By Iftekharul Bashar

In 2024, Bangladesh faces a growing threat of radicalism fuelled by political instability, security vacuums, and weakened counterterrorism infrastructure. Unless the interim government adopts a zero-tolerance policy and strengthens law enforcement and intelligence efforts, extremist groups may gain further ground, leading to long-term instability. COMMENTARY Bangladesh is facing an increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism. The political violence and instability of 2024 have worsened the situation, with extremist elements exploiting the security vacuum created by the regime change. Weakened law enforcement and intelligence agencies, along with the rise of armed groups and radical ideologies, pose a serious threat to the country’s stability. Bangladesh risks long-term insecurity with broader regional implications without swift and decisive action.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU , 2024. 4p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

SYNOPSIS As we enter the new year, armed conflicts continue to rage across the globe, destabilising nations, regions, and even the global order. Terrorist attacks and state responses create ripple effects, which not only shape the battlefields but redefine states, fragment societies, and radicalise communities. What does the terrorism threat landscape look like in 2025?

COMMENTARY Global terrorism will remain a persistent and pervasive threat to the stability and peace of the world. The Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Iran-sponsored Shiite and Sunni militia have exacerbated instability around the globe, while geopolitical competitions have polarised and fragmented the community of nations. Unless governments work together to mitigate common security challenges, threat actors will exploit the gaps, loopholes, and weaknesses in global security systems. All nations need to be steadfast in preventing and preempting threats from taking root and facing up to threats from state and non-state actors including lone wolf attackers. In addition to disinformation operations, threat actors will attack information infrastructure. Nations will need to secure the online domain as hostile states increase their cyberattacks, sabotage infrastructure, assassinate public officials, and engage in espionage.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore 2025. 5p.

By Heidi Ellis , Alisa B. Miller , Georgios Sideridis , Rochelle Frounfelker , Diana Miconi , Saida Abdi , Farah Aw-Osman and Cecile Rousseau

Objectives: We examine the association between perceived discrimination, mental health, social support, and support for violent radicalization (VR) in young adults from three locations across two countries: Montréal and Toronto, Canada, and Boston, United States. A secondary goal is to test the moderating role of location. Methods: A total of 791 young adults between the ages of 18 and 30, drawn from the Somali Youth longitudinal study and a Canada-based study of college students, participated in the study. We used multivariate linear regression to assess the association between scores on the Radical Intentions Scale (RIS) with demographic characteristics, anxiety, depression, social support, and discrimination. Results: In the full sample, discrimination, age, and gender were associated with RIS scores. When we examined moderation effects by location, RIS scores were associated with depression only in Montréal, and with social support (negatively) and discrimination in Toronto. None of the variables were significant in Boston. Conclusion: These findings suggest that an understanding of risk and protective factors for support of VR may be context-dependent. Further research should take into consideration local/regional differences

International Journal of Public Health published: 29 March 2021, 10 p.

By Michael Wolfowicz, Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, and Badi Hasisi

Abstract Background: Two of the most central questions in radicalization research are, (1)why do some individuals radicalize when most of those from the same groups or exposed to similar conditions do not? and (2) why do radicalized individuals turn to radical violence while the majority remain inert? It has been suggested that the answer to both questions lie in the cumulative and interactive effects of a range of risk factors. While risk assessment and counter‐radicalization take a risk‐protectivefactor approach, there is widespread debate as to what these factors are and which are most important.Objectives: This review has two primary objectives.1) To identify what the putative risk and protective factors for different radica-lization outcomes are, without any predeterminations.2) To synthesize the evidence and identify the relative magnitude of the effects of different factors.The review's secondary objectives are to:1) Identify consistencies in the estimates of factors across different radicalizationoutcomes.2) Identify whether any significant heterogeneity exists within factors between(a) geographic regions, and (b) strains of radicalizing ideologies.Search Methods: Over 20 databases were searched for both published and gray literature. In order to provide a more comprehensive review, supplementary sear-ches were conducted in two German and one Dutch database. Reference harvesting was conducted from previous reviews and contact was made with leading researchers to identify and acquire missing or unpublished studies.Selection Criteria: The review included observational studies assessing the out-comes of radical attitudes, intentions, and/or radical behaviors in OECD countries and which provided sufficient data to calculate effect sizes for individual‐level risk and protective factors.Data Collection and Analysis: One‐hundred and twenty‐seven studies, containing 206 samples met the inclusion criteria and provided 1302 effect sizes pertaining to over 100 different factors. Random effects meta‐analyses were carried out for each factor, and meta‐regression and moderator analysis were used to explore differ-ences across studies.Results: Studies were primarily cross‐sectional, with samples representing 20 OECD countries. Most studies examined no specific radicalizing ideology, while others focussed on specific ideologies (e.g., Islamist, right‐wing, and left‐wing ideologies). The studies generally demonstrated low risk of bias and utilized validated or widely acceptable measures for both indicators and outcomes.With some exceptions, sociodemographic factors tend to have the smallest estimates, with larger estimates for experiential and attitudinal factors, followed by traditional criminogenic and psychological factors.Authors' Conclusions: While sociodemographic factors are the most commonly examined factors (selective availability), they also tend to have the smallest es-timates. So too, attitudinal and even experiential factors, do not have effect sizes of the magnitude that could lead to significant reductions in risk through tar-geting by interventions. Conversely, traditional criminogenic factors, as well as psychological factors tend to display the largest estimates. These findings suggest the need to broaden the scope of factors considered in both risk assessment and intervention, and this review provides much needed evidence for guiding the selection of factors

Campbell Systematic Reviews: Volume 17, Issue 3 September 2021, 90 p.

By Joana Cook, Eva Herschinger, Seran de Leede, and Anna-Maria Andreeva

The literature focusing on gender and radicalisation has steadily increased over the last ten years. This has reflected the rise of extremism across the globe, and has been particularly triggered by researchers seeking to better understand the experiences of individuals throughout all stages of the radicalisation process. However, research on the topic has also largely focused on the experiences of women, especially those associated with Islamist forms of extremism. Such narrow focus has resulted in several gaps in the literature, which in turn has translated into gaps in practice. This report seeks to identify the key trends in research between 2014 and 2024 concerning literature on gender and radicalisation, as well as make explicit the areas that remain underexplored. Focusing on tangible recommendations, which align with the needs of practitioners, the report seeks to bring forward the state of the art of research on gender and radicalisation.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2024. 21p.

By Alice Marwick, Benjamin Clancy, Katherine Furl

This literature review examines cross-disciplinary work on radicalization to situate, historicize, frame, and better understand the present concerns around online radicalization and far-right extremist and fringe movements. We find that research on radicalization is inextricably linked to the post-9/11 context in which it emerged, and as a result is overly focused on studying the other. Applying this research to the spread of far-right ideas online does not account for the ways in which the far-right’s endorsement of white supremacy and racism holds historical, normative precedent in the United States. Further, radicalization research is rife with uncertainties, ranging from definitional ambiguity to an inability to identify any simplistic, causal models capable of fully explaining the conditions under which radicalization occurs. Instead, there are multiple possible pathways to radicalization, and while the internet does not cause individuals to adopt far-right extremist or fringe beliefs, some technological affordances may aid adoption of these beliefs through gradual processes of socialization. We conclude that the term “radicalization” does not serve as a useful analytical frame for studying the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online. Instead, potential analytical frameworks better suited to studying these phenomena include theories prominent in the study of online communities, conversion, mainstreaming, and sociotechnical theories of media effects.

A summary of key take-aways includes:

The adoption of extremist, far-right, and fringe beliefs is often referred to as “radicalization,” a term formulated post-9/11 to understand jihadi terrorism, a very different context from the far-right.

Radicalization research is full of uncertainty.

• No specific type of person is vulnerable to radicalization, and most people who commit political violence are not mentally ill or alienated from society.

• Radicalization is not caused by poverty, oppression, or marginalization.

• There is no one way in which people are “radicalized.”

• Viewing extremist media does not necessarily lead to adopting extremist beliefs or committing political violence.

In contrast to the “red pill” model, radicalization is gradual. Recruits slowly adopt the identities, emotions, and interpretations shared by a community. They conceptualize their problems as injustices caused by others, and justify using political violence against them.

The internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.

"Radicalization” is not a useful frame for understanding the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online.

• It is analytically imprecise and morally judgmentalIt doesn’t help us understand the role of media and digital technologies.

• It is inextricably tied to a global security infrastructure targeting Islam.

• It doesn’t account for the fact that fringe or far-right beliefs may change what people think is “true” and “false,” making it hard to find common ground.

• The focus on violence ignores other worrying effects of mainstreaming far-right and fringe ideas.

Publisher: Bulletin of Technology & Public Life, 2022. 83p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

By Simon Greipl, Julian Hohner, Heidi Schulze, Patrick Schwabl, Diana Rieger

Social media messages can elicit emotional reactions and mobilize users. Strategic utilization of emotionally charged messages, particularly those inducing fear, potentially nurtures a climate of threat and hostility online. Coined fear speech (FS), such communication deliberately portrays certain entities as imminently harmful and drives the perception of a threat, especially when the topic is already crisis-laden. Despite the notion that FS and the resulting climate of threat can serve as a justification for radical attitudes and behavior toward outgroups, research on the prevalence, nature, and context of FS is still scarce. The current paper aims to close this gap and provides a definition of FS, its theoretical foundations, and a starting point for (automatically) detecting FS on social media. The paper presents the results of a manual as well as an automated content analysis of three broadly categorized actor types within a larger radical German Telegram messaging sphere (2.9 million posts). With a rather conservative classification approach, we analyzed the prevalence and distribution of FS for more than five years in relation to six crisis-specific topics. A substantial proportion between 21% and 34% within the observed communication of radical/extremist actors was classified as FS. Additionally, the relative amount of FS was found to increase with the overall posting frequency. This underscores FS's potential as an indicator for radicalization dynamics and crisis escalation.

Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media. Vol. 4, 2024.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

From the document: "Eruptions of violence during the events of January 6th 2021 exemplified the need to understand how conspiracy theories and extremism interact to create security threats. Social media presents as a key player in this exchange, and this project sought to respond to that dynamic by exploring and seeking to understand the intra-actions in groups which discuss both conspiracy beliefs and extreme ideas. To achieve this, it synthesises techniques from computer science and social science to analyse data from platforms which enable and promote unguarded speech. [...] This report seeks to understand how conspiracy theories and extreme ideologies impact one another. [...] This report will introduce a new method analysis of conspiracy and politically motivated groups named the SHIFT analysis. This analysis combines data science and social research techniques within a broadly abductive approach to develop new understanding of dynamic events. SHIFT analysis, which is mutable and robust to examine a singular group or between group interactions in this context, is applied to examine the QAnon movement, in the context of the lead up to and aftermath of January 6th, which espoused both extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs." "SHIFT" comes from the beginning letters of the following five analysis procedures: 1. 'S'ocial network analysis and identification; 2. 'H'one extracted sample and coding; 3. 'I'nvestigative netnography; 4. 'F'rame analysis; and 5. 'T'ext analytics.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS. JUN, 2024. 36p.

RISIUS, MARTEN; NAMVAR, MORTEZA; AKHLAGHPOUR, SAEED; XIE, HETIAO (SLIM)

The following excerpt from the document contains multiple links embedded in the original text: "'Content Warning: This insight contains antisemitic, racist, and hateful imagery.' [...] Extremists exploit social media platforms to spread hate against minority groups based on protected attributes such as gender, religion, and ethnicity. Platforms and researchers have been actively developing AI tools to detect and remove such hate speech. However, extremists employ various forms of implicit hate speech (IHS) to evade AI detection systems. IHS spreads hateful messages using subtle expressions and complex contextual semantic relationships instead of explicit abusive words, bringing challenges to automatic detection algorithms. Common forms of IHS include dog whistles, coded language, humorous hate speech, and implicit dehumanisation. Moreover, the forms and expressions of IHS evolve rapidly with societal controversies (e.g., regional wars). Identifying and tracking such changes in IHS is crucial for platforms trying to counter them. In this Insight, we report and analyse 'Substitution' as a new form of IHS. Recently, we observed extremists using 'Substitution' by propagating hateful rhetoric against a target group (e.g., Jews) while explicitly referencing another label group (e.g., Chinese). We show that Substitution not only effectively spreads hate but also exacerbates engagement and obscures detection."

GLOBAL NETWORK ON EXTREMISM AND TECHNOLOGY (GNET). 24 JUN, 2024. 8p.

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

By Hanna Paalgard Munden, Sarah Marsden, MD Kamruzzaman Bhuiyan, Lotta Rahlf, Hanna Rigault Arkhis, Aimee Taylor

This report sets out the findings of research to understand the potential of the Good Lives Model (GLM) to interpret trajectories into and out of violent extremism and considers the implications for policy and practice. The Good Lives Model (GLM) is a well-developed manifestation of a strength-based approach to rehabilitation. The model argues that focusing on developing strengths and enhancing protections, rather than solely managing and controlling risk factors, offers a more fruitful route to preventing (re)offending. The GLM has become an increasingly prominent part of efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders, however its potential with respect to the violent extremist population has not been fully exploited. This report is informed by a review of research on protective factors set out in an earlier report: Conceptualising Protective Factors: Strength-Based Approaches (Marsden and Lee, 2022) that established the theoretical foundation for the empirical research set out here.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 30p.

By Hanna Börgmann

This report provides a summary of the expert conference “In the Blind Spot – Right-Wing Extremists on Alternative and Established Platforms“, which took place in Berlin in September 2023 as part of the “Countering Radicalisation in Right-Wing Extremist Online Subcultures” programme funded by the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ). The third conference of the programme served to present current research projects from digital right-wing extremism research and to discuss various perspectives from research, regulation and law enforcement.

The report emphasises the social and political relevance of the research field and current trends in right-wing extremism research, underpinned by welcoming addresses from Benjamin Strasser, State Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ), and Huberta von Voss, Executive Director of ISD Germany, among others. Dr Julia Ebner, extremism expert and ISD Senior Research Fellow, and Dr Matthias Becker, project manager of the interdisciplinary research project “Decoding Antisemitism”, also provided keynote speeches.

The conference was divided into several panels that focused primarily on discursive and strategic developments, far-right financing, research into right-wing online activities, deradicalization and online regulation. In the discussion panel, a panel of experts focused on the effects of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA).

Berlin: ISD - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 19p.

By: Holger Anders

Mali has faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by extremists, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Continuity and Change: Extremist-used Arms in Mali—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used in extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022, and the sources and pathways through which they were obtained.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 16p.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

by Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

n this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 44p.

By Moonshot

Over a one year period from April 2021 - March 2022, Moonshot partnered with three violence prevention organizations to deliver an online interventions pilot in two Canadian provinces. The pilot advertised psychosocial support services to individuals engaging with extremist content online. Access to these services was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous by design. Our goal was to offer a secure pathway for at-risk individuals to contact a trained therapist or social worker. We built this approach around offering integrated care. Together with our intervention partners, we crafted our advertising messages and service websites to emphasize the confidential, non-judgemental support that callers would receive. Individuals who reached out were connected to an interdisciplinary team, which included a therapist, youth engagement workers, a psychiatrist, and other intervention staff who could offer services like counseling, employment support, addiction support, or simply a space to talk. Our partners were the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) team in Ontario, and Recherche et Action sur les Polarisations Sociales (RAPS) in Quebec. The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPNPREV) acted as a convening and best practice provider, and supported our pilot evaluation. A description of each organization is at the end of this report. Moonshot’s intervention campaigns ran for a total of six months, and reached individuals consuming incel and violent far-right extremist content on Google Search and YouTube. Our online interventions focused on meeting individuals’ psychosocial needs, and appealed to vulnerabilities and grievances, such as anger, frustration, exhaustion, and isolation. Executive summary Key outcomes Moonshot redirected 786 at-risk individuals to our intervention partners’ websites. 22 initiated a conversation with a counselor. Four individuals formally registered and engaged with a service provider for several months, in addition to those who accessed virtual counselling without going through the registration process. At least one person who initially shared violent impulses has been able to find positive, hopeful alternatives for the future. Moonshot’s ads reached users engaging with harmful content on Google and YouTube 44,508 times. Among the hundreds of users redirected to ETA and RAPS’ websites, 26 were watching influential incel YouTube channels and 39 had searched Google for high-risk keywords related to incel and violent far-right ideology (“looksmax org”; “1488 tattoos”). Moonshot, ETA, RAPS, and CPN-PREV established an effective multi-sectoral partnership. During our pilot program, we co-designed support pathways and risk escalation procedures for each service area, built teams’ capacity to deliver online interventions safely and effectively, and engaged at-risk audiences online. This pilot provides a blueprint for future interventions to reach and engage at-risk internet users. New iterations of this work can reach larger audiences by expanding advertising beyond the pilot platforms, strengthening and expanding cross-sectoral partnerships, and testing new ways to reach often-isolated internet users.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023. 13p.

By Moonshot and the Anti-Defamation League

Moonshot partnered with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to analyze US search traffic in July 2020 in response to the threats posed by white supremacist narratives and ideology in the US this past year. The dominant socio-political events of 2020-2021—the COVID-19 pandemic, the widespread BLM protests and counter-protests, and the presidential election—coalesced to create fertile ground for white supremacists and other violent extremist movements to mobilize and recruit. In 2020, racism and systemic racial inequality took center stage in the American public eye, with nationwide mass protests against recent police killings of Black people and historic evidence of racial injustice.1 In a nationwide reactionary mobilization, members of armed extremist groups made frequent appearances at BLM protests as self-appointed “protection” for property and counter-protesters.2 This high-profile direct action, combined with tacit and explicit support from local and national political figures, contributed to an increased interest in white supremacist and racist ideas by segments of the country.3 Protests and opposition to state lockdowns and other measures introduced in response to COVID-19 also provided opportunities for extremist movements to mobilize and engage with wider swathes of the public around shared grievances. While anti-lockdown protests were not related to white supremacy on the surface, these movements began to overlap in their joint opposition to the BLM movement, the defense of Confederate monuments, and general opposition to perceived government tyranny.4 Similarly, national protests alleging election rigging in the wake of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory were repeatedly co-opted and reinforced by white supremacist groups, culminating in the 6 January siege on the US Capitol. Extremist groups and individuals expressing support for white supremacist ideas were well-documented participants in the insurrection. White supremacist groups and other extremist organizations seized on the tensions and uncertainty in American life to promote racist beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to increase their recruitment. Extremist narratives related to the pandemic promoted the conspiracy theory alleging that COVID-19 is a hoax created by a Jewish-led cabal. This and related anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are mainstays of many QAnon narratives.5 Other groups, such as the Patriot Front, have used the past year’s societal upheavals to recruit new members by promoting an impending race war and the perceived persecution of white people—as indicated by conspiracy theories such as “white genocide” and “the great replacement”.6 Extremist groups also exploited wider tensions, perceived grievances and disinformation against the BLM movement, as well as popular disinformation alleging the election was rigged. The findings from this project provide valuable insights on the types of harmful narratives and content that appeal to individuals potentially at-risk of radicalization, including those first searching for extremist slogans and conspiracies out of curiosity. This report presents an overview of the search traffic data collected during the project, between 17 July 2020 - 7 March 2021, and our main findings on online white supremacist narrative trends during this time.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2021. 21p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,