By Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence

America’s deadliest shootings are those we rarely discuss: Over half of all gun deaths are suicides. On average, 64 people die of gun suicide each day in America — more than firearm murders and unintentional shootings combined. Firearms are by far the most lethal method of suicide. Amid the backdrop of COVID-19 and record-breaking gun sales, unsecured firearms in gun-owning households risk an increase in suicide. This report analyzes the relationship between firearms and suicide to provide tangible solutions for policymakers, community organizers, and more to prevent gun suicide and save lives by focusing on:

• Communities uniquely impacted by firearm suicide, including youth and teens, men, Alaskan Native, American Indian, and Black youth, military-connected and LGBTQ+ communities, and more

• Policy solutions, including extreme risk laws, waiting periods, and child access prevention laws

• Public health solutions, including lethal means safety and awareness of safe storage options, like: trigger locks, lock boxes, gun vaults, safes, off-site storage, and “asking to save lives"

Washington, DC: Brady United Against Gun Violence, 2021.

By The Giffords Law Center and the Southern Poverty Law Center

“Stand your ground” laws do not deter crime—in fact, they drive up homicides in states where they are enacted. Since 2005, a majority of states have enacted laws that make it easier to get away with murder. These laws distort the usual standard for self-defense by allowing people to use lethal force even if they could have avoided violence by stepping away from a confrontation. Research has shown that these laws lead to more killing and exacerbate systemic racism. Giffords Law Center and the SPLC Action Fund jointly released a new report, “Stand Your Ground” Kills: How These NRA-Backed Laws Promote Racist Violence, analyzing the failure of Stand Your Ground policies.Stand Your Ground does not offer the promised reductions in crime that the NRA and other proponents promised it would; in fact, Stand Your Ground laws have been proven to increase homicide rates and have been called a “low-cost license to kill” by the American Bar Association.

Giffords Law Center and the Southern Poverty Law Center, 2022. 22p.

Edited by Jens Rydgren

The resurgence of strong radical right-wing parties and movements constitutes one of the most significant political changes in democratic states during the past several decades, particularly in Europe. This resurgence has attracted interest from political scientists, sociologists, historians, and other scholars, most of whose research focuses on party and electoral politics. This book covers that literature, focuses on how the radical right manifests itself as movements rather than parties, and include a number of case studies both in Europe and beyond. The chapters cover concepts and definitions; ideologies and discourses; a range of contemporary issues including religion, globalization, gender, and activism; and cases such as France, Russia, the United States, Australia, Israel, and Japan. By integrating various strands of scholarship on the radical right, the book provides an authoritative and state-of-the-art overview of the topic and sets the agenda for future scholarship on the radical right for years to come

London; New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 760p.

United States. Congress. House. Committee On Veterans' Affairs

From the Hearing Overview: "Having established why DVE [Domestic Violence Extremist] groups target veterans in their recruitment efforts during the October 2021 hearing, the Committee's March 31, 2022, hearing, entitled 'Helping Veterans Thrive: The Importance of Peer Support in Preventing Domestic Violent Extremism,' turned to the veterans' side of the story. The hearing had two main objectives: 1. To further examine some of the risk factors that place a small but growing number of military veterans at risk of radicalization and recruitment by DVE groups; and 2. To identify and evaluate various civil society efforts to combat domestic violent extremism. [...] As a result of the hearing, the Committee identified two main findings: 1. There is no single pathway toward radicalization, but there are certain risk factors that veterans who engage in violent extremism often share[; and] 2. Peer support, including support from other veterans, military families, and Veterans Service Organizations, is vital to countering the threat of domestic violent extremism."

United States. Congress. House. Committee On Veterans' Affairs . 2022. 21p.

By Pijpers, Peter B.M.J.

From the Summary: "The Russian invasion of Ukraine, while primarily a kinetic war, saw new actors and novel activities exploiting cyberspace. Numerous non-state actors, hacker groups and commercial enterprises have entered the virtual battlespace, taking sides with one of the warring states without necessarily being belligerent entities. While states were already struggling with how to regulate activities in cyberspace, the new tropes, techniques and tactics have increased legal uncertainty. International law is based on the state, a territory, and the distinction between war and peace, while cyberspace and the activities conducted therein are not. The Russo-Ukraine war has made it clear that non-state actors such as Microsoft or Anonymous cannot be attributed to a state, and that they do not participate directly in hostilities, at least not physically. Moreover, the attributes of cyberspace have not only blurred the differences between state and non-state actors, but also transformed the dichotomy between war and peace. Not only do the challenges of how to apply international law to the new tropes, techniques and tactics in cyberspace increase differences in interpretation, but the ensuing uncertainties can be exploited, causing legal asymmetry."

European Centre Of Excellence For Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid Coe) . 2002. 20p.

By Ravich, Samantha Fay; Fixler, Annie

From the Introduction: "In 2018, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) published a series of monographs analyzing cyber-enabled economic warfare (CEEW) as practiced by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The four studies brought together for the first time an assessment of each adversary's CEEW attacks on America's economic infrastructure. At the time, the term CEEW was only beginning to seep into the consciousness of the U.S. national security community. The White House had used the term in its 2017 National Security Strategy, noting how adversaries are using technology to 'weaken our businesses and our economy.'1 But the connection between such malicious activities and the overall strategies of America's four principal adversaries remained unclear. The risks associated with CEEW are now clearer, thanks less to the rigorous analysis of adversarial intentions than to the increased scale, scope, and frequency of attacks across the American economic landscape. Still, the federal government has a blind spot that leaves the United States vulnerable to a catastrophic strategic surprise -- one that could simultaneously destabilize the U.S. electrical grid, water supply, banking system, transportation sector, or other critical infrastructure necessary for survival. That blind spot is intelligence that anticipates the adversary's strategy. For too long, the United States has tried to patch its way to safety with the enemy inside its networks."

Foundation For Defense Of Democracies 2022. 68p.

By Ralph Larkin.

On April 20, 1999, two Colorado teenagers went on a shooting rampage at Columbine High School. That day, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold killed twelve fellow students and a teacher, as well as wounding twenty-four other people, before they killed themselves. Although there have been other books written about the tragedy, this is the first serious, impartial investigation into the cultural, environmental, and psychological causes of the massacre. Based on first-hand interviews and a thorough reading of the relevant literature, Ralph Larkin examines the numerous factors that led the two young men to plan and carry out their deed. Rather than simply looking at Columbine as a crucible for all school violence, Larkin places the tragedy in its proper context, and in doing so, examines its causes and meaning.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007. 265p.

By Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke.

This manual is intended to help police executives and other senior executives meet the new challenges involved in countering the threat of terrorism by summarizing writings on the essential components of a counterterrorism plan. It does not deal with the specifics of such matters as (1) conducting surveillance of suspected terrorists; (2) protecting different types of vulnerable targets, such as ports and chemical plants; or (3) achieving interoperability in wireless communications among different disaster-response agencies, such as fire, police, and emergency medical personnel. Although junior officers need this type of detail, chiefs require more general information about a broad range of issues that can help them develop plans and policies to counter the terrorist threat. This manual seeks to meet the needs of chiefs and other senior personnel by summarizing information about 50 key topics in the form of advice to the chief.

Center for Problem Oriented Policing. 2005. 134p. Read more at the Center for Problem Oriented Policing

By U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security

Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders3 and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations.

Washington, DC: FBI, Department of Homeland Security. 2022, 44p.

By: Hugo Micheron

The trial of the November 2015 Attacks in Paris that ended in June 2022 in part symbolizes the end of an important phase of jihadism in Europe. But jihadism continues to pose an intellectual and political challenge to European societies. The need to understand it is urgent, but the task is made difficult for two reasons. First, Islamist militancy has penetrated the Western European media space in the last few years, and now provides the backdrop for a muddled public debate on immigration, the place of religion, and terrorist violence. Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, nearly 150 Islamist attacks have assailed Europe causing 800 deaths and nearly 5,000 injuries. Hundreds of other attempts have been thwarted from Brest to Vienna, from Glasgow to Milan, from Barcelona to Oslo, and even in Geneva. The sheer proliferation of these violent acts often gets in the way of making sense of the broader phenomenon. Second, Islamism tends to produce anabolic effects within the societies it affects. These are fixed around two postures in the debates on terrorism and its causes: extreme relativization, or excessive hysterization. These two postures often trap public reflection in slogans and lead to paralysis.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 39p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon, requiring a proactive and coordinated response from Member States. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plays a key role in providing assistance to Member States, in furtherance of its mandate to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice systems to implement the provisions of the international legal instruments against terrorism, and does so in compliance with the principles of rule of law and international human rights standards. In particular, in 2011, the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/178, reaffirmed the mandate of UNODC to continue to develop specialized legal knowledge in the area of counter-terrorism and pertinent thematic areas, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Despite increasing international recognition of the threat posed by terrorists’ use of the Internet in recent years, there is currently no universal instrument specifically addressing this pervasive facet of terrorist activity. Moreover, there is limited specialized training available on the legal and practical aspects of the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases involving the use of the Internet. The present publication complements the existing resources developed by UNODC in the areas of counter-terrorism, cybercrime and rule of law. It also addresses the importance of developing integrated, specialized knowledge to respond to the technical assistance needs of Member States in combating this continually evolving threat.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012. 158p.

By Alastair Reed, Joe Whitter, Fabio Votta and Sean Looney

This paper assesses whether social media platforms’ personalisation algorithms promote extremist material, finding evidence that only one platform studied – YouTube – prioritises extremist material by the recommender system.

London: Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) , 2019. 19p.

By J.M. Berger

The so-called ‘alt-right’ is an amorphous but synchronized collection of far-right people and movements, an umbrella label for a number of loosely affiliated social movements around the world, although its centre of gravity is in the United States.1 Many factors have contributed to the alt-right’s rise to prominence, but one of the most visible is its online presence. Alt-right views have been promoted online by a small army of trolls and activists staging harassment campaigns, pushing hashtags and posting links to extremist content and conspiracy theories on social media. Since 2016, the alt-right and its allies have held an increasingly prominent place in American and European politics, rallying support behind a variety of causes and candidates. This study seeks to evaluate the alt-right’s online presence with robust metrics and an analysis of content shared by adherents. The alt-right has many components online; this report will primarily examine its presence on Twitter, in part because the movement is particularly active on that platform, and in part because Twitter’s data access policies allow for more robust evaluation than is possible on other platforms.

Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018. 59p.

By Lorenzo Vidino, Seamus Hughes and Bennett Clifford

The time period in which the Islamic State (IS) controlled territory in Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2019 coincided with the largest groundswell of homegrown jihadist activity in United States history. This unprecedented wave of jihadist activism, which hit its peak between 2014 and 2016, could be measured through several indicators. Senior officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that the Bureau managed, at any given time between 2014 and 2019, 1,000 active investigations into IS supporters throughout the U.S.; at least 239 alleged supporters were charged in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, more than 80 Americans traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, and 16 IS sympathizers that remained in the U.S. conducted terrorist attacks that were inspired by or directed by the group. Others provided resources for IS’ global project in different ways, most notably by supporting IS’ online propaganda dissemination and social media recruitment campaigns. At its peak, IS’ perceived ideological credibility and authority, its predilection for extreme acts of violence, and its ability to direct its on-the-ground resources in Syria and Iraq towards information operations designed to incite terrorism in the West, drove its successes in recruiting Americans. However, as the organization began to hemorrhage territory, leadership, and key personnel, it became less and less able to reach its target audiences around the world, including in the U.S. The loss of the last vestiges of its territory in Syria and Iraq, the targeted killings of key English-speaking IS facilitators and “virtual entrepreneurs,” and eventually, the death of IS’ first “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were all harbingers for the decline in IS-related activity in the U.S. Nevertheless, even in a post-caliphate environment, IS continues to inspire American jihadists to conduct activities on its behalf. According to the FBI, the organization remains the predominant homegrown violent extremist (HVE) threat to the U.S., and although the group’s capabilities to recruit and mobilize Americans have significantly degraded, no other jihadist organization has made a significant effort to fill the breach and take IS’ place. While the number of IS-related cases in the American legal system in 2020, 2021, and 2022 have steadily declined from their peak in 2015, the alleged activities of supporters in these cases are more diffuse. In this paper, we evaluate 29 cases of Americans charged in the U.S. with IS-related offenses since January 2020. By comparing and contrasting them with the larger corpus of cases of American IS sympathizers in the U.S. legal system since 2014—when the first IS-related criminal case occurred—this brief report documents emerging trends in the nature of American support for IS and the U.S. counterterrorism response in the world after the collapse of IS’ physical caliphate. Furthermore, it attempts to ascertain what these trends portend for the future of the jihadist movement in America.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 16p.

By Lorenzo Vidino and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

The global LGBTQIA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual/aromantic/agender) community has historically been subjected to hateful rhetoric, discriminatory practices and acts of violence. In the West, this animosity has traditionally mostly originated from a heterogeneous array of actors that can broadly be identified with the far-right. And while in recent years the LBGTQIA+ community has received rights and a degree of acceptance largely unthinkable only a few decades ago, episodes of intolerance and violence are still very much present. Recently, for example, in June 2022, authorities detained 31 members of a white nationalist group called Patriot Front who were allegedly about to attack the Pride in the Park event in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.1 If animosity against the LGBTQIA+ community from right wing circles is a well-known and fairly uncontested topic, less so is that originating from Islamist milieus.2 Yet, an abundance of evidence indicates that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA+ community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric takes different angles. At times, it focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. In line with some Christian fundamentalists, natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes or diseases like AIDS are also painted as divine punishments against homosexuality. A substantial part of the messaging also views homosexuality and gay rights as a Western plot devised to pervert and weaken Muslims. This report documents several instances of preachers and top-ranking officials linked to prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. and Europe, several of whom are engaged as partners by Western governments and civil society, that espouse such views.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.

By Anne Speckhard, Molly Ellenberg, and TM Garret

The following report is an interim report of an ongoing study, with the current results based on 50 in-depth psychosocial interviews of white supremacists in five countries (the U.S., Canada, Germany, UK and New Zealand) collected over the time period of October 2020 to October 2021. The interviews focused on the subjects’ childhood histories, exposures to white supremacism, recruitment and joining processes, experiences in the group including ideological indoctrination and with violence and if disillusioned their disengagement and deradicalization experiences. All of the interviews were conducted over Zoom and video recorded with most participants agreeing to have their interview used to produce a short counter narrative video for use in disrupting white supremacist online and face-to-face recruitment.

McLean, VA: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 2022. 46p.

By Sibusiso Nkomo and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke

Afrobarometer’s Round 7 surveys, conducted between late 2016 and late 2018, asked security-related questions in 34 African countries, including five countries along the East Africa Corridor that have experienced terrorist activity in recent years: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa. (While Somalia has been heavily impacted by terrorism, and has been a source of terrorist activity in the region, no Afrobarometer survey has taken place in the country due to security challenges.) In these five countries, citizens show a generally mixed response to their respective governments’ handling of violent extremism. Public trust in the security sector, particularly the police, is low throughout the region, which may hamper efforts to develop sustainable approaches to addressing violent extremism and insecurity. Many citizens in the region report fearing violence from extremist groups, even where actual incidents have been infrequent, and indicate a willingness to accept government restrictions on certain civil liberties, such as rights to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion. These findings highlight the need for counter-terrorism policies whose national security objectives do not come at the expense of democratic ideals and good governance.

Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2020. 26p.

Edited by Marc Engelhart and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička

The events surrounding the terrorist group officially known as the Islamic State (IS) have galvanized anti-terrorist efforts far beyond the first reactions after September 11, 2001, and led to varying state responses, especially in Europe, e.g., in addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In »Dealing with Terrorism – Empirical and Normative Challenges for Fighting the Islamic State« an international panel of experts analyses current trends and new developments in legal systems and in law enforcement in Europe as well as in the USA and the Middle East. Offering a succinct overview with special focus on criminal law, police law, and European and international law, the book provides unique insights into what dealing with terrorism means to European and non-European countries. It includes material from non-English-speaking countries that is seldom available to a broader academic community. Its comparative approach offers readers three levels of understanding: by country, in terms of the European Union, and the international community as a whole. The book is geared at specialists in national and international institutions, scholars, and students in the field but will also be of great interest to the wider legal community. Its profound insights and expert perspectives enhance the ongoing national and international debate on public security issues by striking a balance between freedom and security

Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 2019. 317p.

By Andrew Papachristos

This report contains the latest work of a unique group of experts convened by the Joyce Foundation beginning in 2019 under the banner "Toward a Fair and Just Response to Gun Violence." The group includes advocates, prosecutors and defense attorneys, policy experts, researchers, violence intervention practitioners, and members of law enforcement, all experts in their fields who have come together as a community of practice to address some of the hardest questions facing our communities in 2022: how to reduce the devastating toll of gun violence experienced in many U.S. cities; how to limit the proliferation of guns - many owned illegally - in those same communities; how to do so without further undermining the relationship between police and communities of color; and how to do so without contributing to the over-incarceration of men and boys of color.

Following a series of virtual meetings in 2020 and 2021, the members of the community of practice arrived at this set of consensus recommendations for policy, research and practice, all in furtherance of the group's shared goals of reducing the harms caused by guns, and reducing the harms caused by punitive law enforcement responses to gun violence.

Chicago: The Joyce Foundation, 2022. 12p

By Travis Taniguchi, Katherine Hoogesteyn, Eiryn Renouard, and Dean Esserman

Ghost guns (also known as privately made or unserialized firearms) have become a significant concern to law enforcement and public safety. The term “ghost gun” encompasses a variety of firearms produced from components that are not currently regulated by federal firearm laws. Most commonly, ghost guns are produced from components purchased from businesses and individuals that most often include nearly finished aluminum, polymer frames, or receivers. Advances in ghost gun parts manufacturing facilitates homemade production of firearms by non-technical users. Public safety and gun violence prevention advocates cite the growing representation of ghost guns in crime as well as the ease of production, lack of background checks, and poor traceability as reasons that ghost guns components and kits should be regulated like all other firearms.

• More.....

  In this study, we addressed current knowledge gaps by exploring law enforcement agencies’ (LEA’s) experience with ghost guns to provide a national overview of current perceptions, practices, and recommendations for improving public policy. Interviews with command, patrol, forensics, and specialized units from 24 LEAs revealed that there was a patchwork of experience with, and strategies to address the public safety risk created by ghost guns. Policy recommendations based on this research include halting the proliferation of ghost guns through regulating the production and sale of ghost gun components and kits by updating the outdated definition of firearm. Recommendations for improvements on the process of tracking and reporting ghost gun data, training, within-agency information sharing, and research are also discussed.

Arlington, VA: National Police Foundation, 20211. 37p.