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Posts tagged Terrorism
After Action Report Washington Navy Yard September 16, 2013 Internal Review Of The Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

Lessons From Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability To Connect The Dots

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

Aum Shinrikyo and Religious Terrorism in Japanese Collective Memory

By Rin Ushiyama,

Aum Shinrikyō’s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 left an indelible mark on Japanese society. This book is the first comprehensive study of the competing memories of Aum Shinrikyō’s religious terrorism. Developing a sociological framework for how uneven distributions of power and resources shape commemorative processes, this book explores how the Aum Affair developed as a ‘cultural trauma’ in Japanese collective memory following the Tokyo attack. The book shows how numerous stakeholders, including the state, the mass media, public intellectuals, victims, and perpetrators offered competing narratives about the causes and consequences of Aum’s violence. Combining multiple methods including media content analysis, participant observation, and original interviews with victims and ex-members, this book reveals various flashpoints of contention such as the state regulation of religion, ‘brainwashing’ and ‘mind control’ controversies, and the morality of capital punishment. It shows that although cultural trauma construction requires the use of moral binaries such as ‘good vs.. evil’ and ‘sacred vs.. profane’, the entrenchment of such binary codes in commemorative processes can ultimately hinder social repair and reconciliation.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. 231p.

Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism

May Contain Mark-Ups

Edited by Joshua D. Freilich and Rob T. Guerette

The book“Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism,”edited by Joshua D. Freilichand Rob T. Guerette, is part of the Advances in Criminology series. It explores the complex interactions between migration, cultural conflicts, crime, and terrorism through a collection of scholarly works. Published by Ashgate in 2006, the book is divided into four parts, each addressing different aspects of these issues.

Part I: Migration, Religion, Culture, and Terrorism

1.Terrorism Rediscovered: Hans-Heiner Kühne examines the political motivations behind terrorism, emphasizing the need to distinguish between acts of war and criminal acts.

2.Culture or Conflict?: Roland Eckert discusses how conflicts generate collective identities and the role of migration in these conflicts.

3.The 21st-Century Kulturkampf: Shlomo Giora Shoham provides a historical and cultural analysis of the clash between fundamentalist Islam and Western culture,advocating for dialogue and mutual respect.

4.Post-9/11 Legislative Changes: Joshua D. Freilich, Matthew R. Opesso, and Graeme R. Newman compare the legislative and policy changes in the UnitedStates, Canada, and Australia following the 9/11 attacks, focusing on operations abroad, detainment of alleged terrorists, border security, and internal measures.

Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006, 235 pages

Russian State Terrorism and State Sponsorship of Terrorism

By Kacper Rekawek  

The field of terrorism studies has traditionally been focused on non-state perpetrators of violence, such as different jihadi organizations which have been active in the West in the last three decades. Things looked different, however, during the Cold War, when state actors actively involved themselves in terrorism by, for example, supporting terrorist organizations operating abroad. This report takes stock of Russia's return to such a paradigm in the 21st century in general and after 2022, the onset of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine, in particular. Russia not only terrorizes its population into submission but also uses homegrown terrorists for Vladimir Putin's regime's domestic ends, deploys terrorist tactics while fighting against Ukraine, and seems increasingly willing and able to use those tactics as part of its foreign policy toolbox in its "political warfare" against the broader West. For this reason, it is argued that one could seriously consider labeling Russia a "state terrorist" or a "state sponsor of terrorism." The report concludes that this might prove challenging in 2024, but also offers a way forward for prosecuting, sentencing, and arresting individuals involved in Russian state terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)    2024. 27p.

Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness

Edited by Alex P. Schmid

This document compiles 35 chapters and over 1000 pages and thereby aims to provide an authoritative resource on terrorism prevention and preparedness. The Handbook is structured into five parts, comprising 32 chapters, next to the two introductory chapters and a concluding chapter by the editor followed by a comprehensive bibliography as follows: Part I: Lessons for Terrorism Prevention from the Literature in Related Fields (4 chapters); Part II: Prevention of Radicalization (6 chapters); Part III: Prevention of Preparatory Acts (7 chapters); Part IV: Prevention of, and Preparedness for, Terrorist Attacks  (10 chapters); Part V: Preparedness and Consequence Management (5 chapters

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) , 2020.1312p.

Missing Connections: Crime-Enabled Terrorism Financing in Europe

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

Domestic Terrorists' Contact with System Stakeholders Before Attacks

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSE AND TACTICS. Vol. 4.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSE AND TACTICS. Vol. 3.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSE AND TACTICS. Vol. 2.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSE AND TACTICS. Vol. 1.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

An End to Evil : How to Win the War on Terror

By David Frum & Richard Perle

War on Terror: The authors argue that the war on terror is ongoing and emphasize the need for continued vigilance and action against groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

Political Challenges: They highlight the political and media elite's wavering commitment to the war on terror, attributing it to political cycles, media bias, and fatigue.

Security Measures: The document discusses the importance of robust security measures, including national identity cards and enhanced surveillance techniques, to prevent terrorism.

International Relations: The authors critique the U.S. government's past complacency and advocate for a stronger stance against countries like Iran and North Korea, which are seen as threats due to their nuclear ambitions.

Random House Publishing Group, 2003 , 284 pages

Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida

By Gierenne Berraderi

Philosophical Dialogues: The book features dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, focusing on their responses to the 9/11 attacks and the philosophical implications of terrorism.

Themes: It explores themes like terrorism, globalization, sovereignty, and the legacy of the Enlightenment.

Philosophical Approaches: Habermas and Derrida offer distinct perspectives on terrorism and political philosophy, with Habermas emphasizing democratic legitimacy and Derrida focusing on deconstruction and hospitality.

Personal Context: The book was conceived in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, reflecting the author's personal experiences and the broader impact of the event on New York City.

University of Chicago Press, 2003, 208 pages