By Gary Risser and Camila Teixeira, with support from Bo Viktor Nylund and Jasmina Byrne.
Throughout much of history, organizations have used violence as a political weapon, exploited it for criminal gain and leveraged it for social change. Children’s involvement in organized violence has persisted equally as long. They have been used and exploited by a range of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and national armed forces to take part in combat, to commit other forms of violence in the context of armed conflict and to fulfil other purposes. They have also become members of organized criminal groups and, more recently, have been targeted by online networks that promote violence for all manner of causes. . Children in the global polycrisis: Increasing risks of their participation in organized violence? What is organized violence? This working paper uses the term ‘organized violence’ to refer to “the intentional use of physical force, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. This violent act is committed by a member of a group of three or more people at any time with a common purpose and knowledge violence will be used to pursue it.” For the purposes of this paper, only armed non-state actors are considered. In the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF’s) programme and policy work, ‘armed non-state actors’ is used as a broad term that covers all armed groups operating in conflict and non-conflict situations. UNICEF then analyses these groups and places them in a typology based on a set of organizational and contextual characteristics. This working paper and a closed-door round table that preceded it (see Section II below), however, drew on the information and expertise of publications and experts that focus on more delineated subdivisions of armed non-state actors. The purpose of the round table was to bring these communities of experts together to share their insights on the involvement of children in these armed non-state actors, to document emerging commonalities and differences, and to identify areas for future foresight analysis and research. This working paper therefore includes three subsets of violent actors: NSAGs in armed conflict situations, including those who are designated or otherwise labelled as insurgents, terrorists and violent extremists and who usually operate in situations of armed conflict. Organized criminal groups, including street gangs and organizations that traffic in arms, drugs or people. These groups are not typically parties to armed conflict, even though some will be operating in places affected by conflict. Emerging loose networks that may have an online-only or hybrid online/offline presence, an unclear leadership hierarchy and limited rules. These are sometimes referred to as ‘post organizational’ groups. These three subcategories are not mutually exclusive. Some violent groups, for example, may be simultaneously engaged in combat against a government while producing narcotics and loosely coordinating with other branches of the group through social media applications. The vulnerability of children to involvement in organized violence may be getting more complex, or at least may be changing. The world is facing a confluence of multiple global shocks that have cascaded to affect and amplify each other. While most countries were still recovering from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, a war in Ukraine which began in 2014 greatly escalated, exacerbating global inflation, energy shortfalls and food insecurity. The latest intensification of hostilities in Israel and the State of Palestine has led to further volatility in the Middle East. Other countries in which conflict has erupted or intensified since 2019 include Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Myanmar and the Sudan. Meanwhile, the long-term challenge of climate change continues unabated. This convergence of global shocks – sometimes called a ‘global polycrisis’ – has had many harmful effects, some of which may present more serious risks to children. This global dynamic has created or exacerbated a number of conditions which affect children and families locally, including economic hardship, rising political tension, anger towards and fear of migrants, frustration with climate insecurity, and the use of new weapons in conflicts that might eventually spread to other crises. All of these conditions have the potential to amplify tensions that may lead to organized violence. In many cases, these shocks have also taken place in contexts with weak governance and inadequate systems to protect children and their rights, further increasing vulnerabilities. This global context is, furthermore, marked by a diversification and fragmentation of armed actors that pursue old and new causes while choosing to organize and operate in different ways. Some of these armed groups hold territory and challenge the state over governance. The Islamic State achieved this briefly in some locations in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Meanwhile, armed groups in Haiti and, until recently, El Salvador have continued to pose challenges to governments in particular neighbourhoods or provinces. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, a former NSAG, removed the government and took control of the country, though it is now battling an Islamic State-linked armed group itself. Territorial control can be important to group identity.6 Some armed groups rely on a networked ‘franchise’ structure, calling for different affiliated groups to form, pursue a common cause and launch attacks when advantageous but without coming under a central chain of command. Still others may orchestrate attacks while hiding among local communities or in the anonymity of the online world. Groups in the latter category may pursue this less structured type of organization when they are dispersed, unable to mobilize and hold territory, or uninterested in challenging the government for control. Some groups, including right-wing groups and the Islamic State, have declared this to be a particular strategy in their area of operation. The children involved in organized violence themselves are members of a significant new generation, Generation Z. In many countries, they are the first generation to have been born into and to have grown up in a digital world. They are also a generation that is struggling with increased mental health challenges. They must grapple with misinformation and disinformation in a ‘post-truth’ era, as well as the effects of algorithmic echo chambers that amplify opinions and trends. For some, engagement in digital realms enables greater social interaction, free from stigma or preconceptions. For others, however, the predominance of digital over in-person social interaction could lead to increased isolation and loneliness, feelings compounded by pandemic-driven lockdowns.8 Generation Alpha – people born from 2014 onwards – are the next group that could be drawn into organized violence, though how they will develop during their adolescence and what influences will predominate remains a matter of discussion. The involvement of children in acts of violence does not usually happen overnight. The diversity of individual trajectories suggests that it is necessary to understand the various manifestations of the phenomenon, from children demonstrating curiosity about ideas to their committing a violent act In addition, children’s engagement with violent groups or participation in violent acts is often not preceded by their accepting or adhering to an ideology. We must explore how these situations of child involvement in organized violence unfold through various pathways.
Florence, Italy: UNICEF Innocenti – Global Office of Research and Foresight , 2024. 40p.
