By Federico Bertola

Drug trafficking on darknet based marketplaces has become a highly concerning topic in law enforcement activities, recently. Even though Dark Markets represent only a tiny fraction of the global drug trade, they are changing the drug markets' social networks, introducing a new paradigm of the link between vendors and buyers of drugs. The aim of this study is to critically review the dark markets' ecosystem and the previous literature regarding these new marketplaces, trying to investigate how the drug trade is changing with these new technologies, and the role of organised crime (OC) in these new illegal markets. And trying to understand how and whether it involved OC on these cyber drug markets and the chain behind them. Despite opinions of part of the academy, the results show that there are no empirical evidences of direct involvement of OC as vendors in dark markets. However, there is evidence of an indirect role of OC in darknet drug trafficking, as supplier of illegal drugs to the online-vendors. 

AM J QUALITATIVE RES, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp. 27-34

By Jakob Demant, Kristoffer Magnus Bjerre Aagesen

This study investigated the current state of social media drug dealing. The main objective was to understand how contemporary hybrid digital social media markets have evolved since previous research was undertaken in 2017-18. This was achieved by conducting netnography in online spaces, with a particular focus on Danish sites. The netnography data collection in Denmark has since been rolled out in Norway, Sweden and Germany. The most significant findings are as follows.

• Our netnography found no access to drug dealing in Danish spaces through searching on the Meta platforms, Facebook and Instagram. Although there may be some limited groups on Facebook, the findings suggest that there has been a successful implementation of increased moderation protocols on both Instagram and Facebook.

• On Snapchat, we identified easy and quick access to many active drug dealers in all major Danish cities. These dealers were identified by searching for common Danish drug slang in the search field and through suggestions from the app’s network-expanding features. We found similar ready access to drug dealers in Norway and Sweden. However, we did not identify drug dealer activity on the German Snapchat.

• We also found a vast amount of Danish and Swedish drug dealing on forums in the social networking site Reddit. Here, dealers created and moderated forums dedicated to selling drugs. The forums functioned as open markets with high levels of competition and a degree of specialisation in offering all types of drugs. No Norwegian and German dealers was found on these sites.

In summary, we identified easily accessible drug dealing on surface-level social media amounting to a large potential drift among social media users. Snapchat and Reddit each host active digital drug markets well suited to taking advantage of the platforms’ features while avoiding effective moderation. It was not possible to reach either platform to inform them

Lisbon:  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) , 2022. 29p.

By Nacer Lalam

Money laundering is practised exclusively by criminal organisations that have attained a proven level of professionalism. It occurs at a certain point in the criminal cycle because it enables an illicit enterprise to legitimise the origin of their funds and benefit from their gains while remaining unpunished. Nonetheless, most professional traffickers think in a sequential manner, that is, first they are interested in how to set up their activity (purchase, logistics, distribution) and only much later in how they are going to hide the origin of the profits they make.

However, the money-laundering phase is crucial for those involved in the criminal world. Moreover, public authorities have been working to combat money laundering for more than thirty years, with, of course, varying degrees of success, depending on the relevant legal provisions, their application and preventive effects.

In the context of the European drug market, this paper provides an exploratory analysis of a method of laundering drug money that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) identify through the use of ‘cash collectors’. We first highlight the main actors of cash collecting linked to drug trafficking, then we discuss its organisation, especially the interpenetration of networks, and, finally, we highlight some salient elements of public responses to the problem in a number of European countries.

Lisbon:  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) , 2022. 25p.

By Antonio L. Mazzitelli

The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel’s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine “Highway 10” among law enforcement.

Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.

Miami: Florida International University Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. 2011.  57p.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet 

Firearms trafficking in the European Union (EU) is driven by criminal demand and is a key enabler for other criminal activities such as drug trafficking . Criminals seek to acquire firearms for instrumental purposes, namely to facilitate their criminal activities, where they use guns to threaten, intimidate or assault others (criminals or non-criminals) , but they can also be acquired for the reputation afforded through the possession of – especially certain types of – firearms . Previous studies have shown that handguns are the type of firearm most commonly possessed by criminals in Europe as they are lightweight, easy to conceal and generally reliable. While automatic rifles can also be very effective for intimidation and assault purposes, their possession by criminals is less common . Criminal demand for firearms comes from various types of criminals ranging from international drug traffickers, armed robbers, youth gangs involved in street drug dealing, human traffickers, loan sharks, professional assassins and so on. Yet not all criminals have equal access to firearms. Given that legal access to firearms is almost impossible for criminals in Europe, they acquire them through other means. These firearms can, for example, be stolen from legal gun owners or state stockpiles, bought from a local criminal arms dealer or trafficked internationally. Interviews with experts, as well as previous studies, suggest also that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member States. Due to the traditionally closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe, firearms are often only accessible to criminals when they have the necessary criminal connections. Younger and less experienced criminals tend to experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms. In the past decade, however, law enforcement agencies from various European countries have noted an increased availability of firearms for criminals in their country. Previous studies have linked this to various trafficking methods, including the continuous supply of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans, the increased trafficking in easy-to-reactivate firearms and in easy-to-convert blank-firing weapons and Flobert-calibre firearms. The possibilities generated by the internet have further eroded the closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe. The increased availability of firearms is believed to have ‘facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, especially in western Europe’. In 2021 Europol noted that the use of violence in serious and organised crime seemed to be increasing in the EU, both in frequency and severity, augmented by the frequent use of firearms and explosives. A 2021 comparative study on gun violence in Europe, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, concluded that firearms trafficking in Europe is not only driven by criminal demand, but is also strongly connected to criminal gun violence. The observed increased availability of various types of firearms to criminals has led to an escalation of criminal gun violence in several European countries and sometimes also to arms races among criminals. The study also concluded that shootings in the criminal underworld in Europe are mainly connected to the drugs trade and enabled by firearms trafficking. A 2018 EMCDDA study on drug-related homicide concluded that this type of homicide is more likely to involve the use of firearms than other means of violence. Findings from project TARGET state that young men (under the age of 35) are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal gun violence. This is also the case for non-lethal gun violence, but there is a more even age distribution in this category.  In 2019 the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms, including automatic weapons, by organised crime groups involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. According to Europol, the use of violence related to the trade in drugs – cocaine and cannabis in particular – has escalated in recent years, and the availability of firearms and explosives is a key enabler for this violence. A previous study concluded that more research is needed to uncover the dynamics between drug markets in Europe and gun violence: ‘While there is clearly a link between the illegal drug trade and firearm violence, this connection and its enabling elements are an important avenue for further research’ (18). Counteracting drug-related gun violence requires a good intelligence picture of its scope, characteristics and dynamics. The objective of this report is to analyse the nexus between gun violence and the illegal drug market in Europe. To reach this objective, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What is the nexus between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in the European Union? 2. What are the scope and characteristics of drug-related firearms violence in the European Union? 3. How does this violence impact society?    

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 2023. 57p.

By EUDA and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO)

This report was prepared jointly by the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO), in order to support the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership (European Ports Alliance). To this end it provides an overview of seizures of drugs in or destined for EU seaports in the period from January 2019 to June 2024. As the report notes, there are significant gaps in the available data, which is a major barrier to developing a better understanding of the current situation and trends. As a result, the report’s findings need to be interpreted with a degree of caution. • Based on data provided by WCO RILO-WE, a total of 1 826 tonnes of drugs were seized at or in transit to EU seaports in the period between January 2019 and June 2024, out of which more than 1 244 tonnes were seized at EU ports (about 68 %). The data available indicates that the majority of the total quantity was seized from container ships (at least 1 507 tonnes, 82.6 % of the total). However, this is likely to be a significant underestimate of all drugs seized in or destined for EU ports during this period, due to the absence of data and gaps in reporting from several EU Member States. • Eighteen EU countries reported to the WCO on seizures carried out at a total of 96 EU ports (of which 40 are in Spain). However, the data submitted by these countries is not comprehensive, as some countries only reported a limited number of cases. For example, two key Member States only reported two cases each to the WCO during the five-and-a-half-year period in question, while the actual number of seizures in these countries during this time was much higher. • Among the 33 seaports that belong to the European Ports Alliance, nine appear not to report drug seizures to the WCO. The analysis also indicates that some seaports that are currently not members of the European Ports Alliance are significant targets for maritime drug trafficking. • Seventeen EU ports seized over 10 tonnes of drugs in this period, with Antwerp (BE) seizing the largest quantity (483 tonnes). • Cocaine appears to be the drug trafficked in the largest quantity to EU ports, with about 1 487 tonnes seized, representing 81.7 % of the total quantity of drugs in the dataset. Cannabis resin appears to be the second most trafficked drug, with about 260 tonnes seized, or 14.2 % of the total. For some drug types, only small numbers of seizures were reported (e.g. only 35 seizures of herbal cannabis were recorded). • The ports of Antwerp (BE) and Rotterdam (NL) seized the largest quantities of cocaine (about 443 tonnes and 181 tonnes respectively) and heroin (8.1 tonnes and 5 tonnes respectively). • The ports of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES) and Huelva (ES) seized the largest quantities of cannabis resin (42 tonnes and 30 tonnes respectively). • The available data indicate that at least 21.7 tonnes of captagon were seized at EU seaports during this period. The majority came from one seizure in Salerno (IT) in 2020 (14.2 tonnes). It is noteworthy that no captagon seizures were reported to the WCO in EU ports after 2020. • The large quantities of drugs seized on average per shipment — more than 500 kilograms of cocaine and more than 1.3 tonnes of cannabis resin — and in total during the period, confirm that criminal networks are still able to use EU ports to smuggle wholesale amounts of various drugs, especially cocaine. This in turn indicates that EU ports are infiltrated by organised criminal networks to a significant degree, implying the likely corruption among port staff including port workers and law enforcement officials. In addition, violence has been observed in connection with drug smuggling in many EU ports. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 2025. 32p

By Elenice De Souza Oliveira , Braulio Figueiredo Alves da Silva , Flavio Luiz Sapori & Gabriela Gomes Cardoso

Many studies demonstrate that homicides are heavily concentrated in impoverished neighborhoods, but not all socially disadvantaged neighborhoods are hotbeds of violence. Conducted in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, this study hypothesizes that the association between high rates of homicide and impoverished areas is influenced by the emergence of a specific type of street drug-dealing common to favelas (slums). The study applies econometric techniques to police data on homicides and drug arrests from 2008 to 2011, as well as 2010 Census data, to test its hypothesis. The findings provide insight into the development of crime prevention policies in areas of high social vulnerability.

International Journal of Law and Public Administration Vol. 3, No. 2; December 2020

By Thomas Grisaffi, Linda Farthing, Kathryn Ledebur, Maritza Paredes, Alvaro Pastor

Between 2006-2019, Bolivia emerged as a world leader in formulating a participatory, non-violent model to gradually limit coca production in a safe and sustainable manner while simultaneously offering farmers realistic economic alternatives to coca. Our study finds that not only has this model reduced violence, but it has effectively expanded social and civil rights in hitherto marginal regions. In contrast, Peru has continued to conceptualize ‘drugs’ as a crime and security issue. This has led to U.S.-financed forced crop eradication, putting the burden onto impoverished farmers, generating violence and instability. At the request of farmers, the Peruvian government has made a tentative move towards implementing one aspect of Bolivia’s community control in Peru. Could it work? We address this question by focusing on participatory development with a special emphasis on the role of local organizations and the relationship between growers and the state. Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, focus group discussions and secondary research, we find that for community control to have any chance of success in Peru, grassroots organizations must be strengthened and grower trust in the state created. The study also demonstrates that successful participatory development in drug crop regions is contingent on land titling and robust state investment, which strengthens farmer resolve to participate so as to avoid a return to the repression of the past.

World Development, 2021, 14p.

By Don Weatherburn, Michael Farrell, Wai-Yin Wan, Sara Rahman

Background: Very few studies have examined the criminal careers of drug traffickers. Our aim in this study was to determine (a) the percentage of drug traffickers who cease involvement in crime following their first conviction for drug trafficking, (b) the factors that affect the likelihood and speed of re-offending among drug traffickers, (c) the factors that affect the rate of reoffending among drug traffickers and (d) the scale of drug trafficker involvement in crimes other than drug trafficking.

Methods: We characterize the criminal careers of a sample of 30,020 cases of offenders convicted of drug trafficking in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over the 29-year period between 2000 and 2023, focussing on how drug charge, trafficker type, and drug and alcohol use affect the risk and frequency of offending. We use a combination of descriptive statistics, cure fraction regression and negative binomial regression. Our controls in the regression analyses consist of age, age of first conviction and number of prior convictions.

Results: The 'cure' rate among males aged 30-39 who were first convicted between 19 and 35 years of age, whose principal offence is trafficking in a non-commercial quantity of heroin, who have three prior convictions and who score 'moderate' in terms of the LSI-R drug/alcohol scale is 31 per cent. The instantaneous risk of re-offending among ATS, heroin, cannabis and ecstasy traffickers ranges between 62 and 82 per cent higher than among cocaine traffickers. Convicted drug traffickers commit a wide variety of offences but only a small proportion are convicted of drug offences before or after their first conviction for drug trafficking.

Conclusions: The present study raises two important questions for future research. The first concerns whether those involved in drug trafficking in Australia rely on it as a primary source of income or whether it is just one of several income-generating criminal activities they switch between in the course of a criminal career. The second question is why there are such marked differences in the risk, speed and frequency of offending among traffickers of different drugs.

International Journal of Drug Policy; 2024, 10p.

 By The United States Sentencing Commission

  More than 780,000 Americans died from a drug overdose in the last ten years. Overdose deaths have increased more than 300 percent from the level two decades ago. The number of such deaths has continued to increase in recent years, with the Centers for Disease Control reporting that 91,799 people died of drug overdoses in 2020, 106,699 in 2021, 107,941 in 2022, and 105,007 in 2023. Provisional data shows a recent decline in overdose deaths beginning in late 2023 and continuing into 2024. Overdoses remain one of the leading causes of deaths in adults in the United States. While fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin are the drugs most often involved in these deaths, synthetic opioids like fentanyl— which is up to 50 times more potent than heroin—contribute to nearly 70 percent of overdose deaths. In this report, the Commission examines all overdoses identified in drug trafficking cases reported to the Commission for fiscal years 2019 to 2023. One or more deaths occurred in more than three-quarters of these cases, while no deaths occurred in the remaining cases. The Commission is able to collect information about the overdoses reported in these cases through the sentencing documents the courts provide to the Commission in every case.8 Using that information, this report provides an analysis of the 1,340 individuals sentenced for a federal drug trafficking offense involving an overdose in fiscal years 2019 to 2023. In it, the Commission analyzes the demographic characteristics of these individuals, the offense conduct that occurred in the case, and how the courts sentenced these individuals—including the application of sentencing guideline provisions that provide for heightened base offense levels when the offense of conviction established that death or serious bodily injury resulting from an overdose occurred, or departures from the guideline range for death or physical injury, or how often courts varied from the guideline range for a similar reason. Additionally, in this report, the Commission provides the results of a special data collection project to explore the outcome of each overdose, the type of drug involved in the overdose, the victim’s knowledge of the drug they were taking, and the sentenced individual’s conduct during the offense.  

Washington, DC, USSC, 2025.   52p.

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35 

By Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Kars de Bruijne

Since 2022, a synthetic drug known as ‘kush’, has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa. Kush emerged in Sierra Leone, but quickly spread across countries in the subregion, including Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with devastating effects. By April 2024, the health impacts of kush, a synthetic drug containing nitazenes, opioids as – or more – powerful than fentanyl, as well as synthetic cannabinoids, were so acute that the presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia had declared national emergencies over drug use – an unprecedented step.

This drug represents a turning point in West Africa’s drug landscape. The scale of its market expansion and its lethal public health effects are unparalleled. Yet, amidst widespread speculation about kush, a number of critical questions remained unanswered about the drug. What is kush? Where does it come from? Who is producing and trafficking it? And what can be done to reduce the harm posed by this drug?

This research confirms that kush is composed of potent synthetic opioids called nitazenes, some of which are 25 times stronger than fentanyl, and synthetic cannabinoids commonly found in European drug markets. The consequences have been dire, with mass fatalities overwhelming mortuary systems, forcing emergency group cremations, and leading to bodies being abandoned in the streets.

The research identifies China, the Netherlands, and most likely the UK as key sources of kush and it’s active ingredients, which are trafficked via maritime routes and postal courier services. It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids. Initially controlled by a few organized criminal groups, the kush market has since fragmented, making it even more difficult to counteract. Local synthesis of the drug has increased, escalating health risks, and Sierra Leone’s street gangs for a key part of the drug’s distribution network.

Some key points highlighted in the report are:

Kush is a drug that has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa, with Sierra Leone as its epicentre;

Chemical testing finds that nearly 50% of samples contain nitazenes, a very addictive and deadly synthetic opioid comparable to fentanyl (the other half contains synthetic cannabinoids)

Some of these substances are imported from China, the Netherlands and most likely the United Kingdom through maritime routes, the air and postal courier services (It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids);

The market for kush used to be more strongly controlled by large groups but increasingly fragmented, with smaller actors setting up own operations

Urgent coordinated action is needed on three fronts; a) better monitoring, early warning, testing, and information-sharing in West Africa; b) disrupting supply chains by China, the Netherlands and the UK and at Sierra Leonean points of entry; c) a strong push on mitigating the harms of kush consumption

Clingendael: 2025. 60p

By Laura R. Blume

Why do drug traffickers sometimes decide to use violence, but other times demonstrate restraint? Building on recent work on the politics of drug violence, this article explores how Central American drug trafficking organizations’ strategies impact their use of violence. I argue that three inter-related political factors—corruption, electoral competition, and the politicization of the security apparatus—collectively determine the type of relationship between traffickers and the state that will emerge. That relationship, in turn, determines the primary strategy used by traffickers in that country. Drawing on over two years of comparative ethnographic fieldwork in key transshipment points along the Caribbean coast of Central America, I show how co-optation strategies in Honduras have resulted in high levels of violence, evasion strategies in Costa Rica have produced moderate levels of violence, and collusion strategies in Nicaragua have generated the lowest levels of drug-related violence.

Comparative Political Studies,Volume 55, Issue 8, July 2022, Pages 1366-1402

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  This report presents the results of the twenty-second Myanmar opium survey, covering the 2023/2024 opium growing and harvesting season. The last three surveys in Myanmar covering the 2020/2021, 2021/2022, and the 2022/2023 seasons showed an increase at the national level in both areas under opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The 2023 survey reported an 18% increase in the area under cultivation to an estimated 47,100 hectares. For the first time in three years the 2024 survey shows a modest decline in the area under cultivation by 4% to 45,200 hectares, indicating a possible stabilization at recent high levels. Three consecutive years of expanding cultivation followed by a year of limited decline could indicate some degree of saturation in regional heroin markets supplied by Myanmar. Declining prices of fresh opium in Myanmar and declining purity adjusted prices of heroin in regional markets could have dissuaded a further increase of production in Myanmar in 2024. However, information from the field suggests that the stagnation in productivity could also be related to the ongoing internal conflict. While instability and conflict, and their impact on the rule of law have traditionally been seen as a driver of illicit crop cultivation, the expansion of the conflict and shifts in the territorial control of armed actors, especially in the growing areas of Shan and Kachin, have limited the mobility of rural population, and likely prevented farmers from accessing cultivation areas further away from their villages. The dynamics of internal conflict might also explain the uneven development across Myanmar’s states in regions, with some areas showing declines in cultivation and others continued growth. In October 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were some 3 million people internally displaced across the country, with Shan and Kachin in particular seeing escalating tensions and clashes in late 2023 and early 2024. The 2024 survey shows decreases in illicit opium cultivation in half of the geographic areas observed, including South Shan which traditionally experienced the most extensive opium cultivation. Eastern Shan, Chin, and Kayah had modest increases between survey years. Overall, cultivation in Shan State, which continues to be the centre of opium production in Myanmar at 88% of total cultivation area, decreased by 4% to 39,700 ha, with decreases in South and North Shan (-9% and -4% respectively) while East Shan increased by 10%. Cultivation in Kachin saw a moderate decrease of 10%, a change from past trends when above-average increases were observed. Estimates for Chin and Kayah, where the overall area remained small in comparison to other areas, showed an 18% and 8% increase, respectively. Overall potential opium production decreased at greater rates than cultivation due to a decline in opium yield. In 2024, average yield declined by 4% from 22.9 kg per hectare to 22kg per hectare, resulting in an estimated opium production of 995 (700-1,580) metric tons, or 8% less than in 2023. Nevertheless, both yield and production remain at high levels across the last decade. The decrease in cultivation and production coincided with a decrease in farmgate prices of both fresh and dry opium in USD terms, by 4% and 8%, respectively. In 2024, fresh opium traded at just over US$300 per kilogram, down from US$317 the year before, although it remained high compared to the last low point in 2021 when it stood at US$131 per kilogram. In combination with lower production, nationally farmers earned slightly less income than the previous year, between US$230 – US$518 million in 2024 (US$271 - US$613 million in 2023). The farmgate value only represents a small share of the overall opiate economy, with heroin manufacture and export making up a larger share. Wholesale prices of heroin in the region declined even more, contributing to a much larger decrease in the value of the total national opiate economy of about 40%, now ranging between US$589 million and US$1.57 billion, representing between 0.9 – 2.4% of Myanmar’s 2023 GDP  

Thailand: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2024. 88p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By Joseph Friedman, jofriedman@health.uDaniel Ciccarone

Synthetic illicit drugs, such as nitazenes and fentanyls, are becoming commonplace in countries around the world, including in Europe, Australia, and Latin America, which raises concern for overdose crises like those seen in North America. An important dimension of the risk represented by synthetic drugs is the fact that they are increasingly packaged in counterfeit pill form. These pills—often indistinguishable from authentic pharmaceuticals—have substantially widened the scope of populations susceptible to synthetic drug overdose in North America (eg, among adolescents experimenting with pills or tourists from the USA seeking psychoactive medications from pharmacies in Mexico). The non-medical use of diverted prescription medications is relatively more common, and less stigmatised, than the use of powder drugs. Many consumers of counterfeit pills are unaware that they contain synthetic illicit drugs, believe them to be authentic pharmaceuticals, and would be unlikely to consume those drugs knowingly or if in powder form. Given these issues, we recommend the expansion of educational and awareness campaigns, pill testing programmes to help consumers shift demand to safer products, increased monitoring in routine clinical scenarios and overdose death toxicology, and expanding medically managed safer alternatives to counterfeit pill use.\

The Lancet Public Health, Volume 10, Issue 1, e58 - e62 2025.

By Erica Marat and Gulzat Botoeva

Summary This research brief examines the links between illegal drug trafficking, violence, and corruption in Central Asia. We argue that drug trafficking is highly organised with major criminal and state actors participating in the illicit activity. Criminal violence is spread across the region, especially in urban areas, but the Central Asian states are capable of intercepting and preventing illicit activities. By analysing big data on violence, drug interdictions, and patterns of corruption in the region between 2015 and 2022, we explain the relationship between drug trafficking and key actors from the criminal underworld and state agencies in Central Asia. We also rely on expert interviews explaining states’ involvement in the drugs economy. Our analysis of violence and policing dynamics in the region shows how patterns of organised crime change depending on state effectiveness and the presence of competition between traffickers. Each country exhibits a unique relationship between state actors and criminal syndicates in both interdicting and facilitating drug trafficking. Our research comes at a time of an anticipated increase in drug trafficking from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and of growing economic uncertainty in the wider region due to Western sanctions against Russia. In the policy realm, our research findings can help develop anti-trafficking strategies in the Central Asian region and improve our understanding of how drug trafficking can be curbed more effectively by identifying the main actors involved in this highly organised criminal process

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham., 2022. 48p.

By The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Illinois is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico grown marijuana in the state.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 6p.

By The U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration

The most significant drug-related threat to Indiana is posed by Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO), particularly the Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) and the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Mexican DTOs dominate the wholesale supply of illicit opioids (both fentanyl and heroin), cocaine, methamphetamine, and Mexico-grown marijuana in the state. The opioid threat remains dire and is of grave concern.

Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Report; 2024. 7p.

By Leila Pereira, Rafael Pucci, Rodrigo R. Soares

We study a Force-down/Shoot-down intervention in Brazil that led cocaine traffickers to shift from air to river routes. Using data on cocaine production, homicides, and the network of rivers in the Amazon, we provide evidence that violence increased in municipalities along river routes originating from Andean producing countries after the policy. We also show that, during the same period, violence in these municipalities became more responsive to cocaine production in origin countries. We document an instance of crime displacement over the three-dimensional space, involving sophisticated adaptations from criminals regarding transportation technologies, with dramatic side-effects for local populations.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 55p.