By Russ Scott

Australia has one of the highest rates in the world of the use of the crystalline form of methamphetamine, a highly addictive stimulant that is often associated with a chronic, relapsing dependency. Methamphetamine use is associated with both acquisitive and violent offending, which cause substantial personal and societal costs. Whilst the short-term euphoria and stimulation provide a positive reinforcement to methamphetamine use, the aversive states of withdrawing from methamphetamine and the associated craving, which may last up to five weeks into abstinence, underlie the negative reinforcement to continued methamphetamine use. Although many methamphetamine-dependent users experience high levels of psychological distress, it is likely that less than half engage with treatment or support services, and current intervention and treatment programmes have high discontinuation rates. Stigma and discrimination, even from paramedics and health clinicians, are prominent barriers to methamphetamine-dependent users accessing treatment in Australia

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law; Vol. 31, No. 4, 671–704,, 2024

By Delvon T. Mattingly  , Maggie K. Richardson ,  Joy L. Hart

Introduction: Cannabis use is increasing due to several factors including the adoption of laws legalizing its use across the United States (US). We examined changes in current cannabis use among US youth and adults and by key socio-demographic groups. Methods: Using data from the 2013–2022 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (n=543,195), we estimated the prevalence of (2013–2019, 2020, 2021–2022) and trends in (2013–2019, 2021–2022) current (i.e., past 30- day) cannabis use among US youth (aged 12–17) and adults (aged 18+) overall and by age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and total annual family income. We also examined sociodemographic factors associated with use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Results: Cannabis use increased from 7.59 % to 11.48 % in 2013–2019, was 11.54 % in 2020, and increased again from 13.13 % to 15.11 % in 2021–2022. Among youth, cannabis use remained constant from 2013 to 2019 and 2021–2022. In 2022, use was highest among aged 18–34, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, and generally lower SES adults. From 2021–2022, cannabis use increased among several groups such as adults who were aged 35–49 (14.25–17.23 %), female (11.21–13.00 %), and Hispanic (10.42–13.50 %). Adults who were aged 18–25, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, some college educated, and of lower annual family income had consistently higher odds of current cannabis use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Conclusions: Cannabis use is increasing overall and among certain sociodemographic groups. Our findings inform prevention and harm reduction efforts aimed at mitigating the prevalence of cannabis use in the US. 

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports 12 (2024) 10025 

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

Hawaii may be poised to become the 25th state to legalize the recreational use of cannabis for adults aged 21 and over. Nearly 90 percent of Hawaii residents supported full legalization of cannabis for adult use in a January 2023 poll conducted by the Hawaii Cannabis Industry Association. Gov. Josh Green has said he would sign a legalization bill if one is delivered to his desk—marking a significant departure from former Gov. Dave Ige, who left office in 2023. During the 2023 legislative session, lawmakers considered proposals to legalize adult-use cannabis. One of these bills was passed by the state Senate but was not heard in the state House of Representatives. Between the conclusion of the 2023 legislative session and the convening of the 2024 session, Attorney General Anne Lopez met with key lawmakers to develop proposed language for a legalization bill that could gain the support of the administration and the legislature. This working group produced a 315-page draft bill, introduced in each chamber of the legislature as House Bill 2600 and Senate Bill 3335, respectively. Despite having played a key role in drafting the legislation, however, the attorney general’s office testified in early hearings that it “does not support the legalization of adult-use cannabis,” although the current legislation is a “good faith effort toward protecting the public welfare and is an improvement on previous bills that have been heard by the legislature.” Reason Foundation has offered recommendations for improvement to successive cannabis legalization proposals in Hawaii. Several of these recommendations were adopted by Senate committees during the 2023 legislative session. Reason Foundation has also reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill 3335, as amended, and submitted recommendations for improvement. This brief goes beyond those recommendations and provides key background on the Hawaiian marijuana market and considerations for market structure and tax policy. Cannabis consumers are price-sensitive and have many options for purchasing cannabis. Prices and availability within the licensed cannabis industry can strongly influence the decisions of both producers and consumers to either participate in this industry or engage in illicit cannabis activity. In California, high taxes and a lack of legal sellers resulted in roughly two-thirds of cannabis demand being satisfied by the illicit market six years after legalization. The prevalence of illicit sales also negatively affects state tax collections, as only a minority of cannabis transactions are legal and subject to taxation. California has recently begun to take corrective action to lower the tax-induced price disparity between licensed and illicit goods, but Hawaiian lawmakers can circumvent the rise of large illicit markets with an appropriate market design. 

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 18p.

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

In the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp and its derivatives across the country, an unexpected flood of hemp-derived cannabinoid products hit the market and has sparked a whirlwind of interest—and concern—among state lawmakers. Unlike marijuana, which for now remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law, hemp-derived cannabinoids, such as cannabidiol (CBD) and delta-8 THC, occupy a murkier legal and regulatory landscape. This ambiguity, along with a lack of guidance from federal authorities, has left states grappling with how to ensure consumer safety, prevent underage access, facilitate interstate commerce, and support existing marijuana markets. The growing popularity of hemp-derived products has stimulated significant legislative attention in recent years, with over 90 regulatory proposals introduced in state legislatures in 2024 alone and 14 states adopting restrictions or prohibitions to some degree. A small but growing number of states have sought to legalize and regulate intoxicating hemp derivatives as general consumer goods, similar to alcoholic beverages or tobacco, or by incorporating them into their existing regulations governing medical or recreational marijuana. Yet, the continued proliferation and evolution of hemp-derived cannabinoid products has exposed significant gaps in existing regulatory paradigms. State regulations governing hemp products vary widely and are unevenly enforced, creating a patchwork of rules that can change dramatically from one state to the next. Unlike the market for marijuana, which has remained largely intrastate due to federal prohibition, federally-legal hemp products can cross state lines more freely. This has resulted in a marketplace where consumers face an increasingly confusing array of products of uncertain quality while businesses must navigate a shifting and uncertain regulatory environment. Additionally, lawmakers and regulators must continually update or amend rules in response to the emergence of new products, consumer behaviors, and industry dynamics. This piecemeal approach leaves consumers at risk, strains state resources, and hampers the ability for even willing actors to comply with state rules. This paper advocates for a cohesive approach to regulating hemp cannabinoid products that includes action by both federal and state policymakers. Our paper presents a series of recommendations for both federal and state authorities aimed at harmonizing standards across testing, labeling, packaging, and taxation for all cannabis products. By implementing these measures, states can enhance compliance and market competitiveness, reduce costs, and ensure consumer safety as both marijuana and hemp markets evolve. Ensuring consumer safety and minimizing youth access to potentially intoxicating products can also be achieved through state regulations that differentiate between high-THC and low-THC hemp products. We recommend states adopt labeling standards by which high THC product labels must provide detailed potency disclosures and risk warnings, while low THC products may adhere to general consumer goods standards. Consistent advertising restrictions across all cannabis products will also avoid bias based on the source of cannabinoids. The disparity in tax and regulatory burdens between marijuana and hemp products also fosters an uncompetitive landscape between the two product categories. High costs in state-regulated marijuana markets, such as those in California, push consumers toward cheaper alternatives, including both illicit marijuana or less-regulated hemp. To level the playing field, states should reduce the tax and compliance costs imposed on legal marijuana businesses, aligning them more closely with those for hemp producers. Imposing a single, uniform excise tax on all intoxicating cannabis products would simplify the tax system and reduce incentives for consumers to seek cheaper, illicit options. Restrictive licensing frameworks for marijuana businesses also contribute to its competitive disadvantage compared to hemp, limiting market entry, innovation, and consumer access, with the artificial scarcity raising prices and pushing consumers toward alternatives. In contrast, intoxicating hemp products can be produced in any state, shipped to a variety of retailers, and sold directly to consumers even in states without legal marijuana sales. This dynamic distorts the market in favor of hemp products, sometimes sold under transient branding and lacking clear originating information for the producer, which consumers might not choose if legal marijuana were more affordable or available. Regulators ought to be aware of who is selling intoxicating cannabis products, but regulatory schemes should not push market participants toward the hemp market merely because marijuana licensing is too costly or unavailable. We recommend states adopt a middle ground approach between overly-restrictive marijuana licensing regimes and the lack of any such framework for hemp. In particular, we suggest state law at least require hemp producers to register with state regulatory authorities while also drastically reducing both financial and non-financial barriers to entry into the marijuana market. This may include allowing any retailer who can demonstrate competence over inventory management for age-gated products to become eligible to retail both hemp cannabinoid and marijuana products. Finally, to fully realize the potential of a national cannabis market, particularly in light of the emerging hemp derivatives sector, states must also permit the interstate sale of marijuana products. As these authors argued in a prior paper, existing bans on out-of-state marijuana products are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and exacerbate the competitive advantage hemp currently enjoys. State lawmakers should agree to remove bans on the import of marijuana and allow state-licensed producers to export to purchasers in other states. In addition, lawmakers should take steps to align packaging, labeling, and testing protocols to facilitate a robust and legal interstate market. The rapidly evolving cannabis industry presents both opportunities and challenges for state regulators. By adopting a more unified and flexible approach to both hemp and marijuana regulation, states can enhance market competitiveness, reduce costs, and protect consumers. Embracing these recommendations will position states to lead in the burgeoning cannabis sector while ensuring consumer safety and market integrity

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 85p.

By Andy Hochstetler1,2, David J. Peters1, Kyle Burgason1, Jeff Bouffard1, Glenn Sterner III3, Shannon Monnat

Introduction: The goal of this project was to identify rural jurisdictions with high drug overdose rates and collaborate with resourced mentors to create law enforcement intelligence responses to local opioid problems. Methods: The first part of the strategy was to control for known contributors to opioid death that are largely beyond the control of law enforcement, and thereby focus on jurisdictions that are outliers in terms of drug problems. (Work products include a Non-Metropolitan County Opioid Overdose Calculator that allows one to examine how demographics and other county conditions affect overdose risk.) Use of maps of drug overdose deaths identified high overdose places by drug type with a classification technique to group places with like drug problems (latent profile analysis) and a multiple regression data analysis to identify outliers. A survey of law enforcement agencies provided an understanding of intelligence resources available in rural areas and agencies. This information informed recruitment of enthusiastic participant agencies. A small scale, intelligence strategy appropriate to resource deprived, rural departments was developed in collaboration with participating agencies, leaving them great flexibility in design. Evaluation of outcomes included a survey, qualitative interviews providing anecdotal feedback, and official data that each department had decided would speak to successful implementation. Conclusions: Variables significantly predicting death rates include population, indicators of ethnic diversity, natural resource amenities, and labor market characteristics. Lagged indicators of drug deaths and prescribing rates are the most consistently significant and convincing block of variables as predictors of current death. The most successful departments implemented efforts based on what they had learned in previous collaborations with better resourced areas, where efforts led to arrests and judges supported use of intelligence in court proceedings, and either information sharing or use of electronic surveillance was supported such as using cell phone opening software. Also, closed network iPads were used in relation to controlled buys, search warrants, pre and post raids, evidence and picture recording during searches, overdose mapping, surveillance photos and messaging to the narcotics officer, confidential informant files and referencing files, and notes from scenes. ODMAP can inform efforts but proved difficult to use on mobile devices, lagging in time, and imprecise to use as daily actionable intelligence. Funds can be well spent in rural places, but investments in departments with little resource slack, lacking in administrative capacity, and where there are few personnel or hours of investment to spare are risky and make for difficult collaborations. Analytics and predictive problem solving are near impossible. Therefore, immediate and accessible intelligence for patrol officers without investment in analytics likely should be the goal.

Ames, IA: Iowa State University, 2023. 71p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Marina Gonzalez and Reygan Cunningham

Community violence prevention is an emerging field of public safety work focused on reducing and preventing lethal and sublethal violence.1 Yet, despite growing awareness of evidence-informed approaches, historic levels of investment and political support from the federal government, few cities have been able to sustainably reduce community violence at the city level through purposeful strategies. With support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, the California Partnership for Safe Communities (CPSC) worked with a diverse range of field experts to identify key capacities that may play essential roles in reducing community violence at the city level and over time. The project team began by combining findings from research across a range of disciplines and interviews with leading subject matter experts to identify key capacities that were likely to play important roles in the ability of cities to sustainably reduce community violence. The six identified capacities were: 1. Political governance and public sector leadership, 2. Data-informed problem analysis, 3. Cross-sector collaboration on a shared strategy, 4. Effective operational management, 5. Robust violence reduction infrastructure, and 6. Sustainability planning and institutionalization. To test and refine these capacities, CPSC project leads explored the role of each capacity in seven cities with long-term violence challenges as well as significant experience with violence prevention efforts: Baltimore; Boston; Cincinnati; Los Angeles; New Orleans; Oakland; and Philadelphia. This second stage of the study surfaced the following city findings: Cities with more key capacities present appeared to be more successful. These cities were able to assemble violence reduction strategies that formal evaluations found to be effective in reducing violence over multi-year time horizons.2 Higher levels of effective political governance corresponded with more robust operational management, which appeared to play a crucial role in cities' ability to reduce violence; Sustained funding, a clear theory of change, a strategic focus on a highest-risk of violence population and organizational support were associated with effective CVI ecosystems. These ecosystems appeared to help cities sustain longer-term reductions. Problem-oriented, data-driven, collaborative policing appears to play an important role, operationally and politically; The challenge of scaling programs and strategies in larger cities is significant, but can drive creative adaptation when supported by robust management structures; and Sustainability and institutionalization of violence reduction strategies appear to depend heavily on stable political governance and effective management 

Oakland, CA: California Partnership for Safe Communities. 18p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked & Amit Timilsina

This research paper explores the findings from semi-structured interviews conducted with business owners operating spa and massage parlours, khaja ghars (snack shops), cabin/hostess bars, dance bars, and dohoris (folk-dance bars) in Kathmandu. It explores business owners’ perspectives on the day-to-day running of their businesses; the risks and stressors they face; their aspirations and motivations; and, where possible, their rationale for working with children, and the types of relationships they have with them.In addition to generating business-level evidence, the research provided evidence on a series of three business owner-led Action Research Groups, which began in February 2022 and continued until September 2023. These groups have generated theories of change, and will test and evaluate solutions to shift the system away from WFCL.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 6, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Malore Dusenbery, Josh Fording, Jennifer Yahner, Jeanette Hussemann, Robbie Dembo

Victim compensation programs provide financial assistance to cover out-of-pocket expenses associated with the financial, physical, and psychological burdens of victimization. From 2022 to 2024, the Urban Institute and NORC at the University of Chicago conducted a National Study of Victim Compensation Program Trends, Challenges, and Successes, which included evaluations of four state crime victim compensation programs. This brief summarizes our evaluation of West Virginia’s victim compensation program to understand its utilization and perspectives on its ability to meet victims’ needs.We conclude that the West Virginia compensation program is connected to providers in the community and provides valuable benefits to victims in a mostly efficient, effective, and comprehensive way. Its being located in the legislature allows for independence and strong legislative support, but perhaps less connection to providers. It benefits from adequate funding and wants to ensure that continues and is not affected by external changes. Program staff and assistance providers note great improvement in awareness of the program since staffing an outreach coordinator. The number of staff and staff retention, however, continue to be a challenge for the program.Our analysis found some disparities in the data related to race and gender, which may be partially attributable to differences in the crimes experienced and reported by gender and by racial group and coverage by the state’s Medicaid system. Future research could dive deeper into these findings to better understand these patterns and the role the compensation program can play in improving access and success for diverse groups.Many of these findings and recommendations align with those emerging nationally in conversations about how to improve victim compensation programs. We are grateful that programs such as West Virginia’s remain open to evaluation and eager to understand how to continue expanding and improving their accessibility, responsiveness, and coverage to provide meaningful benefits to victims.

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2024. 21p.

By Patricia C. Lewis , Nadine J. Kaslow, Yuk Fai Cheong, Dabney P. Evans and Kathryn M. Yount

Femicide Refers to the intentional gender-related killing of women and girls (1). Despite the high prevalence of female murder victimization in the United States (U.S.) (2, 3), the U.S. lags behind other nations in defining and documenting gender-related female homicides (4). While efforts are underway within the criminal justice and public health sectors to better track violent deaths, deficient surveillance systems limit efforts to estimate the annual incidence of femicide in the U.S. Here, we position femicide as a preventable death that should be treated as a social and public health problem and a distinct form of homicide in the legal code. This approach is especially salient, given the documented increase of non-lethal intimate partner violence (IPV) in major cities (5) and nationally (6) during the COVID-19pandemic, demonstrating the collateral impacts of public-health crises on violence against women (VAW). 

Front. Public Health, 27 February 2024 Sec. Injury Prevention and Control Volume 12 - 2024 |

By Goh Zhang Hao, Gulizar Haciyakupoglu, Edson C. Tandoc Jr

This policy report investigates how gender, daily Internet activities, and the use of Internet-enabled devices, can impact one’s frequency of witnessing online harms. Building on a national survey conducted in Singapore in December 2022 by the Centre for Information Integrity and the Internet, this study suggests that men engage in daily Internet activities and use Internet-enabled devices more frequently than women. This partly explains why men witness more online harms than women. The policy report calls for further studies into the relationship between online harms witnessing and perpetration, along with greater attention to gender-based differences, when studying and drafting policies on online harms and emerging online threats.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Centre Of Excellence For National Security, 2024. 20p.

By Jorge García Hombrados and Lindsey Novak  

A sizable share of marriages in several Asian and African countries are initiated by the man abducting the woman he wishes to wed. In this paper, we use quantitative and qualitative methods to characterize the practice of abduction marriage in Ethiopia. We first present the results from in-depth qualitative surveys with community leaders and abducted women in the Gambella region of Ethiopia to gain a deeper understanding of how the practice functions in these communities. These interviews suggest that abduction is typically used to overcome the refusal of the woman’s family. Second, we use Demographic and Health Survey along with ethnographic data to characterize women and ethnic groups affected by this practice in Ethiopia. Finally, we empirically examine the central hypothesis about the persistence of this practice and find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that men often use abduction to improve bargaining power in marriage negotiations and reduce the size of the bride price payment. Specifically, we demonstrate that droughts—a proxy for income shocks in this setting— increase the probability of abduction marriage only for women from ethnic groups that traditionally exchange a bride price

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics . 2024. 50p.

By Stephen Reimer and Matthew Redhead

Numerous deadly terrorist attacks across Europe – from the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris and the Manchester Arena bombing of 2016 to the far-right firearms assault in Hanau, Germany in early 2020 – demonstrate that self-activating terrorism (sometimes referred to as lone actor or small cell terrorism) has become a major security concern for the continent. Much of the current ‘conventional wisdom’ around these kinds of actors assumes that terrorist financing and a counterterrorist financing (CTF) response are not relevant to this growing threat. Reports of attacks involving little to no preparation or financial resourcing have shaped a false perception that self-activator activity produces no usable financial intelligence. This has generated a high degree of unease among both CTF professionals in law enforcement, whose role it is to use legal investigatory powers to apprehend terrorists and would-be terrorists, and practitioners in the financial services sector, whose controls and instruments are designed to identify and report abuse of the financial system by terrorists planning attacks. The natural fear is that if the private sector cannot produce the kind of financial intelligence required, then law enforcement cannot do its job as effectively as it might. In light of this, the European Commission commissioned RUSI Europe to carry out this research study as part of Project CRAAFT, which seeks to answer two related research questions: 

• How do self-activating terrorists operating in Europe conduct their financial attack preparations? 
   

• How should the CTF regime be changed to meet this pervasive terrorist threat? 

For evidence, the research team reviewed relevant academic and policy literature and credible media reports, conducted 37 semi-structured interviews with relevant experts, reviewed 106 cases of successful and disrupted self-activated attacks in Europe between January 2015 and November 2020, and carried out three in-depth case study analyses. 

RUSI Occasional Paper, May 2021 51p.   

Universal Cash and Crime 

By Brett Watson, Mouhcine Guettabi, Matthew Reimer

We estimate the effects of universal cash transfers on crime from Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend, an annual lump-sum payment to all Alaska residents. We find a 14% increase in substance-abuse incidents the day after the payment and a 10% increase over the following four weeks. This is partially offset by an 8% decrease in property crime, with no changes in violent crimes. On an annual basis, however, changes in criminal activity from the payment are small. Estimated costs comprise a very small portion of the total payment, suggesting that crime-related concerns of a universal cash transfer program may be unwarranted.

.The Review of Economics and Statistics (2020) 102 (4): 678–689.

By Jessica Reichert,  Sharyn Adams, H. Douglas Otto,  Julia Sanchez 

 East St. Louis, Illinois has experienced high rates of violent crime including homicide. In 2019, the city’s homicide rate was 137 per 100,000 residents, which was considerably higher than the state rate and the Chicago rate (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2019). Victims of violent crime may have many service needs, such as behavioral health counseling, medical care, legal services, housing, and financial assistance (Aeffect, Inc., 2017). Many crime victims come to the attention of police, so a program was developed in East St. Louis to refer victims to services they need. The East St. Louis Community Engagement Response Team (ESL-CERT) was created to refer victims of crime to necessary services using a law enforcement task force (composed of dedicated Illinois State Police officers) working on violent crime cases in East St. Louis. The program is considered a “deflection” program in which law enforcement and other first responders (or co-responders) connect individuals to treatment and/or other social services thereby deflecting them from emergency services, crisis interventions, and justice involvement (Firesheets et al., 2022; Kelly et al., 2022; Lindquist-Grantz et al., 2021). The program assists crime victims, so there is no threat of potential arrest charges. This evaluation examined the ESL-CERT’s action planning process. Local stakeholders met virtually for 21 hours over seven days to develop the program’s Solution Action Plan (SAP). Action planning is a way to increase community engagement, develop clear and concise program goals, and create strategies to effectively achieve those goals (Creatly, 2021). The action planning work culminated in an action plan with objectives, strategies, and steps needed to aid in program implementation. Methodology To avoid the risk of spreading COVID-19 in 2021, the action planning process was held virtually via Zoom for three-hours per day for seven days. Representatives of several local community agencies and groups participated; 30 participated in at least one session from 23 organizations and 14 organization types. There were 30 community representatives, with attendance ranging from 12 to 19 participants per session. In addition to local participants, 26 representatives from outside of the community [Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC), Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA), and Police, Treatment, and Community Collaborative (PTACC) and subject matter experts] attended at least one session each. ICJIA researchers also provided a local crime victim data presentation on day 6. To evaluate the action planning procedure, the ICJIA research team examined a variety of data sources, including field observations, supporting documents, and participant surveys. The secretary of the ICJIA Institutional Review Board approved the proposed research as a program evaluation. Three researchers completed 21 hours of field observations of the action planning process from June 30, 2021, to August 8, 2021. All action planning sessions were conducted and recorded virtually through Zoom Video Conferencing. A total of 30 community members participated in at least one of the seven sessions. After each session, we administered a survey to action planning participants using the Zoom poll feature. The survey included questions about the action planning process, collaboration with other participants, and their intentions of post-action planning with responses on a 4-point Likert scale. Respondents totaled between seven and 20 respondents per day. Finally, we administered a second online survey using Qualtrics software. The survey included questions about participants (e.g., demographics information) and one open-ended question requesting their thoughts on the action planning process. A total of 13 participants responded. Data Analysis We analyzed field notes and supportive documents. We summarized what transpired sequentially for each of the seven days of action planning as the group built on the previous day’s work in each session. The Zoom platform poll data was exported in Excel for data analysis and the online survey was exported from Qualtrics to Excel for data analysis. We analyzed the poll and online survey data to generate descriptive statistics. Study Limitations We encountered some limitations while conducting this evaluation. First, we could only draw from what was said during the sessions. Participants’ internal thoughts and feelings could only be collected through brief, close-ended poll questions. Second, the participants changed each day because many could not attend all seven sessions leading to varying levels of participation in the action planning and polls. Third, while a number of reminders were sent to the group, only 13 participants responded to the online survey to gather participant demographics. Fourth, COVID 19 precipitated the need for virtual action planning, which had its challenges. For example, because of the large number of participants on the virtual platform, it was difficult to discern who was speaking. Finally, as Chicago-based researchers, we were relative outsiders. Without living or working in their community, it was difficult for us to ascertain group dynamics or potential interpersonal issues and understand historical and community context. Key Findings We noted a number of key findings on action planning participants, engagement, and discussions, as well as participant feedback on the action planning process. The survey, taken by 13 action planning participants, revealed most were female, White, non-Latinx, earned master’s degrees and incomes over $90,000, had over 20 years of experience in various fields such as social services and criminal justice, and were an average age of 52. A poll taken by seven participants on the last day showed five worked in East St. Louis and lived in a city outside of East St. Louis. The group members engaged in discussions to develop the violent crime victim program. Action planning discussions covered many areas, including: • Program purpose, capacity, eligibility, and name. • Community issues, partners, and awareness. • Outcome measures and strategies. • Training needs and topics. • Service provision. • Data and evaluation. During our observations of action planning, we noted that at times, likely exacerbated by the virtual format, it was a challenge to engage some action planning group members. In addition, some participants were initially confused about the action planning process and the program model. Finally, some participants had difficulty formulating measurable objectives. Overall, based on our surveys, participants were pleased with, and supportive, of the action planning process and the program. All participants reported the planned program would help victims of crime somewhat to a great extent. Also all indicated they would be likely or very likely to take an active role in implementation and that the program would be somewhat to very sustainable. However, three of seven participants noted the program had weak community engagement during the action planning process. Ultimately, the discussions culminated in an action plan document—the Solutions Action Plan— with objectives and action steps for the next phase of the program: implementation. The action plan contained four outcomes, 11 strategies, and 21 action steps. Recommendations Based on the evaluation findings, we offered recommendations for action planning. Suggestions to enhance participant understanding and encourage individual engagement on a virtual platform included providing data and background information, personalized invitations, regular introductions, a designated feedback loop, and the use of poll questions to aid in discussion. Another recommendation is to engage a more diverse pool of participants (e.g., East St. Louis residents and younger participants) and limit the number of outsiders participating in action planning. Finally, we recommend setting program goals and using a logic model to ensure all objectives are measurable. Conclusion - Overall, the action planning process resulted in a plan to implement a new deflection program to assist victims of violent crime in East St. Louis. The action plan document contained four objectives, 11 strategies, and 21 action steps. The next steps for the program after action planning, was implementation of the program in which the group would work on completing their action steps. Ultimately, this program supports goals of the Illinois Statewide Violence Prevention Plan including collaborations, pro-social programming, and comprehensive case management and clinical support for victims (Garthe et al., 2021).   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2023. 75p.  

By Yanwen Wang, Jacquelyn Gilbreath , Lynne Mock

While drug crime-related criminal legal system and victim costs reached $113 billion across the United States in 2007, just $14.6 billion was spent on treating substance use disorder (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014). Due, in part, to drug crimes, many U.S. citizens are under correctional supervision, with 1 in 66 adults being on probation or parole in 2020 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021). In Illinois, 67,587 individuals were on probation in 2020 (Administrative Offices of the Illinois Courts, 2021) and 26,426 were on parole (Illinois Department of Corrections, 2020). The supervision population rate of substance use is estimated to be two to three times higher than that of the general population, with nearly half of the people under community supervision having a substance use disorder (PEW Charitable Trusts, 2018). The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s Adult Redeploy Illinois (ARI) program was established by the Crime Reduction Act of 2009 to provide financial incentives to local jurisdictions for programs that divert justice-involved individuals from state prisons by providing community-based supervision and individualized services. While researchers have evaluated ARI, models used in some jurisdictions (DeLong & Reichert, 2016; Kroner, et al., 2021; Mock et al., 2017; Reichert et al., 2016), research on ARI client outcomes related to the impact of drug testing is limited. The research goals for this study included: • Quantitatively examining all local ARI program drug test data, including tested drugs, drug test frequencies, and drug test results. • Systematically examining how ARI drug testing contributes to the possibility of revocation including other factors such as age, sex, and race. • Proposing recommendations for better program practice to reduce the rate of revocation. This study sought to answer the following research questions: 1. How is drug testing being practiced and observed in ARI in terms of its frequency, pass rates, and tested drugs? 2. Does drug testing have a significant impact on ARI participant outcomes when controlling for demographic variables? The study included 53,159 records of 1,055 individuals collected from October 3, 2011, to June 20, 2019. The median number of drug tests per individual was 19, and the median of the average days between drug tests was 10 days. The most frequently tested drugs also had the highest positive results: heroin (32%), marijuana/THC (30%), cocaine/crack (14%), alcohol (10%), and other opiates (8%). Logistic regression analyses were used to determine what demographic, drug testing, and criminal justice variables predicted program outcomes of completion or revocation. Among the demographic variables, only age predicted program outcomes. Neither sex nor race emerged as significant program outcome predictors. Drug test positivity rates predicted revocation, as well as drug test frequency (number of times an individual was tested) and average number of days between the drug tests. i Overall, the average drug positivity rate was 29% and most tests were passed with no drug found. Most successful clients who were older women at medium to medium-high recidivism risk and whom tested monthly with lower test positivity rates. Those most likely to experience program revocation were younger men who tested several times per month with higher test positivity rates during their program tenure. Graphing the programs by test positivity, number of tests, and frequency of tests suggests that individuals enrolled in some programs had higher test positivity rates (>50%) and were subject to less frequent drug tests than other programs. This study focuses on drug test outcomes, however, it also would be worth exploring data on drug testing rewards, sanctions, and requirements for program completion and their impacts on program outcomes.   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority., 2022. 33p 

By Pamela B. Teaster, Erica Wood,  Sally B. Hurme,  Carlisle Shealy

In the United States, 10.6% of adults ages 18-64 and 35.2% of people age 65 and older live with a disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Four and a half percent of adults ages 18-64 and 8.9% of people age 65 and older have a cognitive disability (Kraus et al., 2018). Certain cognitive disabilities make adults vulnerable to abuse and require the help of a surrogate decision-maker, such as a guardian or an agent under a power of attorney (Gunther, 2011). A wide spectrum of adults may need the assistance of a guardian, including individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury. The number of adults with serious mental illness increased from 8.3 million in 2008 to 13.1 million in 2019; the greatest increase occurred in young adults ages 18-25 (Lipari, 2020). More than 7 million people in the United States have an intellectual disability, with many requiring assistance (Population Specific Fact Sheet–Intellectual Disability | National Disability Navigator Resource Collaborative, n.d.). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that each year there are more than 2.87 million visits to emergency departments, hospitalizations, and deaths due to traumatic brain injury; some of these result in long-term disability (TBI Data | Concussion | Traumatic Brain Injury | CDC Injury Center, 2021). The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs reports that more than 400,000 U.S. service members experienced a traumatic brain injury between 2000 and 2019 (VA Research on Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), n.d.). Individuals with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, and traumatic brain injury may require short- or long-term guardianship depending on the progression and treatment of their disability. Advancements in medical care not only expand the lifespan of older individuals but also enhance the life expectancies of younger individuals with brain injuries, serious mental illness, or intellectual disabilities, who may outlive their family caregivers (Patja et al., 2000). Terminology for guardianship differs by state. In many but not all states, court-appointed surrogates who make decisions concerning an individual’s finances are referred to as “conservators,” and those who make decisions concerning an individual’s health or personal matters are called “guardians.” For this report, we use the term guardian to refer to both, unless specifically indicated. Guardians are bound by statutory requirements and case law — as well as ethical principles — to act in the best interests of a vulnerable adult. Guardians are fiduciaries, which means that they must act according to the highest standards of care, accountability, trust, honesty, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflict of interest (Managing Someone Else’s Money: Help for Court Appointed Guardian of Property and Conservators, 2019). Powers given to guardians are often immense — for example, the authority to sell a person’s home and personal property, make contracts on their behalf, and consent to all medical treatments. In addition, guardians may be authorized to charge fees for their services that are payable from an adult’s estate — a situation that, left unmonitored, opens the potential for abuse. Moreover, adults with cognitive impairments may be unable to recognize when guardians are not serving as they should. Although guardians should provide protection, there is also the risk that a guardian may take advantage of an adult whom they were named to protect. Despite this situation, we currently lack reliable data both on how many guardianships or guardians exist and on the outcomes of these  arrangements. A number of high-profile media exposés (e.g., Aviv, 2017; Day, Stark, & Coscarelli, 2021; Garland, 2017) have highlighted how, in some egregious cases, guardian actions have harmed adults who are at risk. 

Washington DC: National Institute of Justice , 2022. 64p.

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Peter Leasure, Maria M. Orsini and Dexter Ridgway

The current paper builds upon previous research and seeks to estimate the likelihood of a drug arrest/violation across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Research seeking to identify disparities is important as appropriate policy interventions to address concerns about inequities can only be soundly explored after the identification of any disparities. This paper begins with a discussion of the data and analytic strategy. In the subsequent section, results are presented. It is critical for readers to understand that this study only seeks to identify if racial/ethnic disparities in drug arrests/violations exist and does not seek to identify the underlying causes of any disparities. Therefore, any results of this study should not be used to imply that the enforcement practices of the Ohio State Highway Patrol are discriminatory in any way. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 880, Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, September 2024,