Edited by Ian Hall, Troy Lee-Brown and Rebecca Strating

This book advances a holistic conceptualization of maritime security under the term ‘Blue Security’ and situates it in states across the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific encompasses a vast space, incorporating two of the planet’s biggest oceans, the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, as well as littoral and hinterland states home to half the world’s population. Security challenges abound across the maritime Indo-Pacific, ranging from the risk of inter-state war at sea to so-called blue crimes, like piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing. Climate change and marine pollution, as well as the over-exploitation of scarce, and sometimes fragile resources, also pose threats to human security, sustainability, and biodiversity. Using the concept of ‘Blue Security’, this book assesses these various challenges and analyses the approaches to their management used by Indo-Pacific states. It argues that we should embrace a holistic understanding of maritime security, incorporating national, regional, international, human, and environmental dimensions. To that end, it explores the Blue Security strategies of 18 Indo-Pacific states, examining their changing perceptions of threat, their approaches to managing those challenges, and their capabilities. The volume makes an innovative contribution to our knowledge of a region crucial to global security and prosperity. This book will be of interest to students of maritime strategy, security studies, Asian politics, and International Relations.  

 London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 226p.

By David Hyman | Mohammad H. Rahmati

Crime doesn’t pay. Or does it? We study the role of expectations regarding sanctions and the likelihood of detection on whether people obey the law. We examine how expectations influence whether people obey the law and conduct simulations of various enforcement counter-factuals. We find the average assessment of the likelihood of detection is quite accurate, but those who (mistakenly) believe the probability is lower than it is are much more likely to break the law. Further, expectations with regard to the likely consequences of getting caught are also heterogeneous. In our simulations, perceived fines have little impact on willingness to break the law, but a higher perceived likelihood of apprehension has an appreciable impact. Because marginal respondents are pivotal in the rate of law-breaking, debiasing expectations among the whole population has little impact.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By Mike Males

Media reports, politicians, and law enforcement lobbies are manufacturing a false picture of crime as Californians prepare to vote. Backers of anti-justice reform policies are falsely blaming liberal reforms and prosecutors for a non-existent “crime wave.” The anti-reform campaign is also exploiting public anger that retail thieves are “getting away with crime,” while the media fails to hold law enforcement and conservative jurisdictions accountable for their own failed practices. California’s criminal justice statistics (BSCC 2024; CDCR 2024; DOJ 2024) clearly show: 1) California’s 23 Republican-voting counties* consistently suffer worse trends in murder, violent crime, gun violence, and drug abuse than the 25 Democratic-voting counties or the 10 counties with mixed-voting patterns. 2) California’s conservative inland and rural counties suffer the state’s worst homicide trends. 3) All counties show similar property crime trends and rates. 4) California’s liberal counties2 have gotten tougher on crime, especially in the post-2010 reform era, incarcerating a greater share of people arrested – even though conservative counties have long incarcerated a greater share of their overall populations. 5) The real reason the public has the impression that retail thieves are “getting away with crime” is not reforms, but because law enforcement in all jurisdictions, regardless of politics, are making arrests in far fewer crimes today than 30 years ago. Law enforcement’s plunging “crime clearance rate” will be detailed in an upcoming report. 

San Francisco; Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice 2024. 7p.  

By Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe and  Ben Miller 

Public defenders are tasked with the unenviable job of representing some of the most vulnerable people in society when they are accused of crimes. At the same time, public defenders receive little thanks for protecting the marginalized and instead face insurmountable odds with insufficient resources and limited public support. Premal Dharia, founder and director of the Defender Impact Initiative, said, “Public defenders are on the front lines of the devastation wrought by our system of mass criminalization and they are guided by an unwavering dedication to the very people being devastated.” As the coronavirus ravages communities, courtrooms, jails, and prisons, public defenders are now indispensable to confronting the epidemic. While not medical professionals, public defenders are the front line, often the only line, between their clients and incarceration. Since jails and prisons have become hotbeds of COVID-19, with infection rates exponentially larger than the general population, public defenders have the added task of not just protecting their clients’ rights, but also, in many cases, their lives. Dan Engelberg, the chief of the trial division for the Orleans Parish Public Defender in Louisiana, aptly characterized the efforts of public defenders nationwide over the last few weeks as “heroic and tireless” as they strive to protect the health, humanity, and lives of their clients. The Justice Collaborative Institute asked nearly 200 public defenders from across the country how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted their work and personal lives. The responses are revealing. Nearly half, as of April 2, 2020, reported clients incarcerated in correctional facilities with at least one confirmed case of COVID-19. Over 80%  did not think their local court systems were doing enough to protect the health and safety of their clients. (See Appendix for results from the questionnaire). Their concerns went beyond the spread of disease. Public defenders expressed anger over the perceived lack of empathy for their clients’ health, frustration with the many officials who treat their clients’ rights as disposable, and mental distress over the impact the virus is having on their clients, their loved ones, and themselves. Taken together, their responses form a powerful argument in support of policies, also popular among voters, to dramatically and urgently reduce jail and prison populations in response to COVID-19. The frontline accounts of public defenders reveal that far too many people in positions of authority continue to undermine public health and safety by processing far too many people daily into the criminal legal system, while at the same time failing to protect the millions of people behind bars. By doing so, they continue to place the lives of millions—people incarcerated at correctional facilities, people who go to work there, and people who live in surrounding communities—at grave risk. Law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and politicians should work with public defenders and urgently adopt policies to limit arrests, expand the use of cite and release, end cash bail, dismiss cases instead of needlessly dragging them out, and release as many people as possible from incarceration who do not reasonably pose a risk to public safety. Such steps can all be taken right now and are options public defenders across the country are advocating for, placing their personal health at risk in many cases, to do so.  

Davis, CA: UC Davis School of Law, 2020. 48p. 

By Jim Quinn  

Since New York State’s 2019 bail reform went into effect, controversy has swirled around the question of its impact on public safety—as well as its broader success in creating a more just and equitable system. The COVID-19 pandemic (which hit three months after the bail reform’s effective date), the upheaval following the killing of George Floyd, and the subsequent enactment of various police and criminal justice reforms are confounding factors that make assessing the specific effects of the 2019 bail reform particularly complex. This paper attempts to give the public a better sense of the risks of this policy shift and the detrimental effect that the changes have had on public safety. First, I will lay out the content of the bail reform and will measure pertinent impacts on crime and re-offending rates. Then I will review changes made in the 2020 and 2022 amendments. I will look at the push for supervised release and closing Rikers Island and how those initiatives fed into the momentum behind these laws. Finally, I will propose recommendations to improve bail reform’s impact on public safety, which include: 1. Allow judges to set bail, remand, release on recognizance (ROR), or conditions of release for any crime and any defendant. There should be a presumption of release for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies, which could be rebutted by the defendant’s prior record or other factors that indicate that the defendant is a flight risk. There should be a presumption of bail, remand, or nonmonetary conditions for defendants charged with violent felonies or weapons offenses. This presumption could also be rebutted by evidence of the defendant’s roots in the community, lack of criminal record, and similar factors

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2022. 29p.

By Fionnuala Ratcliffe

Our criminal justice system in its current form is unsustainable. Long court backlogs, few crimes resolved, probation staff shortages. An ever-rising prison population despite prisons costing a disproportionate amount of taxpayer money and not working to reduce reoffending. One problem is that our criminal justice services - prisons, probation, courts, prosecution, and to some extent policing - are incredibly centralized. There is a lack of local ownership for crime prevention and reducing reoffending. Local agencies go cap in hand with the central government for funding, rather than fostering and supporting innovative solutions locally. Another issue is that many of the levers to prevent crime and reoffending - including health, employment, education, and housing - lie outside the criminal justice system. Local actors are not financially incentivized to tackle these drivers and invest to solve problems upstream. Public services work in silos rather than together toward common goals. We can reduce crime and make our communities safer by giving local leaders the right levers and incentives to tackle crime at a local level – by localizing justice services and budgets. What would localized justice services look like? — Delegation of justice budgets for prison places, magistrates’ courts’ administration, policing, prosecution, and probation to police and crime commissioners or mayors — Pooling of criminal justice resources so that local services work together towards a shared aim and share any savings made — Financially incentivizing local services to shift investment upstream from enforcement to prevention, by allowing them to benefit from the savings from investment — Local management of probation and of the administration of magistrates’ courts and the CPS. Prisons and Crown Courts continue to be managed nationally  Prosecutorial and judicial independence are maintained through the continued use of nationally agreed prosecution and sentencing guidelines. — Standards monitored through inspectorate, effective community scrutiny, and a newly created interdepartmental board This paper sets out how localizing criminal justice services will: — Reduce crime — Reduce waste in criminal justice system spending — Increase trust and confidence in the criminal justice system — Improve the experience of victims

2023. 13p.

Sandra G. Mayson

Police, prosecutors, judges, and other criminal justice actors increasingly use algorithmic risk assessment to estimate the likelihood that a person will commit future crime. As many scholars have noted, these algorithms tend to have disparate racial impacts. In response, critics advocate three strategies of resistance: (1) the exclusion of input factors that correlate closely with race; (2) adjustments to algorithmic design to equalize predictions across racial lines; and (3) rejection of algorithmic methods altogether. This Article’s central claim is that these strategies are at best superficial and at worst counterproductive because the source of racial inequality in risk assessment lies neither in the input data, in a particular algorithm, nor algorithmic methodology per se. The deep problem is the nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks to the past to make guesses about future events. In a racially stratified world, any method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the future. This is as true of the subjective prediction that has long pervaded criminal justice as it is of the algorithmic tools now replacing it. Algorithmic risk assessment has revealed the inequality inherent in all predictions, forcing us to confront a problem much larger than the challenges of a new technology. Algorithms, in short, shed new light on an old problem. Ultimately, the Article contends, redressing racial disparity in prediction will require more fundamental changes in the way the criminal justice system conceives of and responds to risk. The Article argues that criminal law and policy should, first, more clearly delineate the risks that matter and, second, acknowledge that some kinds of risk may be beyond our ability to measure without racial distortion—in which case they cannot justify state coercion. Further, to the extent that we can reliably assess risk, criminal system actors should strive whenever possible to respond to risk with support rather than restraint. Counterintuitively, algorithmic risk assessment could be a valuable tool in a system that supports the risk.

Yale L. J. 2218 (2019) Yale Law Review,

By Lila Kazemian

This paper reviews the empirical literature on desistance from crime among adolescents and adults and the factors that explain (dis)continuity in criminal behavior in the transition to adulthood. It also highlights the implications of this knowledge base for various criminal justice agencies. Drawing on the research literature and relevant theoretical frameworks, the paper offers nine key recommendations on desistance-promoting criminal justice policy and practice.  Our criminal justice interventions would benefit from a paradigm shift that expands from an exclusive focus on recidivism to the consideration of positive outcomes that may result in reduced involvement in crime. Program evaluations that prescribe to this new paradigm should: (a) integrate the well-established fact that desistance from crime occurs gradually and that setbacks are to be expected; (b) consider changes in individual and social outcomes in addition to behavioral measures; (c) offer a balanced assessment of both failure and success outcomes and invest resources in tracking progress before, during, and after any given intervention; and (d) provide incentives for success. Biosocial research has suggested that from a cognitive perspective, emerging adults (18-24 years old) may resemble adolescents more than adults. It would then be logical to extend assumptions about reduced culpability to individuals up to the age of 24. Young adult courts are an example of such an accommodation. The age crime curve confirms that most individuals are likely to give up crime during emerging adulthood; in many cases, criminal justice processing during this period may be counterproductive and might delay the process of desistance from crime that would otherwise occur naturally. Prosecutors play a key role in fostering desistance by avoiding further processing for individuals who do not pose a significant threat to public safety. Longer prison sentences are not effective in promoting desistance from crime and reducing recidivism. Confinement disrupts the desistance process in many ways, and it should be used only as a last recourse. When possible, jurisdictions should favor alternatives to confinement for both juveniles and adults. Few individuals remain active in crime after the age of 40. Barring exceptional circumstances for those who pose a clear threat to public safety, there is no empirical basis for incarcerating individuals for decades past mid-adulthood. Because the decision to give up crime is regarded as a gradual process rather than an abrupt event, preparation for release from confinement should ideally begin early in the sentence for those cases where incarceration is deemed necessary. Individuals can make constructive use of their time in prison if they can find meaning to their sentence, get to the root of the reasons that brought them to prison in the first place, and develop a plan for their return to society. These are essential components of the desistance and reintegration processes. Interactions with law enforcement may disrupt desistance in many ways that are not necessarily well understood by officers. Given that most initial contacts with law enforcement do not result in further criminal justice processing, arrests that do not lead to a conviction constitute a poor measure of criminal behavior and may create unnecessary stigma that hampers the desistance process. This stigma disproportionately affects individuals belonging to socially marginalized groups. Convictions or incarcerations may be more valid indicators of official crime. The stigma of a criminal record has enduring effects on the ability to successfully reintegrate into society. Expungement laws can help offset some of the negative consequences of the stigma of a criminal record. The mere prevalence of past offending is insufficient to assess the future risk of reoffending. We need to account for other dimensions of the criminal record, including the recency and intensity of involvement in past crimes. Housing and employment policies that adopt a blanket ban against individuals with a criminal record cannot be justified based on public safety concerns and are detrimental to the process of desistance from crime. 8. 9. Many state and local jurisdictions have developed promising initiatives and interventions that draw on principles of the desistance paradigm, but few have been rigorously evaluated. Partnerships between policymakers, practitioners, and academics are crucial to conducting more systematic assessments. We also need to better understand whether the level of responsiveness to any given intervention varies across demographic groups (specifically age and gender), criminal history characteristics, and histories of trauma. Efforts to promote desistance from crime are not the sole responsibility of one agency. The most promising desistance-promoting policies and practices rely on ongoing partnerships between the various agents of the criminal justice system and community resources, including law enforcement, prosecution, corrections, and community organizations.    

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2021), NCJ 301497. 2021. 38p.

By Matthew B Robinson

The book provides a thorough summary of the relationships between race, ethnicity, crime, and justice practice and discusses the existence of disparities in criminal and juvenile justice practices and highlights the impact of race and ethnicity on the law, policing, courts, and corrections.It addresses the issue of institutionalized discrimination against different racial and ethnic groups in American institutions, including the criminal law and mainstream media.

Carolina Academic Press, 2021, 317 pages