By Georgina Heydon, Nicola Henry, Rachel Loney-Howes and Sophie Hind

Anonymous reporting tools for sexual assault contribute to gathering intelligence, reducing crime, increasing reporting and supporting survivors. This article examines victim-survivors’ knowledge of and experiences using alternative reporting options, drawing on data collected from a broader study of alternative reporting options for sexual assault. Focus groups with victim-survivors and interviews with support service staff reveal that survivors and support staff are unclear about how authorities use data from alternative reporting tools but can identify preferred designs for a form. Victim-survivors in particular strongly support having an alternative reporting option available.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 678. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 17p.

By Ben Mathews, Nina Papalia, Sarah Napier, Eva Malacova, David Lawrence, Daryl J Higgins, Hannah Thomas, Holly Erskine, Franziska Meinck, Divna Haslam, James Scott, David Finkelhor and Rosana Pacella

Few studies have examined associations between child maltreatment and criminal justice system involvement using large nationally representative samples and comprehensive measures of self‑reported maltreatment. This study analyses nationally representative data from the Australian Child Maltreatment Study, which surveyed 8,500 Australians to obtain self-reported data on all five child maltreatment types (physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, neglect, and exposure to domestic violence) and criminal justice system involvement. We examine associations between self-reported child maltreatment, and chronic multi-type maltreatment, and arrests, convictions and imprisonment. Results show moderate associations between child maltreatment and arrests and convictions, and between maltreatment and imprisonment among men. Stronger associations were found for those experiencing three or more types of maltreatment.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 681. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 21p

By Susan Baidawi, Rubini Ball, Rosemary Sheehan and Nina Papalia

This paper outlines a retrospective follow-up study of all Victorian children aged 10 to 13 years with police contact for alleged offending in 2017 (N=1,369). The sample comprised relatively few 10- and 11-year-olds, while boys and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children were over-represented. Most alleged offending was non-violent (71%), particularly among 10-year-olds (82%). Most matters did not proceed to court (80%), including 55 percent of matters which received police cautions. Of matters proceeding to court, 37 percent were struck out or dismissed, and a further 53 percent had outcomes not involving youth justice supervision. Half of children (49%) had no alleged offending in the following two years.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 679. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 21p

By James Ogilvie, Lisa Thomsen, Jodie Barton, et L.

This is the second and final report to be produced from the “Adverse childhood experiences and the intergenerational transmission of domestic and family violence in young people who engage in harmful sexual behaviour and violence against women” project.

Building on work completed in the first report which analysed a small subset of cases, the authors have used two large existing datasets that coded information relating to adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) for male youth in Queensland who had committed an offence. The two data sets were Queensland Youth Justice records of proven offences (n=6,047) and clinical information maintained by Griffith Youth Forensic Services (GYFS) relating to young men who had been referred to services after perpetrating sexual offences (n=377). The analysis outlined the prevalence of specific ACEs by offence type (YJ dataset) and contrasted the prevalence of ACEs across male youth with and without histories of DFV (GYFS dataset); descriptive presentation ; descriptive analysis of group differences (sexual vs. non-sexual offending); and multivariate models to examine links between DFV and offending.

The report found that across both datasets, ACES were highly prevalent among young men who went on to commit sexual offences. They were also more likely to have experienced co-occurring ACEs. Young men who had been adjudicated for sexual offences were especially likely to have experienced DFV as children.

These findings provide an evidence base for designing program and policy responses for young men who have encountered the youth justice system.

These findings indicate that ACEs occur within a context of gender-based violence. Policy responses drawing on this evidence should prioritise early intervention and promote protective factors applied within a trauma and DFV informed practice framework.

Sydney: Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety Limited (ANROWS), 2022. 64p

By Betty Luu, Amy Conley Wright, Stefanie Schurer, Laura Metcalfe

In a data first, this ANROWS report, released in partnership with researchers from the University of Sydney, highlights approximately 33% of all reports to NSW’s Child Protection Helpline express concerns about a child experiencing domestic and family violence, either alone or in conjunction with parental mental health and or substance use issues.

The research uses the newly established NSW Human Services Dataset to see how families interact with a range of services, including police, child protection and health, over time. The analysis focuses on cases reported to the NSW Child Protection Helpline, unveiling the challenges families experience with domestic and family violence, alongside parental mental health or parental substance use issues.

The findings also confirm that domestic and family violence, parental substance use and parental mental health issues are strongly interlinked and contribute to children being placed in out-of-home care, with findings suggesting that the odds of a child being removed double when all three issues are present.

Sydney, Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety (ANROWS), 2024.89P.

By Danni Zhang, Regina Frei, P.K. Senyo, Steffen Bayer, Enrico Gerding, Gary Wills and Adrian Beck

The growth of online retailing has exceeded expectations over the last few years. This has resulted in high product return rates, which retailers are struggling with due to complex and costly returns processing, logistics, and financial implications. Additionally, online returns come with increased opportunities for returns fraud. During the pandemic, new types of returns fraud have emerged and returns fraud rates have increased across all channels. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with retailers and retail experts, we investigate factors that enable fraudulent returns from consumers' and retailers’ perspectives and outline strategies for retailers to combat product returns fraud in a multichannel environment, leading to a framework for retail fraud. We contribute critical insights to research and practices on understanding and addressing a growing problem that has economic, social and environmental implications.

Journal of retailing and consumer services, Vol.70, 2023. 103145

By Radha Barooah and Ana Paula Oliveira Siria Gastélum Félix

This brief aims to bring specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY People from all walks of life have disappeared during Mexico’s so-called ‘war on drugs’; many others become victims of the growing global human trafficking industry; migrants go missing as they travel to seek a better life elsewhere, often displaced by criminal groups. Vulnerable youth, particularly young boys, are co-opted by criminal interests and then ‘disappeared’ to forcibly join gangs, often groomed to provide gang ‘muscle’ or traffic drugs.1 Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour.2 Many activists, journalists, politicians and whistle-blowers who campaign against organized crime or corruption have disappeared. Disappearances – as we define the phenomenon in this paper – are deployed for various reasons: to silence the voices of social and political leaders, activists and journalists; to assert violent control over criminal territories and illicit markets; or to monetize vulnerable people as a tradeable commodity. In all these cases, criminal groups have a hand, and although organized crime-related disappearances vary in motive and scope, they disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities. Criminal groups therefore instrumentalize disappearances for different objectives. But a fundamental challenge of dealing with this widespread problem is that cases are rarely differentiated and often assumed by law enforcement authorities to be one-off isolated incidents. However, when examining this issue closely, there is a more menacing pattern behind them, namely that they are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups operating in a particular community or controlling a market territory. By not discerning this broader picture of underlying criminal intent, by focusing on the what and ignoring the why, the phenomenon tends to receive limited attention in public policy agendas. There is also inadequate institutional support and investigative work, which has the effect of impeding victims’ access to justice. The international framework designed to address enforced disappearances – the International Convention for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED)3 – requires that state involvement in the act (in the form of collusion, authorization or acquiescence) is proven in order to trigger its obligations. Compounding this, the conditions of state involvement and the role of organized crime actors are not clearly set out in the wording of the convention, so cases of disappearances linked to illicit economies tend to be confined to the margins of national and international agendas. Meanwhile, the international human rights discourse on disappearances perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g. criminal groups or networks) has progressed to a certain degree, but it, too, remains ill-equipped to determine the conditions and factors of collusion between organized crime and state actors that would amount to authorization, acquiescence or omission. These imprecisions and gaps in the legal framework result in a general lack of institutional support for victims and their families. Despite this, individuals and communities affected by this crime have developed mechanisms to respond. Since 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), through its Resilience Fund, has supported over 50 community-based initiatives and activists searching for people who have disappeared, including relatives seeking justice and journalists investigating disappearances related to organized crime around the world.4 The Resilience Fund has documented first-hand experiences through interviews and dialogues and provided financial and capacity-building support.5 This brief draws from the work and perspectives of such civil society and community members who live in environments that are exposed to disappearances. It assesses this form of organized crime as a serious human rights violation. While informed by the global dynamics of this criminal market, it focuses on contexts in which disappearances occur in Latin America, analyzing in particular the cases of Mexico and Venezuela. The first setting examines how criminal groups strategically deploy disappearances to fulfill various objectives; the other considers how disappearances occur in the mining sector, which experiences a high prevalence of criminality. This policy brief therefore aims to bring these specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field. While some of the evidence in the brief is anecdotal, the authors have corroborated it with open-source data and a literature review. The analysis is exploratory and is designed to add to a small yet growing body of literature on disappearances among vulnerable communities exposed to organized crime and amplify understanding of the pressing nature of the problem in policy circles.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 28p.

By J.R. Mailey

Sudan’s current conflict, which erupted in April 2023, is the latest chapter in a story of rival predatory networks competing for control over formal and illicit economies, the information environment and the use of organized violence.

As the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spread death and destruction across the country, fuelling a humanitarian crisis, their battle is driven by the desire to preserve their vast economic empires and the systems that support them.

This report explores the intricate web of illicit networks, armed conflicts, and the devastating impact on Sudan’s socio-political landscape. It explores how predatory networks commoditize violence, exploit strategic industries, and manipulate state institutions for their gain. From the militarization of the economy to the instrumentalization of criminal markets, this investigation sheds light on the arc of state collapse and the urgent need for comprehensive peacebuilding strategies.

The paper is the first in a series focusing on Sudan, aiming to present an overview about the competition for control of Sudan’s security services, civilian bureaucracy and strategic industries. The following reports will explore the people, institutions, networks and transactions that have underpinned the enduring ecosystem of crime and corruption in Sudan that ultimately gave way to the current civil war.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

By The International Crisis Group Latin America and Caribbean

What’s new? The assassination in July of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, perpetrated with no apparent resistance from his elite security detail, and a bout of natural disasters weeks later have further destabilised an already fragile Haiti and intensified its humanitarian crisis at a time of extreme insecurity. Why does it matter? Coming amid intersecting political, human rights, economic and humanitarian crises, Moïse’s killing and other recent events have exposed the chronic failings of state authorities and difficulties in ensuring that foreign support is deployed effectively. Growing insecurity is also driving instability and increased migrant flows within and outside the country. What should be done? Funnelling aid to vulnerable people hit by recent natural disasters, preferably through local civil society, is the imperative. International back ing for prosecuting high-level crimes, police reform and support for a broad-based representative and inclusive interim government stand a better chance than a rush to elections of helping restore stability.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, The International Crisis Group, 30 September 2021 24p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Robert Muggah, et al.

KEY FINDINGS

• Increasingly sophisticated and high-calibre firearms and ammunition are being trafficked into Haiti amid an unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating security situation.

• Haiti remains a trans-shipment country for drugs, primarily cocaine and cannabis, which mostly enter the country via boat or plane, arriving through public, private and informal ports as well as clandestine runways.

• Haiti’s borders are essentially porous, and the challenges of patrolling 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre land border with the Dominican Republic are overwhelming the capacities of Haiti’s national police, customs, border patrols and coast guard, who are severely under-staffed and under-resourced, a variety of sources with their attendant limitations, including unverified media reports, to take account of recent developments. It opens with a cursory overview of the criminal context in which firearms and drug trafficking are occurring. The second section considers the basic infrastructure that facilitates trafficking, especially seaports, roads and airstrips. Sections three and four examine patterns of trafficking of both firearms and drugs into and out of Haiti. The final section summarizes global, regional and national measures to address related challenges, alongside knowledge gaps warranting deeper investigation. Given the evolving circumstances, any attempt to document firearms and drug trafficking trends in Haiti will be fragmented and partial. Even so, certain tendencies and patterns can be discerned. Very generally, firearms and ammunition typically enter Haiti via land and sea, and drugs usually transit Haiti from seaports, airports and across poorly monitored border points. Most weapons are sourced in the US and make their way to gang members and private residents through intermediaries, often through public and private ports and porous checkpoints. Whether they are interdicted or not, most drugs passing through Haiti are produced in Colombia (cocaine) or Jamaica (cannabis) and shipped directly from source, or pass via Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. From Haiti they are shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe and, primarily, the US. and increasingly targeted by gangs.

• Heavily armed criminal gangs are targeting ports, highways, critical infrastructure, customs offices, police stations, court houses, prisons, businesses and neighbourhoods.

• Virtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country – is trending upward.

• International, regional and national responses have underscored the importance of increasing support to law enforcement and border management. Comprehensive approaches encompassing investments in community policing, criminal justice reform and anti-corruption measures are crucial to delivering sustainable peace and stability in Haiti.

Haiti is in the grip of multiple, interlocking, and cascading crises. If unattended, there are serious risks of further destabilization from a myriad of increasingly powerful criminal armed groups. The risks of regional spill-over and contagion are widely acknowledged: The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly raised concerns about the country’s “protracted and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and food security crises” and “extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities”. 1 A particular preoccupation relates to the contribution of illegal firearms and drug trafficking in fuelling Haiti’s deepening security dilemmas. This assessment provides an overview of the scope, scale and dynamics of firearms and drug trafficking in Haiti, including sources, routes, vectors and destinations. It is based on published and unpublished information and 45 interviews conducted by UNODC with representatives of the Haitian government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, subject matter experts, and Haitian civil society.2 The situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, and this assessment has drawn upon

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 47p.

By Insa Koch, Patrick Williams, and Lauren Wroe

Government policies relating to dealers in ‘county lines’ drugs trafficking cases have been welcomed as a departure from punitive approaches to drugs and ‘gang’ policing, in that those on the bottom rung of the drugs economy of heroin and crack cocaine are no longer treated as criminals but as potential victims and ‘modern slaves’ in need of protection. However, our research suggests not so much a radical break with previous modes of policing as that the term ‘county lines’ emerged as a logical extension of the government’s racist and classist language surrounding ‘gangs’, knife crime and youth violence. Policies implemented in the name of safeguarding the vulnerable also act as a gateway for criminalisation not just under drugs laws but also modern slavery legislation. The government’s discovery of, and responses to, ‘county lines’ hinge on a moral crisis in the making, which ultimately deepens the state’s pre-emptive and violent criminalisation of the ‘Black criminal other’ at a time of deep political crisis.

First published online November 15, 2023., Race & Class, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/03063968231201325

By The U.K. Home Office

Purpose - This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm

• That the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

• That the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)

• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory

• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and

• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

London: Assets Publishing Service, 2022. 84p.

By Emma Louise Blondes, Emma Disley, Shann Corbett, Fook Nederveen, Jirka Taylor, Ilia Gaglio, Antonino Sorrenti, Francesco Calderoni

This study looks at three ‘tools’ that Member States can deploy in the fight against serious and organised crime. First, this study assesses whether the Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA – legislation that aims to ensure that all Member States criminalise participation in a criminal organisation – has achieved its objectives, supports effective cooperation to tackle cross-border serious organised crime and is fit for purpose. Second, this study assesses the extent to which the current legislative framework on the use, protection and handling of crown/principal witnesses and collaborators of justice supports effective cooperation to tackle cross-border serious organised crime. Third, this study explores whether Member States have operational and strategic approaches to identify the links between offences that are ‘enablers’ of serious organised crime (money laundering, document fraud, online trade in illicit goods/services, and corruption) and the broader picture of serious organised crime. Based on interviews, an EU-wide survey, workshops and a document review, the study describes the state of play in relation to these topics and outlines possible policy solutions to the address key challenges identified.

Brussels, Belgium: Publications Office of the European Union, and RAND Europe, 2022. 

By Daniel Egel, Gabrielle Tarini, Raymond Kuo, Eric Robinson, Anthony Vassalo

The mystery surrounding the so-called Havana Syndrome — an unexplained illness first experienced by U.S. Department of State personnel stationed in Cuba in late 2016 — illustrates the challenge of mustering a response to a national security threat when the threat, the underlying method, and the actor behind the threat are not understood with certainty. This report explores the applicability of existing concepts for deterrence and compellence using brief case studies. In addition to Havana Syndrome, the authors explore the SolarWinds cyberattack, in which hackers linked to Russian intelligence conducted a massive cyberattack against American companies and government agencies, and the Chinese Communist Party's connections to organized crime syndicates around the world.

The core finding is that few of the standard response options are effective against these types of threats. Without certainty about who is conducting the actions, strategies that rely on threats of punishment, normative taboos, or rallying of international condemnation are largely ineffective. Denial-by-defense strategies are thus likely to be the most effective but may be difficult to design effectively if the method underlying the attacks is poorly understood.

Key Findings

The ability of the United States to respond effectively to a threat is limited when the attribution, nature, and method of the threat are ambiguous.Maintaining this level of ambiguity likely constrains the scale at which U.S. adversaries can deploy these approaches, but the costs the approaches impose can be large.Despite the appeal of other deterrence or punishment strategies, denial-by-defense is likely to be the only approach capable of reducing the efficacy of these threats.

Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 2023. 20p.

by Laura L. Miller, Dmitry Khodyakov, Joachim O. Hero, Lisa Wagner, Coreen Farris, Katie Feistel, Emily Dao, Julia Rollison, Rosemary Li, Jamie Ryan, et al.

Domestic abuse is among many harmful behaviors of concern to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) because of its consequences for military personnel, their families, and military readiness. RAND's National Defense Research Institute is conducting a multi-year research effort, requested by Congress in Section 546C of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, to study domestic abuse from a variety of perspectives.

In the first phase of this study, the RAND team focused its work on identifying strategies that can help DoD and the Services prevent domestic abuse among service members and their spouses or partners before it occurs and strategies that could be effective in the military environment for outreach and communication to individuals who might have risk factors for domestic abuse.

The prevention and outreach strategies highlighted in this research were synthesized from recommendations made by 80 experts — domestic abuse survivor experts and advocates, military program or service providers and practitioners, military leaders, and domestic abuse scholars — and a scoping review of relevant literature published in the past two decades.

Key Findings

• Both the expert panel and scoping review results pointed to the need for prevention strategies to address not only individual and relationship risk factors but also the broader social, cultural, and systemic factors, such as social isolation and perceived tolerance of domestic abuse.

• A comprehensive prevention approach would include strategies that fall outside the primary purview of DoD's Family Advocacy Program (FAP) and would require contributions from, for example, the Office of Force Resiliency, the Military Health Agency, training commands, military leaders, community organizations, and military offices tasked with preventing other problematic behaviors.

• Experts cautioned against risk factors being treated as excuses or causal factors for domestic abuse, domestic abuse material becoming too diluted by other content, and non-subject-matter experts addressing sensitive domestic abuse topics.

• Across discussions of strategies, experts noted that existing installation-level staffing, expertise, and resources were insufficient to implement some recommendations. This concern encompassed not only the capacity of FAP but also other potential key actors, such as counselors and medical staff.

• Nearly half of the research studies in this scoping review focused on domestic abuse prevention strategies to educate and teach skills to individuals, couples, and families, and those focused on relationship and individual skills were the most common. Most studies of relationship skills strategies showed a positive impact on reducing the occurrence of domestic abuse.

Recommendations

• Teach safe and healthy relationship skills by developing a military-specific domestic abuse prevention curriculum for service members and their spouses or partners, expanding the types of services available to support individuals and couples struggling with relationship and parenting issues, and addressing abusive leadership behaviors in the workplace and providing guidance on military-appropriate leadership skills that are not well-suited at home.

• Engage influential community members by (1) preparing military leaders to actively participate in prevention activities and conveying the expectation that leaders will participate and (2) engaging peers and survivors in planning, implementing, and assessing domestic abuse prevention education, training, and information awareness campaigns.

• Create protective environments by focusing on spouse and partner supports and community integration to counter isolation and dependency risk factors, and improve prevention by increasing efforts to hold perpetrators convicted of the crime of domestic violence and leaders accountable for their actions or inaction following a domestic violence conviction.

• Strengthen economic supports for families by coordinating and promoting efforts to help relieve economic risk factors for domestic abuse and reduce economic control in relationships.

• Strengthen the prevention system by increasing the number of prevention and education specialists and providers to increase capacity to focus on prevention before domestic abuse occurs and integrating domestic abuse prevention activities within other violence prevention programs to reduce risk factors.

• Measure, monitor, and evaluate prevention activities by collecting data on domestic abuse prevention activities and resources and conduct surveys with service members, spouses or partners, and users of domestic abuse prevention resources.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023. 107p.

by David M. Adamson, Annie Brothers, Sasha Romanosky, Marjory S. Blumenthal, Douglas C. Ligor, Karlyn D. Stanley, Peter Schirmer, Julia Vidal Verástegui

Social media and other sophisticated communications technology have enabled a new kind of crime: cyberstalking. Cyberstalking involves using communications technology in threatening ways to stalk, harass, or share embarrassing information about victims, and it often involves the threat of intimate partner violence. As online platforms and messaging technologies have multiplied, cyberstalking has become more prevalent. Yet the problem has been understudied, and its dynamics are not well known.

In this report, the authors enhance the understanding of cyberstalking by offering the first empirical analysis on federal cyberstalking cases: In particular, they analyze the number of federal cyberstalking cases filed over time, the characteristics of these cases, and the outcomes of these cases. The results of in-depth interviews with prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and victims' advocacy representatives are also presented.

Key Findings

• The number of federally prosecuted cyberstalking cases has grown steadily since 2014, reaching a peak of 80 cases filed in 2019 (then falling slightly in 2020), with 412 total cases filed between 2010 and 2020.

• In the majority of federally prosecuted cyberstalking cases, the victim knew the offender.

• The legal system is underprepared to handle cyberstalking cases: Law enforcement is seldom able to prioritize or allot substantial resources to cyberstalking, and many agents and officers lack training in how to investigate the crime or help victims.

• A major challenge in prosecuting cyberstalking cases involves tying the digital evidence to the offending individual or group because tech-savvy offenders can be sophisticated at hiding digital tracks.

Recommendations

• Update awareness campaigns regarding online safety beyond antiquated notions of "stranger danger," and develop better warnings and indicators of potentially harmful online activities.

• Clarify cyberstalking legal statutes by removing the "intent to harm" clause from the federal cyberstalking law because it unintentionally protects some harmful behaviors.

• Recognize the complicated nature of working with victims and promote ways of improving trust between victims and the criminal justice system.

• Increase resources and information on emerging technology and investigative strategies available to law enforcement.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023.

By Marcos Alan Ferreira, Oliver P. Richmond

This article analyses how criminal governance creates blockages that prevent peace formation in Latin America. Two blockages emerge where criminal governance prevails: criminal structures do not reduce violence and also take advantage of cultural and structural violence; their legitimacy pushes the state away from citizens. Consequently, civil society usually responds in two ways: promoting alternative forms of political praxis against violence; fostering dialogue between political actors and civil society while building broader networks. Our argument shows that local agency has potential competences and the knowledge necessary to address criminal governance discursively, but its capacity to effect structural change is limited in direct terms.

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Volume 15, 2021 - Issue 2

By Oluwole Ojewale

This study examines the governance framework for regulating fishing generally in the Republic of the Congo. Specifically, it analyses the drivers and enablers of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) shark fishing and the networks engaged in the criminal economy. The illicit activities linked to shark fishing and fin trading negatively impact ocean biodiversity, the local and national economies. New ways of thinking are needed for effective responses to IUU shark fishing in the country. Key findings • The illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing of sharks is driven by local and international demand for shark products. It is further enabled by a lack of state capacity to oversee and enforce legislation and control. • Actors in the criminal supply chain of shark products include artisanal fisherfolk, foreign industrial trawlers, middlemen traders from African countries and Asia, and local women. • The exploitation of shark species negatively impacts environmental biodiversity and has disrupted the ecosystem in the Republic of the Congo’s ocean. • Overfishing of sharks is resulting in juvenile catches, especially of species of conservational concern 

ENACT Africa, 2024. 29p.

By Renato De Almeida Arão Galhardi

Historically, Mexicans deported from the United States tend to be overwhelmingly adult men, where the Mexican borderscape of Tijuana is and continues to be the primary site (and sight) where the majority of deported Mexicans are sent to when deported from the United States. Consequently, the semiotic social topography of Tijuana is peopled through the experiences of deportation. How, then, do Mexican deportees negotiate, mediate and articulate their lived experiences of migration? Working with my ethnographic research in Tijuana, during August 2021 and March 2022, I address the ontopological conditioning of living as a deportee in a borderscape such as Tijuana, assessing how their phenomenographic experiences are shaped by the bordering of the Border, and how Mexican deported men are often “unjustly suffering” and enduring “the bare life.” Through discussions on coloniality of Being, I build off Nicolas de Genova’s “border spectacle,” and argue that deportation is better described through its own “spectacle,” the “deportation spectacle,” highlighting how deportees perform and negotiate their agency between the tensions of suffering and resiliency as a consequence of the practices of imposed by deportation. I posit that deportation is not the end of a process, but reshapes migrancy continuity within new constraints, challenges and obstacles. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the need to recognize misrepresented, misinterpreted and misdiagnosed populations such as deportees in borderscapes such as Tijuana, in order to better attend to the challenges that deportation creates. (Working Paper)

Toronto: Toronto Metropolitan Centre for Immigration and Settlement (TMCIS) and the CERC in Migration and Integration 2023. 23p.

By KPMG Australia  

The Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) set a new standard for modern slavery disclosures in Australia. The Act required entities with a consolidated annual revenue of $100 million or more to disclose their efforts in identifying and addressing modern slavery risks within their operations and supply chain. The objective of the Act was to provide a framework to assist with proactively and effectively addressing modern slavery. 

The 2023 independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, commissioned by the Australian Government (Review), found that the Act had not resulted in meaningful change for people affected by modern slavery.  The review made 30 recommendations to strengthen modern slavery obligations for reporting entities, including the introduction of a positive requirement to conduct due diligence and the introduction of a federal Anti-Slavery Commissioner. The Government has highlighted that many of the Review’s recommendations are in line with key election commitments and introduced a Bill in November 2023 to establish an Anti-Slavery Commissioner. 

KPMG Australia, 2024. 31p.