By Equal Justice Initiative

Race and the Jury: Illegal Discrimination in Jury Selection, released online July 27, 2021, places the continuing illegal exclusion of jurors of color in its historical context as “a continuing legacy of our history of racial injustice,” documenting the country’s “long history of tolerating racial bias in jury selection and a continuing indifference to correcting widespread underrepresentation of people of color on juries.” The report, a follow up to the organization’s 2010 report, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, details the numerous factors that contribute to ongoing jury discrimination today, and what EJI describes as the “persistent and widespread” impact it continues to have on the U.S. legal system.

While racial discrimination in jury selection is present throughout the criminal legal system, the report finds that it has especially pernicious effects in capital trials. “In cases where the death penalty is a possible punishment, the absence of meaningful representation on juries shapes sentencing outcomes, making them less reliable and credible,” the report explains. “The effect is greatest for non-white defendants, as studies show that less representative juries convict and sentence Black defendants to death at significantly higher rates than white defendants. White jurors are also less likely to consider critical mitigating evidence supporting a life sentence, rather than the death penalty, for Black defendants.”

EJI says illegal jury discrimination “persists because those who perpetrate or tolerate racial bias — including trial and appellate courts, defense lawyers, lawmakers, and prosecutors — act with impunity. Courts that fail to create jury lists that fairly represent their communities face no repercussions. Prosecutors who unlawfully strike Black people from juries don’t get fined, sanctioned, or held accountable.”

To redress the problem, EJI recommends that courts and legislatures remove procedural barriers to reviewing claims of jury discrimination, adopt policies and practices that commit to fully representative jury pools, hold accountable decision makers who engage in racially discriminatory jury selection practices, and strengthen the standard of review of jury discrimination claims. However, EJI says, only a few states “have recognized the problem and implemented reforms or initiated studies” and “[m]ost states have done nothing.”

Montgomery, AL: Equal Justice Initiative, 2021. 107p.

By Angelica Duran-Martinez

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

Crime Law and Social Change 82(4):867-891, 2023

Edited by Jacqueline Behrend and Laurence Whitehead

This important book offers an original perspective on the rule of law, development, and democracy in Latin America, establishing a new approach in recognizing the realities of political economy as opposed to merely structural and institutional factors. With contributions from an international team of experts, the book outlines the main challenges that have arisen in the pursuit of a developmental agenda in the region, including subnational variations, state capture by local elites, variations in state capacity, border divergence from centrally designed perspectives, environmental conflicts, uneven access to justice and the role of international organizations. In doing so, the book explores the democratic and developmental implications of conflicts over the rule of law and its application, uneven enforcement, and state capture. Whether a reference tool for the seasoned scholar, a guide aiding practitioner's individual expertise or an introduction to students interested in the complex intersections between the rule of law, development and democracy, this book is a must-have for any library.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 318p.

By Ian Mynot and Oksana Ihnatenko\

On 15 November 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security and the Center for Financial Integrity (CFI)1 launched a Taskforce on Public–Private Partnership in Fighting Financial Crime in Ukraine. An in-person meeting in Warsaw, held on a non-attributable basis, convened 40 representatives, including those from the public and private sectors in Ukraine, and international experts. The discussion included two sessions focused on the current state of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Ukraine and on international experience and recommendations. This report summarises the main findings of each of these sessions. None of the discussions at the meeting are attributable.

London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2025. 15p.

By Sarah Monaghan, Kellyann Bock, Michael Rempel, & Olive Lu

Spanning more than four decades, how has the footprint of New York’s criminal legal system changed? This comprehensive report explores the changing landscape of law enforcement in New York State from 1980 to 2023. It analyzes trends in arrests, prosecutorial declinations, criminal convictions, and sentencing practices, with a focus on regional and racial disparities.

Key Takeaways

Statewide Arrest Trends

After varying patterns by charge and region from 1980 to 2010, arrest rates declined significantly from 2010 to 2020, with a modest resurgence from 2020 to 2023.

Misdemeanor arrests in NYC increased nearly fourfold from 1980 to 2010, dropped by 75% from 2010 to 2020 but rose by 40% from 2020 to 2023.

Felony arrests decreased across all regions from 1980 to 2020, with a modest uptick in recent years.

Charge-Specific Arrest Patterns

Drug arrests in NYC peaked at over 128,000 in 2000, before falling to under 18,000 in 2023.

Prostitution and fare evasion arrests in NYC saw drastic declines. Prostitution declined 99% from 1985 to 2023, and fare evasion declined 99% from 1994 to 2021, before a 2021-to-2023 uptick.

DUI remained a leading charge outside NYC, comprising 18%-19% of suburban and upstate misdemeanors in 2023.

Prosecutorial Declinations

After changing only modestly until 2017, district attorneys’ offices in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn declined to prosecute increasing numbers of low level misdemeanor arrests from 2017 to 2023.

Select low level arrests for transit fare evasion, prostitution, trespass, and marijuana possession saw especially significant increases in declinations in the Bronx, Manhattan, and/or Brooklyn.

Sentencing Trends: Jail and prison sentences for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies peaked around 2000 before decreasing significantly by 2023. Violent felony convictions increasingly resulted in prison sentences across all regions.

Racial and Ethnic Disparities: While shrinking in some areas since 1980 (e.g., felony arrest disparities narrowed), the study found that sizable Black-white and Hispanic-white disparities on most metrics examined.

New York:

Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College,

2024. 45p.

By Chris Tully

JENGbA facilitated a series of Listening Days with the families and friends of those impacted by Joint Enterprise (JE). Between October 2023 and May 2024 four such days took place in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield. The days were attended by 41 family members and friends. Each listening day focussed on five themes; knowledge of JE and when they were first aware their loved ones were to be charged under joint enterprise, the impact on them and their communities following conviction, racism and the gang narrative, role of the media, developing support networks and the fightback against the injustice of joint enterprise. Families reported having little or no previous knowledge of JE and in a considerable number of cases only found out immediately prior to, or during the trial and in some cases not until the judges’ summing up. Inevitably the impact was profound. We heard of the toll on peoples’ physical and mental health, the damage done to family relationships, the breakdown of relationships with neighbours and members of their local communities, often based on stigma, a suspicion that there is ‘no smoke without fire’ and a general lack of awareness amongst the general public of how JE is applied. A lack of independent, accessible information, support and guidance at the point of charging was seen as a fundamental problem for families confronting a trial. Families expressed anger towards the role of the police, often seen as complicit with the Crown Prosecution Service, in using JE as a blunt instrument to “round up” and prosecute young people particularly on the basis of race, class, family name and by dint of neighbourhood. Participants in the conversations also had poor experiences with lawyers citing; a lack of experience, little or no expertise in JE cases, little empathy, a reluctance to share. information and documents. The experiences of trials were predicated on similar concerns. We heard families describe juries who appeared unaware of what guilty verdicts in JE cases meant for defendants, judges who were dismissive of evidence, and concerns that juries rarely reflected the diversity of the cities and towns where trials were taking place. A key concern was disproportionate use of JE in relation to black and racialised communities, working class communities and children and young people. Often underpinning this was the use of a gang narrative to justify charging and prosecution. Families were angered by the speed with which the gang narrative was introduced into proceedings and why this was applied when association was actually founded on living in the same neighbourhood, shared interests such as music and sport, school friendships etc. As such JE was seen as both “lazy” and susceptible to stereotyping and demonisation. Many we heard from had experienced unacceptable treatment at the hands of the media. Commonly this is presented as malign or inaccurate reporting, geared towards racism, blame often attributed to parents and especially mothers. Some felt the media and police worked hand in hand to perpetuate moral panics. Retractions of inaccurate reporting were hard to come by and we also heard how images of families’ children were used repeatedly by local press, sometimes years later, to highlight youth crime or gang violence. The most positive conversations revolved around the value of family relationships as a buffer against the isolation of having a loved one sentenced under JE. Additionally a community of interest has been forged by the work of JENGbA, without which many felt they would have collapsed under the weight of trying to support loved ones and sustain other relationships. JENGbA have provided support, information, understanding and access to a group of people who share campaigning zeal and a desire to put an end to the misuse of a legal doctrine that punishes many more people than ‘just’ those it imprisons.

London: Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association,

2024. 28p.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

  In the aftermath of the riot and breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, among the questions that were raised was how the breach had occurred and what was known by federal law enforcement in advance of January 6 about the possibility of a violent protest that day. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) announced its review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department prosecutors immediately began criminally investigating individuals who violated federal law in connection with the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. The Department—through the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia (DC)— has reported that it has brought charges against over 1,500 individuals and described the January 6 investigations and prosecutions as having “moved forward at an unprecedented speed and scale.” In the public announcement of our review of the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, we took note of these ongoing criminal prosecutions, stating that the OIG was “mindful of the sensitive nature of the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions related to the events of January 6. Consistent with longstanding OIG practice, in conducting this review, the DOJ OIG will take care to ensure that the review does not interfere with these investigations or prosecutions.” As is customary for the OIG, we coordinated closely with the Department and the DC USAO to ensure that the OIG’s investigative work did not conflict with or compromise any ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. To that end, and consistent with OIG practice, in spring 2022 the OIG paused aspects of our review. 1 Once the OIG determined last year, after consultation with federal prosecutors, that our review would no longer potentially interfere with pending prosecutions, we resumed our review. In doing so, we were cognizant of the amount of time that had passed in deference to the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, as well as the number of other non-DOJ OIG oversight reports that have since been publicly released regarding the January 6 events, and we therefore decided to largely focus our inquiry on an issue that has not yet been thoroughly reviewed in oversight conducted by other entities, namely the FBI’s direction and handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) in the lead-up to and on January 6, and whether the FBI exploited its CHSs and other available information to determine the nature of threats in advance of the electoral vote certification on January 6. In addition to the DOJ OIG’s oversight efforts reflected in this report, several other Inspectors General have conducted reviews of their agency’s actions in connection with the events of January 6:  The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) OIG immediately began a review to determine if the USCP, which is responsible for policing the Capitol Complex, (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate  internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations.  The Department of Defense (DoD) OIG initiated a review of the relevant events leading up to January 6, including the DoD’s review and approval of the DC government’s request for assistance from the DC National Guard; DoD’s coordination with DC and federal officials in preparation for January 6; DoD’s receipt and approval of the USCP’s request for assistance on January 6; and the planning involved for National Guard forces to help secure the Capitol in the immediate aftermath of the riot.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG began a review to examine the role and activity of DHS and its components in preparing for and responding to the events of January 6, 2021, including DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis’s responsibility for providing intelligence to law enforcement and DHS law enforcement components’ roles, responsibilities, and actions on January 6. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), which was responsible for protecting then Vice President Mike Pence on January 6 during his time at the U.S. Capitol, is a law enforcement component within DHS. In addition, DHS is responsible for designating an event as a national special security event (NSSE) or as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) event, which it did not do for the electoral vote certification on January 6. 2 The FBI defines a special event as a “significant international event or a domestic event” formally designated as an NSSE event or a SEAR event, which requires the FBI “to plan, coordinate, develop, or provide FBI resources to mitigate potential threats the special event may cause to national security or threats of significant criminal activity that the FBI is responsible for identifying, preventing, investigating, or disrupting.”  The Department of Interior (DOI) OIG initiated a review of the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) in preparing for and responding to the events at the Ellipse and the Capitol on January 6 and in information-sharing between the NPS, the USPP, and their law enforcement partners. The demonstration that preceded the violence at the Capitol occurred at the Ellipse, which is part of President’s Park—a national park under the control of the NPS. The USPP is a unit of the NPS authorized to conduct law enforcement in the national park system and, pursuant to local statutes, within DC generally. A further oversight effort was undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, which announced that it would conduct “a comprehensive overview of events leading up to, during, and following the January 6 attack.” The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives also conducted oversight regarding the events of January 6. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) together with the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (RAC) announced a joint investigation on January 8, 2021, to “examine the intelligence and security failures” that led to the events of January 6. On January 12, 2021, the House of Representatives and Senate leadership were briefed by senior FBI officials about the FBI’s posture leading up to January 6, its response and investigation into the events of January 6, and the threat picture and operational posture leading into the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Subsequently, numerous congressional committee hearings addressed how various federal agencies prepared in advance of the January 6 Electoral Certification and how they responded on January 6, with the first one being held by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on January 26, 2021. In early March 2021, HSGAC/RAC jointly held an oversight hearing that included testimony from the FBI, Hearing Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Part II, as well as from non-FBI witnesses. On June 30, 2021, the House of Representatives established a 13-member Select Committee to investigate the rioting and breaching of the Capitol on January 6, named the “House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol” (House Select Committee). The House Select Committee held 10 televised hearings beginning on June 9, 2022, and concluded the last hearing on December 19, 2022. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2024. 88p.

By Deniz Arıtürk , Michele M. Easter , Jeffrey W. Swanson, and Marvin S. Swartz

Despite significant scholarship, research, and funding dedicated to implementing criminal diversion programs over the past two decades, persons with serious mental illness and substance use disorders remain substantially overrepresented in United States jails and prisons. Why are so many U.S. adults with behavioral health problems incarcerated instead of receiving treatment and other support to recover in the community? In this paper, we explore this persistent problem within the context of “relentless unmet need” in U.S. behavioral health (Alegría et al., 2021). 

  The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 52 (2024): 65-75 

By Peter Leasure

The current paper aimed to estimate the likelihood of an OVI (operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs) arrest across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP). Black and Hispanic males and females had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. However, males and females in the other category had lower probabilities of an OVI arrest than White males and females. For gender differences, males in all race/ethnicity categories had higher probabilities of an OVI arrest than females. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 886 Columbus: Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law, 2024. 11p.

By Robin M. Maher, Leah Roemer

While all eyes are on the race for U.S. President, it is local races for prosecutor, state judge, legislator, and governor that will decide whether and how the death penalty is used. The President only has jurisdiction over federal death penalty cases, which currently represent about 2% of all death row prisoners and 1% of all executions carried out in the U.S. since 1976. He or she selects the Attorney General, who determines whether to seek death sentences in eligible federal cases and how to defend existing federal death sentences. The President also has clemency power for people convicted of federal crimes, including those on federal death row. 

Washington, DC: Death Penalty Information Center, 2024. 32p.

By Diogo G. C. Britto, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie, Paolo Pinotti, Breno Sampaio  

We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes.  

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 60p.

By Deepak Premkumar, Andrew Skelton, Magnus Lofstrom, and Sean Cremin

In April 2020, the Judicial Council of California responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing an emergency bail order, sometimes called “zero bail,” to reduce viral transmission in courts and jails. The policy maintained cash bail for more severe offenses but set bail at zero dollars for most misdemeanors and felonies, sharply increasing the number of people who were immediately released after being arrested. Although the statewide mandate lasted for roughly two months, many county courts temporarily adopted similar policies, and until July 2022, most Californians lived in a county with an emergency bail order in place. California’s emergency bail orders dramatically altered the pretrial process and drew concerns that those released would commit additional crimes. This report examines the impact of these emergency bail measures on the likelihood of arrested individuals being rearrested soon after release. The disruptive nature of the pandemic was likely a key factor in the temporary increase in overall rearrests when emergency bail orders were in place. Notably, increases in felony rearrests did not subside over time or when emergency orders were revoked. While our data do not allow us to determine why this was the case, arrest, and booking rates, as well as jail populations, have stayed well below pre-pandemic levels, suggesting the possibility that some pandemic-era practices may have persisted, which could affect more recent felony rearrest rates. Because their goal was to protect public health, emergency bail orders set a unilateral policy of detention or release based on the accused offenses—a marked difference from broader bail reform efforts that have implemented tools such as assessing arrested individuals’ risk to public safety and not appearing in court, as well as monitoring and/or providing pretrial services to the accused if they are released pretrial. Our findings suggest that pretrial detention policy may benefit from a more holistic measure than the arresting offense when assessing public safety risk, and pretrial risk assessments could be a promising approach.

  San Francisco:  Public Policy Institute of California, 2024. 33p.   

By Julian V. Roberts, Lilly Crellin, Jonathan Bild and Jade Mouton

This report summarises findings from a survey of the public conducted in 2024. It contributes to the well-established and still growing literature on public opinion and imprisonment. The primary focus was upon public knowledge of prisons and prison trends in England and Wales. This survey is a follow-up to an earlier report by the Sentencing Academy on public knowledge of sentencing. Key Findings ¨ Most people acknowledge that they know little about prisons in England and Wales, with almost three-quarters of respondents stating that they knew either ‘not very much’ or ‘nothing at all’. ¨ More than nine in ten respondents significantly over-estimated the proportion of women within the prison population; 93% of respondents thought that women made up 10% or more of the prison population. The correct answer is 4%. ¨ Respondents also over-estimated the proportion of the prison population serving a sentence for a violent offence; whilst around one in three adult sentenced prisoners have been sentenced for a violent offence, 58% of respondents thought that violent offenders made up 40% or more of the prison population. ¨ Offenders who have served a short prison sentence of less than 12 months have the highest re-offending rate. However, most respondents considered that prisoners released after having served longer sentences had a higher re-offending rate. ¨ When asked to specify what they considered to be the single most important purpose of imprisonment, the most popular option, chosen by 42% of respondents, was protecting the public by removing offenders from society. Rehabilitation was the next most commonly-chosen purpose, attracting 19% of respondents. ¨ Approximately three-quarters of respondents (73%) considered prisons to be either ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective at rehabilitating offenders and preventing re-offending. Whilst the perception of prisons as being effective at punishing offenders was less negative, over half of respondents (53%) thought prisons were ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ effective in performing this function. ¨ In common with many previous surveys, a significant proportion of respondents considered prison conditions to be ‘too easy’, with 49% of respondents holding this view.  

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 20p.

By Oliver Kossack

In the past three decades, radical right parties had the opportunity to directly influence political developments from the highest public office in many post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. Oliver Kossack provides the first comprehensive study on government formation with radical right parties in this region. Even after the turn of the millennium, some distinct features of the post-communist context persist, such as coalitions between radical right and centre-left parties. In addition to original empirical insights, the time-sensitive approach of this study also advances the discussion about concepts and methodological approaches within the discipline.

Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2023. 392 p.

Edited by Ian Hall, Troy Lee-Brown and Rebecca Strating

This book advances a holistic conceptualization of maritime security under the term ‘Blue Security’ and situates it in states across the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific encompasses a vast space, incorporating two of the planet’s biggest oceans, the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, as well as littoral and hinterland states home to half the world’s population. Security challenges abound across the maritime Indo-Pacific, ranging from the risk of inter-state war at sea to so-called blue crimes, like piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing. Climate change and marine pollution, as well as the over-exploitation of scarce, and sometimes fragile resources, also pose threats to human security, sustainability, and biodiversity. Using the concept of ‘Blue Security’, this book assesses these various challenges and analyses the approaches to their management used by Indo-Pacific states. It argues that we should embrace a holistic understanding of maritime security, incorporating national, regional, international, human, and environmental dimensions. To that end, it explores the Blue Security strategies of 18 Indo-Pacific states, examining their changing perceptions of threat, their approaches to managing those challenges, and their capabilities. The volume makes an innovative contribution to our knowledge of a region crucial to global security and prosperity. This book will be of interest to students of maritime strategy, security studies, Asian politics, and International Relations.  

 London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 226p.

By The Center for Justice Innovation

This mapping report looking at the alternatives to coercive sanctions for low-level drug offences, forms part of one of the strategic priorities identified in the mid-term review of the National Drug Strategy established in 2017. As the government has shifted towards a healthy response to drug and alcohol use in Ireland, Alternatives to Coercive Sanctions (ACS) have become a recent area of increased focus. This Irish context aligns with the wider European policy shift towards a health-led approach to drug use, and this report will feed into the wider European strategy around this. The recommendations made by the Citizens Assembly on Drugs Use (CADU), established by the Oireachtas in 2023, have also been key in shifting the state’s approach towards promoting alternatives to coercive sanction for drug use. Recommendation 17 of the CADU report specifically says ‘The State should introduce a comprehensive health-led response to possession of drugs for personal use’.1 Criminalisation of drug possession has shown to be ineffective in reducing drug use while concurrently causing harm to individuals and society and placing continual pressure on justice system resources. In Ireland, drug possession continues to make up a significant proportion of drug-related crime, and the Rooney report highlights that “significant rates of offending behaviour amongst the sample were reportedly linked to both Drugs (48%) and Alcohol Misuse (53%)”.2 Alternatives to coercive sanctions on the other hand have shown promising evidence in their ability to reduce drug use and lower reoffending rates.3 As outlined in the European Commission study on ACS, despite the need for more robust evidence in the European context, “a study conducted in Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK found that quasi-compulsory treatment through the criminal justice system was effective in reducing crime” and “overall studies have found evidence that ACS can help reduce levels of substance use”.4 In order to identify local ACS across Ireland, we carried out a survey disseminated to relevant professionals in the sector and held follow-up remote in-depth interviews with several of them, to gain an understanding of specific existing initiatives as well as gaining insight into the appetite for different types of ACS across stakeholders. We found a total of nine relevant initiatives spanning across diverse types of ACS, including; The Garda Adult Caution Scheme, diversionary measures, The Dublin Drug Treatment Courts (DDTC), and drug treatment programmes with various criminal justice referral pathways into them. Some of these programmes have been operating for various lengths of time with the year they were established ranging from 2001 to 2023. The majority of the ACS we came across were local initiatives, with the only national one being the Garda Adult Caution Scheme. It appeared that there was no widespread knowledge about existing ACS across the country, and those interviewed about one project were often not aware of others. There also has been very limited use of the Adult Cautioning Scheme by An Garda Síochána for simple possession of cannabis or cannabis resin, as only 5,139 people were given this caution between December 2020 and February 2024, while 17,125 people were issued with a charge/ summons for this in the same period.5 This may suggest a lack of widespread awareness about the scheme. Overall, there seemed to be an appetite for ACS among those we spoke to, particularly within probation, court workers, the judiciary and the stakeholders and networks of those running local initiatives. One stakeholder mentioned there was an “aspiration to fund more successful national projects”, while another stated, “it would be easy to do this [refer to treatment] upon arrest, the difficulty would just be in setting up the electronic referral system”. The one agency that appeared to have a more varied perspective was An Garda Síochána, although this was not the case unilaterally, as the LEAR pre-court diversionary programme collaborated very successfully with local Gardaí. The findings of this report lead us to believe that at present Ireland is at the precipice of transforming how its justice system responds to drug use in a more effective and humane way. It has shown how local initiatives have identified a need for ACS and have begun to implement them throughout the country in the absence of a national ACS for possession of drugs for personal use. The innovative work undertaken across the system to support individuals with their drug use is laudable, but it is missing opportunities earlier to prevent offending and re-offending and improve health outcomes for its citizens.  

London: The Centre for Justice Innovation (CJI) , 2024.20p.

By James A. Densley and Jillian K. Peterson

This study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic and the civil unrest following George Floyd’s murder influenced the 2020 homicide surge, focusing on individuals already at high risk for violence. Based on life history interviews with 18 people convicted of homicide in Minnesota, the research explores how the disruptions of 2020 intensified pre-existing vulnerabilities, accelerating pathways to lethal violence. Participants reported that the breakdown of social order, loss of routine, and economic instability created conditions that rapidly escalated violence within their lives and communities. This qualitative analysis complements existing quantitative research by offering a detailed account of the micro-level experiences behind the homicide spike, revealing how large-scale societal disruptions can shape individual trajectories toward serious violence. Findings underscore the need for policies that address structural inequalities and ensure continuity of social support and mental health services during periods of widespread upheaval to prevent future escalations in violence.

JOURNAL OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 2024, AHEAD-OF-PRINT, 1-10

By J. Gormley

This new report published by the Sentencing Council is part of a biennial series reviewing the existing research into the effectiveness of sentencing commissioned to enable the Council to consider the most up-to-date evidence when developing and revising guidelines. This report updates the report published by the Sentencing Council in 2022 and reviews what ‘effectiveness’ might mean from the perspective of four key groups: offenders (specifically with regard to deterrence); the public; victims; and sentencers (judges and magistrates).

By Amy Pisani, Sara Rahman, Madeleine Griffiths and Suzanne Poynton

To determine which factors of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), are influential in first-court bail decisions in NSW Local Courts, and the reasons why courts release adult defendants who have already been refused bail by police. METHOD We descriptively and thematically analysed a dataset combining observations of 252 first court bail hearings in the NSW Local Court between February and May 2023, and administrative data from the BOCSAR Re-offending Database (ROD) and the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System. We supplemented these data with a thematic analysis of 40 interviews with criminal justice stakeholders involved in adult bail proceedings in NSW Local Courts. RESULTS Of the 252 observations where police had refused bail, 110 defendants (44%) were released on bail by the court, with six released unconditionally, 12% were finalised at first appearance or had their bail dispensed with, and 44% had their bail refused by the court. Similar to prosecutors and police, magistrates were most concerned with a defendant’s criminal history and the nature and seriousness of the offence, and to a lesser extent defendant vulnerabilities and needs, when determining bail. There was also general agreement between police/prosecutors and the courts regarding bail concerns, with both parties most frequently identifying reoffending and endangering the safety of victims/community as their primary concerns. Two main differences between police and court decisions emerged from the analysis. Firstly, while magistrates identified bail concerns in the majority of matters observed, they were often satisfied that these risks could be mitigated by bail conditions. The bail conditions most commonly imposed were accommodation (82%), reporting (60%), non-contact orders (47%), and place restrictions (34%). Secondly, police rarely grant bail to people charged with show cause offences, whereas 55% of defendants charged with a show cause offence, who were refused bail by police, were able to successfully demonstrate to the court why their detention was not justified. Stakeholders reported that this occurred because police prioritise community and victim safety, have limited access to information from defendants and legal representatives, and do not apply discretion when applying the show cause requirement. CONCLUSION Legal factors, such as criminal history and seriousness of offences, are the most influential factors in both the police and courts’ bail decisions. However, magistrates who are legally trained, less subject to time pressures, and can be informed by legal practitioners, are more able to thoroughly assess show cause requirements and the suitability of bail conditions at the first court bail hearing. In the absence of these factors, police are more risk-averse  

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2024. 42p.

By Lore Joplin, Justice System Partners, Maureen McDonnell, , et al.

In January 2023, California became the first state in the nation to receive approval from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for a Medicaid Section 1115 demonstration request to amend Medicaid’s inmate exclusion. People detained in jails and prisons have high rates of chronic and acute health needs, including physical, mental health, and substance disorders and reentry is a high-risk time. A key to addressing these reentry risks is addressing people’s health needs while they are incarcerated and building continuity of care from jail to community when they are released. California’s waiver, called California’s Advancing and Innovating Medi-Cal (CalAIM), and the specific component focused on individuals who are transitioning out of the criminal justice system, the Justice Involved (JI) initiative, will for the first time provide a targeted set of Medicaid-covered services right before someone is released from prison or jail. These services aim to smooth reentry transitions from jail and prison to the community, establish better connections to community-based providers at release, and enhance access to necessary care and support. California’s approach is designed to reduce the high risk of post- release mortality, morbidity, and other adverse outcomes, including repeat contact with the criminal justice system, by bringing Medicaid financing and coverage standards to bear. The work to implement California’s waiver and make these changes a reality is demanding, involving multiple partners at the state, county, and local level who have not previously worked together at this level of vital cross-system collaboration. Implementation of these changes is well underway, and county-level changes will roll out over the next two years, starting in October 2024. This paper highlights California’s implementation approach, focusing on the county-level impacts on jails, health care providers, and reentry processes. It also explores several implementation challenges and the steps the state and the counties have taken thus far to implement this change.

Safety and Justice Challenge. Org: 2024. 42p.