By C4ADS

Executive Summary

Gun violence in Guatemala is fueled by the licit import of handguns. Once weapons have entered Guatemala, illicit actors have greater opportunity to divert these firearms from their intended use and users, instead wielding them to pursue crime and perpetrate violence.

This report uses seizure data and supply chain analysis to assess how the international flow of weapons into Guatemala is vulnerable to diversion, or the rerouting of licitly transferred conventional arms from their intended recipient or use.

This analysis reveals:

Handguns are the predominant weapon type used in violent crime in Guatemala. Many of the seized handguns are produced by major international weapons manufacturers such as Glock, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Taurus, and Beretta.

Diversion pathways in-country appear among private citizens, commercial, andgovernment actors, presenting opportunities for illicit actors to acquire licit firearms.

Handguns, predominantly those made by top manufacturers, continue to flow into Guatemala.

These weapons are most often manufactured in the U.S., Brazil, and Turkey.

Manufacturers or entities within the manufacturer’s corporate network account for most handgun exports to Guatemala.

Handguns entering Guatemala primarily do so via air. They often transit through third countries and/or third parties, complicating due diligence and creating greater opportunity for diversion.

The U.S., Canada, and Germany are the most common transit countries for Guatemalan handgun imports.

U.S. gun stores are the most common non-manufacturer exporters of handguns to Guatemala.

The majority of Guatemalan importers are not end-users, but retailers that sell to both government and civilian consumers.

This report uses cases of weapons seizure and diversion to explore each of these findings. Using new data, we re-examine a case of Israeli arms that were sold in Guatemala in exchange for weapons later diverted to paramilitary forces in Colombia.

These findings illuminate areas where Guatemalan and international stakeholders can do more to counter the diversion of firearms in Guatemala. To this end, the report makes targeted recommendations for closing gaps in current legislation and enforcement.

Washington, DC: C4ADS2025. 24p.

Edited by Katharina Karcher, Yordanka Dimcheva ,· Mireya Toribio Medina. Mia Parkes

This open access book sheds light on collective practices of remembering, imagining and anticipating in relation to recent acts of urban terrorism in Europe. Analysing a range of personal and collective responses to urban terrorism in contemporary Europe, this book shows that current debates on this issue are shaped by multiple co-existing and intersecting memories of political violence in the past. Moreover, despite public declarations of unity and solidarity, collective memories of urban terror in contemporary Europe are far from consensual - memory can be both a catalyst for and an impediment to social and political change. Drawing on case studies from a range of European countries and creative responses by survivors, artists, and poets, this interdisciplinary volume introduces readers to key methods (e.g. discourse analysis and (auto-)ethnography) and concepts (e.g. Lieux de Mémoire and ‘grassroots memorials’) for the study of the memorialization of terror attacks.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 317p.

By Rose M. C. Kagawa and Elise D. Riley

Background: Unstably housed women experience high levels of violence. While previous studies have investigated psychological, physical, and sexual violence, weapon and gun violence are rarely delineated. We examined factors associated with experiencing violence as an adult among unhoused and unstably housed women, with a focus on gun violence. Methods: We recruited women with a history of housing instability from San Francisco homeless shelters, street encampments, free meal programs, low-income hotels, and health clinics. Participants completed interviews including questions regarding both childhood and adult violence. We used multivariable logistic regression to examine associations of specific types of childhood violence (i.e., physical, sexual, gun, and other weapon-involved violence), age, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, and sexual orientation, with risk of experiencing specific types of violence as an adult (i.e., gun, other weapon-involved, physical violence). Because the violence outcomes were not rare, odds ratios were transformed to approximate risk ratios. Results: Nearly half of women (n = 110, 45%) had been attacked with a gun as an adult. Violent victimization in adulthood was common, with 33% having experienced all three forms of violence. The probability of being attacked with a gun as an adult was almost 70% higher among women who had been hit or kicked hard enough to cause injury as a child (RR = 1.68; 95% CI = 1.24, 2.11), and this association was present for all three violence outcomes. No other risk factors explored, including other types of violence experienced as a child, met the statistical threshold to be considered significant. Conclusions: The high prevalence of gun violence reported here is consistent with prior studies of violence conducted in similar populations. Considered in combination with prior research, findings suggest that multi-generational violence prevention interventions for low-income women and girls are needed. They also emphasize the need to more actively include people who experience unstable housing in statewide and national violence surveys to better understand the extent of the problem and address on a broader scale the high rates of violence experienced by unstably housed populations, which have been consistently documented in local research

Inj. Epidemiol. 8:52, 2021

ByMaura Conway, Ashley A. Mattheis, Sean McCafferty, and Miraji H. Mohamed.

The report describes and discusses developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2023. It accomplishes this by surveying, synopsizing, and integrating the findings of relevant articles and reports produced by academics, think tanks, civil society, and governmental organizations; high-quality press reports; and the first-hand online experience and primary research of the authors.

Dublin: Vox Pol, 2023. 43p.

By Charles C Lanfear , Rebecca Bucci , David S Kirk , Robert J Sampson

Importance: The past quarter-century has seen both sharp declines and increases in firearm violence in the United States. Yet, little is known about the age of first exposure to firearm violence and how it may differ by race, sex, and cohort.

Objective: To examine race, sex, and cohort differences in exposure to firearm violence in a representative longitudinal study of children who grew up in periods with varying rates of firearm violence in the United States and to examine spatial proximity to firearm violence in adulthood.

Design, setting, and participants: This population-based representative cohort study included multiple cohorts of children followed-up from 1995 through 2021 in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Participants included Black, Hispanic, and White respondents from 4 age cohorts of Chicago, Illinois, residents, with modal birth years of 1981, 1984, 1987, and 1996. Data analyses were conducted from May 2022 to March 2023.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm violence exposure, including age when first shot, age when first saw someone shot, and past-year frequency of fatal and nonfatal shootings within 250 m of residence.

Results: There were 2418 participants in wave 1 (in the mid-1990s), and they were evenly split by sex, with 1209 males (50.00%) and 1209 females (50.00%). There were 890 Black respondents, 1146 Hispanic respondents, and 382 White respondents. Male respondents were much more likely than female respondents to have been shot (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR], 4.23; 95% CI, 2.28-7.84), but only moderately more likely to have seen someone shot (aHR, 1.48; 95% CI, 1.27-1.72). Compared with White individuals, Black individuals experienced higher rates of all 3 forms of exposure (been shot: aHR, 3.05; 95% CI, 1.22-7.60; seen someone shot: aHR, 4.69; 95% CI, 3.41-6.46; nearby shootings: adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR], 12.40; 95% CI, 6.88-22.35), and Hispanic respondents experienced higher rates of 2 forms of violence exposure (seen someone shot: aHR, 2.59; 95% CI, 1.85-3.62; nearby shootings: aIRR, 3.77; 95% CI, 2.08-6.84). Respondents born in the mid-1990s who grew up amidst large declines in homicide but reached adulthood during city and national spikes in firearm violence in 2016 were less likely to have seen someone shot than those born in the early 1980s who grew up during the peak of homicide in the early 1990s (aHR, 0.49; 95% CI, 0.35-0.69). However, the likelihood of having been shot did not significantly differ between these cohorts (aHR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.40-1.63).

Conclusions and relevance: In this longitudinal multicohort study of exposure to firearm violence, there were stark differences by race and sex, yet the extent of exposure to violence was not simply the product of these characteristics. These findings on cohort differences suggest changing societal conditions were key factors associated with whether and at what life stage individuals from all race and sex groups were exposed to firearm violence.

JAMA Network Open 6(5); 2023

By PAYNE, KEITH B.

From the document: "With Russia and China as heavily armed and aligned nuclear foes, Washington faces an unprecedented deterrence context and looming threats. Given this new great power alignment, more than 30 states are at increased risk, namely, those allies directly covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent and those partners greatly affected by the credibility of that deterrent, such as Taiwan and Ukraine. Most U.S. civilian and military leaders who must pay attention to this challenge appear to recognize that the U.S. understanding of deterrence, largely based on its Cold War experience, must be reconsidered in this unprecedented context. The search for guideposts for that understanding is now ongoing. The current war in the Middle East appears to offer some tentative lessons in this regard."

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (U.S.). 2024. 6p.

By MACDONALD, STUART KEITH, 1979-; MATTHEIS, ASHLEY A.; WELLS, DAVID

From the document: "Online terrorist propaganda has been an important policy concern for at least the past decade. [...] [T]he EU Commission launched a call for proposals for projects aimed at supporting small companies in implementing the Regulation. Three projects were funded under this call. This report forms part of one of these projects, which is entitled Tech Against Terrorism Europe. It is important to note at the outset that the focus of this report is the use of AI and machine learning to identify terrorist content online using content-based approaches. Accordingly, the following are outside the scope of the report: [1] The moderation of so-called borderline content, i.e., content that does not violate a platform's Terms of Service but which is nevertheless regarded as potentially harmful. [2] The identification of individuals on a radicalisation trajectory, which is a different - and even more difficult - task; and, [3] The use of behaviour-based cues, such as abnormal posting volume and use of unrelated, trending hashtags, to identify accounts that are sharing terrorist content. This includes approaches based on recidivism. The report begins, in section 2, by explaining the terms AI, machine learning and terrorist content online. Readers that are already familiar with these concepts may wish to move straight to section 3, which discusses the two main content-based approaches to the automated identification of terrorist content online: matching-based approaches and classification-based ones. Having explained the limitations of each approach, section 4 details two ways in which it is necessary to supplement automated tools. Section 5 then addresses issues of resource, before the report concludes with three recommendations."

TECH AGAINST TERRORISM; TECH AGAINST TERRORISM EUROPE.. 2023.. 32p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By K.D. Browne , K. Green , S. Jareno-Ripoll , E. Paddock

Knives and sharp objects are tools used in a wide range of violent offences. However, knife offending may have different risk factors than general violence, thus requiring tailored interventions. This systematic review aims to synthesise evidence on the characteristics of knife offenders and interventions aimed at the reduction of knife crime. After screening 1352 titles and abstracts, 344 articles were fully considered of which 21 papers met the inclusion criteria and were quality assessed. These consisted of 15 offender characteristic studies and six intervention studies. Findings suggested that knife crime may be associated with illicit drug use, exposure to any violence as a witness, victim or perpetrator and mental health problems. Males were more at risk of engaging in knife crime in the community and females in domestic settings. Different risk factors were found between gang involved and non-involved knife offenders. Primary prevention strategies, such as stop and search, knife amnesties, media campaigns and curfews did not show a significant impact in reducing knife crime. By contrast, increasing offenders' access to tailored support regarding housing, education, and employment showed an impact in reducing weapon carrying. Further research is required in the area to support the reliability of outcomes.

Aggression and Violent Behavior. Volume 67, November–December 2022, 101774

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2023. 22p.

By Jonathan Colmer, Jennifer L. Doleac

Gun violence is a major problem in the United States, and extensive prior work has shown that higher temperatures increase violent behavior. In this paper, we consider whether restricting the concealed carry of firearms mitigates or exacerbates the effect of temperature on violence. We use two identification strategies that exploit daily variation in temperature and variation in gun control policies between and within states. Our findings suggest that more prohibitive concealed carry laws attenuate the temperature-homicide relationship. Additional results suggest that restrictions primarily decrease the lethality of temperature-driven violent crimes, rather than their overall occurrence, but may be less effective at reducing access to guns in more urban areas.

CESifo Working Paper No. 10525. : Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo, 2023. 67p.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this  process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),    2023. 22p.

By Ahmed Ajil

This book presents a study of politico-ideological mobilisation and violence by focusing on the life stories, trajectories and narratives of individuals who mobilised for causes and conflicts in the Arab World. It provides a greater understanding of the biographical, sociological, political and historic factors pertinent for their radicalisation processes. What makes individuals identify with suffering and injustice, often of others and elsewhere? Why do individuals feel the need to stand up in the first place and how does violent action become a justifiable or necessary course of action? Why and how do they disengage from violence? This book, based on interviews conducted in Lebanon, Switzerland, and Canada, answers these questions. It presents new theoretical insights about politico-ideological mobilisation and violence. By focusing on grievances and grounding analysis in the empirical reality as it is shared and narratively constructed by those who are at the heart of the phenomenon, it moves beyond the moralistic and politicised debates that characterise the field. Interviewees include non-violent and violent engagement for causes and conflicts related to the Arab World, such as sympathisers or members of groups and causes from a variety of ideological orientations, including Shiite militias, Salafi-jihadist groups, radical left-wing groups, Palestine-specific, Kurdish groups, and others such as right-wing or unspecified affiliations. By choosing individuals with different forms of political engagement, both non-violent and violent, and different ideological orientations, it helps readers to get a better grasp of how similar grievances may lead to different outcomes. In focusing on three markedly different geopolitical contexts, the book also provides a cross-contextual understanding of mobilisation for political and violent action. The interviewees also include experts and peripheral actors such as professionals, researchers, policymakers, friends, or family members. Their perspectives complement and enrich some of the findings by providing external yet in-depth ‘expert knowledge’. Politico-ideological Mobilisation and Violence in the Arab World will be of great interest to criminologists, political scientists, sociologists, and other scholars interested in the study of terrorism, radicalisation and extremism. It will also appeal to journalists, policymakers, practitioners working in the field.

London; New York: Routledge, 2023. 286p.

By John Braithwaite and Bina D'Costa

War and crime are cascade phenomena. War cascades across space and time to more war; crime to more crime; crime cascades to war; and war to crime. As a result, war and crime become complex phenomena. That does not mean we cannot understand how to prevent crime and war simultaneously. This book shows, for example, how a cascade analysis leads to an understanding of how refugee camps are nodes of both targeted attack and targeted recruitment into violence. Hence, humanitarian prevention also must target such nodes of risk. This book shows how nonviolence and non-domination can also be made to cascade, shunting cascades of violence into reverse. Complexity theory implies a conclusion that the pursuit of strategies for preventing crime and war is less important than understanding meta strategies. These are meta strategies for how to sequence and escalate many redundant prevention strategies. These themes were explored across seven South Asian societies during eight years of fieldwork.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2018. 706p.

By Tanja Dreher

Targeted researches experiences of racism in New South Wales after September 11, 2001. The monograph analyses data collected by the anti-racism hotline established by the Community Relations Commission For a Multicultural NSW (CRC). It details a significant increase in racially motivated violence and verbal abuse in NSW in the months following the US 2001 September 11 attacks and finds these incidents produced a climate of fear and insecurity, which continues to impact these communities, and denies them the chance to enjoy a true sense of Australian citizenship.

Broadway, AUS: UTS Press, 2006. 48p.

By Elise M. Roberts-Ingleson and Wesley S. McCann

Does misinformation lead to radicalisation? This Research Note explores the theoretical link between consumption of misinformation and radicalisation to violent extremism. Drawing from insights from communication studies, criminology, and psychology, it is argued that some unique characteristics of misinformation are likely to facilitate radicalisation among individuals with self-uncertainty, low cognitive flexibility, and grievances, who also experience social exclusion. This exploration concludes with a summary of findings and offers recommendations for both policy makers and practitioners.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023

Kaitlyn Robinson, Iris Malone, and Martha Crenshaw

The far-right anti-government extremist movement poses a significant threat in the United States. The January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol illustrates the capacity of this movement to plan and mount violent attacks against government targets and democratic institutions. In this article, we explore how the organisational and tactical characteristics of the far-right anti-government movement in the United States enable it to thrive despite the dangers it poses to the public. We argue that its deep-seated ideological roots, fluid organisational structure, and mix of violent and nonviolent tactics make the movement difficult for federal and state authorities to proscribe, prosecute, and ultimately eliminate. US policymakers need to develop an informed response that accounts for the fluid, decentralised, and public-facing nature of anti-government extremism, as well as the pervasive distrust of federal authority that it reflects. We suggest that this approach will likely differ from the modern counter-terrorism tools that were initially designed to combat terrorist threats emanating from abroad, such as those posed by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. We ground our arguments in evidence from cases of anti-government extremist groups and followers active in the United States over the past three decades.

Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume XVII, Issue I March 2023.

By Neil Shortland and Matthew Crayne

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF): Members of the DHS workforce and terrorism researchers are systematically exposed to the propaganda, ideologies, and psychologies of actors who seek to launch terrorist attacks. This content is inherently value-laden and possibly personally troubling, causing these individuals to confront potential violations of their “sacred” or “protected” values such as the preservation of life (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2000). Here we present the result of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) which sought to review research across multiple fields of work in which individuals are exposed to traumatic imagery, or events. This REA found that there is a small body of extant research focused on a few key domains (namely digital forensic and Internet child sex abuse prevention) that has explored the significant psychological trauma caused by exposure to extreme content. This body of literature emphasizes the importance of gaining clarity on the nature of trauma that is caused and the role of different forms of media on traumatic outcomes (e.g., observing Reddit forums vs., watching beheading videos). However, this review also identifies a series of factors that can impact the degree of harm caused by exposure to this content. These factors include the nature of the content, individual traits, and the individual’s social and work environment. Overall, this REA has identified a range of immediate research needs to extend, or apply, this research to the DHS workforce. These include: 1. Disaggregating the relationship that exists between the various possible forms of trauma and the specific forms of media that are consumed. 2. Exploring the degree to which cognitive resilience strategies, such as those identified within Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) staff are effective. 3. Validate the degree to which organizational dynamics can negatively or positively impact the manifestation of trauma in the workforce. These include issues of culture and workload. The presence of these organizational barriers within DHS needs to be explored, and if present, mitigated. 4. While largely untested, several articles included suggestions for interventions that could increase resilience. These largely center on the importance of debriefing. Future research should investigate how effective debriefs can be structured and implemented within the DHS workforce to support the development of resilience by those who are exposed to such harmful content online. Impact on DHS capabilities: Research identified as part of this REA outlines the negative implications of individual trauma, and the important role of the organization in mitigating trauma. Specifically, factors at the organizational level such as workload management, job rotation, and organizational culture were identified as playing a potentially important role in protecting employees from trauma. Furthermore, some studies showed that experiences of secondary trauma stemming from exposure to traumatic imagery was correlated with turnover intentions. As such, to maintain a safe and effective workforce in the face of such extreme pressures, it is important that DHS emphasize the need to protect workers from the negative impacts of exposure to traumatic content and imagery.

Omaha: The National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, University of Omaha, 2023. 30p.

By Rajan Basra

Despite the importance of prisons to terrorist movements and the surge in the jihadist prison population in the Middle East, relatively little is understood about how the prison environment influences terrorists to become violent or peaceful. Prisons have been “centres of gravity” for virtually every terrorist group in the modern era. The strategies, goals, and operations of a variety of groups – from Egyptian Islamists to German Marxists and Irish Republicans – have all been heavily influenced by the imprisonment of their members. In many instances, the treatment of imprisoned comrades served as an important rallying cause, and the lives of extremists have been fundamentally shaped by their time in the jail cells of the state. The increase in the number of suspected and convicted terrorist inmates throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and north-eastern Syria, has made prisons even greater focal points in countering Salafi-Jihadi movements. It is vitally important to continue to tailor policy according to the best available evidence in various contexts and to understand the dynamics and consequences of different types of prison management. Aims The aim of this rapid review of evidence (RoE) is to identify which interventions have been most effective in managing and rehabilitating violent extremists across the world. Its purpose is to help inform current and future FCDO policy debates about prison-related interventions for convicted or suspected violent extremists. Methods This review examines 34 studies (including academic articles, policy reports, programme evaluations, and the grey literature) published in English between 2000 and 2021. The systematic search generated 9,447 articles, of which 25 met the inclusion criteria. The hand search identified an additional nine studies for inclusion. Key findings: The evidence base for prison-based interventions targeting violent extremists, whether in fragile and conflict-affected states or in the developed world, is very poor. Many existing programmes are in their infancy, and so they have not yet been robustly evaluated. However, there are promising themes. The naming of programmes can affect attitudes towards them, whether of participants or wider society. Involving family members can be beneficial to participants, and relatives can be supportive of deradicalisation/disengagement measures. Using deradicalised/disengaged leaders of extremist groups in interventions can have a positive impact on low-level members. There are promising signs that rapport-building is an effective technique when interviewing terrorist detainees. The same is true of motivational interviewing (MI), especially when applied to detainees who are ambivalent about and resistant to change. These techniques encourage engagement and disclosure of information. There is also some evidence that conducting sessions in informal settings leads to greater engagement. Regarding wholesale programmes, the most effective programmes are ones with a comprehensive array of interventions, which include treating inmates with dignity and respect. The Sri Lankan programme has been most effective, and there are promising aspects of the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani initiatives. Those programmes are comprehensive and multifaceted in approach, including vocational training, psychological support, family support, religious counselling and education, and, in some cases, financial assistance.

London: Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT), King's College London, 2022. 32p.

By James Barnett, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter

As intercommunal violence has intensified in many Western countries in recent years, members of the terrorism studies community have sought to better understand the commonalities and interplay between radical Islamists and extremists on the far‑right. One theory that has gained particular traction of late is that of “reciprocal radicalisation”, the notion that far‑right and Islamist extremists feed off each other’s words and actions in a “spiral of violence.” This theory entered the mainstream in the mid‑2000s and quickly attracted the attention of policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners, particularly in the United Kingdom (UK). In, for example, his 2007 speech on “bringing down the barriers to cohesion”, Prime Minister David Cameron appeared to allude to it when he described Islamist extremists as a “mirror image” of the far‑right British National Party (BNP).

The purpose of this review is to examine the extent to which reciprocal radicalisation plays out in reality and, if it does, whether there exists any operational or tactical exchange between far‑right and radical Islamist terrorists. To this end, our intent is to summarise and synthesise the literature on how and why terrorists across the ideological spectrum develop and deploy innovative practices, be they tactical, strategic, organisational, or doctrinal in nature. Beginning with an examination of how social scientists understand creative processes within “malevolent” organisations, we offer an overview of what factors have been identified as influencing the innovative and learning‑based practices of terrorist organisations. In the second section, we examine the existing literature on reciprocal radicalisation before turning to the limited scholarly work that covers what one might call “operational reciprocity” between far‑right and Islamist extremists – that is, an exchange of knowledge and/or material collaboration between groups.

There are important policy implications to each of these questions. If reciprocal radicalisation is indeed as widespread and consistent a phenomenon as some proponents of the theory claim, then it would mean that many Western societies are already trapped in a vicious cycle of violence where the far‑right and Islamist extremists act as self‑fulfilling influences on each other. Relatedly, it has been anecdotally established that far‑right extremists have borrowed from the jihadist playbook, which would potentially help them increase the efficacy of their tactics – both lethal (e.g. bombmaking) and non‑lethal (e.g. social media messaging). In short, were this to be the case, it would be a potentially grave mistake to treat the far‑right and jihadist threats in isolation rather than examining how they interact and influence one another.

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College London , 2021. 22p.