By Carl Gutierrez-Jones

The beating of Rodney King, the killing of Amadou Diallo, and the LAPD Rampart Scandal: these events have been interpreted by the courts, the media and the public in dramatically conflicting ways. Critical Race Narratives examines what is at stake in these conflicts and, in so doing, rethinks racial strife in the United States as a highly-charged struggle over different methods of reading and writing. Focusing in particular on the practice and theorization of narrative strategies, Gutiérrez-Jones engages many of the most influential texts in the recent race debates including The Bell Curve, America in Black and White, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, and The Mismeasure of Man. In the process, Critical Race Narratives pursues key questions posed by the texts as they work within, or against, disciplinary expectations: can critical engagements with narrative enable a more democratic dialogue regarding race? what promise does such experimentation hold for working through the traumatic legacy of racism in the United States? Throughout, Critical Race Narratives initiates a timely dialogue between race-focused narrative experiment in scholarly writing and similar work in literary texts and popular culture.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2001.

By Michael German and Emmanuel Mauleón

On April 27, 2019, a white supremacist armed with a high-powered rifle walked into a San Diego synagogue and shot four people, one fatally, before fleeing and finally surrendering to police. A letter the gunman allegedly posted online shortly before the shooting claimed credit for a previous arson attack on an Escondido mosque, spewed racist “white genocide” conspiracy theories, cited earlier white supremacist attacks against a synagogue in Pittsburgh and mosques in New Zealand, and urged like-minded white Christians to commit further acts of violence.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice. 2019, 51pg

By Gabriel Ahmanideen

In the aftermath of the war on terror, mosques have become targets for hate groups, leveraging online platforms to amplify global anti-mosque campaigns. These groups link local protestors with international hate networks, fuelling both online and offline (i.e., onsite) anti-mosque campaigns. Thoroughly reviewing the literature addressing the interaction between online and offline Islamophobia and introducing an anti-mosque social media page instilling the public with online and offline anti-mosque hate, this article suggests a strong interaction between online and offline Islamophobia. In the provided case study from the Stop Mosque Bendigo (SMB), purposeful sampling was used to collect postings before and after the Christchurch Mosque attacks to analyse the evolution of online anti-mosque campaigns in tandem with real-life hate cases. The literature and the case study reveal the interaction between local and global, digital, and physical realms, as well as the convergence of everyday racism with extremist far-right ideologies like the Great Replacement theory. Relying on the present literature and indicative findings, the article advocates for systematic investigations to uncover the direct connection between online hate and physical attacks and urges closer monitoring and accountability for those online platforms and social media pages apparently contributing to onsite hate-driven actions.

Australia, Sociology Compass. 2023, 14pg

By Barney Afako, Orzala Nemat, Emadeddin Badi, Mary Fitzgerald, Ronald C.Slye and Srinjoy Bose

Transitional justice is a well-known area of theory and practice, but rarely are its central teachings applied as part of a negotiated conflict resolution strategy vis-à-vis “violent extremist” or jihadist groups. This new IFIT publication encompasses three original case studies on the issue. The case studies cover: 1) peace talks between the the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); 2) pre-2011 negotiations between the regime of Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG); and 3) post-2001 transitional justice and peace efforts in Afghanistan in relation to the conflict with the Taliban. Our research on “violent extremism” and transitional justice also involved the development of an original policy framework that draws on these three cases as well as earlier research published in partnership with UNU-CPR. Overall, this research underscores why negotiation cannot be discounted as an option with “violent extremist” groups, and how creative applications of transitional justice have the potential to make any negotiated deal not only more achievable, but also more legitimate.

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2020. 204p.

By Hayden Crosby

Right-wing extremism has been the subject of many studies over the years, especially in contemporary times in which many commentators have argued there is a global resurgence in support for the extreme-right. Despite this, very few studies have been conducted on the extreme-right in New Zealand and previous studies are very outdated. Of the international studies that have been conducted on right-wing extremism only a small minority are empirically based as most scholars prefer to avoid the many challenges and difficulties which accompany empirical inquiry in the subject. Furthermore, only a minority of previous empirical studies have focused on lives of the individuals who come to join the extreme-right. This thesis examines why and how individuals come to join extreme-right groups, what motivates them to stay within these groups, and why many of them eventually come to leave. These questions were investigated by conducting a qualitative method of inquiry into the life histories of six former New Zealand right-wing extremists. A number of social factors were identified as having influenced the participants to join, stay within, and eventually leave extreme-right groups in New Zealand. These social factors were not uniform across all the participants who were also determined to be generally influenced by a combination of factors rather any singular factor. The influencing affect that these social factors had on the participants can be understood with several theoretical explanations which were applied to the findings. Furthermore, the study gave rise to some new theoretical ideas which can improve upon how involvement in right-wing extremism is understood and aid future inquiry into the subject. Overall the study enhances our understanding of individual involvement in right-wing extremism and provides insight into the extreme-right scene in New Zealand.

Auckland, NZ: University of Auckland, 2017. 170p.

By Maura Conway, Ryan Scrivens, Logan Macnair

This policy brief traces how Western right-wing extremists have exploited the power of the internet from early dial-up bulletin board systems to contemporary social media and messaging apps. It demonstrates how the extreme right has been quick to adopt a variety of emerging online tools, not only to connect with the like-minded, but to radicalise some audiences while intimidating others, and ultimately to recruit new members, some of whom have engaged in hate crimes and/or terrorism. Highlighted throughout is the fast pace of change of both the internet and its associated platforms and technologies, on the one hand, and the extreme right, on the other, as well as how these have interacted and evolved over time. Underlined too is the persistence, despite these changes, of rightwing extremists’ online presence, which poses challenges for effectively responding to this activity moving forward.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 24p.

By The Small Arms Survey; Nicolas Florquin, Hafez S. AbuAdwan, Gergely Hideg and Alaa Tartir

The Sahel is home to a number of marginalized borderlands—such as Libya’s southern border region—characterized by the movement and activities of various armed groups, the absence of strong state institutions, and the prevalence of disparaged communities. Potentially, the combination of these factors makes the subregion more exposed to risk and individuals raised in such borderlands can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Perceptions, Vulnerabilities, and Prevention: Violent Extremism Threat Assessment in Selected Regions of the Southern Libyan Borderlands and North-Western Nigeria—a report by the Small Arms Survey's SANA project and UNDP—seeks to better understand the dynamics of these risk factors in southern Libya and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Sudan, as well as Nigeria.

The report finds that hardship and deprivation, the combination of discrimination and marginalization along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, and a comparatively limited access to basic services, are of particular concern from a prevention of violent extremism (PVE) perspective. The report also notes that perceptions of small arms varied significantly across the case studies, with respondents in Nigeria and Sudan reporting the highest levels of proliferation. The sources of weapons cited by respondents included the illegal market, the legal market, craft production, inheritance, state authorities, and employers.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey; New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2022. 138p.

By Justin Everett Cobain Tetrault

Right-wing nationalist movements have gained traction in Westernized countries such as France, Greece, Hungary, Austria, the United States, and Germany, where political figures or groups have mobilized nationalist ideas and right-wing populist sentiment to gain governmental power and/or influence public policy (Mudde 2014, BBC News 2019, Perry & Scrivens 2018: 177). Contrary to Canada’s benevolent international reputation, Canadians have demonstrated increasingly exclusionary politics in the last decade. Anti-Islam rhetoric, for instance, has substantial legitimacy in popular discourse and Canadians are increasingly skeptical of the country’s federal multiculturalism policy (Angus Reid 2017, Braun 2018, Andrew-Gee 2015; Angus Reid 2010, Canseco 2019, Todd 2017). Academics, journalists, and public figures assert that Canada is experiencing “similar trends” to Western Europe’s wave of right-wing populism, pointing to the “growing threat” posed by Canadian far-right groups, also referred to as “rightwing extremists”, “hate groups”, and sometimes the “alt-right” (Perry & Scrivens 2018: 177, Boutilier 2018, Mastracci 2017, McKenna 2019, Habib 2019). Upon closer scrutiny, dominant scholarly and popular discourse tends to reduce this discussion to a problem of white nationalist ideology and the public safety risks posed by these groups, such as terrorism, hate crime, threats and intimidation, and hate speech. Experts struggle to explain how right-wing and far-right groups operate as a social movement seeking mainstream legitimacy in Canada, and the dominant fixation on “extremism” in the form of white nationalism and criminality sometimes obfuscates significant trends in right-wing organizing. Using Canada’s yellow vests movement as a case study, this project identifies and critiques three broader trends in scholarship on right-wing and far-right social movements.

Edmonton: University of Alberta, 2021. 203p.

By Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

In this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. 44p.

By Daniel Koehler

Counterterrorism has, in the last ten years, come to the fore of international relations, and remains in the news almost daily. This is due in large part to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which in turn have also prompted something of a backlash against such military or “hard” approaches to countering terrorism. Partly in response, states and civil society have sought out softer, often preventive, measures to deal with violent extremism, many of which have been deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists. However, problems remain. “Deradicalization” programs, which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism, have grown both in popularity and in scope of late, even in just the past five years. While these programs vary widely, with differing subjects (e.g., prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists), aims (e.g., abandonment of extreme views, disengagement from terrorism, rehabilitation into society), sizes (from just a handful of participants to hundreds), and forms (from arranging jobs, marriages, and new lives for participants, to merely educating them on nonviolent alternatives to their methods), common themes and problems can be discerned. With recent high-profile cases of recidivism by supposedly “deradicalized” individuals, questions are being raised about the efficacy of these programs and about how best to design them

New York: International Peace Institute, 2010. 20p,

By Kris Christmann

The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales’ (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review….The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis.

Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. London. 2012. 77p.

By Brent L. Smith, David A. Snow, Kevin Fitzpatrick, Kelly R. Damphousse, Paxton Roberts, Anna Tan, Andy Brooks and Brent Klein

Research on terrorism prior to 2010 had been described as too descriptive and atheoretical. To partially address this deficiency, the current project is anchored theoretically and empirically in two of the most widely cited perspectives on social movements and the process of radicalization: role identity theory and framing theory (Snow and Machalek, 1983; Snow and McAdam, 2000; Snow, 2004; Stryker 1980). Drawing on these two overlapping perspectives, we contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey. Typically, this journey begins with a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, and moves toward a more radical identity and corresponding orientation…. Five types of identity work have been identified: (1) Engagement in group relevant demonstration acts or events, such as engaging in activities preparatory for the commission of violence; (2) arrangement and display of physical settings and props, such as flying or posting the confederate flag; (3) arrangement of appearance, such as engagement in cosmetic face work or body work; (4) selective association with other individuals and groups; and (5) identity talk, which involves not only the avowal and/or attribution of identities, but also talk relevant to framing. The two key framing concepts – diagnostic and prognostic framing – direct attention to the ways in which some issue or grievance is problematized and blame is attributed and to the call or plan for dealing with the problem.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 24p.

By Mitchell D. Silber; Arvin Bhatt

This report instructs policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the Nation, regarding the threat of and countermeasures for U.S. residents/citizens becoming radical jihadists intent on committing violent attacks in the United States.

In order to test whether the same framework for understanding the radicalization of individuals into jihadists abroad applies within the United States, the authors of this paper analyzed three post-9/11 U.S. "homegrown" terrorism cases and two cases based in New York City. The study found that although Al-Qaeda and its jihadist radicalism have provided the inspiration and ideology for some terrorist activity of U.S. residents, the direct command and control of these "homegrown" terrorists by al-Qaeda has been the exception. Regardless of where and with whom radicalization occurs, this study identified four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators. The four stages are pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and "jihadization." In the pre-radicalization stage, the majority of the individuals who become radicalized have lived ordinary lives without any criminal history. Self-identification is the phase in which individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, which gradually draws them away from their old identity as they bond with like-minded individuals. This reinforces their new identity as a follower of Salafi Islam. Indoctrination is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his/her beliefs. "Jihadization" is the phase in which members of a cell commit to their primary duty to be "holy warriors" against all viewed as enemies of Salafi Islam. Considering the sequencing of these behaviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage, this makes intelligence the critical tool in thwarting an attack or preventing the planning of attacks.

New York: New York City Police Department, 2007. 90p.

By Mark Pitcavage

The Aryan Circle is a large, growing and dangerous white supremacist gang based primarily in Texas. Active in prisons and on the streets, it has a long track record of murder, including the deaths of two police officers in Bastrop, Louisiana, in 2007. • The Aryan Circle originated in the Texas prison system in the mid-1980s and is now the second largest white supremacist gang in Texas. • The Aryan Circle has four segments: its Texas prison population, its federal prison population, its out-of-state prison population, and its non-incarcerated population. Total membership is probably over 1,400, making it one of the largest white supremacist groups in the United States. The most disturbing trend is the growth in its free-world membership. • The Aryan Circle is headed by an elected president and run by senior members. Billy “Thumper” Haynes was elected the Circle’s new president in 2008, but many Circle members fought the choice. In mid-2009, he was replaced by Greg “Droopy” Freeman. • The Aryan Circle recruits in prisons and on the streets. Members tend to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds; many members work in the oil industry. The Aryan Circle is unusual in that women can become members. Some women have achieved positions of considerable responsibility, but sexism makes it difficult for them to rise to the highest ranks. • The original “homegrown” white supremacy of the Aryan Circle has become more sophisticated. However, many Circle members still have only a crude understanding of white supremacist ideology. The Circle uses white supremacy to increase group solidarity. • The Aryan Circle has few relationships with “traditional” white supremacist groups. Its relations with other prison gangs are often violent; the Aryan Circle has been involved in a number of prison gang wars. • The Aryan Circle not only deals drugs; many members abuse drugs, especially methamphetamine. Efforts by Circle leaders to combat drug use by members have failed. A new effort started in 2008 faces serious hurdles. • Much of the Aryan Circle’s criminal activities are profit-driven. Inside prisons, the smuggling of contraband (particularly drugs and tobacco) is the most important endeavor. Outside prison walls, Circle members engage in drug trafficking and a variety of theft and robbery rings. • Organized violence is also a feature of Aryan Circle activity, including killing suspected informants and engaging in violence against rival gangs. Aryan Circle members have also committed hate crimes, in and out of prisons.

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2009. 37p.

By Mark Pitcavage

What is the extreme right in the United States? To many, terms such as “extreme right” and “far right” are simply synonymous with white supremacy. References by the media, political leaders and pundits may reinforce such views, painting a simplistic picture. The reality is the United States is a large, complicated country with ideological fringes equally complex. The American far right is not a monolith but a convoluted landscape encompassing an array of movements and causes. White supremacy is an important feature of that landscape, but hardly the only one. Indeed, when one examines rightwing terrorism in the United States, white supremacist attacks and plots make up only a plurality (43%) of such incidents

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2019. 17p.

By Alex P. Schmid

In this Research Paper, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what “Islamist extremism” entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly “acceptable” non-violent extremists and “unacceptable” violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely “not (yet) violent” militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between “non-violent extremism” and “violent extremism” is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p.

By Anti-Defamation League and the Community Security Initiative

This report examines extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents across New York state during the twoyear time period from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2021, and provides recommendations for combatting these threats. The ADL Center on Extremism (COE) and the Community Security Initiative (CSI), a project of UJA-Federation of NY and JCRC-NY, jointly researched and authored the report. The last two years have seen a significant proliferation of hate incidents both nationwide and in New York State. These incidents have been rooted, in part, in widespread campaigns of disinformation and conspiracy theories, some of which have animated extremists and fueled antisemitism, resulting in unrest and violence, from the January 6, 2021 insurrection in Washington, D.C. to white supremacist activism to a spike in hate crimes and rising antisemitism.

New York: ADL, 2022. 30p.

By The Counter Extremism Project (CEP)

Key Points: • Some modern white supremacist groups, such as The Base, Hammerskin Nation, National Socialist Order (formerly Atomwaffen Division), and Nationalist Social Club subscribe to a National Socialist (neo-Nazi) ideology. These groups generally make no effort to hide their overt racist belief that the white race is superior to others. • Other modern white supremacist groups, however, propagate their radical stances under the guise of white ethno-nationalism, which falsely seeks to highlight the distinctiveness– –rather than the outright superiority––of the white identity. Such groups, like the League of the South and Patriot Front, usually claim that white identity is under threat from minorities or immigrants that seek to replace its culture, and seek to promote white ethnonationalism as a legitimate ideology that belongs in mainstream political spheres. • Many modern white supremacist groups eschew violent tactics in favor of using demonstrations and propaganda to sway public opinion and portray their ideologies as legitimate. However, their racial elitist ideologies have nonetheless spurred affiliated individuals to become involved in violent altercations. • White supremacist groups often target youth for recruitment through propaganda campaigns on university campuses and social media platforms. White supremacists have long utilized Internet forums and websites to connect, organize, and propagate their extremist messages.

New York; London; Etc.: Counter-Terrorism Project, 2018. 101p.

By Meredith LeAnn Lerma

There has been little empirical research on the spatial relationship of violent far-right extremism. Previous studies have only focused on portions of far-right violent incidents, such as homicides, or amalgamated all far-right extremist activity, including legal incidents. This study uses data from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in a temporal frame of 2000 to 2018 to test the relationship of violent incidents against geographic and social factors. The goal is to explore the relationships between macro-level factors and violent far-right extremist incidents. The research determines that the presence of hate groups, higher immigrant populations, higher unemployment rates, higher education levels and higher urbanicity in counties all indicate an increased likelihood a violent extremist far-right incident will take place.

Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas, 2020. 54p.

By Sam Jackson

Over the past two years, and in the wake of deadly attacks in Charlottesville and Pittsburgh, attention paid to right-wing extremism in the United States has grown. Most of this attention focuses on racist extremism, overlooking other forms of right-wing extremism. This article presents a schema of three main forms of right-wing extremism in the United States in order to more clearly understand the landscape: racist extremism, nativist extremism, and anti-government extremism. Additionally, it describes the two primary subcategories of anti-government extremism: the patriot/militia movement and sovereign citizens. Finally, it discusses whether this schema can be applied to right-wing extremism in non-U.S. contexts.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 26p.