By Angelica Duran-Martinez

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

Crime Law and Social Change 82(4):867-891, 2023

By Siobhan Lawler, Hayley Boxall, Christopher Dowling

Research evaluating restorative justice programs for domestic and family violence and sexual violence is limited in Australia and internationally. In 2019 the AIC was commissioned to evaluate the Australian Capital Territory’s Restorative Justice Scheme for domestic and family violence and sexual violence (‘Phase Three’). The evaluation examined the process and outcomes of Phase Three, including barriers to delivery, activities delivered and outcomes associated with participation. A range of data was examined, including interviews with participants (n=16) and stakeholders (n=47), analysis of post-conference surveys (n=28) and analysis of administrative and reoffending data. The evaluation demonstrated Phase Three is working effectively overall. Participants and stakeholders report high levels of satisfaction with Phase Three and the service they received. There was evidence that victim-survivors could meet a range of justice needs with varying levels of offender participation and accountability. Some areas for improving referrals were identified.

Research Report no. 33.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 185p.

By Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog

This Essay theorizes and reimagines the place of courts in the contemporary struggle for the abolition of racialized punitive systems of legal control and exploitation. In the spring and summer of 2020, the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many other Black and Indigenous people sparked continuous protests against racist police violence and other forms of oppression. Meanwhile, abolitionist organizers and scholars have long critiqued the prison-industrial complex, or the constellation of corporations, media entities, governmental actors, and racist and capitalist ideologies that have driven mass incarceration. But between the police and the prison cell sits the criminal court. Criminal courts are the legal pathway from an arrest to a prison sentence—with myriad systems of control in between, including ones branded as “off-ramps”—and we cannot understand the present crisis without understanding how the criminal courts not only function to legitimate police and funnel people into carceral spaces but also contribute unique forms of violence, social control, and exploitation all their own, revealing the machinations of mass criminalization and injustice operating between the police encounter and the prison cell. Our central argument is that courts—with a focus here on the criminal trial courts and the workgroup of actors within them—function as an unjust social institution; we should therefore work toward abolishing criminal courts and replacing them with other institutions that do not inherently legitimate police, rely on jails and prisons, or themselves operate as tools of racial and economic oppression. Drawing on legal scholarship and empirical social scientific research, Part I describes injustices perpetrated by criminal courts, detailing their role in the present crisis of mass criminalization through legal doctrine, racialized social control and violence, and economic exploitation. In Part II, we describe the contemporary abolition movement, briefly laying out its genesis and three guiding principles we view as typically considered in relation to policing and prisons: (1) power shifting, (2) defunding and reinvesting, and (3) transformation. Part III explores how these principles could operate in relation to the courts, drawing on analysis of existing grassroots efforts as well as offering new possibilities. In the short term, non-reformist reforms could make criminal courts a venue to unmask, and therefore aid in dismantling, police and prisons. Such reforms could complement the broader abolition movement and reduce the churn of people through the system. Ultimately, the goal would be to abolish criminal courts as systems of coercion, violence, and exploitation, and to replace them with other social institutions, such as community-based restorative justice and peacemaking programs while at the same time investing in the robust provision of social, political, and economic resources in marginalized communities.

110 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW (Volume 110February 20222022) 45p.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

  In the aftermath of the riot and breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, among the questions that were raised was how the breach had occurred and what was known by federal law enforcement in advance of January 6 about the possibility of a violent protest that day. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) announced its review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department prosecutors immediately began criminally investigating individuals who violated federal law in connection with the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. The Department—through the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia (DC)— has reported that it has brought charges against over 1,500 individuals and described the January 6 investigations and prosecutions as having “moved forward at an unprecedented speed and scale.” In the public announcement of our review of the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, we took note of these ongoing criminal prosecutions, stating that the OIG was “mindful of the sensitive nature of the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions related to the events of January 6. Consistent with longstanding OIG practice, in conducting this review, the DOJ OIG will take care to ensure that the review does not interfere with these investigations or prosecutions.” As is customary for the OIG, we coordinated closely with the Department and the DC USAO to ensure that the OIG’s investigative work did not conflict with or compromise any ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. To that end, and consistent with OIG practice, in spring 2022 the OIG paused aspects of our review. 1 Once the OIG determined last year, after consultation with federal prosecutors, that our review would no longer potentially interfere with pending prosecutions, we resumed our review. In doing so, we were cognizant of the amount of time that had passed in deference to the ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, as well as the number of other non-DOJ OIG oversight reports that have since been publicly released regarding the January 6 events, and we therefore decided to largely focus our inquiry on an issue that has not yet been thoroughly reviewed in oversight conducted by other entities, namely the FBI’s direction and handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) in the lead-up to and on January 6, and whether the FBI exploited its CHSs and other available information to determine the nature of threats in advance of the electoral vote certification on January 6. In addition to the DOJ OIG’s oversight efforts reflected in this report, several other Inspectors General have conducted reviews of their agency’s actions in connection with the events of January 6:  The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) OIG immediately began a review to determine if the USCP, which is responsible for policing the Capitol Complex, (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate  internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations.  The Department of Defense (DoD) OIG initiated a review of the relevant events leading up to January 6, including the DoD’s review and approval of the DC government’s request for assistance from the DC National Guard; DoD’s coordination with DC and federal officials in preparation for January 6; DoD’s receipt and approval of the USCP’s request for assistance on January 6; and the planning involved for National Guard forces to help secure the Capitol in the immediate aftermath of the riot.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG began a review to examine the role and activity of DHS and its components in preparing for and responding to the events of January 6, 2021, including DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis’s responsibility for providing intelligence to law enforcement and DHS law enforcement components’ roles, responsibilities, and actions on January 6. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), which was responsible for protecting then Vice President Mike Pence on January 6 during his time at the U.S. Capitol, is a law enforcement component within DHS. In addition, DHS is responsible for designating an event as a national special security event (NSSE) or as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) event, which it did not do for the electoral vote certification on January 6. 2 The FBI defines a special event as a “significant international event or a domestic event” formally designated as an NSSE event or a SEAR event, which requires the FBI “to plan, coordinate, develop, or provide FBI resources to mitigate potential threats the special event may cause to national security or threats of significant criminal activity that the FBI is responsible for identifying, preventing, investigating, or disrupting.”  The Department of Interior (DOI) OIG initiated a review of the actions of the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) in preparing for and responding to the events at the Ellipse and the Capitol on January 6 and in information-sharing between the NPS, the USPP, and their law enforcement partners. The demonstration that preceded the violence at the Capitol occurred at the Ellipse, which is part of President’s Park—a national park under the control of the NPS. The USPP is a unit of the NPS authorized to conduct law enforcement in the national park system and, pursuant to local statutes, within DC generally. A further oversight effort was undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, which announced that it would conduct “a comprehensive overview of events leading up to, during, and following the January 6 attack.” The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives also conducted oversight regarding the events of January 6. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) together with the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (RAC) announced a joint investigation on January 8, 2021, to “examine the intelligence and security failures” that led to the events of January 6. On January 12, 2021, the House of Representatives and Senate leadership were briefed by senior FBI officials about the FBI’s posture leading up to January 6, its response and investigation into the events of January 6, and the threat picture and operational posture leading into the Inauguration on January 20, 2021. Subsequently, numerous congressional committee hearings addressed how various federal agencies prepared in advance of the January 6 Electoral Certification and how they responded on January 6, with the first one being held by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on January 26, 2021. In early March 2021, HSGAC/RAC jointly held an oversight hearing that included testimony from the FBI, Hearing Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Part II, as well as from non-FBI witnesses. On June 30, 2021, the House of Representatives established a 13-member Select Committee to investigate the rioting and breaching of the Capitol on January 6, named the “House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol” (House Select Committee). The House Select Committee held 10 televised hearings beginning on June 9, 2022, and concluded the last hearing on December 19, 2022. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2024. 88p.

By Colin P. Clarke

Because terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been successful in adapting and innovating in response to counterterrorism measures, it is important to develop a flexible, responsive sanctions regime similar to the 1267 regime, but that can include new organizations and bodies designed to keep it relevant and applicable— and any new regime considered for violent far-right groups should be similarly flexible—both in terms of the various measures employed, but also concerning the individuals and assets to be targeted. • Due to ISIS’ relatively unique ability to capture and administer large swaths of territory as it built a proto-state and diversified its funding portfolio, it is somewhat difficult to assess how effective sanctions were against the group. • If certain terrorist threats concern only a limited number of states—for example, the rightwing threat is likely to be more prominent in North America, Europe, and Oceania, though it certainly exists elsewhere—there may be less of an impetus, or little sense of urgency, for states outside of those immediately impacted to act. In that sense, the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS) were more transnational, and as a result, generated global consensus more easily. Therefore, it will be crucial to work toward creating consensus, as well as to explore other applications of sanctions to counter the violent far-right threat. • One of the primary challenges to evaluating the impact of sanctions against terrorist groups is the lack of an effective assessment framework, in addition to data gaps. The sensitive nature of data related to terrorism and counterterrorism is one of the primary reasons why it has been difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the United Nations’ overall impact in this area. • Recommendations include: focus on tailor-made sanctions regimes that can adapt to the terrorist threat, considering both multilateral and national options; establish metrics to assess implementation and impact of sanctions regimes; and invest in international cooperation for implementation. 

New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 72p.

Edited by  Eveline G. Bouwers and David Nash

This book investigates the relationship between blasphemy and violence in modern history, with a focus on cases from the European world, including its (post-) colonial ties. Spanning from the late eighteenth century to today, it shows how cultures of blasphemy, and related acts of heresy, apostasy, and sacrilege, have interacted with different forms of violence, committed against both the sacred and the secular.

Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022. 

By Hannah Rose and Gina Vale

Also‑called ‘new generation of extremists’ has attracted significant media attention but has suffered from a lack of transparent data and comprehensive, youth‑specific analysis. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving threat landscape, this report presents the first in‑depth research into child terrorist activity in England and Wales. Through the construction of a unique dataset of children convicted of terrorism offences in England and Wales since 2016 – published live alongside this report – it investigates how domestic policing and the criminal justice system understand child‑terrorism offending. Key Data Points In the UK since 2016, 43 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences they committed as minors. Of these, 42 were boys, with only one girl. While the oldest offenders were days before their respective 18th birthdays, the youngest was only 13 years old. Two clear waves of child terrorism offending can be identified. The first, dominated by Islamist cases, runs concurrently with the peak of Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ until its collapse in 2018. The second wave predominantly comprises extreme‑right cases, emerging in 2018 in the context of post-National Action and the decentralisation of extreme‑right online networks. In total, 16 cases relate to Islamist activity, 25 to the extreme right, and two to unknown or unclear ideologies. Almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing an act of terrorism, including the construction of improvised explosive devices, the plotting of complex mass‑casualty attacks, and attempts by seven children to travel independently overseas for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. Eight children – five extreme right and three Islamist – planned to commit domestic acts of terrorism on UK soil. Eleven minors were convicted of encouraging terrorism, one for providing training for terrorism, one for membership of a banned organisation and one for inviting support for a banned organisation. The most common offence, committed by 26 minors, was the collection of terrorist propaganda. Children created their own propaganda, engaged with violent extremist literature and downloaded operational materials. 19 minors disseminated banned materials with friends, family and anonymous online networks. Proportionally, more extreme right than Islamist offenders pleaded guilty, with many denouncing previously held views, citing adverse childhood experiences, explaining their isolation and desire to fit in with online ecosystems, and claiming childhood innocence. The most common sentence was non‑custodial, accompanied by a rehabilitative and monitoring order, which was handed down to twel  sentence, awarded in two separate Islamist cases, was eleven years to life. The disparity in sentencing between ideological categories may be shaped by four factors: the age at sentencing, greater severity of offence, stronger mitigating circumstances among extreme‑right offenders and a higher proportion of not‑guilty pleas entered by Islamist defendants. A New Threat? Children did not merely mimic the actions or do the bidding of older individuals, but proved to be innovators and amplifiers in their own right. Many attempted and managed to recruit peers and older family members, prepare acts of terrorism without the help of adults, and create their own propaganda images, videos and manifestos. In anonymous transnational online extremist ecosystems, which are widely available and have very low barriers to participation, the potential impact of extremist minors is on a par with adults. Children’s support of terrorist networks presents a new threat. While no attack has been committed by a child in the UK to date, late‑stage foiled plots and transnational activism demonstrate this potentiality. However, children cannot merely be treated as ‘small adults’ with heavily securitised policies. An outcome‑focused system must balance the interests of the public and targeted communities with the best interests of the child to address root causes of radicalisation and secure successful reintegration and threat mitigation.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2023. 76p.

By Kay Cook, Adrienne Byrt, Terese Edwards, Ashlea Coen

This report draws on the experiences of 675 single mothers who have engaged with the Australian child support system. It reveals how violence is the backdrop to women’s engagement within each stage of the child support process and the compounding impact of violence and poverty. The report makes four recommendations that would reduce the capacity of the child support system to be weaponised. Child support, despite its straightforward and important aim of transferring payments between separated households, is regarded as a complex area of policy and a ‘black box’ in which there is a lack of data on how the system operates. The system’s opacity means that parents’ experiences are largely unknown – particularly for half of the caseload who transfer payments privately. Policy and service blind spots and loopholes allow harmful behaviour perpetrated through the child support system to go undetected and unaccounted for. The lack of evidence on the harms that the system enables in turn perpetuates the myth that child support is a benign administrative process. The recommendations in this report are a direct result of the survey findings and are intended to: bring about meaningful improvements;empower women with autonomy and choice that is directed by what they want and require for their family; andcreate a system that is safe for women to engage in.

Recommendations

Delink family payments from child support by eliminating the Maintenance Income Test.Co-design family violence processes within the child support system to recognise the high rates of violence experienced by system users.Move all child support collections back into the Australian Tax Office.Make all payment debts owed to and enforced by the Commonwealth.

Hawthorn, VIC: Swinburne University of Technology, 2024. 97p.

By Carolina Sampó, Nicole Jenne, Marcos Alan Ferreira

This article analyzes the criminal governance exercised by the Mexican criminal organ­ization Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), contributing to the scarce information available on this topic. Specifically, we ask how the CJNG has exercised territorial control to ensure the operation of its businesses, mostly concentrated in the production and sale of illegal drugs. Based on a small number of existing studies and publicly available information, we argue that the CJNG relies on a dual system of territorial control consisting of the prioritization of violent coercion vis-à-vis its opponents together with a discourse of protecting Mexicans sustained by selected initiatives to provide security and other basic services to the population to gain legitimacy. This combination has allowed the cartel to grow and expand rapidly over the last decade. 

Revista Científica General José María Córdova,  21(43), 647-665.2023 

By Amanda Kraus, Elizabeth Clelan, Dan Leeds, Sarah Wilson with Cathy Hiatt, Jared Huff, Dave Reese

Section 540I of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2020 NDAA) required the secretary of defense, in consultation with the secretaries of the military departments and the secretary of homeland security, to:

• Issue guidance that establishes criteria to determine when data indicating possible racial, ethnic, or gender (REG) disparities in the military justice process should be further reviewed and describes how such a review should be conducted.

• Conduct an evaluation to identify the causes of any REG disparities identified in the military justice system (MJS) and take steps to address the identified causes, as appropriate.

The Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness asked CNA to provide analytic support to fulfill these requirements. CNA addressed four research questions:

1. What data elements should be tracked, and what disparity indicators should the Department of Defense (DOD) use to monitor trends in MJS outcomes and take appropriate policy actions?

2. How much of the required data currently exist and to what extent are they standardized across the services?

3. Do the existing MJS data reveal any differences in military justice outcomes by REG?

4. Can we identify any specific factors (including bias) that contributed to observed outcome disparities?

The results for the first research question, which support fulfilling the first NDAA requirement, are reported in the document titled, How to Use Administrative Data to Measure and Interpret Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Military Justice Outcomes. This report describes how we addressed the remaining three research questions to support fulfilling the second NDAA requirement.

APPROACH

To manage the scope of this effort within the study resources, we limit our analyses to the regular, active duty enlisted forces of each service. To execute the analyses, we constructed multiple datasets for each service, with each dataset comprising records of MJS incidents reported and resolved over the seven years from fiscal year (FY) 2014 through FY 2020. Each incident record includes descriptive features of the incident, including the REG of the accused servicemember. The constructed datasets follow each incident record through various steps in the MJS, but no dataset follows incidents seamlessly from initial reporting to final resolution and they vary in terms of level of detail. Thus, our dataset construction also served as a check on data completeness and allowed us to determine which REG disparities in incident outcomes can currently be tracked for each service.

We then applied quantitative methods (primarily regression analysis) to calculate unconditional and conditional service-specific REG disparity measures for as many MJS outcomes as the data allowed, controlling for other descriptive features of the offender and the incident. Unconditional disparities are measured for the first-observed outcome in each dataset and are based on comparisons between those experiencing the outcome and those in the service’s entire enlisted population. Conditional disparities are measured for outcomes that occur later in the MJS process and are based on comparisons between the servicemembers who experienced the outcome and those who experienced the outcome associated with the previous observed step in the MJS process. For example, for some services, we calculate REG disparities in guilty findings conditional on having completed nonjudicial punishment (NJP) or court-martial (CM) proceedings. This allows us to determine accurately where REG disparities first appear in the MJS and how long they persist.

RESULTS

There are many detailed results presented in the report. Here, we summarize these results by answering the research questions they addressed.

Research question #2: How much of the required data currently exist and to what extent are they standardized across the services?

Most of the MJS data exist and the services generally collect the same data elements, but the ways the data are collected and stored result in data elements and structures that do not always support quantitative analysis and they are not consistent across services. Specifically, despite recent service efforts to improve data collection and storage, the data are still stored in multiple data systems across multiple commands within each service. Thus, it remains cumbersome to follow incidents through the MJS and to prepare the data necessary to compute REG disparities. This, in turn, limits REG disparity analysis for all MJS incidents and creates outcomes that vary by service.

Research question #3: Do the existing MJS data reveal any differences in military justice outcomes by REG?

Our data analysis confirms that there were significant racial and gender disparities in MJS outcomes during the study period.

Across services and outcomes, we found positive racial disparities: in every service, Black enlisted personnel were more likely than White enlisted personnel to be investigated, be involved in NJP in some way, and be involved in CMs in some way, even after controlling for the other factors included in the regression models. Yet, conditional on a case progressing far enough in the MJS to have an adjudicated outcome, Black enlisted personnel were no more likely—and, in many cases, were less likely—than their White counterparts to be found guilty.

In contrast, across services and outcomes, we found negative gender disparities: in every service, female enlisted personnel were less likely than male enlisted personnel to enter the MJS and, conditional on the case progressing to an adjudication point, they were less likely to be found guilty.

Finally, we found few significant ethnic disparities in MJS outcomes. Across services and for most outcomes, Hispanic and non-Hispanic enlisted personnel experienced the modeled outcomes at similar rates.

Research question #4: Can we identify any specific factors (including bias) that contributed to observed outcome disparities?

It is impossible to determine definitively whether bias exists in the MJS solely based on statistical analysis of administrative data records such as those we used in this study. The analysis did, however, allow us to draw two sets of conclusions regarding causes of MJS disparities.

First, controlling for offender-, incident-, and MJS process-related factors did not eliminate REG disparities, and no specific factor emerged as a leading determinant of MJS disparities. Thus, bias remains on the table as a potential cause.

Second, by using the data to show where in the MJS disparities occur, we provide information to help the services decide where to investigate further. Specifically, the largest positive racial disparities were associated with the first-observed outcomes. This suggests that it is important to get more clarity on how and why Black enlisted servicemembers enter the MJS. It would be especially valuable to better understand how outcomes differ depending on whether the initial investigation is conducted by a professional military law enforcement agency (LEA) or by the command and how commanding officers (COs) make their disposition decisions, and to evaluate the relative strengths of cases brought against Black versus White servicemembers.

RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We make the following recommendations to improve data collection and analytical processes.Provide the services with sufficient funding and support to ensure that MJS incident and case data are collected, stored, and made usable for conditional REG disparity analysis at each step in the MJS.For future data assessments, follow the two key steps recommended in the companion document: support service-specific studies and provide the time and structure for effective collaboration between researchers and MJS experts in each service.Continue efforts to collect complete NJP information.Include common case control numbers in all MJS data systems so that datasets associated with different parts of the MJS can be merged and cases can be followed from investigation through initial disposition to final resolution.Populate variables related to offender characteristics, especially REG, by pulling data from authoritative personnel records.Ensure that all relevant dates are populated.Define all data fields to include all potential outcomes or values, including indicators that a variable is not applicable for a given incident or that the incident has not yet proceeded far enough through the MJS for the variable to apply.Use dropdown menus to minimize data error and inconsistency due to hand entry.

RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO REG DISPARITIES

To address the identified MJS outcome disparities, we make the following recommendations that range from specific to general:Seek to address disparities, not bias per se. As reported in the companion document, regardless of their causes, disparities may create perceptions of bias and perceptions of bias have negative effects not only on the effectiveness of the MJS, but also readiness.Begin by studying how outcomes differ depending on whether the initial investigation is conducted by a professional military LEA or by the command, how COs make their disposition decisions, and the relative strengths of cases brought against Black versus White servicemembers.Follow additional steps recommended in the companion document. Specifically, conduct assessments and report results on a regular basis. Do not wait until negative publicity occurs and do not respond only to disparities identified in raw data.Develop procedures and systems for holding leaders accountable for the proper use of discretion across the full range of MJS outcomes. Discretion is a necessary part of law enforcement and justice, but it is also where bias (implicit or explicit) can enter. It is leadership’s job to think more broadly about the role of discretion in the MJS.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2023. 158p.