By Mitchell L. Doucette, Cassandra K. Crifasi, Alex D. McCourt, Julie A. Ward, Rebecca L. Fix, Daniel W. Webster

Research Summary: We utilized the synthetic difference-in-difference method to estimate the impact of adopting a permitless Concealed Carry Weapons (CCW) law on rates of assaults, robberies, and homicides committed with a firearm and by other means, as well as weapons arrests, from 1981 to 2019. We stratified permitless CCW laws by whether they previously prohibited violent misdemeanants from obtaining a CCWpermitorpreviouslyrequiredlive firearm training to obtain a permit prior to law adoption. Findings robust to sensitivity analyses suggest that states that lost a training requirement to obtain a CCW permit had 21 additional gun assaults per 100,000 population (SE =5.2) (32% increase). Policy Implications: In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, states should implement CCW permitting law provisions that may reduce the risk of firearm violence. Requiring live firearm training prior to carry aconcealedweaponmayattenuatenegativehealth impacts of deregulation associated with permitless CCW laws. 

Criminology and Public Policy, 2023

By Eli Ben-Michael , Mitchell L. Doucette , Avi Feller , Alexander D. McCourt, and Elizabeth A. Stuart

Gun violence is a critical public health and safety concern in the United States. There is considerable variability in policy proposals meant to curb gun violence, ranging from increasing gun availability to deter potential assailants (e.g., concealed carry laws or arming school teachers) to restricting access to firearms (e.g., universal background checks or banning assault weapons). Many studies use state-level variation in the enactment of these policies in order to quantify their effect on gun violence. In this paper, we discuss the policy trial emulation framework for evaluating the impact of these policies, and show how to apply this framework to estimating impacts via difference-in-differences and synthetic controls when there is staggered adoption of policies across jurisdictions, estimating the impacts of right-to-carry laws on violent crime as a case study. 

Unpublished paper 2024.

By Brittni Lambing, Ron Frandsen, Jennifer Karberg, and Joseph Durso

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires a background check on an applicant for a firearm purchase from a dealer who is a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL). During the permanent Brady Act period, from 1999 through 2018, background checks were conducted on over 237 million applicants for firearm transfers or permits. During this period, nearly 3.5 million applications for firearm transfers or permits were denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or by state and local agencies. This report summarizes the number of applications for firearm transfers and permits, denials that resulted from background checks, reasons for denial, rates of denial, appeals of denials, and arrests of denied persons during the permanent Brady Act period. Statistics are presented at the FBI, state, and local levels. The report also provides a summary of significant changes in federal and state laws and regulations related to firearm sales. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report, and complete details are included in an appendix.

St. Louis, MO: Regional Justice Information Service (REJIS), 2024. 29p.

By Kerry Mulligan and Daniela Gilbert

 Vera’s Redefining Public Safety initiative works with local governments and community leaders to build community-centered and coordinated approaches to creating safety. This includes expanding non-police response to 911 crisis calls, investing in civilian-led approaches to violence prevention and intervention, and building and institutionalizing public safety infrastructures outside the criminal legal system. To be sustainable and effective, these infrasctructures should adopt a public health framework, leverage data-informed decision-making, and focus on community-centered strategies. Gun violence problem analysis (GVPA) can be an important component of this work. Traditionally, GVPA refers to the analysis of data on fatal and non-fatal shootings to establish a common understanding of local violence dynamics and inform the development and implementation of violence reduction strategies.1 Although there is variability in the scope and process of GVPA, it generally involves identifying the characteristics of, and relationships between, people involved in recent fatal and non-fatal shootings. People involved in shootings are, by definition, at greatest risk of future interpersonal violence and gun violence. Therefore, jurisdictions generally use GVPA to inform near-term violence intervention strategies— including group violence intervention strategies, focused deterrence, and fellowship/mentorship programs that focus on people at highest risk of violence.2 This concept paper proposes an expanded version of GVPA that can inform the system changes and strategies necessary for more comprehensive and sustained improvements in public safety. Like a traditional GVPA, this expanded approach analyzes data to guide the development. Expanded gun violence problem analysis can help develop interventions to reduce gender-based violence and violence associated with economic and housing insecurity, inform prevention and system transformation, and prioritize capacity building for sustainability. of community violence reduction strategies. However, unlike traditional GVPA, the expanded approach also illuminates the social-structural factors that drive violence, such as economic and housing insecurity. While traditional GVPA is designed to inform strategies for near-term community violence intervention, this expanded approach can help develop longer-term strategies to support violence prevention efforts. These include strategies to improve access to economic opportunity, housing, and healthcare. It also prioritizes comprehensive strategy development and capacity-building for sustainability.  

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2024. 4p.

By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

A study on the factors behind rising gun violence in the Bay Area & our recommended approach for tackling it. Three primary factors are contributing to the Bay Area’s gun violence challenge: the impact of gentrification, a poorly understood regional violence problem, and a lack of formal mechanisms to support regional coordination across public safety departments and service providers. Cities can effectively reduce this violence in the near term. To do so, we recommend that regional leaders: 1. Develop a Regional Intervention Strategy by identifying a convener who can incubate a regional community violence intervention approach. 2. Formalize Communication and Information Sharing Between Oakland & San Francisco Public Safety Providers by having each department systematically share information. 3. Improve Cross-City Coordination to understand and address cross-city violence issues. 4. Utilize Existing Infrastructure by leveraging the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. 5. Monitor California Highway Patrol Capacity to ensure they can investigate freeway homicides and shootings. 1 2 In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT:  In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.

 By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

Bakersfield is a large and rapidly growing city in the Central Valley that has an exceptionally high need for effective violence intervention and prevention strategies. This is supported by crime and violence data; health, social and economic indicators. Gun violence in particular is a serious, long-term problem in Bakersfield, with rates double of those of the state and national overall. In many neighborhoods, a homicide or non-fatal injury shooting takes place almost every day and has a significant negative impact on community health and wellbeing. Based on homicide records from 2014-2019, as well as the problem analysis undertaken as part of this project, high risk social networks (gangs, crews, high risk street groups, etc.) appear to play a major role in community violence. The risk of violence; poor health, educational and economic indicators; and strengthening community-police relations have been real concerns in Bakersfield for many years. While Bakersfield has a higher poverty rate than many California cities; it has a somewhat lower overall violent crime rate but a particular problem with gun and gang violence. The State of California’s CALVIP Grant program presented a much-needed opportunity to take on this difficult challenge in a more comprehensive and evidence-informed way. This opportunity allowed Bakersfield city and community leaders to analyze the dynamics of violence in Bakersfield, and the needs of young people at highest risk of involvement in violence, so they could more effectively intervene and break the cycle of violence. Bakersfield’s CalVIP-funded GVRS strategy combines concepts from several evidence-informed strategies: the group violence reduction strategy (also known as focussed deterrence) is a primary framework, with elements of police-community trust building (through procedural justice) and significant investment in building community violence intervention (CVI) capacity. Focussed deterrence is supported by a significant body of research evidence; while community violence intervention and procedural justice are also supported by growing research evidence (Abt 2017, Braga 2018, Buggs 2022). This combined strategy seeks to reduce violence citywide while providing support and opportunities for community members at highest risk of violence. Together, the city and community partners also work to strengthen community-police relations with residents and neighborhoods who are directly impacted by violence

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 11p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Reygan Cunningham, and Robin Campbell

Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S. Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men. Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities. The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually. Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S.1 Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men.23 Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities.4 The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually.5 California’s 2023 passage of the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Act, colloquially referred to as AB 28, represents the first time that a US state resolved to tax the gun industry in order to fund programs that would address community gun violence. By imposing a modest 11% excise tax on gun sellers and manufacturers, this historic policy will channel nearly $160 million per year to a range of programs supported by the state’s Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Fund. The largest share of this funding, $75 million, is for the California Violence Intervention and Prevention (CalVIP) grant program, focused on community violence intervention, an increasingly effective field of public safety work that engages people who are most likely to be victims or perpetrators of gun violence to reduce their risk of harm. AB 28 was an audacious idea. It was also a longshot for California, because the state requires a two-thirds majority on any legislation that would increase taxes. This report is an overview of how a diverse coalition of advocates, local practitioners, and policy organizations (The CalVIP Coalition) conceived of, and passed, transformative legislation to establish community violence intervention (CVI) as a permanent part of the state’s public safety infrastructure, including a permanent and dedicated source of public funding. A case study for others interested in pursuing similar strategies, this report concludes with a summary of key elements that contributed to this landmark initiative’s success.  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2024. 18p.

By Mitchell L. Doucette, Alexander D. McCourt, Cassandra K. Crifasi, and Daniel W. Webster

The United States faces rapidly rising rates of violent crime committed with firearms. In this study, we sought to estimate the impact of changes to laws that regulate the concealed carrying of weapons (concealed-carry weapons (CCW) laws) on violent crimes committed with a firearm.We used augmented synthetic control models and random-effects meta-analysis to estimate state-specific effects andtheaverageeffectofadoptingshall-issue CCW permitting laws on rates of 6 violent crimes: homicide with a gun, homicide by other means, aggravated assault with a gun, aggravated assault with a knife, robbery with a gun, and robbery with a knife. The average effects were stratified according to the presence or absence of several shall-issue permit provisions. Adoption of a shall-issue CCW law was associated with a 9.5% increase in rates of assault with a firearm during the first 10 years after law adoption and was associated with an 8.8% increase in rates of homicide by other means. When shall-issue laws allowed violent misdemeanants to acquire CCW permits, the laws were associated with higher rates of gun assaults. It is likely that adoption of shall-issue CCW laws has increased rates of nonfatal violent crime committed with firearms. Harmful effects of shall-issue laws are most clear when provisions intended to reduce risks associated with civilian gun-carrying are absent. 

American Journal of Epidemiology 192(3) 2023.   

By Cassandra K. Crifasi, Julie Ward, Alex D. McCourt,  Daniel Webster & Mitchell L. Doucette 

 Background

Fatal and nonfatal shootings by police are a public health issue that warrants additional research. Prior research has documented associations between fatal shootings by police and gun ownership, legislative strength scores, and lax concealed carry weapons laws. Despite research on other firearm-related outcomes, little is known about the impact of permit-to-purchase (PTP) laws on shootings by police. We generated counts of fatal and nonfatal OIS from the Gun Violence Archive from 2015 to 2020. We conducted cross-sectional regression modeling with a Poisson distribution and robust standard errors. In addition to PTP, we included several state-level policies that may be associated with shootings by police: comprehensive background check only (CBC-only) laws, concealed carry licensing laws, stand your ground laws, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and extreme risk protection orders (ERPO). We controlled for state-level demographic characteristics and included a population offset to generate incidence rate ratios (IRR).

Findings

PTP laws were associated with a 28% lower rate in shootings by police [IRR = 0.72, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.64–0.81]. Shall Issue (IRR = 1.34, 95% CI 1.17–1.53) and Permitless (IRR = 1.61, 95% CI 1.35–1.91) concealed carry laws and CBC-only laws (IRR = 1.12, 95% CI 1.01–1.25) were associated with higher rates of shootings by police. Stand your ground, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and ERPO laws were not associated with shootings by police.

Conclusions

Our study found that PTP laws were associated with significantly lower rates of shootings by police. Removing restrictions on civilian concealed carry was associated with significantly higher rates. State-level firearm policies may be a lever to address shootings by police.

Injury Epidemiology,  10, 28 (2023).

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By : Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

* Suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U03, X60–X84, and Y87.0. Firearm-involved suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes X72–X74.† Homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01–U02, X85–Y09, and Y87.1. Firearm-involved homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01.4 and X93–X95.

Top

In 2022, among persons aged ≥10 years, the percentage of suicide deaths involving a firearm was lowest among persons aged 25–44 years (47.4%) and highest among persons aged ≥65 years (70.6%). The percentage of homicide deaths that involved a firearm was highest among persons aged 10–24 years and then decreased with age, from 92.2% among those aged 10–24 years to 44.5% among those aged ≥65 years.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:828. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7337a3

By Jennifer L. Behrens & Joseph Blocher

At a time when Second Amendment doctrine has taken a strongly historical turn and gun rights advocates have increasingly argued that gun regulation itself is historically racist, it is especially important that historical claims about race and guns be taken seriously and vetted appropriately. In this short article, we evaluate the often-repeated claim that the nickname “Saturday Night Special” derives from the phrase “[n___er]-town Saturday night.” Based on a review of newspapers, legislative debates, dictionaries, slang compendiums, and other sources, we find no historical support for this claim. It apparently appeared for the first time, unsourced, in a 1976 article and has been repeated in dozens of briefs and scholarly sources since. Advocates and scholars should stop invoking this unsupported origin story, which if anything serves as a cautionary example of how citations can cascade. The most plausible origin of the nickname as it related to cheap firearms stemmed from the turn of the century when the phrase “Saturday night special” was already in common usage with connotations of cheapness and convenience. 

108 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 283 (2024) 

By Patrick Sharkey , Megan Kang

Background: The recent rise of gun violence may lead to the perception that the problem of gun mortality in the United States is intractable. This article provides evidence to counter this perception by bringing attention to the period spanning from 1991 to 2016 when most US states implemented more restrictive gun laws. Over this period, the United States experienced a decline in household gun ownership, and gun-related deaths fell sharply.

Methods: The main analysis examines the conditional association between the change in gun regulations at the state level and the change in gun mortality from 1991 to 2016. We include a range of robustness checks and two instrumental variable analyses to allow for stronger causal inferences.

Results: We find strong, consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that restrictive state gun policies reduce overall gun deaths, homicides committed with a gun, and suicides committed with a gun. Each additional restrictive gun regulation a given state passed from 1991 to 2016 was associated with -0.21 (95% confidence interval = -0.33, -0.08) gun deaths per 100,000 residents. Further, we find that specific policies, such as background checks and waiting periods for gun purchases, were associated with lower overall gun death rates, gun homicide rates, and gun suicide rates.

Conclusion: State regulations passed from 1991 to 2016 were associated with substantial reductions in gun mortality. We estimate that restrictive state gun policies passed in 40 states from 1991 to 2016 averted 4297 gun deaths in 2016 alone, or roughly 11% of the total gun deaths that year.

Epidemiology. 2023 Nov 1;34(6):786-792. 2023 Sep 26.

By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

By U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future. On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms. Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law enforcement officers were wounded. A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident. The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources and capabilities of responding officers and agencies. OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review: Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially further loss of life. CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.

OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked door. None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school. Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms 111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door). CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate medical treatment. In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future. CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations. OPR made the following recommendations based on its review: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so. All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols. CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events. CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’ ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence events, focusing on the healing involved.

Washington, DC: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2024. 203p.

By Julia Korkman

Traffickers often use manipulation to tie their victims with what is sometimes called “invisible chains”. These, often subtle and large ly psychological means of controlling and manipulating victims are hard to detect and prove by the criminal justice system. The terms used for this phenomenon in the scientific literature are psychological coercion, psychological control and coercive control. IN THIS POLICY brief, we use the term psychological coercion, as it is widely used in the human trafficking literature. This policy brief pro vides a brief insight into psychological coercion as a phenomenon, what is known about the use of such coercion in the context of trafficking in human beings and how investigators can strive to address the issue of psychological coercion within criminal investigation

Helsinki: HEUNI, 2023. 4p.

By The Little Hoover Commision

California must improve and expand efforts to identify labor trafficking, the state’s independent government watchdog recommends in a new report.

In Labor Trafficking: Strategies to Uncover this Hidden Crime, the Little Hoover Commission calls for increased efforts to identify labor trafficking through better training, data collection, and public awareness. This is the Commission’s second report studying California’s response to human trafficking and builds upon the recommendation from its first report on the topic, released in June 2020, to create a statewide Anti-Human Trafficking Council.

“Too often, this heinous crime goes undetected, and those who have been preyed upon have nowhere to turn,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “This horrible crime demands an aggressive response, and our recommendations will help California do just that.”

Labor trafficking occurs when employers use force, fraud or coercion to exert a level of control over workers that leaves them trapped in oppressive situations. It can occur in a variety of workplaces, including restaurants, construction sites, farm fields, and households, and is often very difficult to detect. Widespread unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic may contribute to the conditions necessary for labor trafficking to flourish.

The Commission’s report focuses on the obstacles that make it difficult to identify labor trafficking, including a lack of enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and a lack of familiarity about the issue among government officials and the public. The report also notes that the state’s primary focus has been on combatting sex trafficking, a focus that must continue but be expanded to include labor trafficking as well.

“We need to know where labor trafficking is occurring in California and who is being affected so we can direct resources to help victims and bring traffickers to justice,” explained Commissioner Cynthia Buiza, chair of the Commission’s subcommittee for the labor trafficking studies. “More information will mean a stronger state response.”

The report also notes the strides taken by state officials to combat and deter child sex trafficking and calls for similar investment in protections for child victims of labor trafficking.

“It is crucial that all children are protected,” said Commissioner Dion Aroner, a member of the study’s subcommittee. “Nothing is more important than ensuring that California’s youngest and most vulnerable residents do not fall prey to the evil of human trafficking.”

Report #251, September 2020; Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2020. 30p.

By The Little Hoover Commission

The Commission assessed California’s efforts to combat labor trafficking in 2020 and produced three reports that included recommendations to strengthen the state’s stance against this horrific crime. Together, in these reports, the Commission offers recommendations to help California coordinate its response to human trafficking, detect labor trafficking, help victims, and bring traffickers to justice. In 2023, the Commission held a public hearing and sought additional input from five state agencies to learn about progress made towards implementing its recommendations. As part of this follow-up review, the Commission found a growing need for support of labor trafficking survivors. Yet, barriers—such as insufficient resources to identify and prosecute this crime—continue to undermine the state’s efforts. These challenges are exacerbated by gaps in state and local leadership that hinder continuity of effort in anti-trafficking work. Coordinating Leadership Around Anti-Trafficking Activities In its initial study, the Commission found that California’s response to human trafficking focuses principally on combatting sex trafficking. Additionally, the state lacks a coordinated strategy to target human trafficking statewide. In its report, Human Trafficking: Coordinating a California Response, the Commission recommended the creation of an antihuman trafficking council to build and enhance collaboration among communities throughout the state, study and improve services for survivors of both sex and labor trafficking, and assist in the successful prosecution of human traffickers. While there have been several legislative attempts to create such a coordinating body, none have been successful thus far. Nonetheless, representatives from regional human trafficking task forces told the Commission that such an entity would elevate trafficking as an explicit statewide priority, help them to implement strategies to identify labor trafficking, share best practices, and access published case law. California must institutionalize its response to human trafficking through the creation of a state-level centralized hub. Uncovering Labor Trafficking Combatting labor trafficking within California must begin with effectively detecting this crime— whenever and wherever it occurs. Yet, uncovering labor trafficking can be particularly challenging, as few understand the nature of the crime and to the untrained observer, the work itself may appear legitimate. In its report, Labor Trafficking: Strategies to Uncover this Hidden Crime, the Commission identified several strategies to help California better detect labor trafficking, including through increased worker training, public education and outreach, and equal application of statutory protections to help identify and address all forms of child trafficking. In its review, the Commission found some efforts to improve identification of this crime, such as periodic training on labor trafficking for certain public officials and workers, increased public awareness resources, and legislative attempts to equally address all forms of child human trafficking. While important, these efforts do not meet the scale or scope envisioned by the Commission in its original study. California must expand upon this work to have a chance at significantly reducing labor trafficking. In this report, the Commission reiterates a few such opportunities, including regular and robust support to train public officials to serve as “first identifiers,” expanded worker training opportunities and informational campaigns across industry sectors, and statutory amendments to ensure equal protection against all forms of trafficking.

Report #278; Sacramento: Little Hoover Commision, 2024. 25p.