Edited by Jens Rydgren

The resurgence of strong radical right-wing parties and movements constitutes one of the most significant political changes in democratic states during the past several decades, particularly in Europe. This resurgence has attracted interest from political scientists, sociologists, historians, and other scholars, most of whose research focuses on party and electoral politics. This book covers that literature, focuses on how the radical right manifests itself as movements rather than parties, and include a number of case studies both in Europe and beyond. The chapters cover concepts and definitions; ideologies and discourses; a range of contemporary issues including religion, globalization, gender, and activism; and cases such as France, Russia, the United States, Australia, Israel, and Japan. By integrating various strands of scholarship on the radical right, the book provides an authoritative and state-of-the-art overview of the topic and sets the agenda for future scholarship on the radical right for years to come

London; New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 760p.

United States. Congress. House. Committee On Veterans' Affairs

From the Hearing Overview: "Having established why DVE [Domestic Violence Extremist] groups target veterans in their recruitment efforts during the October 2021 hearing, the Committee's March 31, 2022, hearing, entitled 'Helping Veterans Thrive: The Importance of Peer Support in Preventing Domestic Violent Extremism,' turned to the veterans' side of the story. The hearing had two main objectives: 1. To further examine some of the risk factors that place a small but growing number of military veterans at risk of radicalization and recruitment by DVE groups; and 2. To identify and evaluate various civil society efforts to combat domestic violent extremism. [...] As a result of the hearing, the Committee identified two main findings: 1. There is no single pathway toward radicalization, but there are certain risk factors that veterans who engage in violent extremism often share[; and] 2. Peer support, including support from other veterans, military families, and Veterans Service Organizations, is vital to countering the threat of domestic violent extremism."

United States. Congress. House. Committee On Veterans' Affairs . 2022. 21p.

By Pijpers, Peter B.M.J.

From the Summary: "The Russian invasion of Ukraine, while primarily a kinetic war, saw new actors and novel activities exploiting cyberspace. Numerous non-state actors, hacker groups and commercial enterprises have entered the virtual battlespace, taking sides with one of the warring states without necessarily being belligerent entities. While states were already struggling with how to regulate activities in cyberspace, the new tropes, techniques and tactics have increased legal uncertainty. International law is based on the state, a territory, and the distinction between war and peace, while cyberspace and the activities conducted therein are not. The Russo-Ukraine war has made it clear that non-state actors such as Microsoft or Anonymous cannot be attributed to a state, and that they do not participate directly in hostilities, at least not physically. Moreover, the attributes of cyberspace have not only blurred the differences between state and non-state actors, but also transformed the dichotomy between war and peace. Not only do the challenges of how to apply international law to the new tropes, techniques and tactics in cyberspace increase differences in interpretation, but the ensuing uncertainties can be exploited, causing legal asymmetry."

European Centre Of Excellence For Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid Coe) . 2002. 20p.

By Ravich, Samantha Fay; Fixler, Annie

From the Introduction: "In 2018, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) published a series of monographs analyzing cyber-enabled economic warfare (CEEW) as practiced by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The four studies brought together for the first time an assessment of each adversary's CEEW attacks on America's economic infrastructure. At the time, the term CEEW was only beginning to seep into the consciousness of the U.S. national security community. The White House had used the term in its 2017 National Security Strategy, noting how adversaries are using technology to 'weaken our businesses and our economy.'1 But the connection between such malicious activities and the overall strategies of America's four principal adversaries remained unclear. The risks associated with CEEW are now clearer, thanks less to the rigorous analysis of adversarial intentions than to the increased scale, scope, and frequency of attacks across the American economic landscape. Still, the federal government has a blind spot that leaves the United States vulnerable to a catastrophic strategic surprise -- one that could simultaneously destabilize the U.S. electrical grid, water supply, banking system, transportation sector, or other critical infrastructure necessary for survival. That blind spot is intelligence that anticipates the adversary's strategy. For too long, the United States has tried to patch its way to safety with the enemy inside its networks."

Foundation For Defense Of Democracies 2022. 68p.

By Meenakshi Balakrishna and Kenneth C. Wilbur

How well do firearm markets comply with firearm restrictions? The Massachusetts Attorney General issued an Enforcement Notice in 2016 to announce a new interpretation of the key phrase “copies and duplicates” in the state’s assault weapons ban. The Enforcement Notice increased assault rifle sales by 1,349 (+560%) within five days, followed by a reduction of 211 (- 58%) over the next three weeks. Assault rifle sales were 64-66% lower in 2017 than in comparable earlier periods, suggesting that the Enforcement Notice reduced assault weapon sales but also that many banned weapons continued to be sold.

Unpublished paper, University of California, San Diego, 2021. 50p.

By Christopher S. Koper

Controlling gun crime continues to be a difficult challenge for policymakers and practitioners in the United States. With an estimated 258 million guns in private hands and millions more produced each year, there are many sources and means through which offenders can obtain firearms despite legal restrictions on gun purchasing and ownership by convicted felons, juveniles, and other high-risk groups. In order to better understand the workings of illicit gun markets—and particularly the rapid diversion of guns from the retail market into criminal channels—this study utilizes a decade’s worth of data on handgun sales in the state of Maryland and subsequent recoveries of those guns by police in order to identify the characteristics of firearms, sellers, buyers, and sales transactions that predict whether a gun is used in crime subsequent to purchase. The study provides some of the most sophisticated evidence to date on crime use risks associated with high-risk buyers, problem gun dealers, preferred crime guns, purchases involving multiple guns, and other suspected trafficking indicators. The study is based on three sets of analyses: 1) analysis of 235,011 handgun sales in Maryland from 1990 through October 1999 and 7,575 recoveries of those guns reported by police throughout the nation to the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) from 1990 through March 2000; 2) analysis of 71,956 handgun sales in the Baltimore metropolitan area from 1994 through October 1999 and 1,850 recoveries of those guns reported by Baltimore police to ATF from 1994 through March 2000; and 3) analysis of 48,039 handgun sales in the Maryland counties of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area from 1994 through October 1999 and 529 recoveries of those guns reported by D.C. police to ATF from 1994 through March 2000.

Philadelphia: Jerry Lee Center of Criminology University of Pennsylvania, 2007. 96p.

By Aaron Karp

Uncertainty about any firearms data requires systematic estimation that relies on a broad spectrum of sources and makes approximation unavoidable. The Small Arms Survey’s estimates of civilian firearms holdings use data gathered from multiple sources. However, with much of civilian ownership concealed or hard to identify, gun ownership numbers can only approximate reality. Using data from several different sources, at the end of 2017 there were approximately 857 million civilian-held firearms in the world’s 230 countries and territories. Civilian firearms registration data was available for 133 countries and territories. Survey results were used to help establish total gun civilian holdings in 56 countries. The new figure is 32 per cent higher than the previous estimate from 2006, when the Small Arms Survey estimated there were approximately 650 million civilian-held firearms. Virtually all countries show higher numbers, although national ownership rates vary widely, reflecting factors such as national legislation, a country’s gun culture, historical and other factors. While some of the increase reflects improved data and research methods, much is due to actual growth of civilian ownership.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018. 12p.

By John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja and Kyle D. Weber

This paper uses more complete state panel data (through 2014) and new statistical techniques to estimate the impact on violent crime when states adopt right-to-carry (RTC) concealed handgun laws. Our preferred panel data regression specification, unlike the statistical model of Lott and Mustard that had previously been offered as evidence of crime-reducing RTC laws, both satisfies the parallel trends assumption and generates statistically significant estimates showing RTC laws increase overall violent crime. Our synthetic control approach also strongly confirms that RTC laws are associated with 13-15 percent higher aggregate violent crime rates ten years after adoption. Using a consensus estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration of 0.15, the average RTC state would need to roughly double its prison population to offset the increase in violent crime caused by RTC adoption.

Cambridge, MA; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. 126p.

By Philip J. Cook, Harold A. Pollack and Kailey White

Chicago became infamous for high rates of gun violence during the Tommy Gun era of the Roaring ‘20s. While Tommy Guns are rare these days, Chicago continues to have relatively high rates of lethal violence, almost all involving guns. Homicide rates in Chicago hit a post-War peak during the Crack epidemic circa 1992, and declined thereafter. But other cities, most notably New York and Los Angeles, experienced far greater reductions in violence, as did the nation as a whole. Then in 2016, Chicago experienced a spike in gun violence, with the homicide rate increasing year over year by 58% (University of Chicago Crime Lab, 2017). Reducing gun violence, already a priority for city leaders, has become still more urgent. There was also a nationwide surge in gun violence between 2014 and 2016, raising the question of whether the long downward trend in violence has reversed. What can be done? There are two basic law enforcement strategies for reducing gun violence. The first is through police and court efforts, both reactive and proactive, to deter gun misuse directly. Those efforts entail improved investigation capacity to increase the arrest and conviction rates for gun assault, but also proactive tactics to discourage illicit gun carrying. The second strategy is targeted on illicit gun transactions that arm people who might harm others. The goal is to make guns scarcer to anyone legally disqualified from buying them, including youth and people with prior felony convictions. Crafting an effective supply-side strategy requires a good understanding of how people who might harm others currently procure their guns. Providing that baseline information is the motivation for this project.

Chicago: University of Chicago Crime Lab, 2018. 152p.

By Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig

The National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms took place during November and December 1994 to gather information on the size, composition, and ownership of the gun stock in the United States; how and why guns are acquired; gun storage and carrying; and the defensive use of firearms against criminal attackers.

This national telephone survey used a list-assisted random-digit-dialing sampling method and produced a response rate of 44 percent or 59 percent, depending on the definition used. Results revealed that an estimated 192 working firearms are in private possession; about one-third of these are handguns. At least 40 percent of all handguns are semi-automatics. Only about 1 in 6 handguns have barrel lengths shorter than 3 inches. About one-fourth of adults personally own a firearm; this finding includes 42 percent of men and 9 percent of women. Gun ownership may be less popular among younger adults than among those ages 51 or older. Gun ownership is also most prevalent among middle-aged, middle-class white people from rural areas. Adults who have been arrested for a non-traffic offense are more likely to own a firearm than are other adults. In addition, about 10 percent of the adults own about 77 percent of the total stock of firearms. Overall, 46 percent of gun owners own some kind of gun primarily for protection against crime. Almost all owners report receiving some kind of instruction in the use of their firearms. About one in five of all gun-owning households keep a loaded and unlocked gun in the home. About one in six handguns are kept on the owner's person or in a motor vehicle. Estimates of defensive use of guns are similar to those of Kleck and Gertz, but survey-based estimates appear to be grossly in error for several reasons.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1996. 112p.

By Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III and Alexandria Zhang

For over a decade, there has been a spirited academic debate over the impact on crime of laws that grant citizens the presumptive right to carry concealed handguns in public – so-called right-to-carry (RTC) laws. In 2004, the National Research Council (NRC) offered a critical evaluation of the “More Guns, Less Crime” hypothesis using county-level crime data for the period 1977-2000. 15 of the 16 academic members of the NRC panel essentially concluded that the existing research was inadequate to conclude that RTC laws increased or decreased crime. One member of the panel thought the NRC's panel data regressions showed that RTC laws decreased murder, but the other 15 responded by saying that “the scientific evidence does not support” that position.

We evaluate the NRC evidence, and improve and expand on the report’s county data analysis by analyzing an additional six years of county data as well as state panel data for the period 1979-2010. We also present evidence using both a more plausible version of the Lott and Mustard specification, as well as our own preferred specification (which, unlike the Lott and Mustard model presented in the NRC report, does control for rates of incarceration and police).

• More.....

  While we have considerable sympathy with the NRC’s majority view about the difficulty of drawing conclusions from simple panel data models and re-affirm its finding that the conclusion of the dissenting panel member that RTC laws reduce murder has no statistical support, we disagree with the NRC report’s judgment on one methodological point: the NRC report states that cluster adjustments to correct for serial correlation are not needed in these panel data regressions, but our randomization tests show that without such adjustments the Type 1 error soars to 22 - 73 percent.

  Our paper highlights some important questions to consider when using panel data methods to resolve questions of law and policy effectiveness. We buttress the NRC’s cautious conclusion regarding the effects of RTC laws by showing how sensitive the estimated impact of RTC laws is to different data periods, the use of state versus county data, particular specifications (especially the Lott-Mustard inclusion of 36 highly collinear demographic variables), and the decision to control for state trends.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 109p.

By Rosanna Smart, Terry L. Schell

There is no standard definition of what constitutes a mass shooting, and different data sources—such as media outlets, academic researchers, and law enforcement agencies—frequently use different definitions when discussing and analyzing mass shootings. For instance, when various organizations measure and report on mass shootings, the criteria they use in counting such events might differ by the minimum threshold for the number of victims, whether the victim count includes those who were not fatally injured, where the shooting occurred, whether the shooting occurred in connection to another crime, and the relationship between the shooter and the victims. These inconsistencies lead to different assessments of how frequently mass shootings occur and whether they are more common now than they were a decade or two ago. Data show that, regardless of how one defines mass shootings, perpetrators are likely to be men. But several other characteristics that are statistically predictive of perpetration are still uncommon among offenders on an absolute level. The rare nature of mass shootings creates challenges for accurately identifying salient predictors of risk and limits statistical power for detecting which policies may be effective in reducing mass shooting incidence or lethality. Implementing broader violence prevention strategies rather than focusing specifically on the most-extreme forms of such violence may be effective at reducing the occurrence and lethality of mass shootings.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 32p.

by Mary Allen, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics

In 2020, consistent with historical trends, violent Criminal Code offences accounted for about one in every five crimes that came to the attention of police. Firearm-related violent crime typically represents less than 3% of police-reported violent crime in Canada; nevertheless, it has a significant emotional and physical impact on victims, families and communities. Additionally, rates of firearm-related violence have seen a general increase over the past several years.

Concern about gun crime is long standing and a variety of approaches have been used to address it, including changes in legislation (see Text box 1). In April 2020, 22 people were killed in a mass shooting in Nova Scotia, the deadliest mass shooting in Canada in recent years. In particular, the Nova Scotia shooting led to a ban on assault-style firearms and renewed discussions around gun control and access to illegal weapons.

Mayors Against Illegal Guns

This report provides a comprehensive review of Stand Your Ground laws and how they have affected public safety and the criminal justice system. It explains how Stand Your Ground statutes have dramatically expanded the circumstances under which people are permitted to use deadly force and have created legal hurdles that make it more difficult for law enforcement to hold shooters accountable. The report also shows that Stand Your Ground states have on average experienced a 53% increase in homicides deemed justifiable in the years following passage of the law, compared with a 5% decrease in states without Stand Your Ground statutes during the same period — an increase disproportionately borne by the black community. Finally, the report provides a state-by-state analysis of each of the 22 state Stand Your Ground laws.

New York: National Urban League, 2013. 28p.

By Scott R. Kegler; Deborah M. Stone; James A. Mercy and Linda L. Dahlberg

Firearm homicides and suicides represent an ongoing public health concern in the United States. During 2018–2019, a total of 28,372 firearm homicides (including 3,612 [13%] among youths and young adults aged 10–19 years [youths]) and 48,372 firearm suicides (including 2,463 [5%] among youths) occurred among U.S. residents (1). This report is the fourth in a series* that provides statistics on firearm homicides and suicides in major metropolitan areas. As with earlier reports, this report provides a special focus on youth violence, including suicide, recognizing the magnitude of the problem and the importance of early prevention efforts. Firearm homicide and suicide rates were calculated for the 50 most populous U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)† for the periods 2015–2016 and 2018–2019, separated by a transition year (2017), using mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) and population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following a period of decreased firearm homicide rates among persons of all ages after 2006–2007 in large metropolitan areas collectively and nationally, by 2015–2016 rates had returned to levels comparable to those observed a decade earlier and remained nearly unchanged as of 2018–2019. Firearm suicide rates among persons aged ≥10 years have continued to increase in large MSAs collectively as well as nationally. Although the youth firearm suicide rate remained much lower than the overall rate, the youth rate nationally also continued to increase, most notably outside of large MSAs. The findings in this report underscore a continued and urgent need for a comprehensive approach to prevention. This includes efforts to prevent firearm homicide and suicide in the first place and support individual persons and communities at increased risk, as well as lessening harms after firearm homicide and suicide have occurred.

Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control, 2022. 7p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

Analysis from 750 cities of data available for the first times reveals that:

The rate of people who died by gun suicide in cities increased 11 percent over the past decade, and now make up an average of over four in 10 city gun deaths.

Cities in states with the strongest gun violence prevention laws have about half the rate of people who die by gun suicide as those in states with the weakest laws, demonstrating the importance of legislative action in preventing gun violence in cities.

Cities with the most gun shops experience nearly four times higher rates of people who die by gun suicide than those with the fewest gun shops, signaling the importance of expanding cities’ focus beyond illegal guns.

Smaller cities and those with fewer walkable neighborhoods (i.e., distance to local resources) experience higher rates of people who die by gun suicide, underscoring the importance of adequate access to resources and networks of social support that reduce risk factors like social isolation.

Cities with the most parks have about half the rate of people who die by gun suicide as those with the least, suggesting that cleaning and greening efforts may offer benefits in reducing both gun homicides and suicides.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2022. 25p.

By The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions; Art Davies, et al.

Two leading organizations dedicated to gun violence prevention—the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Prevention and Policy and the Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence—have merged to form a new center at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions combines the expertise of highly respected gun violence researchers with the skills of deeply experienced gun violence prevention advocates. We use a public health approach to conduct rigorous scientific research to identify a range of innovative solutions to gun violence. Because gun violence disproportionately impacts communities of color, we ground our work in equity and seek insights from those most impacted on appropriate solutions. Using the best available science, our Center works toward expanding evidence-based advocacy and policy-making efforts. This combination of expertise creates a unique opportunity to turn public health research into action that reduces deaths and injuries from gun violence.

Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. 2022. 40p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

In California, a 16-year-old boy shot and killed two of his classmates and shot and wounded three others with a handgun. In Washington D.C., ghost guns were used in four recent fatal shootings. In Arizona, a neo-Nazi sex offender bragged on Facebook about his arsenal of firearms and homemade assault-style rifles. All of these people were legally prohibited from buying guns. But due to a dangerous wrong turn by ATF these individuals were able to access a haunting new source of firepower: ghost guns. Ghost guns are the thread connecting a horrific series of recent shootings. These do-it-yourself (DIY) firearms are made from parts available without a background check and are predictably emerging as a weapon of choice for violent criminals, gun traffickers, dangerous extremists, and, generally, people legally prohibited from buying firearms. Because it has no serial number, a ghost gun cannot be traced back to where it came from, which frustrates police investigations and robs victims and survivors of justice. The rise of ghost guns is the fastest-growing gun safety problem facing our country. But disturbingly little is known about who sells ghost guns, who buys them, and how much they are used in crime. The scant data available is disjointed and barely scratches the surface of the issue. To remedy this problem, Everytown for Gun Safety examined available data, including a sample of 80 online ghost gun part sellers and more than 100 federal prosecutions involving ghost guns, to find out who is selling and using these deadly weapons and what can be done about it.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2020. 28p.

By Nicholas Simons, Jaclyn Schildkraut and Julianna Caruso. Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium

On April 11, 2022, the Biden administration announced the submission of new rules issued by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), more specifically the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), addressing the proliferation of ghost guns across the nation….

What exactly are ghost guns, and what challenges do they pose? Moreover, what do these new rules do to contribute to a solution to such challenges? Privately made firearms (PMFs), which have become informally known as “ghost guns” due to their virtually untraceable nature, function similar to firearms wholly constructed by licensed firearm manufacturers but have a fraction of the regulations. In 2021, law enforcement in New York State recovered 637 PMFs (135 percent more than the year prior), reflecting continued annual increases from 44 in 2018 (the first year of reporting), 100 in 2019 (up 117 percent over the year prior), and 2020 (an increase of 171 percent). Other law enforcement agencies across the country, particularly those located in larger cities, have reported similar jumps in recoveries: Law enforcement in Boston has seen a nearly three-fold increase in the city since 2019; Philadelphia reported a five-fold increase since that year. Data from the ATF mirrors these trends: the recorded number of suspected PMF recoveries nationally increased more than 90 percent between 2020 and 2021 and more than ten-fold between 2016 and 2021. Such increases, however, must be interpreted with caution as they may be an artifact of increased reporting by jurisdictions.

While these increases represent a relatively low percentage of total gun recoveries, they illustrate that ghost guns pose a unique and rapidly growing challenge. Law enforcement agencies are unable to trace the origins of ghost guns used in crime and ultimately curb their flow at the source. While the federal government has taken first steps to regulate these weapons, state and local lawmakers have for several years been exploring and enacting policies designed to monitor and prevent ghost guns from falling into the hands of individuals who are prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 20p.

By Carlos Solar

While the effects of militarism and militarization toward security are evident in the Americas, most notably transmitted via images of soldiers complementing and replacing law enforcement agencies at times of social crisis, this report seeks potential answers to what this means in theory and practice. The author does this in two ways. First, it unpacks an up-to-date understanding of militarism and militarization aiming to feed academic and policy debates with a perspective on what citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean think. Second, it expands knowledge of militarism and militarization informing security and defense planners, specifically those preparing tailored policies toward conflict and peace in the region.

Miami: Florida International University, 2021. 27p.