By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year.1 New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure.2 Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish owned businesses and other institutions.  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By Merve Betül Gökçe, Murat Güray Kirdar:

This study investigates the impact of the Syrian civil war and refugee status on the risk of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) among Syrian women in Jordan, the country with the second-highest refugee-to-native ratio worldwide. We analyze data from the 2017-18 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey, which includes a nationally representative sample of Syrian refugees. Using the information on the timing of first violence after marriage within a discrete-time duration analysis, we examine the hazard rates of IPV exposure across different periods: prewar Syria, postwar Syria, and refugee status. Our findings demonstrate that war and refugee status increase the risk of IPV, and these findings persist for women who were married before the civil war. Additionally, the rise in IPV after the refugees' arrival in Jordan diminishes over time. The study identifies the economic strain resulting from lower household wealth and refugee husbands' employment losses as a driver of the rise in IPV. Moreover, our innovative approach utilizing GPS locations of refugee households to calculate refugee density reveals that greater social isolation, indicated by reduced proximity to other refugees, significantly exacerbates the risk of IPV among these women. In addition, we explore whether the civil war and refugee status alter marriage patterns, which could contribute to the observed effects on IPV. Both the civil war and forced migration lower the marriage age and increase the incidence of non-cousin marriages at the expense of cousin marriages—both of which are associated with a higher risk of IPV.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 61p.  

By Paul M. Barrett

The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are—exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. Certain features of social media platforms make them susceptible to such exploitation, and some of these features should be changed to reduce the danger. “ The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are— exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. ” Based on a review of more than 400 studies published by peer-reviewed journals and think tanks, the report provides a platform-by-platform survey focusing on the particular features of each site that make it susceptible to exploitation by extremists promoting intimidation and violence and/or seeking recruits for their various causes. The report emphasizes that neither subjective observation nor social science research indicates that social media platforms are the sole or even primary cause of political intimidation and violence. Other media and irresponsible political leaders play crucial roles. However, the use of social media can enable or facilitate violence in a fashion that deserves attention and mitigation. Most of this problem—extremism and occasional use of force for political ends—occurs on the political right. But the left is not immune to these pathologies. The platforms discussed in the following pages range from some of the best known, like Facebook and YouTube, to the more recently ascendant TikTok to those on the right-wing fringe, such as Gab, Parler, and 4chan. Among the features, we examine are: • Facebook’s Groups, which helped the sometimes-violent QAnon to grow into a full-blown movement devoted to the delusion that former President Donald Trump has secretly battled “deep state” bureaucrats and Satanic pedophiles.1 • Instagram’s comments function, which has allowed the Iranian government to threaten dissidents with sexual assault and death as a way of silencing them.2 • TikTok’s powerful recommendation algorithm, which in one experiment promoted violent videos, including incitement of students to launch attacks at school.3 After a case study of January 6 by our collaborators at Tech Policy Press, the report concludes with recommendations for industry and government.

NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights Leonard N. Stern School of Business 2024. 32p.  

By Cristina Cretu-Adatte, Renaud Zbinden, Luca Brunoni, Hazel Bunning, Josselin Wilfred Azi & Olivier Beaudet-Labrecque

This article delves into the intricacies of managing illicit financial gains among Ivorian cyber fraudsters, shedding light on the findings of a field study conducted in Côte d’Ivoire by Swiss and Ivorian research teams. The study involved interviews with cyber criminals, law enforcement officials, and subject matter experts, to answer a specific question: What strategies do Ivorian cyber fraudsters use to manage and launder the criminal proceeds originating from romance scams and sextortion? The results explore the tactics employed by cyber fraudsters to obfuscate illicit financial flows, their organizational structures, and the strategies they employ in managing and using their gains. It confirms certain elements from the scientific literature, in addition to introducing new insights for a better understanding of the processes of money laundering and the use of illicit funds. The article also unravels the multifaceted challenges encountered within the anti-money laundering framework in the context of cybercrime and raises avenues for further reflection and future work to enhance the fight against this scourge.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 30, 359–378 (2024).

By Michele Riccardi & Peter Reuter

Two images dominate the discussion of money laundering. Investigative journalists and politicians stress the variety and sophistication of methods that have been used to launder the money of corrupt officials and white-collar offenders. The research literature, largely dependent on criminal cases, emphasizes how unsophisticated and routine are the laundering methods used by drug dealers and other illegal market participants. The discrepancy may reflect the incapacity of police to detect sophisticated money laundering but it may also represent the reality; that different groups of offenders choose different methods. This paper presents a theoretical framework to explain how offenders choose to launder their criminal earnings. Specifically, it asks: what determines the sophistication of the method chosen? Among the variables that we suggest influence the choice are: (a) the type of predicate crime and of crime proceeds, (b) the type of offender (age, education, social status), (c) his/her motivations, (d) the AML environment and the level of AML controls. The paper provides arguments from criminological and economic theory for how these variables might play a role. Without claiming that individual cases can test the theory, we offer some case narratives to suggest the plausibility of the factors that we propose.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Volume 30, pages 333–358, (2024)

By Charles Fain Lehman

Crime remains a pressing concern for Americans, even as rates of violence have receded from 2022 peaks. What explains these persistent concerns? This report investigates this question in the context of a small but rapidly growing American city: Chattanooga, Tennessee. A Manhattan Institute poll from earlier this year found that Chattanooga residents are worried about safety in their communities; this report investigates why. A review of Chattanooga data, it finds that the city experienced the same increases in certain kinds of crime that other American cities did over the past four years, but that, through the application of evidence-based practices, the city’s police and municipal government have brought the problem under control. But even as violent crime has largely receded, multiple indicators are suggesting that another problem persists: disorder. Data indicate that homelessness, trash, and certain kinds of petty crime remain elevated above pre-2020 levels. A reduction in city resources—especially police resources—appears to have caused a concentration on serious crime, at the expense of more minor but still significant issues. Disorder, this report argues, matters, especially for a growing city like Chattanooga. Consequently, this report concludes by outlining several principles for addressing this problem, while capitalizing on the gains that the city has already made in getting major crime under control.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 26p.

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Paulo J Murillo-Sandoval1, Steven E Sesnie2, Manuel Eduardo Ordoñez Armas3, Nicholas Magliocca4, Beth Tellman5, Jennifer A Devine6, Erik Nielsen7 and Kendra McSweeney8,*

We assess how much of Central America is likely to be agriculturally suitable for cultivating coca (Erythroxylum spp), the main ingredient in cocaine. Since 2017, organized criminal groups (not smallholders) have been establishing coca plantations in Central America for cocaine production. This has broken South America's long monopoly on coca leaf production for the global cocaine trade and raised concerns about future expansion in the isthmus. Yet it is not clear how much of Central America has suitable biophysical characteristics for a crop domesticated in, and long associated with the Andean region. We combine geo-located data from coca cultivation locations in Colombia with reported coca sites in Central America to model the soil, climate, and topography of Central American landscapes that might be suitable for coca production under standard management practices. We find that 47% of northern Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize) has biophysical characteristics that appear highly suitable for coca-growing, while most of southern Central America does not. Biophysical factors, then, are unlikely to constrain coca's spread in northern Central America. Whether or not the crop is more widely planted will depend on complex and multi-scalar social, economic, and political factors. Among them is whether Central American countries and their allies will continue to prioritize militarized approaches to the drug trade through coca eradication and drug interdiction, which are likely to induce further expansion, not contain it. Novel approaches to the drug trade will be required to avert this outcome.

Environ. Res. Lett. 19 (2024) 104068  

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Understanding the changing dynamics of heroin and methamphetamine flows from Afghanistan, through southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, continues to be important, particularly in light of the Taliban’s drug ban in Afghanistan and the harmful effects drugs have on the populations along the route. In order to improve information sharing and to help build connections between countries and International Organisations and to strengthen regional co-operation, UNODC held an Expert Working Group in Maputo, Mozambique during 10th-11th October 2023. Topics discussed at the EWG included an update on the current drug situation in Afghanistan, the opiate and methamphetamine flows from southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, regional drug seizures, the nature of organized crime groups and a summary of the drug demand situation in the region. The findings of the EWG are published in this report. This EWG report covers the flow and distribution of heroin along the Southern Route, highlighting key trends and vulnerabilities. Exploration of the routes utilized for drug trafficking sheds light on movements from Afghanistan into Eastern and Southern Africa, within Africa, and towards other destination countries. Moreover, an overview of the demand for illicit drugs in the region offers insights into the societal impact and challenges faced by communities. Insight into the fragmented groups and the critical role played by brokers, as well as the strong presence of criminal networks, provides valuable context on the organized crime landscape. Furthermore, the EWG discussed the regional cooperation efforts aimed at addressing drug trafficking challenges and promoting collective action underscores the importance of collaborative approaches in responding to the drug trade in the region. An examination of the policy and law enforcement responses implemented by affected countries provides valuable insights into national efforts to address the supply and demand dynamics. Analysis of the various modus operandi and trafficking methods employed by organized crime groups, including poly drug trafficking and links to other crime types, enhances understanding of the operational tactics used in the region. Finally, recommendations for policy interventions and follow-up actions aim to enhance counter-trafficking efforts and promote regional security and stability. Through a comprehensive examination of these topics, this report seeks to provide valuable insights and inform stakeholders on the complexities of drug trafficking along the Southern Route, with the ultimate goal of fostering effective strategies and initiatives to combat illicit drug trade in the region.   

 Vienna:  UNODC  2024. 36p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

By Storm Ervin, Erica Henderson

The Urban Institute received funding from the George Kaiser Family Foundation to conduct an 11-month mixed-methods assessment of adult domestic violence (DV) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. * The purpose of Urban’s study was to understand major programs, policies, services, and funding sources geared toward preventing and responding to adult DV survivors and recommend ways Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. The first part of the mixed-method assessment focused primarily on the largest service provider in Tulsa, Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc. (DVIS). The second part of the assessment focused on qualitative data collection with criminal legal and human services agencies and stakeholders to provide insight into the larger domestic violence landscape in Tulsa. Based on the assessment findings, we identified seven overarching recommendations for how Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. Overarching Findings Tulsa’s largest DV service provider, DVIS, and Tulsa’s family justice center, the Family Safety Center (FSC), offer a multitude of evidence-based practices for adult and child survivors. In addition, DVIS is successful in reaching and serving people with low educational attainment and unemployment, which are major risk factors for experiencing DV. Law enforcement has implemented evidenced-based screening tools—such as the Lethality Assessment Program and the Danger Assessment for Law Enforcement—to screen for lethality and strangulation among victims at the scene of DV incidents. Further, organizations engage in several interagency efforts to respond to DV through Tulsa’s Rapid Intervention Team, the FSC, Tulsa’s response to strangulation, and the Integrated DV Court. Finally, not without some challenges, federal and philanthropic funding sources have demonstrated commitment to supporting Tulsa’s response to DV. Our assessment also yielded notable areas for improvement. For example, Black and Indigenous survivors are vastly underserved by DVIS, though they are most likely to experience intimate partner homicide (Oklahoma Domestic Violence Fatality Review Board 2021). In addition, Tulsa has few programs aimed at intervening on behalf of children who experience or are at risk of DV. For both adults and children, stakeholders reported few programs for preventing DV. Moreover, stakeholders reported policy and practice constraints as negatively impacting survivors and intervention in DV. For example, failure-to-protect legislation was described as a method for criminalizing survivors. Stakeholders also reported that Battering Intervention Programs (BIPs) involve burdensome amounts of money and time for those who are mandated to participate. Moreover, policy constraints limit stakeholders’ ability to provide wraparound services to people who cause harm. Another notable challenge is the McGirt Decision, which established that state courts no longer have the authority to prosecute crimes committed by or against Oklahomans who are also tribal members, and in turn, complicated Tulsa’s ability to respond to people who cause harm and also belong to Indigenous communities. Other challenges include those related to specific agencies, such as law enforcement’s faithful administration of the Lethality Assessment Program (LAP) screens, the role that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services plays in separating children listed in protective orders, and service providers’ limited ability to provide more evidence-based services. Other notable challenges are agencies’ limited capacity and staff and a lack of sustainable funding sources.    

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2023. 110p.

By Robert Zeithammer, James Macinko, Diana Silver

Introduction

Ignition interlock devices installed after conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) have been shown to reduce subsequent DUI arrests (specific deterrence). However, there is little evidence on how interlock-device penalties might affect general deterrence, that is, deterring people from driving after consuming alcohol before a DUI conviction.

Methods

A discrete choice experiment was conducted and data were analyzed in 2023 with 583 U.S.-based adults who consumed alcohol at least once in the past week to assess the deterrent effects of five different penalties (fine, jail time, interlock device, license suspension, alcohol treatment) for alcohol-impaired driving under randomized sequential scenarios of high (20% chance of being caught) and low (1%) police enforcement. Participants resided in 46 states.

Results

Deterrent effects of an interlock penalty, operationalized as having to install an interlock device for 1 year, are large and on par with a 20-fold increase in police enforcement activity (from 1% chance of being caught to 20%), or a $2,000 increase in the DUI fine under the status quo enforcement regime. On average, a 1-year interlock penalty had the same deterrent effect as a 10-day increase in jail time.

Conclusions

Wider use of interlock devices as a DUI penalty could have large deterrent effects, independent of their ability to physically prevent the motor vehicle of an intoxicated driver from starting. The deterrent effect documented here adds to evidence of interlock devices’ overall effectiveness as well as their potential to shift DUI penalties away from criminalization (jail time) and toward immobilization and rehabilitation.

American Journal of Preventive Medicine; 2024 Articles in Press

By Leke de Vries, Toby Davies

The role of street networks in shaping the spatial distribution of crime has become a foundational component within environmental criminology. Most studies, however, have focused on opportunistic crime types, such as property offenses. In this study, we instead research a theoretically distinct phenomenon by examining the placement of venues that host criminal activity. In particular, we study the relationship between network structure and the placement of illicit massage businesses, which operate at the intersections of illicit and legitimate activity by hosting illicit commercial sex under the guise of legitimate massage. We model their placement as a function of two network metrics: betweenness, which measures a street's usage potential, and a variant called “local betweenness,” which measures the potential of nearby streets. Multilevel models are used to examine the importance of these street-level metrics while accounting for tract-level covariates. Our findings demonstrate that, unlike property crimes, illicit massage businesses tend to be located on streets that are quiet but that are close to areas of high activity. Such locations seem to combine accessibility and discretion, and therefore, represent ideal conditions for such businesses to thrive. Our findings can inform problem-oriented approaches to prevent the harms associated with illegitimately operating businesses.

 Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By John Leverso, Cyrus Schleifer, David C. Pyrooz

During the last decade, health criminology—the study of health outcomes for justice-involved individuals and their families—has gained traction in the field. We extend health criminology to the study of street gangs by drawing on the stress process perspective. Gang membership is conceptualized as a primary stressor that leads to secondary stressors with direct and indirect adverse effects on mental health. Leaving a gang, we hypothesize, offers relief by shrinking the stress universe to improve mental health. We test the gang disengagement–mental health link using panel data from a sample of 510 active gang members in the Northwestern Juvenile Project, longitudinal entropy balancing models, and mental health outcomes related to both clinical diagnosis and functional impairment. The results indicate that gang disengagement leads to improvements in mental health and functioning. Compared with those who stayed in gangs, those who left experienced improvements in global functioning, overall mental health diagnosis, behavior toward others functioning, substance abuse functioning, and alcohol-related diagnoses. Secondary stressors partially, but not fully, mediated this association. Our findings extend the inventory of research on the benefits of disengagement from gangs to health outcomes and support interventions designed to promote gang disengagement.

Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By: InSul Kim

The purpose of this dissertation study is to conduct an art-based, community action research study as a means (1) to support the recovery process of domestic violence survivors; (2) to produce social capital among members of the community to initiate civic discussions on the consequences of domestic violence; and (3) to investigate its implications for cultural policy as the outcomes of this study highlight the unique role of the arts in making a difference in people’s lives and communities. The artworks produced by the workshop participants of this study (i.e., domestic violence survivors) were exhibited in a professional gallery as a form of visual narrative that speaks for their wounded past and difficult journeys. The collected data strongly indicates that art can be an exceptionally powerful tool for communication and healing, when words and discussions fall short. Overall, this research investigates the instrumental functions of the arts as a means to produce social capital for personal well-being, social support, and social justice. The study was framed within action research methodology and the triangulation model in data sources, research methods, and theoretical lenses, while both quantitative and qualitative techniques were employed. The collected data were analyzed at three different levels: (1) Personal level (i.e., the art workshop participants: n=16), (2) Organizational level (i.e., the staff of the transitional housing facility and the gallery: n=6), and (3) Community level (i.e., the general audience who came to the exhibit: n=74).

Ohio State University 2011

By: Dr. Hilal Özcebe, Dr. Sutay Yavuz, Hacer Taşcene, and Dr. Sinan Türkyılmaz

Around the world, women and girls are victims of countless acts of violence. The range of gender-based violence is devastatingly endless, occurring quite literally from womb to tomb. Violence against women and girls occurs in every segment of society – regardless of class, ethnicity, culture, or country.

While you are reading this text, many millions of women around the world will experience the trauma of violence and abuse. It is estimated that 1 in 3 women throughout the world suffer this violence during her lifetime. The same figure for EU countries is 1 in 5. Women in Turkey face violence like women in many other countries; the latest survey shows that 2 in 5 women have been exposed to physical violence. In the same research, 42 percent of women have been exposed to physical and sexual violence, and 44 percent of women have been exposed to emotional violence or abuse. All of these were caused by their husbands or partners.

Over the past 30 years, increasingly gender-based violence has been recognized both in Turkey and worldwide. One of the newest and most comprehensive international instruments to combat violence against women is “Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)” which was built on the 4P principle of ‘Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Policy’. For many years all the interventions to combat VAW have been mostly built around the protection and prosecution. However policy development and prevention are the weakest links of the combating interventions. Among the prevention interventions the most excluded groups have been the youth and children. As it is indicated in some research, children and the youth are the two groups who have been the silent victims of violence within the family even they are not the subject of direct violence. However it is also known that violence is an act that is learnt and to prevent violence against women, the interventions should be started in the early childhood.

Increased rates of violence worldwide have heightened the need to understand what children think about their experiences as victims or witnesses of violence. Much has been written about children and violence, but less has been written from the viewpoint of the children themselves. Without knowing their experience and perception it is impossible to develop any intervention to prevent violence against women regarding to early ages of youth.

This research which is the first in its area had been conducted to understand the perception of school age youth (ages between 11-17) on violence against women and gender inequality which is the root cause of the act. Upon the results of this research UNFPA with the relevant partners will develop prevention interventions for the school age children.

As UNFPA we would like to thank to the researchers, Prof. Dr. Hilal Özcebe, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinan Türkyılmaz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sutay Yavuz and Hacer Taşçene and the interview team for conducting this special qualitative research. We would also convey our gratitude to all the government officials, school principals and teachers who supported us in Ankara, Aydın and Erzurum.

Population Association (Turkey) and United Nations Population Fund - UNFPA November 2013

By Kristy E. Williams, U.S. Government Accountability Office

Domestic and child abuse can result in devastating consequences for military service members and their families. It also can reduce mission readiness. In fiscal year 2023, DOD recorded 26,978 reports of domestic and child abuse incidents, of which 14,110 met the DOD definition of abuse. House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review the policies and regulations governing IDCs and the use of decision notification letters. This report (1) describes how military commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers may use IDC decisions; and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services have established processes to notify commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers of IDC decisions. GAO conducted site visits at four military installations; analyzed random samples of IDC notifications and incident case logs; reviewed DOD and military service guidance; and interviewed DOD, military service, and civilian officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends DOD clarify its guidance and expectations on incident determination notification methods and content based on its identification and analysis of associated risks. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation.    

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 49p.