By Pamela D Schulz

The language in media stories surrounding the high drama of juvenile and youth crime is very alarmist and continues to fuel political debates and demands for tougher penalties rather than the proverbial slap on the wrist for young offenders. Further there are fear discourse elements that suggest that for some politicians cited in the daily news cycle as being “out of control”. In opposition to this fear and alarmist discourse in the notion that the media news cycle highlights youth crime for its sensationalist perspectives and poor reporting of youth courts and their judgments in such matters. A comprehensive discourse analysis of youth crime reporting may suggest that media must take the blame for some of the inappropriate focus on youth crime as being selective. This yearlong study suggests that the public need more information to see for themselves whether the current moves and political debates need to be reviewed and refreshed. In addition, family supports are a signal to consider as presented by expert authorities involved in decision making and reporting.

Children and Teenagers, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2023, http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ct.v6n4p1

By U.K. Home Office

Country information and protection guidelines for British asylum authorities on fear of gangs (gangs' origins; main gangs; structure, size and reach; characteristics of members; activities and impact; targets of gang violence; returnees; government anti-gang policy and law; effectiveness of law enforcement agencies; freedom of movement)

London: Home Office, Independent Advisory Group on Country Information, 2021. 92p.

By Owen Elrifi

This paper explores the classification of gangs as criminal actors and not as political actors. I propose that urban street gangs often resemble and reflect the actions of the Weberian state in their communities and that this makes them inherently political, even if they do not make explicitly political claims against the state. To test this, I develop a theoretical framework by which to compare gang characteristics to state characteristics. Through ethnographic case studies of three Chicagoan gangs in the latter half of the 20th century, I demonstrate the utility of my framework in analysis and evaluate the similarities between gangs and states.

Chicago: University of Chicago, 2019. 70p.

By Clare Ribando Seelke

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in parts of Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang-related crime and violence on governance, citizen security, and investment in Central America. Congress has examined the role that gang-related violence has played in fueling mixed migration flows, which have included asylum seekers, by families and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) to the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Central American governments have struggled to address the gang problem. From 2012 to 2014, the government of El Salvador facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country’s largest gangs. The truce contributed to a temporary reduction in homicides but strengthened the gangs. Since taking office in June 2014, President Salvador Sanchez Cerén has adopted repression-oriented anti-gang policies similar those implemented in the mid-2000s, including relying on the military to support anti-gang efforts. El Salvador’s attorney general is investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings committed by police engaged in anti-gang efforts. Successive Honduran governments have generally relied on suppression-oriented policies toward the gangs as well, with some funding provided in recent years to support community-level prevention programs. The Guatemalan government has generally relied on periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members. U.S. agencies have engaged with Central American governments on gang issues for more than a decade. In July 2007, an interagency committee announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which emphasized diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds through a special line item for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue those anti-gang initiatives. Significant additional support has been provided through CARSI for violence-prevention efforts in communities affected by gang violence, as well as for vetted police units working on transnational gang cases with U.S. law enforcement. Recently, U.S. and Salvadoran officials have also targeted the financing of MS13, which the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Transnational Criminal Organization subject to U.S. sanctions in October 2012, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the potential impact of U.S. sanctions on law-enforcement efforts.

Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2016. 23p.

By Celinda Franco

Two predominantly Latino gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18), have raised concern among policy makers for several reasons: (1) membership in these gangs has spread from the Los Angeles area to other communities across the United States; (2) these gangs are becoming “transnational,” primarily because MS-13 and M-18 cliques are being established in Central America and Mexico; (3) evidence suggests that these gangs are engaged in criminal enterprises normally associated with better organized and more sophisticated crime syndicates; and (4) MS-13 and M-18 gang members may be involved in smuggling operations and, by extension, could potentially use their skills and criminal networks to smuggle terrorists into the United States. To date, however, no evidence exists establishing a link between MS-13 and M-18 members and terrorists. Nevertheless, some observers maintain that these two gangs may develop the capacity to become organized criminal enterprises capable of coordinating illegal activities across national borders. Yet, others find them to be no more criminally organized or sophisticated than other street gangs. At issue for Congress is whether the MS-13 and M-18 gangs constitute an emerging transnational criminal threat. The federal response to the MS-13 and M-18 gang problem has largely involved the enforcement of criminal and immigration laws, including the deportation of alien gang members. More recently, federal efforts have focused on prosecuting gang members under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. Deported alien gang members have established MS-13 and M-18 gang cliques in their home countries, and some experts suggest that U.S. deportation policies have effectively transported U.S.-styled gang culture to parts of Central America and Mexico. Moreover, evidence shows that deported alien MS-13 and M-18 gang members have established a “revolving door” migratory pattern of repeat illegal reentry into the United States, raising concerns that these “migratory” alien gang members may become involved in narco-trafficking, smuggling, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Mexico border. Legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress (and one such proposal has been passed by the Senate) that would strengthen the enforcement of immigration law directed at alien gang members and provide additional tools to federal prosecutors to pursue members of violent gangs. Such legislation includes H.R. 880, H.R. 1582, H.R. 1645, H.R. 2954, H.R. 3150, H.R. 3156, H.R. 3547, S. 330, S. 456, S. 990, S. 1348, and S. 1860.

Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2007. 24p.

By James Gilbert

The youth culture is on everyone's lips today, as pressures build to ban controversial song lyrics, reintroduce school prayer, and prohibit teenagers' access to contraceptives. It's not the first time Americans have been outraged over the seuction of the innocent.. When James Dean and Marlon Brando donned their motorcycle jackets and adopted alienated poses in Rebel Without a Cause, East of Eden, and The Wild One, in the 1950's, so did countless numbers of American teenagers. Or so it seemed to their parents. American teenagers were looking and acting like juvenile delinquents. By mid-decade, the nation had reached a pitch of near obsession with the harmful effects of film, radio, comic books, and television on American youth.

New York; Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1986 . 273p.

By International Crisis Group

Born in the aftermath of civil war and boosted by mass deportations from the U.S., Central American gangs are responsible for brutal acts of violence, chronic abuse of women, and more recently, the forced displacement of children and families. Estimated to number 54,000 in the three Northern Triangle countries – El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – the gangs’ archetypal tattooed young men stand out among the region’s greatest sources of public anxiety. Although they are not the only groups dedicated to violent crime, the maras have helped drive Central American murder rates to highs unmatched in the world: when the gangs called a truce in El Salvador, homicides halved overnight. But it is extortion that forms the maras’ criminal lifeblood and their most widespread racket. By plaguing local businesses for protection payments, they reaffirm control over poor urban enclaves to fund misery wages for members. Reducing the impact of these schemes, replacing them with formal employment and restoring free movement across the Northern Triangle’s urban zones would greatly reduce the harm of gang activity. Charting this route, however, requires a sharp switch in current policies. Ever since mara-related insecurity became visible in the early 2000s, the region’s governments have responded through punitive measures that reproduce the popular stigmas and prejudices of internal armed conflict. In programs such as Iron Fist in El Salvador, the Sweep-Up Plan in Guatemala or Zero Tolerance in Honduras, mass incarceration, harsher prison conditions and recourse to extrajudicial executions provided varieties of punishment. The cumulative effects, however, have fallen far short of expectations. Assorted crackdowns have not taken account of the deep social roots of the gangs, which provide identity, purpose and status for youths who are unaccommodated in their home societies and “born dead”. The responses have also failed to recognise the counterproductive effects of security measures that have given maras prisons in which to organise and confirmation of their identity as social outcasts. The succession of unsuccessful punitive measures is now coming under closer scrutiny across the Northern Triangle. All three countries are experimenting with new forms of regional collaboration in law enforcement. Guatemala has introduced vanguard measures to combat extortion rackets, many of them run from within jails, and has proposed a range of alternatives to prison terms. Although the collapse of the truce with the maras in 2014 spurred unprecedented violence in El Salvador, murder rates appear to have fallen again, while parts of the maras have proposed fresh talks with an eye to their eventual dissolution – an offer shunned by the government. Mass deportation from the U.S. back to these countries risks a repeated upsurge in gang crime. However, U.S. concern with reducing the migrant flow from Central America has generated significant new funds for development in the region via the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity. At the core of a new approach should stand an acknowledgement of the social and economic roots of gang culture, ineradicable in the short term, alongside a concerted state effort to minimise the violence of illicit gang activity. Focused and sophisticated criminal investigations should target the gangs responsible for the most egregious..

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 41p.

By InSight Crime and Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS)

Mara Salvatrucha, or MS13, is one of the world’s largest and most violent street gangs. It is also one of the least understood, making it difficult for policymakers and law enforcement to confront. A new report by InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS) reveals new details about the gang’s operations and provides policy prescriptions for eradicating MS13. Entitled “MS13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Street Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction,” the report is based on hundreds of interviews with, and surveys of gang members and law enforcement officials in El Salvador, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Long Island. It contains insights into the gang’s hierarchy, politics, structure, and recruitment methods.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime and Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2018. 90p.

By Janique Kroese.

The aim of this dissertation is to assess the effect of growing up in a single-parent family during childhood and adolescence on adolescents’ involvement in delinquency. More specifically, it investigates whether different types of single-parent families have different effects, and whether these effects depend on parental involvement in crime.

Amsterdam: Free University of Amsterdam, 2022. 204p.

By Curtis Fogel.

in the complicated interaction between sport and law, much is revealed about the perception and understanding of consent and tolerable deviance. When a football player steps onto the field, what deviations from the rules of the game are considered acceptable? And what risks has the player already accepted by voluntarily participating in the sport? In the case of Canadian football, acts of on-field violence, hazing, and performance-enhancing drug use that would be considered criminal outside the context of sport are tolerated and even promoted by team and league administrators. The manner in which league review committees and the Canadian legal system understand such actions highlights the challenges faced by those looking to protect players from the dangers of the sport. Although there has been some discussion of legal and institutional reforms dealing with crime and deviance in Canadian sport, little exists in the way of sports law, with most cases falling into the legal categories of criminal, administrative, or civil law. In Game-Day Gangsters, Fogel argues for a review of the systems by which Canadian football is governed and analyzes the reforms proposed by football leagues and by players. Juxtaposing material from interviews with football players and administrators and from media files and legal cases, he explores the discrepancies between the players’ own experiences and the institutional handling of disciplinary matters in junior, university, and professional football leagues across the country.

Athabasca, AB:Athabasca University Press, 2013. 176p.