a critical counterpoint to simplistic and politicised interpretations.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 110p.

By Riza Kumar 

Culture of Violence: Terrorism Reaches Its Peak in Burkina Faso paints a harrowing picture of a nation consumed by escalating extremist attacks, militarized ethnic tensions, and a state strategy that empowers untrained civilian militias with deadly consequences.

Key points include:

• Burkina Faso ranks #1 in global terrorism deaths, with over 3,000 civilians killed in 2024 alone.

• State-sponsored militias—the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)—now outnumber the national army, but their lack of training and ethnic bias has fueled further violence.

• Over 80% of Burkinabe territory is under the control of terrorist groups, with projections estimating nearly 4 million people could be internally displaced by year-end.

• Human rights abuses are rampant: civilian massacres, ethnic targeting—particularly of the Fulani—and extrajudicial killings are now common features of the government’s counterterrorism effort.

• Public trust in the state is collapsing, while extremist groups like al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) are increasingly seen as more reliable providers of security.

The report warns that the Burkinabe government's hardline, militarized approach—relying on loosely controlled militias and sidelining local peace negotiations—has entrenched a self-perpetuating “culture of violence.” This normalization of brutality not only undermines stability in Burkina Faso but risks setting a dangerous precedent for the broader Sahel region.

Riza Kumar, Senior Research Analyst, CEP and author of the report, said:

“Without law, accountability, or a credible strategy, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism model is spiraling into a humanitarian catastrophe. Security solutions that disregard human rights and social cohesion are destined to fail—and are only empowering the extremists they aim to defeat.”

CEP calls for an urgent reevaluation of counterterrorism strategy in Burkina Faso, emphasizing demilitarization of rogue militia forces, restoration of local mediation mechanisms, and the increased recognition and integration of marginalized communities across all security sectors.  

New York; Berlin; London: Counter Extremism Project, 2025. 24p.

German Colonialism in Africa and the Third Reich

By Bachmann, Klaus

Between 1904 and 1907, German soldiers, settlers and mercenaries committed mass murder in Africa. Can this be considered the first genocide of the 20th century? Was it a forecast of the Third Reich’s extermination policy in Central and Eastern Europe? This book provides the answer. Based on extensive archival and library research in Tanzania, Namibia, South Africa, Germany and Poland as well as on the most recent and up-to-date jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, the renowned historian and political scientist Klaus Bachmann paints a new and surprising picture of the events and their legal significance, which many will find disturbing and provocative. It abolishes many well-established interpretations about German colonialism and its alleged links with the Third Reich and provides a new and intriguing contribution to the current post-colonial debate.

Bern: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2018. 384p.

By Bertrand Russell . Introduction by Colin Heston.

This collection of essays is not merely a pacifist manifesto; it is a profound philosophical inquiry into the nature of justice, the psychology of conflict, and the responsibilities of individuals—especially thinkers and educators—in times of national crisis. Russell, a mathematician and philosopher by training, brings to bear his analytical precision and moral clarity in dissecting the arguments used to legitimize war. His opposition to World War I was not rooted in naïve idealism but in a deep conviction that war, particularly modern industrial war, represents a failure of reason and humanity.

The book opens with an appeal to the intellectuals of Europe, urging them to resist the tide of militarism and to uphold the values of truth and justice even when doing so is unpopular or dangerous. Russell believed that intellectuals had a duty to question the narratives presented by their governments and to advocate for peace, not as a passive withdrawal but as an active moral stance. This appeal is followed by essays such as “The Ethics of War,” “War and Non-Resistance,” and “Why Nations Love War,” each of which explores different dimensions of the war impulse—from philosophical arguments to psychological and sociological observations.

One of the most striking aspects of Justice in War-time is Russell’s willingness to confront uncomfortable truths. He examines the role of imperialism, economic interests, and historical rivalries in fueling conflict, and he critiques the Entente policy and the diplomatic maneuvers that led to war. His essay “The Danger to Civilization” warns of the long-term consequences of war on democratic institutions, civil liberties, and the moral fabric of society.

In the broader context of Russell’s life and work, Justice in War-time marks a pivotal moment. It reflects his transition from a primarily academic philosopher to a public intellectual deeply engaged with the political and ethical issues of his time. The book also foreshadows themes that would recur in his later writings on peace, nuclear disarmament, and civil liberties.

Today, Justice in War-time remains a powerful reminder of the importance of moral courage and intellectual integrity. In an age where war continues to be justified through appeals to patriotism, security, and national interest, Russell’s essays challenge us to ask deeper questions: What is justice? Who benefits from war? And what is the role of the individual in resisting injustice?

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 191p.

By The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISCAP)

Columbia University is the oldest institution of higher education in New York, and the fifth oldest in the United States. Today, it is one of the world’s leading research institutions.5 Joint degree programs are available through Union Theological Seminary, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and the Juilliard School, whilst Teachers College and Barnard College are official faculties of the university. Columbia University has additionally been at the forefront of an explosion of antisemitism on North American campuses since Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack on Israel in which some 1,200 people were murdered and over 240 people were taken hostage. Students and faculty at Columbia University have openly praised the terrorist attack by Hamas and have contributed to an environment at Columbia University in which Jewish students and staff do not feel safe. Two lawsuits have been filed against Columbia University and a Congressional hearing has been held concerning its failure to protect its Jewish constituents amid rising campus antisemitism. Despite receiving large amounts of funding from Qatar over the years, Columbia University has not reported any of this funding to the Department of Education (DOE). Moreover, there have been no references to connections between Columbia University and Qatar or Qatari entities in its financial statements. The relationship between Qatar and Columbia University is characterized by varying degrees of collaboration that have endured over an extended period of time. They include:6 a. Collaboration with Qatar Foundation International There are two joint projects between Columbia University and Qatar Foundation International (QFI). Estimated Qatari funding: $500,000. b. National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) Grants Within the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF), there are six NPRP projects that involve collaboration with Columbia University. ISGAP estimates the Qatari contribution to Columbia University to be approximately $250,000 for each project. Estimated Qatari estimated funding: $1,500,000. c. Qatar and Columbia University Energy Partnerships ISGAP has found seven research projects involving collaboration between the Gas Processing Center (GPC) at Qatar University and Columbia University’s Department of Chemistry. Estimated Qatari funding: $1,750,000. d. Qatar & Columbia University Education Partnerships In April 2014, the Qatar Foundation (QF) hosted a delegation from Columbia University in Education City, Qatar. 7 In addition, on September 20, 2019, the Qatar Foundation’s World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) held an international conference, alongside UNESCO and Teachers College, Columbia University, that was attended by six Columbia staff. 8 It is difficult to estimate the Qatari funding budget to Columbia University faculty for these activities. e. Student Grants The Amiri Scholarship Program, which is fully funded by the State of Qatar, is designed to sponsor university students for full-time undergraduate and graduate studies abroad at leading international universities. ISGAP has uncovered that 14 Qataris have obtained degrees from Columbia University between 2006 and 2023. Collectively, these individuals have amassed a total of 38 years of study at the university. Estimated Qatari funding: $3,420,000. As noted above, none of this foreign funding has been reported to the DOE, in violation of existing regulations. This report starts by examining the explosion of antisemitism on Columbia University’s campus since October 7, 2023. This is followed by an exploration of the role of Columbia’s chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) in fostering a hostile environment at the university. Next, a brief investigation of the Middle East Institute at Columbia is presented, followed by an analysis of the financial relationship between Qatar and Columbia University. The report concludes with a number of policy recommendations.

Miami Beach, FL: New York: The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), 2024. 37p. 

By Prakoso Permono

Recent international conflicts have sparked religious sentiments, prompting varied Muslim responses, including the issuance of fatwas with possible risks of them being misused to fuel radicalization and terrorism. Coordinated efforts between Muslim organizations and the government are crucial to provide legal and secure avenues for religious expression, thereby mitigating risks and promoting peaceful coexistence.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, RSIS, 2025. 6p.

By David Teiner

The inability of the Mexican state to effectively fight against organized crime and to counter the territorial control of entire regions by criminal cartels has led many studies on organized crime in Mexico to new approaches, with many describing the acts of publicly displayed violence by Mexican cartels as Narco-Terrorism. Concerning the enhanced military capacity of many cartels and their territorial control, some scholars have also claimed that Mexico is experiencing a Criminal Insurgency, while others have criticized this classification for its impreciseness and for the consequences that come with it. Much of this debate continues to focus on the extent to which Mexican cartels are profit-driven and nonpolitical, or whether they have become politicized over time. Some studies avoid this controversy by seeing (Narco-)Terrorism as a tactic used by cartels to intimidate politicians and civil society, to demonstrate strength, and to claim territorial control

Perspectives on Terrorism , August 2020, Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 2020), pp. 83-98  

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2024Athanasios Gkoutzioulis Athanasios Gkoutzioulis

This article demonstrates how the application of a broad and decontextualized distinction between “moderate” and “extremist” Muslims can undermine our assessment of an Islamic identity, security, and radicalization. It compares how this distinction has been used by the British colonial administrators (in Raffles, Crawfurd, Marsden, and Swettenham) in nineteenth-century Malaya and by Malaysia's Prime Ministers (Mahathir, Badawi, and Najib) in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. This comparison demonstrates that both groups, despite their very different backgrounds (Western non-Muslim and Muslim non-Western), introduced a similar distinction between “moderate” and “extremist” driven more by socio-political objectives than by religious ones. Furthermore, the article stresses the importance of considering the socio-political and contextual dimensions of Islamic identity before attempting to explain the process of radicalization and its implications for security. Such an approach discourages reference to broad categories such as “moderate,” “extremist,” “Islamism,” or “Salafism,” and allows for discussion of their contextual and socio-political connotations.

International Journal of Asian Studies. 2024;21(2):304-325. doi:10.1017/S147959142400004

By Aleksandar Srbinovski | Trpe Stojanovski

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been concern that the conflict may act as a source of illegal arms flows into Europe, following the pattern of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. To be sure, the risk is significant. The conflict in Ukraine is the most protracted mechanized war in Europe since the Second World War, and materiel of all descriptions has flooded into the battlefield. There are now millions of unregistered weapons circulating in civilian Ukraine, many of which are trophy weapons collected from the battlefield, and the situation is similar in Russia, which has seen a spike in gun-related violence in regions adjoining the occupied territories.1 The prospect of these weapons falling into the hands of organized criminals in Europe and beyond is a major risk to countries’ internal security. But with this heightened attention there is a danger of tunnel vision. The conflict in Ukraine is only one risk among many. The illicit firearms market in Europe is diverse, with multiple sources, paths to market and types of weaponry for sale; from Soviet-era stockpiles to cutting-edge 3D-printed guns. This report maps out the illicit firearms dynamics in three countries to the south-east of Europe – gateways for illicit weapons into the EU and elsewhere but which have distinct ecosystems in their own right – Türkiye, Greece and Bulgaria. For organized crime, these three countries serve multiple purposes: transit routes, consumer markets and points of origin for a variety of illicit flows along the so-called ‘Balkan route’. In recent decades, the flow of illicit drugs (particularly heroin) and migrants through these countries has dominated global headlines, especially in light of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. But the movement of illegal firearms – and their threat to Europe – has been little discussed in comparison. The one exception is the issue of gas guns originating from Türkiye, which have grown in popularity among criminals in Europe because they are cheap and low risk to transport as legal unconverted weapons.2 Close to the point of sale they can be converted into lethal firearms. But as this report makes clear, converted gas and blank guns are just one issue among many in the region, each with their own criminal dynamics. This report considers the illicit arms markets of each country and how they are interconnected. This analysis is intended to complement two previous reports, ‘Smoke on the horizon’, which described trends in arms trafficking in Ukraine and assessed the marketplace for illicit weapons in Europe, and ‘Tomorrow’s fire’, which mapped how arms trafficking in Europe may develop depending on the outcome of the Ukraine conflict.3 Taken together, these three reports provide a holistic view of how the European illicit firearms market interacts with its south-eastern flank, and how it may evolve in the future. This report highlights how complex the illicit arms markets are in Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye, and the cultural, criminal and political factors that must be taken into consideration in assessing the risk. It also spotlights the responses that these countries have formulated, including through international forums and joint operations. Finally, the report offers a series of recommendations that aim to integrate analysis of the region into the broader picture of European threats.

Geneva: Rhw Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2025. 49p.

By NADINE SALMAN , SARAH MARSDEN , JAMES LEWIS

This report synthesises and critically analyses the existing research that has considered whether and how political contention and protest relate to radicalisation and terrorism. It draws on social movement theory perspectives to provide insights into what informs group and mass radicalisation and what constrains them, and what impact state responses have. AIMS This review seeks to address the following primary research questions: 1. What factors, features, or events are linked to violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 2. What factors, features, or events constrain the potential for violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 3. What are the mechanisms that help explain what facilitates or constrains opportunities for violence in social movements? 4. How do different state and policing responses affect the potential for violence and extremism in social movements? METHODOLOGY This research adopts a rapid evidence assessment (REA) approach, synthesising knowledge on specific topics in line with the research questions from KEY FINDINGS This REA identifies several potential drivers for violent and extremist escalation within social movements, as well as potential factors for de-escalation. The literature reviewed highlights the complex and interacting nature of movement characteristics, mobilisation contexts, and the influence of external actors, namely countermovements and state responses. Key findings identified in this review are summarised in a table for each major section, loosely based on the EMMIE framework for evidence relating to crime prevention interventions (Johnson et al., 2015). The EMMIE framework summarises the overall effect, direction, and strength of the evidence;1 the mechanisms or mediators it activates; relevant moderators or contexts, including unintended effects; implementation considerations; and economic costs/benefits (Johnson et al., 2015). Since the findings of this review are not solely concerned with interventions, the latter two considerations are not summarised here. These tables therefore highlight the factors identified, their overall effects on violence and/or extremism, any identified mechanisms and/or moderators, and the strength of the evidence from the literature base. Movements are informed by their socio-historical contexts and internal dynamics, the factors set out in the tables therefore represent general trends in the research rather than firm indicators of movement behaviour. The effects identified below should not, therefore, be interpreted as suggesting a direct causal relationship between a given factor and the likelihood of violence/ extremism, but instead as evidence of how these factors have impacted the dynamics within certain contexts and mobilisations. MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS Different movement characteristics, including factors relating to movement structure, resources, and composition, as well as ideological factors, may contribute to an increased potential for engaging in or rejecting violence. Understanding the characteristics of a given movement is therefore an important first step when understanding how and why violence is produced.

Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF, UK.The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2025. 44p.

By Aileen van Leeuwen and Amy-Jane Gielen

Executive Summary The Dutch National Training Institute against Radicalisation (Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan Radicalisering, ROR) offers a broad range of training programmes on radicalisation and extremism for first- and second-line professionals from various sectors who may encounter these phenomena in their work. The one-day introductory training is the most frequently delivered course, with over one hundred sessions held in 2023. To assess the introductory training’s longer-term impact (six months after completion), the ROR commissioned an independent impact evaluation by the International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT). The evaluation targeted all participants – first- and second-line professionals from various fields – who attended ROR’s introductory training between 14 November and 21 December 2023. The final report was delivered in August 2024. The design of the impact evaluation was based on the Kirkpatrick evaluation model, which provides a framework for measuring training outcomes. Additionally, a results monitoring framework was created to provide an overview of the intended outcomes, relevant indicators for tracking change over time, the methods used to collect data for each indicator, and the frequency of data collection. The evaluation employed a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative as well as quantitative indicators and research methods. The evaluation included three measurement points: a baseline prior to the training, a post-training measurement immediately after, and a follow-up conducted six months later. Three rounds of surveys were administered (N=235, N=221, N=88), followed by interviews with former participants six months after the training (N=8). In addition, two training sessions were observed, a focus group was held with stakeholders from the ROR and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), and a document analysis was carried out by the research team. Based on this data, the evaluation was able to answer the three key research questions guiding the study. 1. What is the expected and actual impact of the ROR introductory training on participants’ foundational knowledge, perceived ability to respond to signs of radicalisation and extremism, and intention to embed knowledge within their own organisations in the longer term (6 months)? Overall, the impact evaluation shows highly positive results, indicating that expectations and learning objectives were largely met for the majority of participants. At the end of the training, 90 percent of participants reported that the course met or exceeded their expectations. Only a small minority found the training either too basic – due to extensive prior knowledge – or difficult to follow because they struggled to connect it to their daily work. Foundational knowledge Both the ROR and the participants expected the training to strengthen participants’ foundational knowledge of radicalisation and extremism. The results strongly support this. • Firstly, the findings confirm that the training reached the right target audience – namely, professionals who are not yet experts on radicalisation and extremism and have had limited prior exposure to these topics. • Secondly, the content of the training was well-aligned with participants’ knowledge levels: those with limited prior understanding found it accessible, while those with more background also gained new insights. Participants reported a better grasp of the complexity of the topic, more practical tools, and a more nuanced understanding of radicalisation. • Thirdly, a statistically significant increase in knowledge was observed among participants, which was sustained after six months. The comparative analysis revealed that participants from the security domain with a secondary vocational education background (the Dutch so-called MBO-level) had the lowest baseline knowledge and experienced the most difficulty engaging with the content. This underscores the need for tailored approaches by trainers to better match participants’ prior knowledge and learning needs. While this customisation improves accessibility, it may lead to slight variations in training delivery and, ultimately, in participants’ knowledge outcomes.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 9p.

By Méryl Demuynck

The intentional spread of false or misleading information to inflict harm, commonly referred to as disinformation, raises unprecedented challenges in today’s digital age. This phenomenon becomes even more concerning when strategically leveraged by violent extremist actors to disseminate hateful narratives, incite violence, and recruit followers. While both disinformation and violent extremism are widely recognised as critical global threats, their intersections have however received limited scholarly and political attention. Drawing on findings from a multiyear EU-funded project, this policy brief seeks to address this gap and raise awareness on the complex dynamics and potential harms associated with disinformation propagated by extremist actors. Building on a cross-country mapping, with a particular focus on Boko Haram factions in Nigeria, it outlines the enabling conditions, defining features, and potential harmful impacts of such disinformation. The brief concludes by offering evidence-based recommendations to enhance the capacity of policy-makers and practitioners to assess, prevent, and mitigate its adverse effects.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 27p.

By J.M. Berger

This report compares two large random samples of Twitter accounts that tweet in English: one taken just before Elon Musk acquired Twitter in October 2022, and one taken three months later, in January 2023. It also examines several related datasets collected during the period following the acquisition, a period in which, the study found, new accounts were created at a record-breaking pace. Some extremist and conspiracy networks created accounts faster than the baseline rate, probably because changes to Twitter’s trust and safety policies had been announced. In the context of these policy announcements, the study examines some reinstated accounts, with mixed results. Despite the loosening of several content policies, accounts that automated the sending of tweets (‘bots’) saw activity drop sharply during the period of the study, with many bot accounts being suspended or deactivated, while others voluntarily curtailed their activity in light of the API changes announced. Deactivated accounts were dominated by sex- related content and apparent financial spam or scams, often coupled with automated tweeting.

Oxford. UK: VOX-Pol Institute, 2024. 80p.

Editors: Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project Marcin Zaborowsk

Central Europe represents a fertile ground for extreme right-wing ideologies (XRW), some of which are openly preaching intolerance and even violence. Similar to the western part of Eurppe. Central Europe has been affected by global dynamics related to the expansion of populism and XRW to a considerable extend. There are, however, also some specific conditions in the formerly communist Central Europe that are setting the region aside from other parts of Europe. These conditions are historical, economic, and ethnic in nature. With most of the region subjected to foreign communist domination during the second half of the 20th century, nationalism, sometimes in extreme forms, remains a strong under-current within the nations of Central Europe. With interwar Czechoslovakia (1918- 1938) being historical exception, Central Europe had practically no tradition of democracy prior to 1989. Also, whilst most of Western Europe went through the period of cultural changes in the 1960s, the Communist states of Central Europe were stuck on the wrong side of the iron curtain and isolated until 1989. Finally, although Central European nations are often historically heterogeneous, there is little experience of recent migrations into the region, especially from the outside of Europe. Whilst democratic transitions in the formerly communist Central Europe were achieved relatively smoothly, these processes were considerably helped by the international context and the conditionality of NATO and EU enlargements. For much of the current post-Cold War history Central Europeans were guided through the process of post-communist transitions by externally imposed criteria and requirements. The process was entirely voluntary as Central Europeans were keen to join the EU and NATO, hence, ready to meet the conditions set out by these institutions. Most importantly, this conditionality were also supporting stability and predictability of the domestic transitions in Central European states. However, this inevitably led to some shallowness of the process with the candidate states hurriedly setting up institutions and mechanisms that would satisfy NATO and EU. Today, with these countries being members of the EU and NATO, the stabilizing role that the conditions during the accession processes played is no longer available while democratic norms and institutions remain very fragile. The combination of all these factors means that XRW ideologies have find sizable constituencies in Central Europe. The salience of the phenomenon is compounded by the relative inexperience and sometimes the lack of legal instruments to address this issue in the states of Central Europe. In this report we chose to focus on four middle and smaller size Central European nations: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Three of the four were formerly parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire whilst Bulgaria spent half of the previous millennium under Ottoman domination. All the four were members of the Soviet block until 1989 (Czech Republic and Slovakia as a one state) and today all are members of the EU and NATO. Although XRW movements remain outside mainstream politics in all four countries, all have powerful populist movements which tend to operate in symbiosis with the respective XRW movements.

Bratislava Slovakia : GLOBSEC, 2023. 64p.

By Stephen Reimer

Extremism and terrorism motivated by far-right ideologies has captured the attention of policymakers and much of the public as an urgent threat to peace, security and democracy across much of the Western world. This has not escaped the notice of practitioners of counterterrorism financing (CTF), many of whom see the far right as a natural extension of the global terrorist-financing threat. Although there is enthusiasm for immediately and directly applying CTF tools and responses to far-right fundraising and related financial activities, the ability of the CTF regime to suitably respond to this threat has been largely assumed. Through an analysis of the operational and organisational financing behaviours of the contemporary far right, this paper finds this financing threat to be largely incompatible with the CTF regime and identifies several shortcomings in the regime as it stands. The vast majority of far-right violence emits meagre financial signals before an attack is carried out, which is incongruous with a CTF regime that depends on financial institutions to spot overt red flags in transaction data. Further, the CTF regime’s reliance on terrorism designations and resultant sanctions to financially isolate groups is at odds with the far right, whose organisational structures are unprecedentedly fluid and adaptable to such restrictive measures. In the absence of clearer direction from states, the private sector (especially operators of online platforms) has responded to pressure to independently ‘cut off’ perceived far-right ideologues and agents from accessing their services. Although laudable in their intention, such responses have precipitated several adverse consequences, including the spoiling of opportunities to collect financial intelligence on individuals and networks that could feed into more effective disruption efforts. In recalibrating the CTF regime to make it more suitable for the far-right threat of today, this paper makes the following recommendations: • To increase the likelihood of pre-attack financial signals being identified by financial institutions and used for preventative purposes, states should broaden public–private collaboration in the form of multiagency ‘fusion cells’ involving social services, health, education, security intelligence services and financial institutions for real-time intelligence sharing on persons of interest • To maximise the near-term effectiveness of far-right terrorism designations for disrupting finance, states should provide their private sector (particularly financial institutions) with detailed lists (including names and identifying information) of real or legal persons linked to designated far-right groups to aid implementation. • In recalibrating their national CTF regimes to meet the threat posed by the far right, states should reclaim authority and safeguard freedom of expression by denying private sector actors a free pass to make decisions, largely on the basis of reputation, about what constitutes violent extremism, as opposed to merely distasteful ideology. • In building CTF regimes fit to combat far-right financing, states should include oversight mechanisms to forestall the abuse of anti-financial crime measures for authoritarian ends. Responding to far-right mobilisation using financial tools could also set dangerous precedents for authoritarian onlookers if not done transparently

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2023), 20p.