By Joseph Quesnel

Elected Representatives and the media are confused about what police independence means in Canada. Media accuse politicians who address policy issues with police of interfering in police operations. Ongoing pro-Palestinian protests in Canada have led to Canadians questioning police willingness to enforce the law in the face of troubled protest behaviour that has crossed into criminality. Canadians want police to enforce the law unbiasedly and believe police are accountable to the public. In examining the origins and evolution of Canada’s police independence doctrine, this study will show that Canadians have a point as our police are responsible to government ministers, meaning they are accountable to the Canadian public. However, Canadians know that the police must be insulated from political pressures. Canadian history contains examples of elected representatives inappropriately interfering in police operations. Perhaps the term ‘independence’ is inappropriate, given police are subject to laws, policies, and ministerial oversight. Police are autonomous, not independent. The study proposes a model of made-in-Canada democratic policing, allowing politicians to properly converse with police on policy directions while avoiding a form of “governmental policing” where elected representatives too easily influence police operations with partisan politics. Finally, the study’s policy recommendations set Canada toward “apolitical and autonomous” policing.

Winnipeg: Frontier Centre for Public Policy. 2024. 26p.

Edited by Jonathan Adams and Cordelia Hess

Is research on antisemitism even necessary in countries with a relatively small Jewish population? Absolutely, as this volume shows. Compared to other countries, research on antisemitism in the Nordic countries (Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) is marginalized at an institutional and staffing level, especially as far as antisemitism beyond German fascism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust is concerned. Furthermore, compared to scholarship on other prejudices and minority groups, issues concerning Jews and anti-Jewish stereotypes remain relatively under researched in Scandinavia – even though antisemitic stereotypes have been present and flourishing in the North ever since the arrival of Christianity, and long before the arrival of the first Jewish communities.
This volume aims to help bring the study of antisemitism to the fore, from the medieval period to the present day. Contributors from all the Nordic countries describe the status of as well as the challenges and desiderata for the study of antisemitism in their respective countries.

Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2020]

By Elinor Carmi

"Forget everything you know about spam. Now, let's talk about spam. Digital Distortions is about the power behind producing deviant media categories. This book explores the politics behind categories we take for granted such as spam and noise, and what this power means for our broader understanding of media. Despite being an inseparable part of our lives, we know very little about these media categories. The book synthesizes approaches such as media theory, sound studies, feminist technoscience and software studies into a new composition to explore media power. Through the concepts of processed listening and rhythmedia, Digital Distortions draws on sound and sound's ability to cross boundaries as a conceptual framework to think and examine media power more productively. Drawing on repositories of legal, technical and archival sources, Digital Distortions amplifies three stories about media distortions. The book shows that spam received different names in different periods; it is part of a larger project to influence the way people think, understand, and engage with media. The book starts in the early 20th century with Bell Telephone's production of noise. The next story jumps several decades to the web metric standardization in the European Union and the production of spam. The final story focuses on the 2010s and the way Facebook constructs unwanted behaviours. These stories show how deviant categories re-draw boundaries between human and non-human, public and private spaces, and, importantly, social and antisocial"--

New York : Peter Lang, [2020] 270p.

By Retman, Sonnet H.

"A combination madhouse, burlesque show and Coney Island" : the color question in George Schuyler's Black no more -- "Inanimate hideosities" : the burlesque of racial capitalism in Nathanael West's A cool million -- "The last American frontier" : mapping the folk in the Federal Writers' Project's Florida : a guide to the southernmost state -- "Ah gives myself de privilege to go" : navigating the field and the folk in Zora Neale Hurston's Mules and men -- "Am I laughing"? : burlesque incongruities of genre, gender, and audience in Preston Sturges's Sullivan's travels -- Afterpiece : the Coen brothers' Ol'-timey blues in O brother, where art thou?

Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 2011. 322p.

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.

By Jesuit Social Services

This paper focuses on how governments can support a greater understanding of perpetration and a strengthening and acceleration of current efforts to end men’s violence against women and children. It affirms the need to build on Australia’s current approaches to prevention and considers whether they need to be further adapted or refined. Recommendations are based on practice experience, research, and the lived experience of participants. 

Recommendations

1. Investment in the collection of more and better data on the extent of perpetration, and its dynamics and drivers.

2. Identification of emerging opportunities to intervene early to prevent violence against women and children.

3. A “stocktake” of existing prevention and early intervention work taking place across the country, including consideration of evidence where it exists, to promote more specific discussions regarding the merits of various practice approaches.

4. Development of an evidence framework for prevention and early intervention, including standards of evidence.

5. A workforce capability building approach which views a range of work as prevention, including work with people of all genders who can influence men and boys across settings.

6. An online deterrence/early intervention campaign which draws on international best practice.

7. Investment in digital tools to support parents and critical workforces to confidently foster discussions with men and boys about gender norms and use of violence, and to counter negative influences.

8. Exploring in-prison behaviour change approaches, in parallel with changes to prison conditions and culture.

Australia: Jesuit Social Services, 2024. 39p.

By Nina Jankowicz, Isabella Gomez-O’Keefe, Lauren Hoffman

Technology facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) is not an in­tractable problem. But it must no longer be the responsibility solely of women’s advocacy groups. Others – technology companies, governments, civil society organizations, law enforcement, businesses, schools – must step up and work in unison to combat TFGBV in order to reflect its main­streamed effects on society. 

This report, drawing on a case study around the online harassment of Australian eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant, assesses the state of research on TFGBV as well as recent global policy progress made on this issue, and offers a number of practical solutions to make women and girls safer online.

The authors argue that TFGBV must be mainstreamed to be mitigated, centering women’s experiences in broader policy debates. Technology companies, governments, civic tech organizations, law enforcement, employers, schools, and others must mainstream their work to combat TFGBV to reflect its mainstreamed effects on society. To this end, the authors recommend a number of practical solutions to the specific and pressing issues that women and girls face online today. Addressing the urgent changes described here will not only make women and girls safer and ensure their voices are heard, but also improve the safety and free expression for everyone who uses the internet, building more robust, representative democracies.

The recommendations are presented under the following themes:

• Ensuring platform accountability and action

• Urgently addressing deepfake image-based sexual abuse

• Supporting victims and survivors of TFGBV

• Deepening research and mainstreaming advocacy.

New York: Institute of Global Politics, 2024. 41p.

By Matt Gibbs, Melissa Goldman, Machiko Hodge, Susan Newell, Susan Nicolson, Kerry O’Donohue, Ashlee Parcell, and Georgia van der Westhuizen

The treatment of children in the criminal justice system, some as young as 10 years old, is one of the most urgent human rights issues facing Australia today. Numerous inquiries and reviews, including Royal Commissions, as well as UN Committees, have highlighted serious breaches of rights and systemic problems with our child justice and related systems over many years. However, Australia continually fails to implement evidence-based reforms to our child justice systems which would reduce offending behaviour and make our communities safer. This report investigates opportunities for reform of child justice and related systems across Australia, based on evidence and the protection of human rights. It is the result of a project undertaken by the National Children’s Commissioner (NCC) in 2023–24. The project included a submissions process, consultations with children and young people, families, community members, and interviews and roundtables with government and non government stakeholders across Australia. Australia is not protecting the rights of children Children’s rights are set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and other international instruments that Australia has ratified. Australia’s lawmakers and decision makers have obligations to take all possible measures to help all children in Australia realise their rights. However, reports and inquiries continue to highlight how our systems fail to protect their human rights. Many children at risk of or in contact with the criminal justice system are dealing with multiple and complex issues in their lives which often contribute significantly to their chances of offending and reoffending. Their lack of basic ‘Help way earlier!’ rights often manifest as the drivers of their contact with the justice system in the first place, including poverty, intergenerational trauma, violence and abuse, racism, homelessness, and inadequate healthcare. These social determinants of justice show that children’s rights to health, safety, culture, participation, non-discrimination, adequate standards of living, and education are not being realised. When children enter the justice system, they may face additional breaches of their rights. For example, despite what we know about the harmful effects of detention on children, children as young as 10 can be detained in most parts of Australia. The overwhelming majority of these children are unsentenced, on remand, with some detained because there is no safe place for them to live while on bail. When they enter detention, many have disabilities and mental health issues, and are harmed by the conditions in detention, including extended periods of time in isolation in their cells, as noted in numerous official reports. First Nations children and young people continue to be overrepresented in the criminal justice system, and particularly in detention. Children and young people told us what children need in order to stay out of trouble The voices of 150 children and young people are at the centre of this report. Children and young people said that children want to be safe and to have a place to live. They want to participate in positive activities, and they want friends and supportive family relationships. Children want to be heard and have their views taken seriously. They want to be able to go to school and one day get a job. Children want to get extra help for themselves and their family members when it's needed  Children and young people said these things would help children to stay out of trouble with the police and reduce their contact with the child justice system. A national, child rights-based approach to reform is required Recommendations from many inquiries, including Royal Commissions, have attempted to guide reform, in particular by focusing on prevention and early intervention in both child justice and child protection systems. However, responses have been piecemeal, uncoordinated and inadequate. Despite evidence of the social determinants that are the root causes of offending behaviour, policy responses to these children are often only tinkering with the symptoms, with tougher policing, stricter bail laws, and incarceration. This is done under the guise of keeping the community safe. However, human rights and community safety are not opposing goals. The solutions lie in transformational thinking and action to address systemic disadvantage. Many stakeholders, in submissions, interviews and roundtables, argued that the scale of the child rights crisis in Australia requires a nationally coordinated approach to reform. This type of reform should be driven by: Australian Governments establishing a National Taskforce for Reform of Child Justice Systems, that develops a 10-year cross-portfolio National Roadmap to reform the Australian Government appointing a Cabinet Minister for Children the Australian Government establishing a Ministerial Council for Child Wellbeing, chaired by the Minister for Children, and reporting to National Cabinet the Australian Government legislating a National Children’s Act as well as a Human Rights Act, incorporating the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Reform also requires positioning children at the centre of policy-making and service delivery; empowering First Nations children, families and communities; optimising community-based action; building a capable and child specialised workforce; basing systems on data and evidence; and embedding accountability for the rights of children. Multiple barriers have stood in the way of child rights and evidence-based reform Stakeholders, in interviews, roundtables and submissions to this project, identified barriers to achieving critical reform. They argued that unless these barriers are addressed, transforming the child justice and wellbeing landscape in Australia will not be possible. Barriers include systemic racism; the fragmented way our governments operate; limited workforce capacity; lack of political commitment to evidence-based reform; pervasive ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric; and our persistent failure to make child wellbeing a national priority. These barriers to reform will not be addressed by a ‘business as usual’ approach. Transformational reform requires political will at all levels, including states and territories, and strong leadership, collaboration and coordination at the national level. Australian governments should coordinate across the federation to protect the rights of children in their laws, policies and service systems, and in doing so create a safer community for all.  

Sydney: Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024. 195p.

By Jason Payne and Anthony Morgan

In this study we used criminal history data for three birth cohorts in New South Wales to estimate the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending. Using an accelerated longitudinal design, we estimate that 6.3 percent of people born in New South Wales had been proceeded against by police for a family and domestic violence offence by age 37. The rate was significantly higher for men: 9.6 percent of men— one in 10—had been proceeded against for a family and domestic violence offence, compared with 3.0 percent of women (one in 33). Overall, 1.2 percent of people born in New South Wales were responsible for more than 50 percent of recorded family and domestic violence offences. Further, family and domestic violence offenders accounted for nearly half of all recorded offences by people in the birth cohort. This is the first estimate of the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending in a population sample in Australia. This is an important step towards increasing the visibility of family and domestic violence perpetrators.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 701. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.

By Anthony Morgan

This report examines the effect of money laundering on the harm associated with organised crime by linking data on organised crime groups known to law enforcement, and data on suspicious transactions reported to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). This study is the first step in assessing the social and economic harms associated with money laundering and terrorism financing in Australia.

Key Findings

• Suspicious matter reports captured a high proportion of individuals and groups known by law enforcement to be involved in organised crime.

• Known organised crime groups accounted for a very small proportion of suspicious matter reports.

• The amount of money laundered by groups varied according to where they laundered their funds and whether they had professional facilitators.

• The presence and amount of money laundering was consistently associated with an increase in recorded crime-related harm and the probability of organised crime.

• Evidence indicates that the laundering of illicit funds preceded increases in crime-related harm.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 73p.

By W. Bentley Macleod and Roman Rivera

Abstract: Theories of crime in economics focus on the roles of deterrence and incapacitation in reducing criminal activity. In addition to deterrence, a growing body of empirical evidence has shown that both income support and employment subsidies can play a role in crime reduction. This paper extends the Becker-Ehrlich model to a standard labor supply model that includes the notion of a consumption need (Barzel and McDonald (1973)) highlights the role of substitution vs income effects when an individual chooses to engage in crime. Second, we show that whether the production of criminal activity is a substitute or a complement with the production of legitimate activity is central to the design of optimal policy. We find that both individual responsiveness to deterrence and optimal policy vary considerably with context, which is consistent with the large variation in the effect of deterrence on crime. Hence, optimal policy is a combination of deterrence, work subsidies and direct income transfers to the individual that vary with both income and location.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024. 48p.

By Jason Beaman

This final research report describes a project that used various data sources to analyze the relationship between methamphetamine usage metrics, such as overdose deaths and related crimes, and violent crime such as rape and robbery, in order to inform law enforcement and other stakeholders of upstream prevention for crimes related to methamphetamine use. The project’s key objectives included developing a dashboard, analyzing methamphetamine-crime intersections, and assessing the influence of social determinants of health (SDOH) of methamphetamine use. Results demonstrated significant correlations between methamphetamine overdoses and violent crimes, especially economic-compulsive crimes. The report highlights distinct patterns and geographic variations among rural and American Indian communities. The report notes that results emphasize the complex interplay between methamphetamine use, violent crime, and socio-economic factors, and it advocates for targeted prevention strategies. It also offers the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Data Initiative (OKMDI) framework for addressing substance use and violence as a tool for policymakers and law enforcement.

Stillwater, OK: Oklahoma State University, 2024. 39p.

By Ben Mostyn

This article presents archival data produced by Australian diplomats in the 1980s that report on the ‘drug problem’ in various host countries. The reports reveal growing concern in many countries at a rapid increase in drug use. The second half of the article focusses on diplomatic reports from the United Nations where discussions were beginning about creating a third convention against drug trafficking. These early drafts of the convention labelled drug trafficking a ‘crime against humanity’—a criminal charge that had not been prosecuted since the Nuremburg trials. The article applies elements of moral panic theory, neorealism, and the sociology of punishment. Combining these theories suggests that condemning drug traffickers in the 1980s allowed diplomats to create a global social solidarity that may have helped end the Cold War.

Critical Criminology, August 2024. Crit Crim (2024).

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Sintiki Tarfa Ugbe, et al.

This policy brief by the West African Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (WENDU) details regional drug use trends for 2023. Based on data from 11 countries, the brief reviews supply, consumption, treatment opportunities and counter-narcotics efforts. In a continuing trend, cannabis dominates the regional substance use data matrix, followed by medical opioids. However, alcohol use disorders are growing across multiple countries and, worryingly, more minors are getting caught in the toxic web of drug use. Recommendations • The increasing involvement of minors in drug use demands the urgent introduction of comprehensive substance abuse prevention programmes across all educational levels. • Given the rising prevalence of substance abuse among women and their limited access to treatment opportunities, women-focused rehabilitation centres are urgently needed. • There is a need for regionwide adoption of the Alternative to Incarceration programme introduced by ECOWAS. • ECOWAS and political leaders across West Africa need an evidence-based and context-appropriate stance on the region’s cannabis problem.  

Issue 32, WENDU policy brief 2 | September 2024 24p.

 By Gautam Basu 

 Customs and border control agencies face key challenges in preventing illicit trade and disrupting transnational smuggling operations. Maintaining the delicate balance between facilitating legitimate trade flows while concurrently deterring those that are illicit is a complex operational task. This paper identifies and delves deeper into three of those challenges: the scale of complexity of physical transportation geography in border management, adaptive capabilities of concealment, evasion, structural and operational flexibility by professional smugglers, and institutional coordination problems which may arise in customs and border control management.  

World Customs Journal,  Volume 8, Number 2

By Michael J. Zoorob,; Ju Nyeong Park,; Alex H. Kral,; et al

Importance: With the implementation of Measure 110 (M110) in 2021, Oregon became the first US state to decriminalize small amounts of any drug for personal use. To date, no analysis of the association of this law with overdose mortality has fully accounted for the introduction of fentanyl-a substance that is known to drive fatal overdose-to Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Objective: To evaluate whether the decriminalization of drug possession in Oregon was associated with changes in fatal drug overdose rates after accounting for the rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Design, setting, and participants: In this cohort study, the association between fatal overdose and enactment of M110 was analyzed using a matrix completion synthetic control method. The control group consisted of the 48 US states and Washington, DC, all of which did not decriminalize drugs. The rapid spread of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets was determined using the state-level percentage of all samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System that were identified as fentanyl or its analogues. Mortality data were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022. Data analysis was performed from fall 2023 through spring 2024.

Exposures: Measure 110 took effect in Oregon on February 1, 2021.

Main outcomes and measures: The primary outcome assessed was fatal drug overdose rates per half-year. A changepoint analysis also determined when each state experienced a rapid escalation of fentanyl in its unregulated drug market.

Results: In this analysis, rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug supply occurred in the first half of 2021, contemporaneous with enactment of M110. A positive crude association was found between drug decriminalization and fatal overdose rate per 100 000 per half year (estimate [SE], 1.83 [0.47]; P < .001). After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], -0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon. Sensitivity analyses were consistent with this result.

Conclusions and relevance: In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon's unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.  

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(9):e2431612. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.31612

By Drug Policy Alliance

In 2020, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved Ballot Measure 110. This made Oregon the first state in the U.S. to decriminalize possession of small amounts of all drugs, while greatly expanding addiction services and social supports. But in 2024, state leaders recriminalized drug possession after a disinformation campaign led by drug war defenders and backed by corporate interests. Statewide criminal penalties for drug possession returned on September 1, 2024. Promised deflection programs were not ready, meaning people will be arrested and prosecuted because of their addictions. As before, drug use will be used as an excuse to arrest Black and Brown Oregonians at higher rates (they are statistically more likely to face incarceration and harsher sentencing due to targeted policing and enforcement). Oregon’s public defender shortage continues. People who are arrested will likely have their cases dismissed for lack of counsel. In a return to the failed war on drugs, people will cycle through the criminal legal system without connection to services. The successes of Measure 110 should neither be downplayed nor contributed to H.B. 4002. Measure 110 provided over $300 million for addiction services, including a program where police connect people to care without arrest. Policymakers must focus on implementing a thorough public health approach to drugs and real solutions to other pressing issues, not on the false promises of criminalizing drug possession.

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 5p.