By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

The Trump administration has entered into third-country deportation agreements with 27 countries to date—from Eswatini and Palau to Uzbekistan—sending people to nations where they have no ties, no
language, and in some cases, little to no legal recourse. Yet despite the high foreign policy priority placed by the U.S. government on reaching these agreements, only about 15,000 deportations in 2025 involved third countries, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) estimates.

So, what is driving this policy?

The primary purpose appears less about achieving deportation at scale, given the administration’s goal to carry out 1 million deportations yearly, and more about the strategic use of fear, a new MPI short read argues. Signaling that deportation could mean relocation to a far-off, unfamiliar country with no legal status or protection could increase pressure on unauthorized immigrants to “self-deport” or deter future arrivals, the short read notes.

The analysis maps the four distinct types of agreements now in use, from safe third country agreements to incarceration deals. It examines critical gaps, including the lack of transparency around the agreements, the limited infrastructure of receiving countries, and the limbo deportees face. Courts in the United States and abroad are already weighing in, with the issue expected to end up before the Supreme Court