By Bennett Clifford

By reviewing studies of how today’s terrorist and extremist groups operate on social media in conjunction with an overview of U.S. government regulation of terrorist content online, this report finds that stricter U.S. regulation of social media providers may not be the most effective method of combating online terrorist and extremist content.

Specifically:

• Direct governmental regulations that ignore other sources of regulation on content removal policies could disrupt growing intra-industry collaboration on countering terrorist content online.

• In many regards, the U.S. government defers to and depends on the private sector to conduct counterterrorism online. Many factors contribute to this arrangement, including limits on the government’s authorities, expertise, staffpower, dexterity and political will to manage online terrorist content with the same efficacy as major social media companies.

• Attempts by other governments to strictly regulate social media companies’ terrorist content removal policies hurt small companies, created double standards and redundancies, and raised concerns about censorship and free speech.

• Proposed regulations may only affect major U.S. social media providers; smaller and non-U.S. companies may be unable, unwilling, or not required to comply. Due to the proliferation of social media platforms exploited by terrorists and extremists, platforms that may be unaffected by U.S. government regulation currently host a large proportion of terrorist content online.

• In certain regards, major social media companies’ content removal policies have more flexibility than the U.S. government to be able to account for new terrorist and extremist groups and actors and their respective tactics, techniques, and procedures online.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 24p.

By Anyssia S. Kokinos, Nakissa P. Jahanbani,  Jon Lewis, Devorah Margolin,

Executive Summary ● This report aims to provide a comprehensive examination of Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America by examining all publicly-known federal criminal cases from 1997 to 2020 in the United States with a concrete link to Hezbollah. The authors found evidence of 128 individuals that meet these criteria. ● The majority of cases involve small, centralized hubs of Hezbollah operatives, who engage in illegal activities in conjunction with wider criminal enterprises to create an array of networks across America. These relationships of convenience have resulted in Hezbollah operatives collaborating with financially-motivated individuals, criminals, and other nonideological actors, in furtherance of a broader operational mission. These arrangements, in turn, have allowed Hezbollah to profit financially and deepen its influence in the United States, even as many such cases display minimal direct connective links to the terrorist organization itself. ● Based on analysis of the cases, the authors identified two distinct categories of participation in Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America: individuals who provided financial support to Hezbollah (109 individuals), and those who provided operational support (19 individuals). ○ 87% of individuals provided financial or material support to Hezbollah as money launderers, bundlers, fraudsters, and goods smugglers, with many raising funds from others to be provided to Hezbollah or directly providing funds to the group themselves. This finding supports existing assessments that Hezbollah’s primary aspirations in the United States are to use it as a financial support hub. ○ 13% of individuals in the dataset engaged in operational conduct in support of Hezbollah, including as human smugglers, weapons procurers, pre-operational surveillance, and travelers who sought to join the group. Despite the prominence of Hezbollah’s financing activities in the United States, elements within Hezbollah remain intent on developing the capacity and capability to plot attacks on U.S. soil. ● The vast majority (92%) of cases involved network activities between two or more individuals. Larger geographic hubs operated out of Michigan (55 cases), California (19 cases), North Carolina (16 cases), and New York (15 cases). 90% of individuals operating in these four states and 76% of all cases in this dataset were a part of just six networks. ○ Large parts of network activity involved individuals with limited evidence to suggest a direct link to Hezbollah. As discussed above, these individuals actively collaborated with persons with an evidenced connection to the terrorist organization, and in many cases appear to be driven primarily by financial rather than ideological motivations. This in and of itself is a manifestation of Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, which sought to use local criminal actors in furtherance of their illegal activities. Further, in several significant instances, network activity often involved friends or family members engaged in organized conspiracies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.

By Lorenzo Vidino

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe is a controversial topic, frequently subjected to misinterpretations and manipulations. Opinions on it vary from those who argue that it does not exist and that it is bigoted and conspiratorial thinking to argue otherwise, to those who claim that it does and it is, in substance, similar to groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State; from those who believe that it is a force that has evolved over time and now embraces democracy and the positive integration of Muslims in European society, to those who argue that it is a complex movement that, while showing a moderate façade, is in reality engaged in non-violent but nonetheless highly problematic activities (a position held by this author).  

Much of the confusion stems from the opaque and secretive nature of the Brotherhood and, consequently, the difficulty of obtaining clear and unequivocal information. As the Brotherhood was founded and operates mostly in Middle Eastern countries where local regimes have enacted various forms of repression against it, the movement has always seen dissimulation of many aspects of its structure and goals as a necessary tactic to survive. Organizations belonging to the Brotherhood’s family in the Arab world have therefore gone to great lengths to hide various aspects of their inner workings. It is a tactic that, given the context, is understandable and has ensured the movement’s survival in tough political environments for almost a century.  

Somewhat counterintuitively, the secrecy that shrouds Brotherhood networks is somewhat greater in the West, where the Brotherhood is not considered a terrorist organization and can generally operate freely within a democratic framework. Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, as said, have historically kept secret many aspects of their activities, but they have never denied their own existence. That denial is common in the West where most Brotherhood-linked activists and organizations not only shroud in secrecy their inner workings but even refuse to admit any Brotherhood connection. Brotherhood activists and sympathizers also tend to attack those who highlight the existence of Brotherhood-linked networks in Europe and their problematic nature with charges of shoddy research, conspiratorial views, and bigotry. 

Given these dynamics, it is important to observe what entities across Europe, whose institutional mandate is to monitor potential threats to their countries, think about the movement, from its very existence to its tactics and goals. The Brotherhood is not designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union or by any individual European country. At the same time, however, the security services of virtually all European countries have long monitored the movement---a fact that is per se telling.

European security services have kept the movement under watch with different degrees of intensity. Those that have a broad institutional mandate that leads them to monitor all potential threats to their countries’ democratic and constitutional order, like Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz, both at the federal level and in all 16 German states), have done so more extensively than some of their counterparts throughout Europe whose mandate is narrower and law enforcement-like. And in each country the degree of scrutiny of the Brotherhood varies with time, depending on factors such as the existence of more immediate security threats or input from political decisionmakers.

Yet, without exception, all European security services adopt a highly negative view of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Continent. All European security services which have publicly expressed views on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe over the last twenty years have clearly and consistently stated that:

1. An extensive and sophisticated network linked to the Brotherhood operates covertly in Europe, both at the national and pan-European level (through its umbrella organization, FIOE/CEM, and spinoffs like FEMYSO);

2. European-based Brotherhood-linked activists have created front organizations that allow them to operate within society and advance their agenda without being easily recognizable as being part of the Brotherhood; and

3. Brotherhood networks in Europe are not engaged in terrorism but have views and goals that are problematic, subversive, undemocratic, and incompatible with basic human rights and Western society.

These views have been expressed in various terms by European security services, and some have reached more pessimistic conclusions than others. But all those that have gone on the record over the last two decades about the movement have been extremely negative and concerned about its impact on European society.

This short report has collected all publicly available statements from annual and occasional reports, testimonies in parliamentary hearings, and formal statements in court cases from the various European security services that have addressed the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. They include all the statements the author could find, with no selections or omissions, save for repetitions (as in the case of annual reports from German security services, which in substance repeat what was reported in previous years). All documents are publicly available and unclassified. All are herewith reported with references (so that the reader can read the context) and without commentary. The report does not include media interviews by representatives of security services, as they do not constitute a direct representation of their views and manipulation/misinterpretations might have occurred.     

The assessments here reported come from the security services of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The author is not aware of any security service from any other European country having gone on the record on the matter. The main reason for this is arguably the varying levels of comfort of different security services when it comes to going on the record on any matter unless strictly necessary. In general, for example, the security services of most Southern and Eastern European countries are culturally less prone to revealing much of their views on any matter than their Central and Northern European counterparts. Moreover, issues related to Islamism in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular do not constitute a major issues in Eastern European countries, given their small Muslim population.

In substance, the security services of basically all the largest Western European countries (with the notable exception of Italy) have gone on the records expressing very negative views on the Muslim Brotherhood. The author is not aware of any European security service having stated anything that even slightly contradicts the assessments on the Brotherhood made by the services of the seven countries here mentioned. To the contrary, interviews conducted by the author with most European security services over the last twenty years confirm that even those that have not gone on the record (Italian security services, for example) adopt extremely negative views of the Brotherhood, in line with those that do appear on record.  

The inevitable conclusion of this reading is that the European security community has reached a firm consensus over the presence, structure, tactics, aims, and ultimately, problematic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. That consensus has been consistent over the last twenty years and has no known deviations, and this consensus should be the basis for well-informed policymaking on the subject.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 20p.

By Omar Mohammed

The Iraqi Parliament is poised to discuss a new amnesty bill that has generated significant controversy and debate. This legislation is intended to address the issue of wrongful detentions but raises profound ethical, judicial, and societal concerns. Advocates claim the bill will rectify unjust imprisonment, particularly in the post-ISIS era. Critics, however, argue that the bill's broad language could inadvertently release individuals affiliated with ISIS, undermining ongoing counterterrorism efforts and the pursuit of justice for victims. Complicating matters further is the recent decision by the United Nations Security Council to terminate the mandate of UNITAD, a team responsible for investigating crimes committed by ISIS. This article delves into the intricacies of the proposed bill, its implications for justice and national reconciliation, and its potential impact on counterterrorism efforts in Iraq.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 10p.

By Lorenzo Vidino 

Executive Summary • Hamas supporters have long operated in the United States. Internal Hamas documents and FBI wiretaps introduced as evidence in various federal criminal cases clearly show the existence of a nationwide Hamas network engaged in fundraising, lobbying, education, and propaganda dissemination dating back to the 1980s. • The network formalized its existence in 1988, when it created the Palestine Committee in the US. The Committee’s goals included “increasing the financial and the moral support for Hamas,” “fighting surrendering solutions,” and publicizing “the savagery of the Jews.” • The Palestine Committee spawned several public-facing organizations, most of which are based out of Chicago, Dallas, and Washington DC. They included the all-purpose Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the financial arm represented by the Occupied Land Fund (which later became the Holy Land Foundation, HLF), and the think tank United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). • In 1993, the FBI wiretapped a meeting of top Hamas activists in the US held in Philadelphia. The wiretaps show internal discussions on how to improve activities in support of Hamas within the US and how to shield them from the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. US-based Hamas activists agreed that hiding their affiliation and intentions was the best tactic to avoid negative consequences. “I swear by Allah that war is deception,” said one senior leader, “[d]eceive, camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy.” “Let's not hoist a large Islamic flag and let's not be barbaric-talking. We will remain a front so that if the thing [the U.S. government ban on Hamas] happens, we will benefit from the new happenings instead of having all of our organizations classified and exposed.” • Over the years, US authorities have conducted several activities to clamp down on the network, including deporting and prosecuting Hamas operatives and shutting down multiple front organizations. The 2001 designation of HLF and subsequent prosecution of part of its leadership for funneling approximately $12.4 million to Hamas constitutes to date the largest successful terrorism financing prosecution in US history. • Yet, US-based Hamas networks and individuals have displayed a remarkable resilience and many of the core activists of the Palestine Committee are still engaged in various forms of support (albeit at times purely political and not material) for Hamas. 

Washington DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Bennett Clifford and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

 As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitation.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 33p.

By Ilana Krill & Bennett Clifford   

  In the United States, critical infrastructure, or “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, [that] are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” are prime targets in violent extremist attack plots.1 While a variety of violent extremist movements have attempted to assault American critical infrastructure throughout modern history, the Department of Homeland Security and other national security authorities have recently sounded the alarm that U.S.-based violent extremists have developed “credible, specific plans” to attack critical infrastructure.2 To understand the current dimensions of this threat, this paper reviews 94 cases of individuals charged in the U.S. federal court system from 2016 to 2022 with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, 35 of whom attempted to attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of these cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement; 16 are associated with white supremacist groups. Evaluating these cases, the report finds: ● Salafi-jihadist attack planners were significantly more likely to consider critical infrastructure systems as targets for attack than their white supremacist counterparts. ● Salafi-jihadist and white supremacist attack planners attempted to target different critical infrastructure sectors, with the former focusing on the commercial facilities, government facilities, and emergency services sectors, and the latter predominantly focusing on the energy sector. ● Since 2019, white supremacist attacks plots against critical infrastructure systems have distinctly increased. ● Between 2016 and 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems dramatically increased in frequency. 13 individuals associated with the movement were arrested and charged in federal court with planning attacks on the energy sector; 11 of these attack planners were charged after 2020. ● The rise of accelerationist ideology and doctrine during the past decade likely fueled the increased risk of attack plots within white supremacist milieus targeting critical infrastructure, and the energy sector in particular.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.

By Brady United Against Gun Violence

Understanding the source of America’s gun violence epidemic is essential to building effective solutions to prevent it. For decades, laws passed at the behest of the gun industry have shielded important information from public view, making it nearly impossible to understand how, and from where, guns are funneled into the criminal market. Brady has used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover information in an attempt to better understand how guns make their way from the legal marketplace to ultimately being used in crime. This report examines federal records that identify gun dealers subject to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) Demand Letter 2 program — a program created to identify firearms dealers that sell the most crime guns and to aid law enforcement investigations. Only 2% of gun dealers nationwide are subject to this program, which includes dealers who have sold at least 25 guns that were recovered in crime during the past year that were found to have taken less than three years to make it from point of sale to being recovered in that crime. The ATF had identified that this low “time-to-crime” is a strong indicator of gun trafficking. This report, and its underlying national data, are the clearest look we’ve had in two decades as to which gun dealers sell the most crime guns. Absent complete transparency into the gun industry’s role in supplying firearms that fuel our nation’s gun violence epidemic, this data is the best indicator we have as to which gun dealers are fueling crime.

Washington, DC: Brady Campaign, 2024. 20p

By Sulaiman Lebbe Rifai

Nothing puts the human conscience on trial as does the Genocide in Gaza. Nothing illustrates the political hypocrisy of some Western leaders as does the war in Gaza. Nothing exemplifies the double standard of Western political leaders as their complicity in the Gazan war. Moreover, this war has put the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court in a somewhat difficult and precarious position. It has also put the UNHR in a difficult situation and it is alarmed with the seriousness of atrocities in Gaza. These courts and international organizations are instituted to establish justice and fairness in all international conflicts. They cannot discriminate between countries in their application of justice. They cannot apply one set of laws to the State of Zionist Israel and another set of laws to the people of Palestine. They must do unconditional justice to all parties equally without any prejudice, racial religious, or political discrimination. They must do this to protect the integrity and reputation of these international institutions and yet, the Zionist State of Israel and its supporters are standing between these institutions and their official responsibilities to apply laws equally to all. Take, for instance, the South African lawsuit against the state of Israel for its genocide in the Gaza Strip. Many countries in the Global South welcomed and supported South Africa’s initiative to file a case against Israel and yet, many Western countries blindly dismissed the legal complaint of South Africa in support of Israel as if there was no genocide committed in the Gaza by the State of Israel. To understand the gravity of the political discrimination of some Western leaders on the problem of the Gaza Genocide, we should revisit the contents of the UN’s convention on the prevention of the Crime of Genocide.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By David Lochhead, Tidiani Diakité, Roberto Sollazzo, Saikou Sow, Raoul Sumo Tayo, Leonard Tettey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically between 2014 and 2022. As of 2022, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria were heavily affected by these weapons, while Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo suffered from their use as an emerging threat. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict theatres in West and Central Africa, including the Lake Chad Basin, where armed groups have used IEDs extensively. IED designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the West Africa region, making them attractive for use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The Small Arms Survey collected data on more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, including the type, date, and location of these events. Information on perpetrators, their targets, and more than 6,600 casualties from deaths and injuries was also collected (Small Arms Survey, 2022). The data was collected through research undertaken in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, as well as desk research and remote interviews concerning Benin, Chad, and Nigeria. Where relevant from a comparative perspective, discussion of other regions that have countries with IED incidents or components occurs throughout the Report, such as those in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East. Most IED incidents analysed during this study involved IEDs containing explosive components or precursors specifically manufactured for the commercial extractive and construction sectors. Chemical products such as ammonium nitrate (AN), manufactured and supplied for bulk mining explosive emulsions, have entered IED-building networks, and are sourced principally from Ghana and Nigeria. Commercial explosives in bulk, including their precursors and accessories such as electric initiators and detonating cords, are diverted from the legal to illicit markets. This diversion primarily fulfils demand from the largely unregulated artisanal gold mining sector across West and Central Africa. A small subset of this diverted material also provisions IED construction. Captured, stolen, and recovered explosive ordnance—including legacy anti-vehicle mines trafficked from Chad, Libya, and possibly Sudan—also constitutes a source of IED components. Coordinated action among affected, source, and transit states is required to prevent armed groups and criminals from accessing commercial explosive materials and other IED components. Such action can involve: national stocktaking exercises; the development of national and regional counter-IED (C-IED) strategies; monitoring, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms; regulatory modernization and harmonization;  engagement with artisanal mining associations, the mining and explosives industry, states, and regional trade blocs in pursuit of regulatory reform; and efforts to establish minimum standards for bulk and individual traceability of commercial explosives. Reducing the recovery of explosive ordnance requires renewed programmatic investment in clearing minefields and explosive remnants of war across the Sahe   

Geneva, SWIT:  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , 2023.  124p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition. 

KEY FINDINGS • Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied. • Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes. • A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU. • The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.

By Rachel A. Kane; Basia E. Lopez; Paul A. Haskins

This Special Report of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) presents a synthesis of select findings from over 60 publications on 18 NIJ-supported research projects on public mass shootings, including school mass shootings, since 2014. It also identifies areas of need and interest for future research and recommendations. For the purpose of this report, we define public mass shooting as a shooting event in a public setting that causes at least four fatalities in a single event. Excluded from our definition are events that occur in the course of a separate felony or domestic incident. However, the definition of a mass shooting varies among sources; for more information see “The Challenges of Defining ‘Mass Shooting’” in Part I of this report.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice , 2023. 42p.

By: Jonathan P. Caulkins, Philippe C. Schicker, H. Brinton Milward & Peter Reuter

Overdose deaths in North America have soared, primarily because of the spread of illegally manufactured fentanyl. This paper uses detailed qualitative and transaction-level data to analyse an early and prominent dark web fentanyl-selling operation. The data record the date, drug, quantity, and selling price for 5,589 transactions comprising 872,659 items sold for a little over $2.8 million through AlphaBay. Findings include that the organisation sustained an impressive sales growth rate of approximately 15% per week, com-pounded. Increasing order sizes by a factor of ten reduced the price per pill by approximately 25% for Oxycodone and 50% for Xanax. Those steep quantity discounts imply large price markups when selling further down the distribution chain. Such high growth rates and price markups suggest that it might be difficult to constrain supply by shutting down individual organisations, since any remain-ing organisations may be able to quickly grow to fill unmet demand.

Glob. Crime 2023

By Catrina Doxsee, Alexander Palmer, and Riley McCabe

Terrorism is no longer the leading international threat to the United States or its top defense priority, but challenges related to violent extremism remain. The threat from Salafi-jihadist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State has declined, and ethnonationalist threats are largely contained. However, a broader patchwork of violent far-right and far-left extremist ideologies has become more prominent on the global stage. Meanwhile, terrorism continues to overlap in significant ways with strategic competition, especially via Iran's support to terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. 138p.

By  Vincenzo Bove,  Georgios Efthyvoulou,  and Harry Pickard

Numerous studies demonstrate that terrorism causes strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Yet, are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a quasi-experimental design and data on three successful and three foiled terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of successful attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 130 days after the attacks. We also find that, whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Interestingly, foiled attacks can also affect public perceptions, which, however, quickly return to normal levels. We argue that the extent of media coverage is partly responsible for the duration of these effects.

United Kingdom: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2022, 19p.

By Jens F. Binder and Jonathan Kenyon

This work is concerned with the extent and magnitude of threat related to online radicalization in the context of terrorist acts and related offending. Online influences have been depicted as major drivers for the propagation and adoption of extremist ideologies, which often contain an element of collective grievance, and subsequent acts of violence. This is most pronounced in the discussion of so-called lone actor terrorism, but extends to all forms of extremist offending, and beyond. The present work situates online radicalization leading to terrorist acts within the wider context of grievance-based beliefs and attitudes. Further, it addresses current positions and debates surrounding the relevance and mechanisms of online radicalization in terrorist offending. Recent evidence from quantitative studies is reviewed to estimate prevalence of online radicalization and the level of threat that results from it. This is followed by a discussion of plausible, but opposing, interpretations of the estimates presented. While online radicalization does occur, with and without reference to offline processes, the resulting threat is not overly high. This assessment, however, refers to the present only and is unlikely to hold for the future, given the general growth and acceleration of online activity among terrorist actors

United Kingdom: Forensic and Legal Psychology, 2022, 10p.

By Jonathan Kenyon

The overarching aim of this doctoral research was to investigate the role of the Internet in radicalisation pathways and offending of convicted extremists in England and Wales. The empirical study was unique because it benefitted from access to closed source risk assessment reports within His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). These reports were authored by Psychologists and Probation Officers with access to restricted case documentation and in the majority of cases, direct interviews with the individuals concerned. Findings were based on 235 convicted extremists, all of whom were considered to have radicalised prior to committing their offence. Variables of interest, including offender demographics, offence characteristics and online activities were extracted from risk reports completed from October 2010 to December 2017. Since completion of the doctorate, the analysis has been expanded to 437 convicted extremists, which includes all those subject to risk reports from October 2010 to December 2021. This accounts for close to every convicted extremist in England and Wales considered to have radicalised prior to their conviction.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 4p.

By Hanna Paalgard Munden, Sarah Marsden, MD Kamruzzaman Bhuiyan, Lotta Rahlf, Hanna Rigault Arkhis, Aimee Taylor

This report sets out the findings of research to understand the potential of the Good Lives Model (GLM) to interpret trajectories into and out of violent extremism and considers the implications for policy and practice. The Good Lives Model (GLM) is a well-developed manifestation of a strength-based approach to rehabilitation. The model argues that focusing on developing strengths and enhancing protections, rather than solely managing and controlling risk factors, offers a more fruitful route to preventing (re)offending. The GLM has become an increasingly prominent part of efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders, however its potential with respect to the violent extremist population has not been fully exploited. This report is informed by a review of research on protective factors set out in an earlier report: Conceptualising Protective Factors: Strength-Based Approaches (Marsden and Lee, 2022) that established the theoretical foundation for the empirical research set out here.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 30p.

By Rosamund Mutton, James Lewis, and Sarah Marsden

This guide sets out the evidence base for ‘online radicalisation’, examining how individual use of the Internet, in conjunction with offline influences, can facilitate radicalisation processes. The UK is the main context of concern, however comparable evidence is found in studies with samples from the USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Israel. Radicalisation remains a contentious concept and few studies explicitly define ‘online radicalisation’. For the purposes of this guide, ‘radicalisation’ is understood as leading to cognitive outcomes reflected in changes in beliefs and ideas, and/or behavioural outcomes which manifest in changes in behaviour. Two systematic literature reviews (Hassan et al., 2018; Carthy et al., 2020) directed initial searches for relevant research. Further literature was identified through forward and backward citation searching, and narrower key word searches conducted in Google Scholar. Literature searches were completed between June and August 2022. The guide primarily examines literature published between January 2017 and July 2022. Although the evidence base remains modest in size, the research underpinning this guide is assessed to be good quality. There is a growing body of evidence that uses qualitative and quantitative methods to examine a range of factors which are relevant to online radicalisation.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 42p.

By Joanna Dawson

This paper describes the recent history and present status of proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 (the “2000 Act”). Prior to the 2000 Act, proscription was exclusively concerned with terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. Under the 2000 Act, proscription was extended to include organisations concerned with both domestic and international terrorism. The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is “concerned in terrorism”. If the Home Secretary believes that an organisation meets this statutory test, they must then decide whether to proscribe the organisation. In doing so, they must take into account various policy considerations. Consequences of proscription The 2000 Act sets out a number of proscription offences. These include belonging to or inviting support for a proscribed organisation; arranging or assisting with the arrangement of a meeting that supports a proscribed organisation; addressing such a meeting; or wearing clothing or displaying articles in public which arouse suspicion of membership or support of a proscribed organisation. It is also possible to impose financial sanctions on proscribed organisations.   Current proscribed organisations As of September 2023 there were 79 international terrorist groups proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland proscribed under previous legislation. In November 2021 the Home Secretary announced that the Government had laid an instrument to proscribe Hamas in its entirety, ending the distinction between different wings of the organisation. In September 2023 the Government laid an instrument to proscribe Wagner Group, a private military organisation which has acted as a proxy for the Russian state. The Government considers it to involved in committing acts of terrorism, including in relation to its involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Annex to this paper includes a current list of proscribed organisations and a description of their activities. Criticisms of the proscription regime Proscription has been characterised as a powerful deterrent, a way of tackling lower-level support for terrorism, and a signal of rejection by society. But questions have also been raised as to its utility in combating terrorism and its compatibility with the rule of law. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Lord David Anderson KC, repeatedly recommended the introduction of time limits for proscription orders, as have his successors, Max Hill QC and the current IPTL, Jonathan Hall KC. However, the Government has so far declined to follow these recommendations and currently deproscription is done by way of application only. As a consequence, groups that no longer meet the statutory requirements for proscription continue to be proscribed, a situation described by Lord Anderson as “an affront to the rule of law”.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024, 70p.