By Haroro J. Ingram and Jon Lewis

This study begins by establishing the foundation for the conceptual framework through which the authors analyze the leadership and impact of Beam, Pierce, and Mason. It draws on the Ligon et al. CIP (Charismatic, Ideological, and Pragmatic) leadership model with its dual focus on leadership typologies and six life events that tend to characterize the life narratives of outstanding leaders. Our framework is further supplemented by a more nuanced conceptual grounding in charismatic leadership theory.  It then features the three central case studies. These case studies seek to examine the respective backgrounds, leadership styles, influence, and lasting appeal of these American ideologues. It traces their life experiences, reviewing the totality of their contributions to their respective far-right milieus. In doing so, it examines their roles within specific right-wing movements as well as their roles as nodes that connected disparate elements of the modern far-right. This study concludes by drawing out key overarching findings that emerge from the preceding analysis. Specifically, it focuses on the enduring legacies of Beam, Pierce, and Mason by reflecting on how they have collectively impacted the evolution of violent far-right movements, and considers how the differences in the leadership types and life narratives have shaped that legacy. Finally, it offers policy insights and avenues for future research with respect to the modern far-right landscape and the role of charismatic leadership in prominent white supremacist movements active today.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 85p.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Moustafa Ayad

In May 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an intelligence bulletin which included one of the first official acknowledgments of what they and other similar agencies in the West identified as an emerging violent extremist threat.  It warned that “anti-government, identity-based, and fringe political conspiracy theories” were playing an increasing role in motivating domestic extremists to commit criminal, sometimes violent, acts. Since then, officials have also noted the emergence of individuals acting on the basis of “salad bar ideology” extremism, a term used in 2020 by FBI Director Christopher Wray to describe the nature of some of the recent violent extremist threats. Their ideologies, according to Director Wray, “are kind of a jumble…a mixture of ideologies that don’t fit together.”  He went on to say that some extremists “take a mish mash of different kinds of ideologies often that don’t fit coherently together, and sometimes are even in tension with each other, and mix them together with some kind of personal grievance,” to justify their attack. Director Wray concluded that “it’s more about the violence than it is about the ideology.”

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 39p.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Blyth Crawford, Valentin Wutke

Salafi-jihadism and right-wing white supremacist extremism are two of the most visible, active, and threatening violent extremist movements operating in the West today, responsible for dozens of attacks throughout North America and Western Europe. With the increased threat of white supremacist terrorism in the West have also come questions about its relationship to jihadist terrorism. This study provides an assessment of the ideological similarities between the two movements, concluding that they share key traits and political outlooks, some of which have become increasingly widespread over recent years in the Western world and beyond. Firstly, these forms of extremism are the most violent iterations of their respective movements. Jihadists are the ideological fringe of the wider Islamist movement, while white supremacist extremists emerge from more mainstream, right-wing white identity and supremacist politics. They are both reactionary political movements. They treat any form of social or political progress, reform, or liberalization with great suspicion, viewing these chiefly as a threat to their respective ‘ingroups’. In this sense, jihadists too are extreme right-wing actors even if they are rarely referred to in such terms. Both movements share a similar underlying diagnosis for the ills of their respective societies, placing blame primarily on the forces of liberal progress, pluralism, and tolerance.  

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 103p.

By Mark Pitcavage

What is the extreme right in the United States? To many, terms such as “extreme right” and “far right” are simply synonymous with white supremacy. References by the media, political leaders and pundits may reinforce such views, painting a simplistic picture. The reality is the United States is a large, complicated country with ideological fringes equally complex. The American far right is not a monolith but a convoluted landscape encompassing an array of movements and causes. White supremacy is an important feature of that landscape, but hardly the only one. Indeed, when one examines rightwing terrorism in the United States, white supremacist attacks and plots make up only a plurality (43%) of such incidents

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2019. 17p.