By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

By Hanna Paalgard Munden, Sarah Marsden, MD Kamruzzaman Bhuiyan, Lotta Rahlf, Hanna Rigault Arkhis, Aimee Taylor

This report sets out the findings of research to understand the potential of the Good Lives Model (GLM) to interpret trajectories into and out of violent extremism and considers the implications for policy and practice. The Good Lives Model (GLM) is a well-developed manifestation of a strength-based approach to rehabilitation. The model argues that focusing on developing strengths and enhancing protections, rather than solely managing and controlling risk factors, offers a more fruitful route to preventing (re)offending. The GLM has become an increasingly prominent part of efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders, however its potential with respect to the violent extremist population has not been fully exploited. This report is informed by a review of research on protective factors set out in an earlier report: Conceptualising Protective Factors: Strength-Based Approaches (Marsden and Lee, 2022) that established the theoretical foundation for the empirical research set out here.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 30p.

By Hanna Börgmann

This report provides a summary of the expert conference “In the Blind Spot – Right-Wing Extremists on Alternative and Established Platforms“, which took place in Berlin in September 2023 as part of the “Countering Radicalisation in Right-Wing Extremist Online Subcultures” programme funded by the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ). The third conference of the programme served to present current research projects from digital right-wing extremism research and to discuss various perspectives from research, regulation and law enforcement.

The report emphasises the social and political relevance of the research field and current trends in right-wing extremism research, underpinned by welcoming addresses from Benjamin Strasser, State Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ), and Huberta von Voss, Executive Director of ISD Germany, among others. Dr Julia Ebner, extremism expert and ISD Senior Research Fellow, and Dr Matthias Becker, project manager of the interdisciplinary research project “Decoding Antisemitism”, also provided keynote speeches.

The conference was divided into several panels that focused primarily on discursive and strategic developments, far-right financing, research into right-wing online activities, deradicalization and online regulation. In the discussion panel, a panel of experts focused on the effects of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA).

Berlin: ISD - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 19p.

By: Holger Anders

Mali has faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by extremists, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Continuity and Change: Extremist-used Arms in Mali—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used in extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022, and the sources and pathways through which they were obtained.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 16p.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

by Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

n this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 44p.

By Moonshot

Over a one year period from April 2021 - March 2022, Moonshot partnered with three violence prevention organizations to deliver an online interventions pilot in two Canadian provinces. The pilot advertised psychosocial support services to individuals engaging with extremist content online. Access to these services was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous by design. Our goal was to offer a secure pathway for at-risk individuals to contact a trained therapist or social worker. We built this approach around offering integrated care. Together with our intervention partners, we crafted our advertising messages and service websites to emphasize the confidential, non-judgemental support that callers would receive. Individuals who reached out were connected to an interdisciplinary team, which included a therapist, youth engagement workers, a psychiatrist, and other intervention staff who could offer services like counseling, employment support, addiction support, or simply a space to talk. Our partners were the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) team in Ontario, and Recherche et Action sur les Polarisations Sociales (RAPS) in Quebec. The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPNPREV) acted as a convening and best practice provider, and supported our pilot evaluation. A description of each organization is at the end of this report. Moonshot’s intervention campaigns ran for a total of six months, and reached individuals consuming incel and violent far-right extremist content on Google Search and YouTube. Our online interventions focused on meeting individuals’ psychosocial needs, and appealed to vulnerabilities and grievances, such as anger, frustration, exhaustion, and isolation. Executive summary Key outcomes Moonshot redirected 786 at-risk individuals to our intervention partners’ websites. 22 initiated a conversation with a counselor. Four individuals formally registered and engaged with a service provider for several months, in addition to those who accessed virtual counselling without going through the registration process. At least one person who initially shared violent impulses has been able to find positive, hopeful alternatives for the future. Moonshot’s ads reached users engaging with harmful content on Google and YouTube 44,508 times. Among the hundreds of users redirected to ETA and RAPS’ websites, 26 were watching influential incel YouTube channels and 39 had searched Google for high-risk keywords related to incel and violent far-right ideology (“looksmax org”; “1488 tattoos”). Moonshot, ETA, RAPS, and CPN-PREV established an effective multi-sectoral partnership. During our pilot program, we co-designed support pathways and risk escalation procedures for each service area, built teams’ capacity to deliver online interventions safely and effectively, and engaged at-risk audiences online. This pilot provides a blueprint for future interventions to reach and engage at-risk internet users. New iterations of this work can reach larger audiences by expanding advertising beyond the pilot platforms, strengthening and expanding cross-sectoral partnerships, and testing new ways to reach often-isolated internet users.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023. 13p.

By Moonshot and the Anti-Defamation League

Moonshot partnered with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to analyze US search traffic in July 2020 in response to the threats posed by white supremacist narratives and ideology in the US this past year. The dominant socio-political events of 2020-2021—the COVID-19 pandemic, the widespread BLM protests and counter-protests, and the presidential election—coalesced to create fertile ground for white supremacists and other violent extremist movements to mobilize and recruit. In 2020, racism and systemic racial inequality took center stage in the American public eye, with nationwide mass protests against recent police killings of Black people and historic evidence of racial injustice.1 In a nationwide reactionary mobilization, members of armed extremist groups made frequent appearances at BLM protests as self-appointed “protection” for property and counter-protesters.2 This high-profile direct action, combined with tacit and explicit support from local and national political figures, contributed to an increased interest in white supremacist and racist ideas by segments of the country.3 Protests and opposition to state lockdowns and other measures introduced in response to COVID-19 also provided opportunities for extremist movements to mobilize and engage with wider swathes of the public around shared grievances. While anti-lockdown protests were not related to white supremacy on the surface, these movements began to overlap in their joint opposition to the BLM movement, the defense of Confederate monuments, and general opposition to perceived government tyranny.4 Similarly, national protests alleging election rigging in the wake of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory were repeatedly co-opted and reinforced by white supremacist groups, culminating in the 6 January siege on the US Capitol. Extremist groups and individuals expressing support for white supremacist ideas were well-documented participants in the insurrection. White supremacist groups and other extremist organizations seized on the tensions and uncertainty in American life to promote racist beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to increase their recruitment. Extremist narratives related to the pandemic promoted the conspiracy theory alleging that COVID-19 is a hoax created by a Jewish-led cabal. This and related anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are mainstays of many QAnon narratives.5 Other groups, such as the Patriot Front, have used the past year’s societal upheavals to recruit new members by promoting an impending race war and the perceived persecution of white people—as indicated by conspiracy theories such as “white genocide” and “the great replacement”.6 Extremist groups also exploited wider tensions, perceived grievances and disinformation against the BLM movement, as well as popular disinformation alleging the election was rigged. The findings from this project provide valuable insights on the types of harmful narratives and content that appeal to individuals potentially at-risk of radicalization, including those first searching for extremist slogans and conspiracies out of curiosity. This report presents an overview of the search traffic data collected during the project, between 17 July 2020 - 7 March 2021, and our main findings on online white supremacist narrative trends during this time.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2021. 21p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence

Within the world of 3D-printed guns, one pseudonymous figure has emerged as a symbol for the cause of universal access to firearms: “JStark1809”. He created the world’s most popular 3D-printed gun and established an influential network of 3D-printed gun designers. Since his death in July 2021, he has been memorialised as a martyr for the right to bear arms. In this report, ICSR Senior Research Fellow Dr Rajan Basra identifies “JStark1809” as Jacob Duygu, a German national born to Kurdish parents who arrived as refugees from Southeast Turkey in the 1990s. Using a combination of authorship attribution techniques, JStark can be identified as the author of over 700 seemingly “anonymous” comments on 4chan’s /pol/ board. He disclosed hitherto unknown details about his life, broader political views, and extremist attitudes.

Chapter one lays out the findings and structure of the report. Chapter two details the open-source methodology used in finding JStark’s digital footprint, including how he was identified as the author of “anonymous” comments. It also summarises JStark’s biographical details.

The subsequent chapters analyse JStark’s life according to three themes: (1) his journey to designing 3D-printed firearms; (2) his political beliefs, including his xenophobic online behaviour and threats of violence as expressed on 4chan’s /pol/; and (3) his life as a self-identified incel, attitudes to misogynistic violence, and his related suicidal ideation. The report concludes with implications for the broader 3D-printed gun movement.

London: ICSR, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 2023. 52p.

By Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

This report aims to provide a first look into Irish far-right activity on the messaging app, Telegram, where the movement is operating both as identifiable groups and influencers, and anonymously-run channels and groups. The report looks at the activity across 34 such Telegram channels through the lens of a series of case studies where content posted on these channels resulted in real life consequences. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the report examines the tactics, language and trends within these channels, providing much-needed detail on the activity of the Irish far-right online. This report was produced in conjunction with TheJournal.ie and its investigative platform Noteworthy.ie as part of their Eyes Right series, examining the growth of far-right ideology on Irish online networks, and its influence on wider public opinion.

Beirut; London; etc.: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2021). ,30p.

By The Digital Citizens Alliance

Digital platforms enabled the disturbing rise of domestic extremism, culminating with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Militia groups use social media networks to plan operations, recruit new members and spread anti-democracy propaganda, a new Digital Citizens Alliance (Digital Citizens) and Coalition for a Safer Web (CSW) investigation has found.

Taking a page from Jihadists, these extremist groups operate along the fringes of where platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram will let them. Federal prosecutors investigating the Capitol riot revealed how militia groups used social media platforms to coordinate and prepare for possible conflict with Antifa. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995.

Washington, DC: Digital Citizens Alliance, 2021. 56p.

By Ariel Bogle

As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups,1 there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms.2 There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia,3 and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities.4 This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’5 now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload.6 Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels7 that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence8 as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries.9 The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.

Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, International Cyber Policy Centre 2021.36p.

By Riza Kumar

Protracted insurgencies and the growing threat by local affiliates of the global terrorism networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) throughout Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have transformed on-the-ground responses to violent extremism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia continues to grapple with the unrelenting force of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab; Burkina Faso contends with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam; and Nigeria remains encumbered by Boko Haram’s 14-year insurgency and the increasingly violent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). As serious and sustained militant and terrorist movements continue to kill thousands and displace millions, the three respective governments have altered their responses to violent extremists and terrorism, integrating civilian-led, community-based security strategies into their national counterterrorism programs. National armies and their international partners have offered some reprieve from enduring violent conflicts, but in many cases have failed to offer comprehensive protections to all civilians. Civilian counterterrorism militias emerged to provide security to vulnerable communities and were quickly recognized as an alternative to state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns. However, once these counterterrorism militias were enlisted and absorbed into the national security apparatus, new—albeit long-established—challenges quickly emerged. Localized counterterrorism campaigns have at times devolved into vengeful operations against ethnic rivals as well as opportunities to carry out illicit activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, and looting. The benefits and drawbacks of civilian counterterrorism militias remain consistent across different regions. The strategy is cost-effective and practical as civilian defense forces are often cheaper than formal security units, such as the national army and the police. There is a ready pool of potential local recruits to safeguard vulnerable communities, and they are knowledgeable about the communities they protect. Most importantly, civilian troops establish a level of community loyalty that can be difficult to achieve with national armies. Significant drawbacks of civilian forces are that troops can become unreliable and difficult to control if not properly managed. Furthermore, without strong and effective oversight mechanisms, civilian troops are capable of undermining government authority, rule of law, and governance. Unfortunately, if not carefully executed, civilian forces could deteriorate into armed criminal networks,1 transforming from vanguards of safety into long-term sources of instability and insecurity.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2023. 24p.

By Anders Strindberg

This report provides an overview of Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its utility as an integrative framework for the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. SIT is a sociological theory for understanding the effects of social identification on group membership, group behaviour, and intergroup relations. It was designed specifically for the study of intergroup conflict, but scholars have developed a comprehensive analytical apparatus for improving our understanding of multiple aspects both of inter- and intragroup relations and conflict. SIT can serve as scaffolding for organizing our knowledge about terrorism and violent extremism, but also as a foundation for new analytical tools and structures. Following a preface, chapter one demonstrates the need for an integrative analytical framework in the qualitative study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter two discusses why SIT is suitable as such a framework, and also the main criticisms against it. Chapters four through seven examine the basic hypotheses and implications of SIT and each chapter identifies some to the key implications for the study of terrorism and violent extremism. Chapter eight outlines a particularly influential SIT-derived structure for organizing analysis of terrorism – Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorism” – and chapter nine provides a brief summary and conclusion.

Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2020. 80p.

Armstrong-Scott, Gabrielle L.; Waldo, Jim

From the document: "Ten years ago, U.S. national security agencies grew concerned about a relatively new and powerful weapon used by terrorists: the World Wide Web. What had begun as an effort to connect end users from across the world to share information and to serve as a force of human liberation, instead began to be used as a tool for destruction of life. Terrorists were exploiting technology companies' lax content moderation policies to recruit new members, spread violent extremist ideology, and plan terrorist attacks. [...] Technology companies and governments have spent the past decade trying to better address the evolving threat of terrorist and violent extremist content online (TVEC). However, there are few studies examining just how effective these efforts have been, where we are today in managing the problem, and wherein lie gaps for improvement. This paper argues that companies' efforts to deal with TVEC have been hampered at the outset by a tendency to define TVEC extremely narrowly. [...] This paper also explores the idea of ethical obligations and norms as an alternative to a legally required definition. On the technical side, this paper finds that even if there was consensus on the legal and ethical questions surrounding TVEC, the technical tools currently available are no panacea. Trade-offs across efficiency, scalability, accuracy, and resilience are persistent. Current technical tools tend to disadvantage minority groups and non-English languages. They are also less robustly implemented across small and non-U.S./European firms, generally either because they are left out of inter-firm initiatives or because they lack resources and capability. This paper does not claim to cover every issue relevant to TVEC; however, it highlights several important gaps that could be addressed by policymakers and tech companies and identifies avenues for future research."

Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs. 2023.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this  process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),    2023. 22p.

By Olaizola Rosenblat, Mariana; Barrett, Paul (Paul M.)

From the document: "This report draws on existing literature; fresh interviews with gamers, gaming company executives, and experts; and findings from a multinational survey of gamers conducted in January 2023. [...] A growing body of evidence shows that bad actors exploit basic features of video games and adjacent platforms to channel hate-based rhetoric, network with potential sympathizers, and mobilize for action--sometimes with deadly consequences. The relative ease with which extremists have been able to manipulate gaming spaces points to the need for urgent action by industry actors to avoid further harm. Although some gaming companies have made recent investments in content moderation technologies and systems, most companies are still far behind in terms of adequately governing and mitigating abuse of their platforms. This call to address extremist exploitation became more urgent in April 2023 in the wake of media reports that the large gaming-adjacent platform, Discord, had been used by a young U.S. air national guardsman for the reckless and allegedly illegal sharing of top-secret military documents, which then were spread to other online sites. [...] Yet another reason to pay attention to the ways gaming spaces have been misused is that the technologies that help make video games so appealing are poised to become far more common. [...] Heeding the popularity of gaming, these companies are pouring billions of dollars into the creation of a fully immersive 3-D [three-dimensional] Internet. Addressing the extremist exploitation of gaming spaces today will better prepare the industry to usher in new technologies while preventing harm to individuals and societies."

New York University. Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. 2023. 40p.

By Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner

  This report presents the findings of a project that investigated the prevalence, scale and nature of the ideologies and narratives that motivated the attack which left 51 dead and injured a further 50 more during Friday prayers at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. The report explores the origins of the ‘Great Replacement’ and ‘white genocide’ theories and the dynamics and platforms which have allowed the ideas to spread. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis across mainstream and alternative social media channels, this report reveals significant mainstreaming of extreme-right narratives across social media platforms and in language and policies promoted by mainstream politicians in Europe and North America. This report provides some recommendations for steps to be taken by technology companies, government and civil society to counter the spread of extremist ideologies.   

Beirut; Berlin; London; Paris; Washington DC : Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2019. 36p.