Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

By Thomas R. Simon,  Heather B. Clayton,  Linda L. Dahlberg; Corinne David-Ferdon,  Greta Kilmer,  Colleen Barbero, 

Suicide and homicide are the second and third leading causes of death, respectively, among youths aged 14–17 years (1); nearly one half (46%) of youth suicides and most (93%) youth homicides result from firearm injuries (1). Understanding youth gun carrying and associated outcomes can guide prevention initiatives (2). This study used the updated measure of gun carrying in the 2017 and 2019 administrations of CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey* (YRBS) to describe the national prevalence of gun carrying for reasons other than hunting or sport among high school students aged <18 years and to examine the associations between gun carrying and experiencing violence, suicidal ideation or attempts, or substance use. Gun carrying during the previous 12 months was reported by one in 15 males and one in 50 females. Gun carrying was significantly more likely among youths with violence-related experiences (adjusted prevalence ratio [aPR] range = 1.5–10.1), suicidal ideation or attempts (aPR range = 1.8–3.5), or substance use (aPR range = 4.2–5.6). These results underscore the importance of comprehensive approaches to preventing youth violence and suicide, including strategies that focus on preventing youth substance use and gun carrying (3). CDC’s YRBS uses an independent three-stage cluster sample design to achieve a nationally representative sample of students in grades 9–12 who attend public or private schools in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (4). The overall response rates for 2017 and 2019 were 60% (14,765) and 60.3% (13,677), respectively. After the removal of responses missing age (153; 0.5%), those indicating legal age to purchase a firearm (i.e., age ≥18 years) (3,412; 12%), and those missing sex (138; 0.5%) or gun carrying information (2,927; 10.3%), the final analytic sample included 21,812 students. Information on YRBS weighting, sampling, and psychometric properties has previously been reported (4,5). YRBS was reviewed and approved by CDC and ICF institutional review boards.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Weekly / Vol. 71 / No. 30 July 29, 2022 

By Kacper Rekawek  

The field of terrorism studies has traditionally been focused on non-state perpetrators of violence, such as different jihadi organizations which have been active in the West in the last three decades. Things looked different, however, during the Cold War, when state actors actively involved themselves in terrorism by, for example, supporting terrorist organizations operating abroad. This report takes stock of Russia's return to such a paradigm in the 21st century in general and after 2022, the onset of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine, in particular. Russia not only terrorizes its population into submission but also uses homegrown terrorists for Vladimir Putin's regime's domestic ends, deploys terrorist tactics while fighting against Ukraine, and seems increasingly willing and able to use those tactics as part of its foreign policy toolbox in its "political warfare" against the broader West. For this reason, it is argued that one could seriously consider labeling Russia a "state terrorist" or a "state sponsor of terrorism." The report concludes that this might prove challenging in 2024, but also offers a way forward for prosecuting, sentencing, and arresting individuals involved in Russian state terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)    2024. 27p.

By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

A study on the factors behind rising gun violence in the Bay Area & our recommended approach for tackling it. Three primary factors are contributing to the Bay Area’s gun violence challenge: the impact of gentrification, a poorly understood regional violence problem, and a lack of formal mechanisms to support regional coordination across public safety departments and service providers. Cities can effectively reduce this violence in the near term. To do so, we recommend that regional leaders: 1. Develop a Regional Intervention Strategy by identifying a convener who can incubate a regional community violence intervention approach. 2. Formalize Communication and Information Sharing Between Oakland & San Francisco Public Safety Providers by having each department systematically share information. 3. Improve Cross-City Coordination to understand and address cross-city violence issues. 4. Utilize Existing Infrastructure by leveraging the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. 5. Monitor California Highway Patrol Capacity to ensure they can investigate freeway homicides and shootings. 1 2 In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT:  In recent years, there has been a sustained increase in shootings and gun homicides - with an increase in highway shootings in particular - in the Bay Area. This has implications for the cities of Oakland, Stockton, San Francisco, and Antioch. However, there has been little public study conducted to-date into these increases. This report analyzes the Bay Area’s regional violence dynamics from a variety of data sources to provide crucial information about the factors behind this growing public safety concern. Using this data, it provides recommendations to regional leaders on how best to tackle this issue and improve public safety in the near-term 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 13p.

 By Vaughn Crandall, et al.

Bakersfield is a large and rapidly growing city in the Central Valley that has an exceptionally high need for effective violence intervention and prevention strategies. This is supported by crime and violence data; health, social and economic indicators. Gun violence in particular is a serious, long-term problem in Bakersfield, with rates double of those of the state and national overall. In many neighborhoods, a homicide or non-fatal injury shooting takes place almost every day and has a significant negative impact on community health and wellbeing. Based on homicide records from 2014-2019, as well as the problem analysis undertaken as part of this project, high risk social networks (gangs, crews, high risk street groups, etc.) appear to play a major role in community violence. The risk of violence; poor health, educational and economic indicators; and strengthening community-police relations have been real concerns in Bakersfield for many years. While Bakersfield has a higher poverty rate than many California cities; it has a somewhat lower overall violent crime rate but a particular problem with gun and gang violence. The State of California’s CALVIP Grant program presented a much-needed opportunity to take on this difficult challenge in a more comprehensive and evidence-informed way. This opportunity allowed Bakersfield city and community leaders to analyze the dynamics of violence in Bakersfield, and the needs of young people at highest risk of involvement in violence, so they could more effectively intervene and break the cycle of violence. Bakersfield’s CalVIP-funded GVRS strategy combines concepts from several evidence-informed strategies: the group violence reduction strategy (also known as focussed deterrence) is a primary framework, with elements of police-community trust building (through procedural justice) and significant investment in building community violence intervention (CVI) capacity. Focussed deterrence is supported by a significant body of research evidence; while community violence intervention and procedural justice are also supported by growing research evidence (Abt 2017, Braga 2018, Buggs 2022). This combined strategy seeks to reduce violence citywide while providing support and opportunities for community members at highest risk of violence. Together, the city and community partners also work to strengthen community-police relations with residents and neighborhoods who are directly impacted by violence

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2023. 11p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Reygan Cunningham, and Robin Campbell

Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S. Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men. Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities. The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually. Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S.1 Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men.23 Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities.4 The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually.5 California’s 2023 passage of the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Act, colloquially referred to as AB 28, represents the first time that a US state resolved to tax the gun industry in order to fund programs that would address community gun violence. By imposing a modest 11% excise tax on gun sellers and manufacturers, this historic policy will channel nearly $160 million per year to a range of programs supported by the state’s Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Fund. The largest share of this funding, $75 million, is for the California Violence Intervention and Prevention (CalVIP) grant program, focused on community violence intervention, an increasingly effective field of public safety work that engages people who are most likely to be victims or perpetrators of gun violence to reduce their risk of harm. AB 28 was an audacious idea. It was also a longshot for California, because the state requires a two-thirds majority on any legislation that would increase taxes. This report is an overview of how a diverse coalition of advocates, local practitioners, and policy organizations (The CalVIP Coalition) conceived of, and passed, transformative legislation to establish community violence intervention (CVI) as a permanent part of the state’s public safety infrastructure, including a permanent and dedicated source of public funding. A case study for others interested in pursuing similar strategies, this report concludes with a summary of key elements that contributed to this landmark initiative’s success.  

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2024. 18p.

By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.

By Jessica H. Beard , Shannon Trombley, Tia Walker, Leah Roberts3, Laura Partain4, Jim MacMillan5 and Jennifer Midberry

Background: Firearm violence is an intensifying public health problem in the United States. News reports shape the way the public and policymakers understand and respond to health threats, including firearm violence. To better understand how firearm violence is communicated to the public, we aimed to determine the extent to which firearm violence is framed as a public health problem on television news and to measure harmful news content as identified by firearm-injured people.

Methods: This is a quantitative content analysis of Philadelphia local television news stories about firearm violence using a database of 7,497 clips. We compiled a stratified sample of clips aired on two randomly selected days/months from January to June 2021 from the database (n = 192 clips). We created a codebook to measure public health frame elements and to assign a harmful content score for each story and then coded the clips. Characteristics of stories containing episodic frames that focus on single shooting events were compared to clips with thematic frames that include a broader social context for violence.

Results: Most clips employed episodic frames (79.2%), presented law enforcement officials as primary narrators (50.5%), and included police imagery (79.2%). A total of 433 firearm-injured people were mentioned, with a mean of 2.8 individuals shot included in each story. Most of the firearm-injured people featured in the clips (67.4%) had no personal information presented apart from age and/or gender. The majority of clips (84.4%) contained at least one harmful content element. The mean harmful content score/clip was 2.6. Public health frame elements, including epidemiologic context, root causes, public health narrators and visuals, and solutions were missing from most clips. Thematic stories contained significantly more public health frame elements and less harmful content compared to episodic stories.

Conclusions: Local television news produces limited public health coverage of firearm violence, and harmful content is common. This reporting likely compounds trauma experienced by firearm-injured people and could impede support for effective public health responses to firearm violence. Journalists should work to minimize harmful news content and adopt a public health approach to reporting on firearm violence.

Beard et al. BMC Public Health, 2024.     

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Rachel Martin

Gun violence is widely considered a serious public health problem in the United States, but less understood is what this means, if anything, for evolving Second Amendment doctrine. In New York Pistol & Rifle Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court held that laws infringing Second Amendment rights can only be sustained if the government can point to sufficient historical analogues. Yet, what qualifies as sufficiently similar, a suitable number of jurisdictions, or the most important historical eras all remain unclear. Under Bruen, lower courts across the country have struck down gun laws at an alarming pace, while scholars and jurists continue debating the so-called true meaning of centuries-old firearm restrictions at times when slavery existed, women could not vote, and it took Thomas Jefferson longer to travel from Washington, D.C. to Williamsburg, VA than it currently takes to fly to the other side of the planet. This approach ignores the historical relevance of the government’s authority, if not outright duty, to respond to public health crises even if constitutional rights were implicated. The lack of historical laws related to mass shootings, large capacity magazines, and bullets designed to expand inside the body reflects the drastic evolution of gun violence rather than an impenetrable Second Amendment scope. Indeed, while state police powers to protect public health and safety preexist the Constitution, gun violence would have hardly been a priority for elected officials historically. Thus, the absence of robust, widespread gun regulations hardly reflects a consensus understanding of Second Amendment protections. Instead, examining accepted government restrictions for public health crises such as infectious diseases may provide better insight into the scope of authority to limit constitutional rights to protect the public. A public health law lens also helps to clarify that cementing policy options to emerging public health problems lacks historical pedigree.

Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2023, 20pg

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in north-eastern Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). In the course of 2023, JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad, which ISWAP had controlled. 

Why did it happen? Conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from differences in governance and treatment of civilians. JAS kills and steals from everyone; the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants. Many JAS members surrendered to authorities or continued fighting instead of joining ISWAP after the death of JAS’s

leader in 2021. 

  Why does it matter? In the last two years, JAS and ISWAP may have visited more damage upon each other than the Lake Chad states have inflicted on the jihadists. Still, the splinters pose a significant threat. ISWAP is regrouping, while the revamped JAS is set to target civilians around the lake. What should be done? The Lake Chad governments will need to do more to prevail over the jihadists. They should mitigate risks to civilians by maintaining humanitarian assistance; expanding efforts to support defectors; improving airstrike precision; and reinvigorating regional security cooperation.    

Edited by Jeff Breinholt

Initially enacted in 1992, the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §2333, provides a legal remedy for American victims killed or injured by reason of international terrorism by creating a private cause of action, with treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Since then, some 150 lawsuits have been brought under the statute against such terrorist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah, and FARC, as well as the banks and companies alleged to have assisted them. These lawsuits have generated some 600 opinions.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 91pg