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INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION FRAUD: HOW POORLY IMPLEMENTED LEGISLATION EFFECTS COUNTRIES, CHILDREN, AND PARENTS

By CARLY GARCIA

As the world regains normalcy following a global pandemic, intercountry adoption has taken a hit. Intercountry adoption within the United States reached its peak in 2004, with 22,988 children placed with families. Since 2004, the United States has seen a drastic decrease in intercountry adoption rates. In 2020, only 1,622 international adoptions took place in the United States; slightly increasing in 2021, with 1,785 children adopted. There are multiple causes for the decline in adoptions. For example, origin countries, such as Russia and Guatemala, have terminated their international adoption programs with the United States. More recently, the leading cause of this decrease is the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries, including China, placed adoptions on hold as the coronavirus took over the world. In contrast, other countries such as Colombia and Bulgaria, relaxed their visitation rules to allow international adoptions to continue.

The current intercountry adoption laws and treaties protect children’s rights and prevent illicit adoption practices. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”) established safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions occur in the “best interest of the child.” However, protection for adoptive parents and birth parents is left to the laws of the country in which they reside. For example, in the United States, the federal statute governing intercountry adoption is the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (“IAA”). Unfortunately, despite the multiple treaties and statutes implemented to prevent illicit adoption practices, fraud still occurs

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2023], Art. 11

Self-Control and Crime: Beyond Gottfredson & Hirschi's Theory

By Callie H. Burt

Over the past several decades, Gottfredson & Hirschi's self-control theory (SCT) has dominated research on self-control and crime. In this review, I assess the current state of self-control knowledge and encourage the field to move beyond SCT, as its peculiar conceptualization of self-control and the causal model present challenges for integrative scholarship. Drawing heavily on scholarship outside criminology, I clarify the definition of self-control; describe the malleable nature of trait self-control; highlight its situational variability as state self-control; and consider the multiplicity of contextual, situational, and individual factors that affect its operation in relation to crime. This specification of contingencies and the interplay between impulse strength and control efforts in the process of self-control is intended as a springboard for research moving beyond SCT and its key premise that self-control (ability) is sufficient to explain individual variation in crime (i.e., is tantamount to criminality). Finally, I address what I see as important areas for further study in light of current knowledge.

Annual Review of Criminology, Vol. 3:43-73, 2020

Revisiting the Problem of Organized Crime in Post-Soviet Development

By Louise I. Shelley

In 1994, the second full year of Demokratizatsiya’s publication, I analyzed the impact of organized crime on the development of post-Soviet states in an article entitled “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Social, and Political Development.”1 This article was written at a time when many in the West were sure that the future course of development for Russia and other post-Soviet states was one of free markets and democracy. Most research on organized crime and high-level corruption in Russia would not be published until much later.2 My article provided a very different and contrarian approach to this rosy scenario for Soviet successor states. In the article’s introduction, I asserted that the infiltration of organized crime into the state would ensure that organized crime would “play a significant role in determining the future course of developments in the Soviet successor states.” In my view, organized crime represented an amalgam of traditional criminals, members of the state security apparatus, former military personnel, and law enforcement officials. I did not associate post-Soviet organized crime exclusively with the very v zakone, the traditional thieves in law or professional criminals. I was especially concerned at the time that the rapid and non-transparent privatization of state property to the benefit of corrupt politicians, organized crime, and their business partners would have persistent and deleterious long-term consequences, leading to the monopolization of key sectors of post-Soviet economies rather than the competitive economies needed for growth.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 30, Number 4, Fall 2022, pp. 411-419

The Local Advantage: Corruption, Organized Crime, and Indigenization in The Nigerian Oil Sector

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

An Evaluation of Crime Victim Compensation in New York: Part of a National Study of Victim Compensation Programs

By Malore Dusenbery, Josh Fording, Jennifer Yahner, Jeanette Hussemann, Robbie Dembo

Victims of crime can experience serious harms and face significant costs with long-term implications for their economic security and safety. From 2022 to 2024, the Urban Institute and NORC at the University of Chicago conducted a National Study of Victim Compensation Program Trends, Challenges, and Successes, which included evaluations of four state crime victim compensation programs. This brief presents our evaluation of New York State’s victim compensation program to understand its utilization and professionals’ and victim claimants’ perspectives on its ability to meet victims’ needs. We conclude that the New York compensation program serves a vital role helping victims address the financial burden of crime with many strengths and recent improvements. Although participants identified some gaps in coverage, the program is overall comprehensive, with no limits on medical costs and increases to property and funeral coverage. And despite challenges making changes to compensation coverage, professionals appreciate that the program has been able to evolve eligibility and benefits based on victims’ needs, which we hope they continue to do for new communities (e.g., migrants) and emerging costs (e.g., informal economy wages). The program has made great efforts to be accessible, with multiple ways to submit a newly shortened application, frequent training and outreach to victim assistance providers and other programs, and a statewide awareness campaign and needs assessment in 2023. The program also recently enacted several major changes to improve the accessibility and equity of the program, particularly eliminating the requirement to report to law enforcement and changing the policy on contributory conduct for homicide claims. Professionals in the compensation program and the community offered recommendations for improving New York’s compensation program regarding awareness and accessibility, compensation coverage, and program funding and staffing. The most common suggestion was to do more public information campaigns and advertising to increase people’s awareness of the program before they become victims. The program could also conduct training and education alongside providers and educate programs in underserved communities beyond victim assistance programs, including schools, hospitals, YMCAs, social services, and family service providers. Additional staff are needed to efficiently process claims, respond to claimant outreach, and help claimants understand the appeals process. Spanish-speaking staff in particular could help reduce the number of Latino claimants who want but do not get help. Potential solutions to increase staff recruitment and retention include increasing salaries, providing more resources on vicarious trauma, and opening up more career paths for staff who start in the compensation program. Many of these findings and recommendations align with those emerging nationally in conversations about how to improve victim compensation programs. We are grateful that programs such as New York’s remain open to evaluation and eager to understand how to continue increasing awareness and accessibility of the program across the state and within underserved communities, maximizing coverage, and improving their efficiency and effectiveness so they may best serve all victims in need.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute 2024. 24p.

Undocumented Immigration and Terrorism: Is there a Connection? 

By Michael T. Light , Julia T. Thomas

Unauthorized immigration, already a divisive and controversial subject in American society, was reframed as a grave national security threat after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. Yet, despite substantial public, political and policy attention to the issue of undocumented immigration and terrorism, there has been relatively little empirical assessment of the relationship between unauthorized immigration flows and terrorist activity. We attempt to fill this gap by combining newly developed estimates of the unauthorized population, a novel use of sentencing and prosecutorial data to measure terrorism-related activity, and multiple data sources on the criminological, socioeconomic, and demographic context from all 50 states from 1990 to 2014. We then leverage this unique dataset to examine the longitudinal, macro-level relationship between undocumented immigration and various measures of terrorism. Results from fixed effects negative binomial models suggest that increased undocumented immigration over this period is not associated with terrorist attacks, radicalization, or terrorism prosecutions.

Soc Sci Res. 2021 February ; 94: 102512. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102512. 

Immigration And Violent Crime: Triangulating Findings Across Diverse Studies

By Michael T. Light and Isabel Anadon

The dramatic increase in both lawful and unauthorized immigration in recent decades produced a groundswell of research on two questions: (1) Does immigration increase violent crime? and (2) What policy responses are most effective at addressing unauthorized immigration (e.g., sanctuary policies, deportations, etc.)? For the most part, these bodies of work have developed independently, and thus we know little as to whether the insights from one inform the other. This Article fills this gap by first reviewing both areas of research and then triangulating shared findings between them. In doing so, we focus on three contemporary immigration policies: (1) increased deportation; (2) “sanctuary” policies, and (3) “amnesty” laws. Our review provides little evidence to suggest that immigration increases the prevalence of violence. For this reason, policies aimed to enhance public safety by reducing immigration are unlikely to deliver on their crime reduction promises.

103 Marq. L. Rev. 939 (2020).

Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue

By Graham C. Ousey and Charis E. Kubrin

Are immigration and crime related? This review addresses this question in order to build a deeper understanding of the immigration-crime relationship. We synthesize the recent generation (1994 to 2014) of immigration-crime research focused on macrosocial (i.e., geospatial) units using a two-pronged approach that combines the qualitative method of narrative review with the quantitative strategy of systematic meta-analysis. After briefly reviewing contradictory theoretical arguments that scholars have invoked in efforts to explain the immigration-crime relationship, we present findings from our analysis, which (a) determined the average effect of immigration on crime rates across the body of literature and (b) assessed how variations in key aspects of research design have impacted results obtained in prior studies. Findings indicate that, overall, the immigration-crime association is negative—but very weak. At the same time, there is significant variation in findings across studies. Study design features, including measurement of the dependent variable, units of analysis, temporal design, and locational context, impact the immigration-crime association in varied ways. We conclude the review with a discussion of promising new directions and remaining challenges in research on the immigration-crime nexus.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2018. 1:63–84

Association of Recreational Cannabis Legalization With Cannabis Possession Arrest Rates in the US

By Christian Gunadi; Yuyan Shi,

Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) has been advocated as a way to reduce the number of individuals interacting with the US criminal justice system; in theory, however, cannabis decriminalization can achieve this objective without generating the negative public health consequences associated with RCL. It is still unclear whether RCL can bring additional benefits in terms of reducing cannabis possession arrests in states that have already decriminalized cannabis. OBJECTIVE -  To examine whether RCL was associated with changes in cannabis possession arrests in US states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period and whether these changes differed across age and racial subgroups. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - This repeated cross-sectional study used cannabis possession arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCRP) for US states from 2010 through 2019. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 6, 2021, to October 12, 2022. EXPOSURES -  Implementation of statewide RCL. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES - Cannabis possession arrest rates per 1000 population per year were assessed with a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design and were used to estimate the association of RCL with arrest rates in RCL states that had or had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. This association was also examined in subgroups for age (adults vs youths) and race (Black vs White). RESULTS - This study included UCRP data for 31 US states, including 9 states that implemented RCL during the study period (4 without and 5 with decriminalization) and 22 non-RCL states. In the 4 states that had not decriminalized cannabis before legalization, RCL was associated with a 76.3% decrease (95% CI, −81.2% to −69.9%) in arrest rates among adults. In the 5 states that had already decriminalized cannabis, RCL was still associated with a substantial decrease in adult arrest rates (−40.0%; 95% CI, −55.1% to −19.8%). There was no association of RCL with changes in arrest rates among youths. In addition, changes in arrest rates associated with RCL did not differ among Black and White individuals. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE -  In this repeated cross-sectional study, RCL was associated with a sizable reduction in cannabis possession arrests among adults in states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period (2010-2019), albeit the magnitude was smaller compared with states that had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. In addition, RCL did not seem to be associated with changes in arrest rates among youths or disparities in arrest rates among Black and White individuals. 

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 5;5(12):e2244922

Alternatives to the Criminalization of Simple Possession of Illicit Drugs: Review and Analysis of the Literature

By Jon Heidt

This report reviews the key research literature on the impact of decriminalization, depenalization, diversion, and harm reduction programs from countries in Europe, North America, South America Oceania, and several U.S. states including California, Maine, Oregon, and Washington state. From this review, key indicators emerged in two domains: crime and criminal justice and mental and public health. Crime and criminal justice indicators include crime rates, levels of organized crime, rates of imprisonment, levels of public disorder (e.g., open air drug use and dealing), drug use trends and patterns, drug availability and price, rates of treatment uptake, addiction and overdose, police clearance rates, costs of enforcement, and functioning. Mental and public health indicators include drug use rates and patterns, rates of drug treatment participation, and rates of drug related mortality. These indicators were used to evaluate the impact that different approaches to drug policy have on society.

Vancouver, BC:  International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2021. 80p.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the United States

By  Almudena Arcelus, Carlos Chiapa, Pierre Cremieux, Maria Garibotti, Owen Hearey, Yeseul Hyun, Lu Jinks, Jee-Yeon Lehmann, Yao Lu, Kritika Narula, Lolo Palacios, Haimin Zhang 

Immigrants are an integral part of the U.S. economy. According to 2022 data from the U.S. Census Bureau, there are approximately 46 million immigrants in the United States, representing close to 14 percent of the total U.S. population. Immigrants participate in the civilian labor force at higher rates than native-born U.S. workers, and they are an important source for U.S. labor force growth that will help offset the large-scale retirement of baby boomers. A significant part of the growth in the foreign-born labor force in the United States over the past decade is associated with the arrival of immigrants who hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. Immigrants in the United States participate in a wide variety of occupations, ranging from high-skilled, high-wage jobs such as physicians and engineers to low-wage jobs such as agriculture work and food manufacturing. During the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns in the United States, immigrants played critical roles in key sectors of the economy, including healthcare, scientific research and development, agriculture, and food supply. Analysis by the Immigration Research Initiative, a nonpartisan think tank, estimates that in 2021, immigrants contributed $3.3 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), which represents 17 percent of total U.S. GDP. In addition to the civilian workforce, immigrants also serve in the U.S. military. As of 2022, nearly 731,000 veterans of the U.S. armed forces were born outside the United States, representing approximately 4.5 percent of the U.S. veteran population, with Mexican and Filipino immigrants comprising the largest groups of foreign-born veterans. 

Boston: The Analysis Group, 2024. 166p.

Uncovering The Ecosystem of Intellectual Property Crime: A Focus on Enablers

By Europol 

Intellectual property (IP) crime refers to the theft, infringement and unauthorised use of intellectual property ( 1 ) such as copyrights, designs, trademarks, patents, and geographical indications of origin, and crimes related to trade secrets. Common types of IP crime include counterfeiting (the manufacture, importation, distribution, storage and sale of goods that falsely carry the trademark of a genuine brand without permission) and piracy (the unauthorised copying, use, reproduction, and distribution of materials protected by intellectual property rights). IP crime continues to pose a threat to the EU’s internal security ( 2 ). The harm produced by IP crime is more significant than it appears at first sight. Not only because of its adverse economic effects, but especially in terms of impact on consumers’ health and safety, and on the EU’s natural environment. Criminal actors operating in IP crime are very adept at exploiting opportunities and loopholes, posing challenges to right holders, law enforcement and other relevant authorities. The scale of crime remains considerable. In 2022, approximately 86 million fake items were seized in the EU, with an estimated value exceeding EUR 2 billion. The most common products seized were games ( 3 ), packaging materials, toys, cigarettes, and recorded CDs/DVDs. 60 % of the goods were detained within the EU, and 40 % at the EU’s borders ( 4 ). The illegal trade in counterfeit goods was estimated to represent 5.8% of imports to the EU( 5 ). IP crime thrives because it fulfils a worldwide demand for low-priced goods, which is satisfied by criminal actors and networks operating across continents. Despite prevention campaigns to expose the health and safety dangers of purchasing and consuming counterfeit goods, besides the severe consequences for the industries and companies targeted, counterfeiting keeps appealing to or misleading consumers. IP crime entails a complex criminal process involving multiple steps and various actors. The infringement of intellectual property rights is only the initial stage of IP crime, as the final objective of counterfeiters is to profit as much as possible from the subsequent illicit sale of the fake goods introduced into the consumers’ market. IP crime relies on a multitude of enablers that make this criminal activity particularly successful and at the same time difficult to tackle. These enabling factors can be crimes in themselves, but can also be lawful activities misused for facilitating IP crime. This report explores the ecosystem of IP crime and its interactions with developments in our society. At the core of the report is a description of the criminal process by which the various types of IP crime are committed and the steps it entails. It assesses which key catalysts in today’s EU and global society drive IP crime, making it an area of opportunity for criminal actors. It zooms in on those factors – be they criminal acts or lawful activity misused for criminal purposes – that enable IP crime. At the same time, it considers how IP crime can function as an enabler of other serious and organised crimes. Ultimately, it describes IP crime’s harmful impact on EU citizens and  This report uses operational data from investigations contributed to Europol. The EUIPO has also collected contributions by the private sector. Case examples are used throughout the report as illustrations. Where relevant, open-source intelligence has been used to corroborate analytical findings. The focus on enablers invites law enforcement authorities (LEAs), legislators, relevant stakeholders and the public to work even more closely to reduce the harm of IP crime and identify the criminals behind it. A cohesive response by all stakeholders, both within and outside the EU, is a prerequisite toward the detection and dismantling of the criminal networks involved

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union , 2024. 45p.

Trends in Drug Driving Charges, Roadside Drug Testing and Drug Use in NSW, 2008-2023 

By Adam Teperski, Stewart Boiteux, and Callan Brown

Aim: To examine trends in drug driving charges, roadside drug testing, and population drug use in New South Wales (NSW) between 2008 and 2023. METHOD Data on drug driving proceedings and roadside drug testing were obtained from the NSW Police Force. Focusing on the period between 2008 and 2023, we describe trends in the number of drug driving charges laid by police, as well as changes in the volume of roadside drug tests undertaken by police and the detection rate over time. We also examine the profile of drivers who are proceeded against after testing positive and any differences in key characteristics over time. Finally, to support the interpretation of these results, we assess changes in drug use from two population drug use monitoring systems and consider associated trends in self-reported drug driving behaviours. RESULTS Between 2008 and 2023, the number of drug driving charges rose from an average of 102 per quarter in 2008 to 3,296 in 2023. This significant growth in charges followed the announcement of two expansions of the NSW Mobile Drug Testing (MDT) program, which resulted in a rapid increase in testing volumes from around 20,000 to 156,000 tests per year in 2008 and 2019 respectively. While the MDT expansions aimed to increase police capacity to detect and deter drug driving behaviours, we found a weak relationship between total testing volumes and subsequent detection rates, with the average detection rate varying between 2% and 18%. This suggests that the number of drug driving charges over this 15-year period was not simply a function of the number of tests conducted, but also related to when, where, and for whom tests were used. When we compared drug driving offenders charged in 2019 with those charged in 2023, we found that the 2023 cohort were more likely to be older, test positive for methamphetamine, reside in regional areas and have a prior drug driving charge. During the period we study, population-level drug use has remained relatively consistent. Meanwhile, the self-reported prevalence of drug driving has decreased at a steady rate, with this downward trend commencing prior to the start of the MDT program in NSW. CONCLUSION Sequential expansions of the MDT program have led to a considerable increase in the number of offenders charged with drug driving offences in NSW between 2008 and 2023. Recent growth in the roadside drug test detection rate and subsequent charges may be driven by police targeting of repeat drug driving offenders, and motorists who offend in regional areas. 

Bureau Brief, No. 172 Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime  Statistics and Research. ....2024. 23p.

From Nationalist Movements to Organized Crime Groups The Trajectory of The Niger Delta Struggles  

By Maurice Ogbonnaya 

What began as a struggle for the political and economic autonomy of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has morphed into organised crime of transnational dimensions that has turned the West African coast and the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most unsafe maritime zones in the world and is decimating Nigeria’s economy. The crimes include kidnapping for ransom, maritime piracy, armed robbery at sea, the theft and smuggling of oil and other contraband products, illegal oil refining and bunkering. This report analyses the current drivers of organised crime in the region, arguing that crime has become a fundamental element of the struggle. Key findings • The Niger Delta region accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of 2.5 million barrels, which makes the country Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixthlargest oil-producing country in the world. • State repression, poverty and widespread inequality, politics, greed and institutional corruption in the oil and maritime sectors have shaped the evolution of the struggle from a nationalist movement to an organised criminal enterprise. • The Nigerian government must tackle issues of environmental degradation, infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty, the lack of job- and income-generating opportunities, especially for the youth, and institutionalised corruption in the oil and maritime sectors.  

ENACT Africa, 2020. 22p.

Mining and Illicit Trading of Coltan in The Democratic Republic of Congo

By Oluwole Ojewale

Mining and the illicit trade in minerals have long been the source of social and environmental upheaval in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and coltan, a mineral essential to modern electronics, has become a particular focus of criminal networks. This study reveals a network of organised crime involved in the production and supply chain of coltan, and its connections to legitimate businesses in advanced economies. It raises awareness of the implications of this illicit trade and suggests multi-stakeholder interventions to prevent criminal networks from operating in the Great Lakes Region. Key findings • As 5G technology grows, the demand for coltan increases. • Much of the coltan produced by artisanal mining remains unaccounted for due to the government’s inability to access and regulate mines in remote territories. • Coltan smuggling is enabled by state collusion and corrupted networks of social relations. • Coltan smuggling flourishes because of the differences between the prices set in mining areas and those on the black market. • Environmental impact assessments are seldom carried out before exploration for coltan begins. • Sites of historical heritage and indigenous norms are violated by artisanal miners and foreign companies. • Exploitation of children, rape and gender-based violence are common at coltan mining sites.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 20p.

Rethinking Prohibition Towards an Effective Response to Drugs in South Africa  

By Romi Sigsworth and Shaun Shelly

South Africa’s prohibitionist and punitive response to people who cultivate, sell and use drugs has failed to reduce the supply, demand or harms related to the use and trade in scheduled drugs. This report explores the universal costs and consequences of prohibition before providing a global contextualisation of current drug policy debates. It then outlines the historical context of drug policy in South Africa and suggests what might be done differently in the present and future to reduce the burden of drugs and drug policy in the country. Key findings • Despite the vast expenditure on a prohibitionist and criminal justice approach to drugs globally over more than five decades, drugs are more readily available at lower prices, drug use has increased significantly and the social and health harms associated with current policies and responses to drugs are substantial. • In South Africa, the criminalisation of people who use drugs is a massive burden on the police, courts and correctional services, as well as a significant barrier to resolving the economic, social and health challenges that communities face in developing an equitable and just society. • The current societal and political attitude towards people who use drugs, however, means that any changes to drug policy are unlikely to be radical or rapid until communities are  able to see the benefits of alternative approaches.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 28p.  

Text Mining Police Narratives to Identify Types of Abuse and Victim Injuries in Family and Domestic Violence Events

By Armita Adily, George Karystianis and Tony Butler

Police attend numerous family and domestic violence (FDV) related events each year and record details of these events as both structured data and unstructured free-text narratives. These descriptive narratives include information about the types of abuse (eg physical, emotional, financial) and the injuries sustained by victims. However, this information is not used in research. In this paper we demonstrate the application of an automated text mining method to identify abuse types and victim injuries in a large corpus of NSW Police Force FDV event narratives (492,393) recorded between January 2005 and December 2016. Specific types of abuse and victim injuries were identified in 71.3 percent and 35.9 percent of FDV event narratives respectively. The most commonly identified abuse types mentioned in the narratives were non-physical (55.4%). Our study supports the application of text mining for use in FDV research and monitoring.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 630. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 12p.

Text Mining Police Narratives for Mentions of Mental Disorders in Family and Domestic Violence Events

By Armita Adily, George Karystianis and Tony Butler

In this paper, we describe the feasibility of using a text-mining method to generate new insights relating to family and domestic violence (FDV) from free-text police event narratives. Despite the rich descriptive content of the event narratives regarding the context and individuals involved in FDV events, the police narratives are untapped as a source of data to generate research evidence. We used text mining to automatically identify mentions of mental disorders for both persons of interest (POIs) and victims of FDV in 492,393 police event narratives created between January 2005 and December 2016. Mentions of mental disorders for both POIs and victims were identified in nearly 15.8 percent (77,995) of all FDV events. Of all events with mentions of mental disorder, 76.9 percent (60,032) and 16.4 percent (12,852) were related to either POIs or victims, respectively. The next step will be to use actual diagnoses from NSW Health records to determine concordance between the two data sources. We will also use text mining to extract information about the context of FDV events among key at-risk groups.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 629. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 16p.

Child Sexual Abuse Material on The Darknet: A Script Analysis of How Offenders Operate

By Benoit Leclerc, Jacqueline Drew, Thomas J Holt, Jesse Cale and Sara Singh

The development of online technologies in recent decades has facilitated the distribution and consumption of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) over the internet, which also led to the emergence of CSAM on the darknet—the segment of the internet hidden from the general public. Using data obtained from interviews with online investigators, this study uses crime script analysis to reconstruct step-by-step how offenders operate on the darknet. The findings highlight the three phases of the script: (1) the crime set-up phase, (2) the crime completion phase, and (3) the crime continuation phase. Scripting is a practical method of developing concrete ways to address this problem. The implications of using crime scripts to fight CSAM are discussed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 627. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 14p.

Early-Career Offending Trajectories Among Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Members

By Isabella Voce, Anthony Morgan and Christopher Dowling

This study examines the criminal histories of outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members during adolescence and early adulthood to determine whether the profile of young members has changed over time. The recorded offence histories of three cohorts of members—those born between 1979 and 1983, 1984 and 1988, and 1989 and 1993—were compared. Seventy-eight percent of OMCG members across all three cohorts had at least one recorded offence between the ages of 12 and 24. The majority of offenders did not desist but continued offending at a steady rate into adulthood. The youngest cohort in the study was more likely than the middle and older cohorts to have a criminal history and follow a high-rate offending trajectory. Members of the youngest cohort were also more likely to have been apprehended for violence and intimidation, weapons and ongoing criminal enterprise offences by their early twenties. These results suggest that OMCGs are recruiting younger members, who are becoming involved in gang-related offending earlier in life, or that individuals with a history of offending are becoming more likely to join or be recruited into OMCGs.

 Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 625. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2021.  18p.