By Saana Rikkilä, Pirjo Jukarainen, Vesa MuttilainenNordic Council of Ministers

Nordic countries are viewed as having low levels of corruption. However, Nordic businesses can be exploited in corruption or money laundering schemes. The KORPEN project (Korruption i samband med näringsverksamhet i Norden) was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, Finland and implemented by the Police University College. The project concludes that anti-corruption and anti-money laundering (AML) efforts share the same features and actors but are still rather separated. Some shared methods could be utilised in combatting both crimes. In general, the AML frameworks are more structured, whereas corruption and bribery are not viewed as such a serious issue in the Nordic countries. There are incidents in the Nordic region of interconnected corruption and money laundering. New risk assessment approaches and technology solutions could be of help.

Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2022. 104p.

By Calum Inverarity, Gareth Price, Courtney Rice and Christopher Sabatini

Travel restrictions and lockdowns have forced changes to the traditional means illicit groups have used to launder their ill-gotten profits. This paper explores whether COVID-19 may have affected these processes through three main channels: increased reliance on cryptocurrencies to move and launder funds tied to illicit activity; the expanded use of the internet through e-commerce sites to continue and expand trade mispricing practices to move illicit funds; and the use of FinTech and peer-to-peer payment services to transfer illicit funds.

Miami: Florida International University, 2021. 37p.

By Greg Barak

Why are crimes of the suite punished more leniently than crimes of the street? When police killings of citizens go unpunished, political torture is sanctioned by the state, and the financial frauds of Wall Street traders remain unprosecuted, nothing succeeds with such regularity as the active failures of national states to obstruct the crimes of the powerful.

Written from the perspective of global sustainability and as an unflinching and unforgiving exposé of the full range of the crimes of the powerful, Unchecked Corporate Power reveals how legalized authorities and political institutions charged with the duty of protecting citizens from law-breaking and injurious activities have increasingly become enablers and colluders with the very enterprises they are obliged to regulate. Here, Gregg Barak explains why the United States and other countries are duplicitous in their harsh reactions to street crimes in comparison to the significantly more harmful and far-reaching crimes of the powerful, and why the crimes of the powerful are treated as beyond incrimination.

London; New York: Routledge, 2017. 213p.

By Chris Mathers

In Crime School: Money Laundering, a twenty-year law enforcement veteran of financial crime explains this felony in simple terms. Written anecdotally, the book describes what money laundering is and how the crimes behind it fit together.

Organized criminals operating both domestically and internationally corrupt bankers and subvert national economies through the use of drug money.

This book examines the history of money laundering from ancient times to the cocaine craze of the 1970s to the sophisticated, brutal techniques employed by today's terrorists and organized crime.

Lively and detailed, this book chronicles the stark realities and deadly dynamics of the lynchpin between organized crime and modern terrorism. It's a rare and fascinating look at a deadly world few have ever witnessed and lived to tell the story.

Buffalo, NY: Firefly Books, 2004. 244p.

By Fausto De Sanctis

Professional football means many things to many people. For players, a means to possible fame and fortune. For fans, a source of local or national pride, and perhaps the chance to score with a few bets. For criminal organizations, a cover for making millions in corrupt enterprises. In the world of gambling this is no different.

Football, Gambling, and Money Laundering describes in impressive detail the scope of the problem, the layers of denial that allow sports-related financial crime to flourish, and the steps that are being taken--and that need to be taken--to combat illicit operations in the sports world. Expert analysis explains criminal activity in the context of football, and how sports governing bodies, the media, and others have created a culture that regularly turns a blind eye. International data and instructive legal case examples shed light on the role of the Internet in the spread of gambling and money laundering as well as the strengths and weaknesses of current law enforcement, legislative, and sports-based efforts in fighting corruption.

Cham, SWIT: Springer, 2014. 173p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

In this report, EIA documents for the first time the systematic export and import of illegal wood from Peru to the United States. In many ways, this report not a new story: the system’s corruption is something of which everyone in the sector is aware. EIA’s contribution lies in having identified and patiently put together the pieces of the puzzle to reveal the mechanism that allows this trade to happen: what Peruvians call the “laundering machine”.

EIA’s investigative work focused on reconstructing the routes that timber takes from the Amazon to the warehouses of US importers, through use of official information obtained under Peru’s Transparency and Access to Public Information Law. The links in this chain are willfully obscured to perpetuate confusion about the origins of almost all timber traded in Peru. EIA was able to reconstruct the chain of custody for trade in cedar (Cedrela odorata) and bigleaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) only because both species are protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) and thus require specific export permit documents. The same illegal modus operandi is being applied for other species, but the even more limited information available regarding non-CITES species trade makes it virtually impossible to connect the concession of origin with the shipments being exported.

Washington, DC; London:: EIA, 2012. 72p.

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

Money Trails – Identifying financial flows linked to wildlife trafficking looks at the current state of play and makes the case for using financial investigations and anti-money laundering laws as standard when investigating wildlife crime.

It also features case studies from major EIA investigations which reveal widespread use of the formal financial system by wildlife crime syndicates and the important role banks can play in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2020. 14p.

By Mark Gregory

Illegal logging is believed to account for between 15% and 30% of the international trade in timber. Revenues from timber crime are likely to run into billions of dollars each year. Data such as this has prompted the European Union (EU), the World Bank and others to call for tougher enforcement and more effective use of anti-money laundering (AML) procedures as a way of tackling the illicit financial flows that support illegal logging. Against this background, Fern carried out research to find out if action on money laundering could be a worthwhile lever to help preserve the world’s forests.

Brussels: FERN, 2015. 27p.

By Sam Lawson

Previous studies commissioned by the EU have shown that the EU has been leading the world in imports of ‘embodied deforestation’ in the form of agricultural and timber products. This study goes a step further, by showing that the EU is also one of the largest importers of products resulting from illegal deforestation. The study estimates that in 2012, the EU imported EUR 6 billion of soy, beef, leather and palm oil which were grown or reared on land illegally cleared of forests in the tropics – almost a quarter of the total world trade. The Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Italy and France are among the largest consumers of these illegally sourced deforestation commodities, being collectively responsible for two-thirds of EU purchasing by value and three-quarters in terms of the areas of forest destroyed.

Brussels: FERN, 2015. 28p.

By Davin Nina and Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

IEP Aix-en-Provence - Sciences Po Aix - Institut d'études politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, 2022. 22p.

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By Jack A. Blum; Michael Levi; R. T. Naylor; and Phil Williams

While there has been a general trend towards enacting money-laundering laws that provide for the lifting of financial secrecy in appropriate cases, such secrecy remains a barrier in many jurisdictions, including some of those that have come to be known as 'financial havens'. The advances in technology and communication have made the three F's - finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets all the more difficult. This publication discusses these issues and other related problems in depth. The law enforcement success stories presented convey a sense of imaginative ways in which financial havens are used. The cases also highlight the advantages, from the point of view of criminals, of collusion with bank employees and the use of professional launderers.

Vienna: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998, 117p.

By Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The aim of this project is to study one specific sport which could reveal money laundering schemes that may also be occurring in other sports. As one of the largest sports in the world, football1 was chosen. Both professional and amateur football were to be examined. Although the scale of vulnerabilities to money laundering is potentially different, risks in both areas were considered likely to be similar.

Paria: FATF, 2009. 42p.

By Davin Nina 1 Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

Sciencespo.aix. ND. ca. 2021.p.12.

By Tomas Williams, Pablo Slutzky, and Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas

We explore how anti-money laundering (AML) policies affect banks and credit provision to firms. For identification we exploit the enactment of a financial regulation in Colombia. Aimed at controlling the flow of money from drug trafficking into the financial system, we find that after implementation bank deposits in municipalities with high drug trafficking decline. This negative liquidity shock has consequences for credit in other municipalities. Banks sourcing their deposits from areas with high drug trafficking cut lending relative to other banks. Using a proprietary database containing data on bank-firm credit relationships, we show that small firms that rely on credit from affected banks experience a negative shock to sales, investment, and profitability. Furthermore, we use night-lights data to show that these results are not due to a reallocation of activity across firms nor between the formal and informal sectors. Our evidence uncovers a hidden to be considered when implementing AML policies.

Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2020. 62p.

By Pacelli, Joseph, Janet Gao, Jan Schneemeier, and Yufeng Wu.

Bank employees face discretion in investigating and reporting money laundering activities via suspicious activity reports (SARs), a primary tool to combat financial crimes. We investigate the incentives banks face to initiate SARs and the implications for criminal activity. Our theoretical and empirical analyses document that banks with more profit-seeking pressure adopt lax reporting policies to attract criminal customers, ultimately leading to more suspicious activity reports. A structural estimation approach helps us uncover the relation between bank profitability, reporting stringency, and the demand from criminal customers. Our results also suggest an assortative matching between lax banks and criminal clientele.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 61p.,

By Steven Pierce.

State Formation & Political Culture in Nigeria. “The messages are familiar to almost anyone with an e-mail account. During the early 2000s they became an international punch line. Often purporting to come from the relative of a Nigerian government official, they requested the recipient’s help to transfer vast sums of money out of the country. In return for this assistance, the recipient would receive a significant percentage of the funds being transferred. Usually unsaid was that the money had been acquired corruptly and that the sender needed help in avoiding the attention of law enforcement.”

Duke University Press (2016) 305p.