By H. M. Fogle. Intrdosction by Graeme Newman

At once a chronicle and a funeral dirge, The Palace of Death stands as a haunting testament to early twentieth-century American penal culture. Published in 1909 by an Ohio penitentiary official, H. M. Fogle's volume compiles 59 firsthand accounts of incarceration and execution—each rendered with chilling precision and accompanied by stark photographic documentation. The period covers the execution by hanging and the transition to the electric chair, all in considerable detail. These narratives propel the reader through the twilight of life, revealing how society confronts its most extreme judgments. Yet, behind the factual veneer lies a provocative tension: does Fogle intend to expose the tragedy of fallen humanity, or to feed a voyeuristic appetite for death? In this liminal space between documentation and spectacle, the work demands not only attention, but moral inventory.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p.229.

By Lee Kovarsky

There is a widely held belief that to delay executions, American death-row prisoners strategically defer litigation until the eleventh hour. After all, the logic goes, that the incentives for prisoners who face the death penalty differ from those who do not. Noncapital prisoners typically try to move the terminal point of a sentence (release) forward, and capital prisoners typically try to push that point (execution) back. This theory of litigant behavior—what I call the “Strategic Delay Account,” or the “SDA”—underwrites an extraordinarily harsh institutional response. It primes courts to discount real constitutional grievances and to punish participating lawyers, and it spurs legislatures to restrict crucial remedies. In this article, I explain that the SDA inaccurately describes condemned prisoner behavior, both because it assumes a non-existent incentive structure and because it ignores the major structural causes of delayed litigation. First, deferred litigation is risky, and fortune disfavors the bold. Procedural doctrines that operate across post-conviction law strongly incentivize the promptest conceivable presentation of claims. Second, prisoners often omit challenges from early rounds of litigation not because they have done so strategically, but instead because some claims are inherently incapable of being asserted at that time. Third, the volume of end-stage litigation reflects the comprehensive failure of American jurisdictions to provide adequate legal services; condemned prisoners are often functionally unrepresented from the moment early-stage proceedings conclude until the state sets an execution date.

New York University Law Review Issue: Volume 95, Number 5, November 2020