May Contain Mark-Ups

By Joshua D. Freilich & Graeme R. Newman

The book “Reducing Terrorism Through Situational Crime Prevention,” edited by Joshua D.Freilich and Graeme R. Newman, explores how situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques can be applied to reduce terrorism. The central theme is that strategies proven effective in preventing conventional crimes can also mitigate terrorism by manipulating environmental factors to block opportunities for terrorist acts. The book includes various case studies and theoretical discussions that illustrate how SCP can be tailored to address specific types of terrorism, such as bioterrorism, hostage-taking, and insurgent attacks.Each chapter delves into different aspects of SCP, such as increasing the effort required to commit a terrorist act, increasing the risks for terrorists, reducing the rewards, and removing excuses for terrorism.One notable case study in the book is the analysis of the 23 Korean hostages inAfghanistan, which demonstrates how SCP measures can be applied in real-world scenarios to prevent terrorist kidnappings. The book also discusses the importance of understanding the terrorists decision-making processes and the situational factors that influence their actions. By integrating SCP with script theory, the authors provide a detailed procedural map of terrorist activities, which can help in developing targeted prevention strategies. Overall, the book emphasizes a practical, evidence-based approach to counter-terrorism, highlighting the need for continuous adaptation and learning to effectively combat evolving terrorist threats

Criminal Justice Press, 2009, 244 pages

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

From the document: "Eruptions of violence during the events of January 6th 2021 exemplified the need to understand how conspiracy theories and extremism interact to create security threats. Social media presents as a key player in this exchange, and this project sought to respond to that dynamic by exploring and seeking to understand the intra-actions in groups which discuss both conspiracy beliefs and extreme ideas. To achieve this, it synthesises techniques from computer science and social science to analyse data from platforms which enable and promote unguarded speech. [...] This report seeks to understand how conspiracy theories and extreme ideologies impact one another. [...] This report will introduce a new method analysis of conspiracy and politically motivated groups named the SHIFT analysis. This analysis combines data science and social research techniques within a broadly abductive approach to develop new understanding of dynamic events. SHIFT analysis, which is mutable and robust to examine a singular group or between group interactions in this context, is applied to examine the QAnon movement, in the context of the lead up to and aftermath of January 6th, which espoused both extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs." "SHIFT" comes from the beginning letters of the following five analysis procedures: 1. 'S'ocial network analysis and identification; 2. 'H'one extracted sample and coding; 3. 'I'nvestigative netnography; 4. 'F'rame analysis; and 5. 'T'ext analytics.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS. JUN, 2024. 36p.

United States. Department Of State.

From the document: "The United States seeks to work with allies, partners, and stakeholders across the globe to shape the design, development, governance, and use of cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect the exercise of human rights, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. The United States believes in the critical role that the responsible uses of digital technologies and interconnected networks play in empowering people, and that an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet enables new solutions to global challenges. Autocratic states and other actors, however, have used cyber and digital tools to threaten international peace and stability, harm others, exert malign influence, and undermine the exercise of human rights. An innovative, rights-respecting international cyberspace and digital technology policy strategy is foundational to U.S. strategic, security, economic, and foreign policy interests. Leadership in cyberspace, the digital economy, and emerging digital technologies is central to advancing the U.S. vision set forth in the October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) of a 'free, open, secure, and prosperous world.' As the lead foreign policy agency for the United States, the Department of State is advancing the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) and its objectives of forging international partnerships to build an open, resilient, defensible, and rights-respecting digital ecosystem."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 6 MAY, 2024

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

From the document: "Fulcrum represents the Department's ambitious Information Technology (IT) advancement strategy designed to leverage the power of technology to drive transformative change and serves as a tipping point for catalyzing digital modernization for the warfighter. To propel the Department forward, we must ensure continued success and relevance in the digital age. Fulcrum will enable achievement of the DoD mission and strategic objectives with unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness. [...] The DoD Chief Information Officer's (DoD CIO) mission is to 'connect', 'protect', and 'perform'. Fulcrum outlines a vision guided by four lines of effort (LOEs) representing a strategic shift that embraces technology as a mission enabler. [...] Fulcrum features the DoD CIO's IT goals and objectives for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2025-2029 that provide essential support to the priorities in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the supporting DoD Strategic Management Plan (SMP)."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 6 JUN, 2024

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg