By Marco Romagna&Eric Rutger Leukfeldt

The organizational aspects of hacktivist networks are seldom studied, with research mainly focused on exploratory and descriptive case studies. To narrow the gap, we have used the sociological model for the social organization of deviants developed by Best and Luckenbill (1994). Said model illustrates how hacktivist networks are organized and contributes to a clear-cut categorization useful when dealing with hacktivism. Our study uses a rich dataset obtained from 32 semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted within 23 different networks. By expanding on past research on cybercriminal and hacktivist networks, the results show that hacktivists operate at varying levels of sophistication, favoring small, well-organized teams where roles and tasks are clearly divided. While there are differences among networks, our analysis reveals the importance of individual actions within larger operations: being affiliated with like-minded people, the existence of internal rules, and the importance of hacking skills to determine, if not hierarchies, then who is the most influential. Most of the networks analyzed were classified as “peers” or “teams,” although the landscape shows considerable heterogeneity. Compared to other cybercriminal networks, hacktivists seem to have lower level of sophistication, while embracing the hacking subculture that places importance on the role of the individual within the network.
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025, VOL. 46, NO. 9, 1104–1124

By C4ADS

Executive Summary

Gun violence in Guatemala is fueled by the licit import of handguns. Once weapons have entered Guatemala, illicit actors have greater opportunity to divert these firearms from their intended use and users, instead wielding them to pursue crime and perpetrate violence.

This report uses seizure data and supply chain analysis to assess how the international flow of weapons into Guatemala is vulnerable to diversion, or the rerouting of licitly transferred conventional arms from their intended recipient or use.

This analysis reveals:

Handguns are the predominant weapon type used in violent crime in Guatemala. Many of the seized handguns are produced by major international weapons manufacturers such as Glock, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Taurus, and Beretta.

Diversion pathways in-country appear among private citizens, commercial, andgovernment actors, presenting opportunities for illicit actors to acquire licit firearms.

Handguns, predominantly those made by top manufacturers, continue to flow into Guatemala.

These weapons are most often manufactured in the U.S., Brazil, and Turkey.

Manufacturers or entities within the manufacturer’s corporate network account for most handgun exports to Guatemala.

Handguns entering Guatemala primarily do so via air. They often transit through third countries and/or third parties, complicating due diligence and creating greater opportunity for diversion.

The U.S., Canada, and Germany are the most common transit countries for Guatemalan handgun imports.

U.S. gun stores are the most common non-manufacturer exporters of handguns to Guatemala.

The majority of Guatemalan importers are not end-users, but retailers that sell to both government and civilian consumers.

This report uses cases of weapons seizure and diversion to explore each of these findings. Using new data, we re-examine a case of Israeli arms that were sold in Guatemala in exchange for weapons later diverted to paramilitary forces in Colombia.

These findings illuminate areas where Guatemalan and international stakeholders can do more to counter the diversion of firearms in Guatemala. To this end, the report makes targeted recommendations for closing gaps in current legislation and enforcement.

Washington, DC: C4ADS2025. 24p.