By The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

The National Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI) Governing Board leverages the collective experience of Federal, State, and local experts working in forensics, law enforcement, and criminal law to ensure that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) receives valuable input on national programs relating to CGI. As part of this mission, the Governing Board created this best practice guide to help our law enforcement partners successfully use a CGI model to reduce violent crime.

Washington, DC:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Firearms Operations Division, 2020. 77p.  

By Marc L. Swatt, Craig D. Uchida, Anna M. Goedert, and Alese Wooditch

Gun violence remains a challenging problem for law enforcement agencies across the country. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 2023), there were 20,958 firearm homicide deaths across the United States in 2021 resulting in a rate of 6.3 per 100,000 residents. This rate understates the problem, as the risk for firearm homicide is not evenly distributed and certain segments of the population have a considerably higher risk of firearm homicide victimization. For example, for 15-19-year-old Black males, the rate of firearm homicide death is 98.9 per 100,000 residents and for 20-24-year-old Black males, the rate is 134.4 per 100,000 residents (CDC, 2023). Further, firearm homicide is concentrated within impoverished areas within cities (Kravitz-Wirtz, Bruns, Aubel, Zhang, & Buggs, 2022). Recent research suggests that firearm violence has increased in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (Kegler, Simon, Zwald, Chen, Mercy, Jones, et al. 2022; McDonald, Mohler, & Brantingham, 2022). While the causes of firearm homicide are complex and involve both risk and protective factors (see American Psychological Association, 2013; Gaylord-Harden, Alli, Davis-Stober, & Henderson, 2022; Mattson, Sigel, & Mercado, 2020; Pardini, Beardslee, Docherty, Shubert, & Mulvey, 2020), there are strategies that law enforcement can adopt to reduce the prevalence of firearm violence (see Braga, Turchan, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2019; Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, 2019; Uchida & Swatt, 2013). Recently, law enforcement agencies have sought to leverage forensic evidence from gun discharge events to improve gun violence suppression efforts. Traditionally, firearm forensic evidence – namely retrieved firearms and spent casings – were used mainly to enhance prosecutorial efforts at obtaining convictions. However, by rapidly entering and retrieving information from the ATF’s National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) and electronic gun tracing database (eTrace), law enforcement can proactively use this information to identify linkages between seemingly disparate cases to apprehend likely shooters and disrupt gun trafficking networks (see Pierce, Braga, Hyatt, & Koper, 2004). To maximize the efficacy of this strategy, several agencies have been adopting coordinated interagency firearm enforcement programs – Crime Gun Intelligence Centers. The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) is one of 46 agencies across the country that received funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to set up a CGIC. In 2018, BPD planned its CGIC and over the next five years implemented key components of it. Justice & Security Strategies, Inc. (JSS) served as the research partner on the grant and evaluated the program. This report details the results of this evaluation effort. In this chapter, we first discuss the CGIC concept, how CGICs can decrease gun violence and the results of CGIC evaluations. In the second chapter, we discuss the City of Baltimore, the BPD, the implementation of CGIC, and the unique challenges facing this implementation to provide context for our findings. In the third chapter, we discuss the results of the process evaluation for CGIC and discuss CGIC activities,  challenges, and successes. The fourth chapter presents the results of the impact evaluation and examines whether CGIC was successful at reducing violent gun crime. The final chapter provides additional discussion of the conclusions of this research and provides several recommendations to BPD for the continuation of CGIC. 

Los Angeles: Justice & Security Strategies, 2024. 123p.

By Christopher Koper | Heather Vovak | Brett Cowell 

This study presents an evaluation of the Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) initiative in Milwaukee conducted by a research partner team from the National Police Foundation and George Mason University. The report covers the operations and impacts of the CGIC program from 2014 through 2017. The first part of the report documents the CGIC program as it operated during the study period. The heart of the CGIC initiative involves systematic collection and analysis of ballistics evidence collected from both crime scenes and test fires of recovered firearms. This ballistics evidence is scanned into the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Scanning ballistics evidence into NIBIN enables analysts to compare images of ballistics evidence across cases nationwide to identify gun crimes that may have involved the same firearm (based on unique markings that firearms make on fired shell casings and bullets). This helps investigators to identify crimes that are likely to have been committed by the same offender or by offenders who used the same firearm. Teams of detectives, analysts, and other staff from MPD, ATF, and other partner agencies use these leads to prioritize, inform, and target gun crime investigations and prosecutions. The second part of the report presents three series of analyses conducted by the Milwaukee CGIC’s research partners to assess the potential and actual impacts of the CGIC initiative on gun-related investigations and gun crime in Milwaukee. All of these analyses focus in particular on the outcomes of NIBIN testing and the value of NIBIN-related evidence in solving gun-related investigations and reducing gun crime. The first set of analyses examined the scope and nature of interconnected gun crimes in Milwaukee. The CGIC program targets repeat shooters and networks of offenders responsible for multiple gunfire incidents through the sharing of firearms. As a first step in evaluating the impacts of the program, the research team sought to determine how much of Milwaukee’s gun violence is attributable to such offenders using data from CGIC case files and the MPD’s records management system (RMS). This portion of the study helped to define the scope of the problem targeted by the CGIC program and illuminate the program’s strategic value as a tool for improving gun crime investigations and reducing gun crime. It also illustrates the value of NIBIN testing as an analytical tool to improve the understanding of gun crime in the city. The next series of analyses examined the impact of NIBIN testing on the outcomes of gun-related investigations in Milwaukee. In principle, the CGIC program, and NIBIN testing in particular, should produce leads that help investigators solve gunfire-related crimes that might otherwise go unsolved. The research team thus examined the outcomes of NIBIN-related investigations and the role that NIBIN evidence played in these investigations using information extracted from NIBIN-related case files. In addition, the research team used data from MPD’s RMS to examine  whether the CGIC program has improved overall case closure rates for gunfire-related crimes since its major launch in 2014. Finally, the third set of analyses investigated whether NIBIN-related enforcement activity has reduced gun crime in Milwaukee. If the CGIC program is successful in targeting the most active shooters and networks in the city, then the program could produce significant incapacitation and deterrence effects that reduce the city’s overall level of shooting incidents. This was examined through a time series analysis of trends in NIBIN-related arrests and shootings (fatal and nonfatal) across Milwaukee’s police districts from 2011 through 2017. In summary, the evaluation suggests that the CGIC program in Milwaukee has high strategic value in targeting the city’s gun violence prevention efforts. Ballistics evidence generated through NIBIN testing is helping the MPD focus on repeat shooters and networks of active offenders who account for roughly half of fatal and non-fatal shootings in Milwaukee. Hence, the CGIC program has a high ceiling for its potential to reduce gun crime. NIBIN-related evidence is also helping investigators identify and apprehend more suspects in gun crime investigations. This does not mean that NIBIN evidence is a cure-all for investigating gun crime; cases with NIBIN links do not always produce arrests, nor is NIBIN evidence always critical to closing cases when it is available. Greater coordination and effort focused on NIBIN-related cases have also contributed to better outcomes for these investigations. On balance, nonetheless, systematic collection and analysis of ballistics evidence appears to be a useful strategy for solving cases and illuminating active shooters for further investigation. NIBIN-related evidence and the CGIC investigative process appear to have been particularly helpful for improving the investigation of non-fatal shootings. After an initial decline in clearances for these crimes in 2014 (due likely to a surge in gun violence throughout the city), they have been increasing during the years of the CGIC initiative. By some measures, clearances for nonfatal shootings in 2017 (the last year studied) were better than those before the program, even though gun violence levels were considerably lower during the pre-program years. Further, these recent improvements have been due specifically to improvements in clearances of cases with NIBIN-related evidence. Finally, the study provides tentative indications that NIBIN-related arrests have reduced shootings. These findings were not definitive. However, it was difficult to conduct a rigorous assessment of the program’s impacts on shootings given the lack of comparison areas for study (the program was implemented citywide, so it was not possible to compare areas with and without the program). A general rise in gun violence in Milwaukee that coincided with the implementation of the program also complicated efforts to judge the program’s impacts. In light of these findings, a longer-term study of Milwaukee’s CGIC program would seem valuable. The program’s effects may well become stronger over time as the MPD’s ballistics evidence database grows. Indeed, the rate of matches and leads from recovered ballistics evidence has grown notably during the life of the program. Hence, the research team recommends additional follow-up studies to assess the program’s longer-term impact on shooting investigations and gun crime. If impacts on gun crime can be determined more conclusively, cost-benefit analyses could also be conducted to quantify the program’s financial benefits. 

Washington, DC: National Police Foundation. 2019.. 51p.   

By Craid Uchida, Allison Quigley and Kyle Anderson

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD Department) received a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to establish the Los Angeles Crime Gun Intelligence Center (LA CGIC). The Center is a collaboration that focuses on the collection, management, and analysis of crime gun data and seeks to reduce gun-related crime. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) developed the concept of the Crime Gun Intelligence Center, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance provided funding for planning and implementation purposes. In Los Angeles, ATF, the LAPD, and all of the partners implemented a CGIC in 77th Street Division, one of 21 patrol stations in the Department. In January 2018, LA CGIC became fully operational and began to use ‘actionable intelligence’ based on National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) leads and hits. In October 2018, LA CGIC was expanded to include three other South Bureau divisions: Harbor (HBR), Southeast (SOE), and Southwest (SOW). This report provides background information about the formation of the LA CGIC and evaluates the program using data and information gathered through interviews and observations of meetings and activities of the LA CGIC partners.   

Los Angeles: Justice & Security Strategies, Inc., 2019. 46p.

By Seth Fallik,  Cassandra Atkin-Plunk, & Vaughn Crichlow

Palm Beach County (PBC), Florida is home to approximately 1.47 million residents and 8 million tourist visitors each year (pbc.gov), where extreme wealth exists alongside abject poverty. Concentrations of high unemployment, unstable housing, community divestments, large immigrant populations, segregated neighborhoods, and gross inequities in the distribution of resources have contributed to the later. Crime is, unfortunately, an artifact of these conditions, with some areas in PBC experiencing violent crime nearly twice national and state averages. In these communities, there is a large gang presence, human trafficking, and drug activity. In 2019, nearly half (46.6%) of violent crimes in PBC involved a firearm, including a high rate of nonfatal shootings and rising homicide rates. Within this context, the bereaved, injured, and communities in PBC often live in fear of retaliation, are intimidated away from cooperating with law enforcement, and are innocent bystanders in gang-related incidents. Substantively, PBC needed to take immediate action to address firearm-related crime. As the largest law enforcement agency in PBC and with its lengthy history of community-wide initiative leadership, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (PBSO) is poised to inform and lead a response to these issues. There are several intelligence, technology, coordination, and engagement efforts already underway with the PBSO. They, for example, manage the only Forensic Criminal Laboratory in the County and the PBC Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC). They also have strategically placed ShotSpotters and license plate readers throughout PBC. Additionally, the PBSO has developed several meaningful collaborations in PBC in response to gun crime, which appears in the National Resource and Technical Assistance Center (NRTAC) Business Process Maps (see Appendix A). In the last six years, for Figure 1.01 Law Enforcement and Community-Based Task Forces example, the PBSO has participated in many law enforcement- and community-based task forces (see Figure 1.01). While these partnerships have effectively started the conversation around violence and gun crime, a community-wide, coordinated gun strategy has been without technical assistance and is resource-limited in PBC.  

Boca Raton, Florida: Florida Atlantic University , 2024.  163p.

By DJ Summers  

Colorado’s crime surge in the early 2020s was not limited to property and violent crimes. Human trafficking also surged. These offenses come in two forms. Victims are either coerced into labor or into commercial sex acts, the latter of which represents the majority of Colorado’s human trafficking. Colorado is not an outlier. Nationally, human trafficking has increased as well and reached a ten-year high in 2023. Colorado’s human trafficking is more severe than elsewhere. The state ranks among the states with the highest numbers of human trafficking reports and rates of human trafficking reports. To understand the problem of human trafficking better, leaders should consider better means of assembling data that would show trends among offenders and victims.

Key Findings

In 2023, Colorado had the nation’s 10th-highest number of human trafficking reports, 84 in total.

 In the U.S., the total number of reported human trafficking incidents rose and reached a 15-year peak in 2023, with 3,117, more than twice the number reported in 2019.[i]

Colorado had the nation’s 10th highest rate of human trafficking reports per 100,000 at 1.44.

 Colorado reached a record amount of human trafficking in 2023, with 84 reported incidents.

On average, there have been 74 reports of human trafficking in Colorado in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Between 2016 and 2020, there were an average 48 per year.

Adams County is the location for the largest share of Colorado’s human trafficking both over time (27%) and in 2023 (26%).  

El Paso and Denver counties rank second and third from 2008 to 2024, with 21% and 18%, respectively.

 In the record year 2023, Adams, Boulder, and Denver counties had the highest shares of human trafficking at 26%, 15%, and 18%, respectively.

 Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2024. 10p.

By John J. Donohue

Substantial evidence has documented a powerful “instrumentality” effect: the more lethal the weaponry employed, the greater the likelihood that death will result from any given assault. This finding provides the foundation for the subsequent findings that a variety of measures that restrict the prevalence or limit the permissible types of lethal weaponry can lower the costs of gun violence. The literature has advanced to the point that there is a sufficient empirical basis to call for the elimination of right-to-carry laws, to reestablish bans on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, to maintain restrictions on youthful access to guns, and to repeal stand-your-ground laws. The Supreme Court’s recent decision expanding the scope of the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen shows a concerning disinterest in the importance of these empirical findings.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 92-117

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.

By Ndubuisi Christian Ani

The densely populated southern regions of Kayes and Koulikoro in Mali are at a watershed moment, with the rapid expansion into the regions by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) from the north and central regions. The two regions provide JNIM with new and profitable frontiers for resource exploitation, such as access to a vast tax base and control of the lucrative timber logging sector. The regions also provide JNIM with opportunities for cattle rustling, kidnapping, banditry and access to artisanal gold mining sites. Key points For the government l Promote regular confidence-building initiatives between farmer and herder communities in order to reduce stigmatisation and alliance with JNIM. l Initiate a national dialogue with the aim of prohibiting hereditary slavery. l Work proactively together with community. For ECOWAS l Urge Mali to revitalise the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. l Seek international partnerships to support developmental and humanitarian initiatives in Mali in order to prevent radicalisation in the southern regions. l Support national consultations over the abolition of hereditary slavery.

Africa, OCWAR-T Research Report 13  Ecowas Commission. 2023. 20pg