By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Galen Lamphere-Englund

GIFCT hosts Working Groups annually to bring together international experts across sectors to work together in helping tech companies counter terrorist and violent extremist exploitation online. GIFCT's GCoP Working Group ran from May 2024 through January 2025, with the aim of providing a space to share insights and feedback on how gameplay spaces could evolve safety work, review safety policies, tools, and practices, and anticipate evolving safety risks. The following document, Interventions for Countering Violent Extremism on Gaming Surfaces, is a series of explanations that detail various intervention strategies, structured across three stages of Prevent, Detect, and React. Each stage outlines specific interventions that gaming platforms can implement, organized by clearly described objectives (“How”) and supported by real-world examples with links to resources (“Case Studies”). Many thanks to the 2024 GIFCT GCoP members for sharing their expertise, particularly to Linda Schlegel (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; PRIF) and Rachel Kowert, Ph.D. (Discord) for their helpful suggestions. How to Use This Resource Each section below presents a strategic goal (Prevent, Detect, or React), specific objectives that support that goal (such as “Design Games and Gaming Experiences With User Safety in Mind”), and practical case studies with linked resources. The examples given should be seen as illustrative, not exhaustive. GIFCT’s academic research arm, the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), regularly shares the latest research related to gaming and gaming-adjacent platforms, which can be found here. Additionally, the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN), where GIFCT is a founding member, distributes resources here. GIFCT offers tailored guidance and support to any online gameplay company seeking to prevent TVE from exploiting their platform.   

(Washington, D.C.: Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, Year 4 Working Groups. 2025. 28p.

Edited by Morten Bøås, Gilad Ben-Nun, Ulf Engel, and Kari Osland

Precarious living conditions across the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa create fertile ground for radical ideas. Yet, despite genuine grievances and legitimate grounds for anger, most people living in these regions are not radicalized and do not embrace ideas that lead to acts of violent extremism. Which raises the question ... why?

To answer this question, the authors of Resisting Radicalization investigate the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in what they term enabling environments. Their work, the result of a multiyear international project, has critical implications for the future of P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) programs.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2025, 293p.

By Arthur Bradley and Galuzzi, O.

The abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists is keeping pace with the exponential growth of new technologies, and poses multifaceted challenges to national and global security. Cyber-enabled threats manifest for example in terrorist-operated websites, the shift to alternative or fringe social media platforms, the use of the decentralised web, the exploitation of gaming and adjacent platforms, and the abuse of live-streaming technologies to amplify terrorist and violent extremist attacks. In addition to these online activities, there are concerns also around more disruptive or destructive cyber operations, such as Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks and the hacking of critical infrastructure to cause civilian casualties. In all the research on the diverse range of malicious actors behind these threats, there is comparatively little on the online activity of violent extremist movements, whether right-wing or left-wing, in the Global South. This report forms part of UNICRI’s effort to investigate the threats stemming from the complex interplay between terrorism, violent extremism and cybercriminality – threats that are often overlooked, owing to the difficulty of gathering evidence and attributing offensive cyber operations, and to the prioritisation of more pressing security threats in diverse geographic locations. UNICRI strives to shed light on the online presence, activities and trends of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements and the cyber-enabled threats they may consequently pose to global security. The report was compiled following a three-part research methodology consisting of a literature review, expert interviews and open-source investigations conducted in order to analyse the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist movements in South America, Africa and Asia, and examining both their intent and ability to mount offensive cyber-attacks. The report includes particular case studies within these regions, including in Brazil, South Africa, India and Maritime South-East Asia. The case studies were selected because of the availability of public information online, the known presence of active non-state violent extremist actors with right- and left-wing ideologies, the similarities and differences these actors present, and their geographic diversity. These factors, and consequently the choice of case studies, demonstrate the global nature of the phenomenon which still requires contextually relevant solutions. The selection of these case studies does not imply that similar threats in other geographies are not considered relevant to international peace or development, and conversely, the omission of any movements is merely the result of restricted resources and time. The groups and movements presented within this report are not necessarily referenced as violent extremists either by the United Nations or by the Member States mentioned, however, their alignment, proximity, and connection with right- and left-wing violent extremist ideologies, as well as their use of violent extremist tactics, justify mention in this report to ultimately reflect on the global dimension of the abuse of digital technologies by violent extremists . This report finds widespread exploitation of digital platforms by right- and left-wing violent extremists based in South America, Africa and Asia. Groups and their affiliated networks use a wide variety of platforms and services for a range of different purposes, and they often seem to face fewer restrictions in terms of content moderation by technology companies, many of which are based in the United States or European countries. In particular, it found: As in Europe, North America, and Australasia, the online activities of right- and leftwing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia are increasingly superseded by more disparate, horizontal online networks. In many of the case studies, for example in Brazil and India, physical attacks have increasingly been carried out by lone actors or small cells, some of which may have had previous engagement with organised groups. This dynamic has implications for the ability of technology companies and law enforcement agencies to counter the threat, as planned attacks and their perpetrators may be more difficult to prevent or identify. * Violent extremist networks and individuals are increasingly using a more diverse range of online platforms and services to further their goals. This is in line with the increase in the number of online platforms and services used by broader populations generally, but it may also be part of a concerted effort by these networks to reach a broad audience and mitigate the impact of the potential removal of their accounts or groups by technology companies. Violent extremist networks continue to exploit multiple platforms simultaneously, using outlinking between platforms to evade detection or enforcement by specific companies. Violent extremists comprise the minority of the perpetrators delivering cyber-attacks globally, most of which are believed to be carried out by state-backed actors, hacktivist collectives, or financially motivated criminals. Interviews with a group of 31 experts consulted as part of this research, however, indicate that the threat from cyber-attacks motivated by a belief system and delivered by individuals or groups affiliated with violent extremist movements is likely to increase in the coming years, and is likely to be particularly high in countries believed to have less developed cybersecurity defences. This report suggests that international technology companies are not adequately fulfilling their content moderation policies as consistently in South America, Africa and Asia as in other countries in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Also, they do not appear to be allocating sufficient resources to ensuring platform safety in these regions, where they face significant challenges in effectively countering the exploitation of their services by violent extremist movements. Practical challenges are compounded by definitional challenges regarding contentious terms such as “violent extremism” and “terrorism”, neither of which has an internationally agreed definition. Also, technology companies, it seems, still struggle to detect and understand violent extremist content or communications effectively in languages other than English. This task is made more difficult by the challenge of interpreting and understanding local dynamics and the community-specific slang found in content, and by the efforts of malevolent networks to evade detection or enforcement by moderation teams. Evidence suggests that, to date, this – together with an imbalance in resource allocation – means that the capability of many technology companies to moderate content in languages other than English is comparatively ineffective. Often, a splintered regulatory landscape also makes it difficult for technology companies to apply their policies consistently across multiple jurisdictions around the world. Technology companies operating globally are subject to a variety of differing and often contradictory regulatory requirements, including those relating to designations, hate speech legislation and Internet-related laws, and companies can be under pressure from the political or cultural contexts in particular countries. This can make it difficult for these companies consistently and effectively to maintain a balance between removing violative content and upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The report focuses on a set of case studies diving into the online activities of right- and left-wing violent extremist groups in South America, Africa and Asia, and the ways in which they abuse digital technologies

Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the VOX-Pol Institute. 2025. 88p.

By Wesam Charkawi , Kevin Dunn ,  Ana-Maria Bliuc

Since the September 11 attacks, prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs have rapidly increased worldwide, garnering significant interest among researchers. This paper is a systematic review focusing on the evaluations of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention programs from 2001 until 2020. The review identified 74 program evaluations that included satisfactory measures and metrics. Only 32% of the studies deemed the intervention successful, 55% described limited success, and 8% deemed the program had failed. Many of the programs evaluated failed to reach their objectives; some generated negative outcomes such as community disdain and an increase in the likelihood of alienation and stigma. Success was largely a self-assessed measure by the facilitators or stakeholders of the programs or the evaluators of the study. Success indicators can be operationalized as the degree of enhanced sense of belonging (connectedness to the community, social connection), trust and willingness to engage in programs, development of critical thinking skills (integrative complexity theory), and a strong sense of worth (quest for significance). Without a generally accepted set of metrics and no cohesive framework for conducting evaluations, this review offers an important addition to the field on the evidence suitable for program evaluations. An important aim of this systematic review was to identify what makes an effective and successful countering violent extremism program. The key findings indicate that enhancing belonging, identity, trust and community engagement, acknowledging perceptions of injustice, religious mentoring, and the promotion of critical thinking/self-reflection are associated with successful programs. The findings press upon policymakers, funders, and researchers the need to consider and support high-quality evaluations of programs.

International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 2024., 19p.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Bennett Clifford, Lorenzo Vidino

Executive Summary • Antisemitism is pervasive throughout several categories of American extremist movements, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements. • During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. • Antisemitism, as a belief and world-structuring theory, can at times serve as a gateway issue for individuals into further radicalization to violent extremism. Nonviolent and violent iterations of the same extremist milieus often share antisemitic views as central elements of their belief system, and thus antisemitism constitutes a linkage between activist and violent extremist segments of the same movement. • Several case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in justifying terrorist attacks. • Based on this report’s finding that antisemitism is foundational to multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, counter-extremism practitioners and scholars may consider incorporating antisemitism as a diagnostic factor for extremist radicalization. o While there is no single profile of an American extremist, antisemitism has long been widespread among American extremist movements of multiple persuasions, acting as a least common denominator between extremist groups. o Antisemitic beliefs often serve as a key entry point for individuals to radicalize, join extremist groups, and progress into violent mobilization. o By using promotion of antisemitism as a factor in identifying key influencers and ideologues in extremist movements, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming can isolate key nodes in extremist groups and debunk the narratives they promote without engaging in theological debates. o Studying the role of antisemitism in extremist groups can assist scholars in identifying common themes between different types of extremism, as well as between non-violent and violent strands of the same extremist movements. This can improve analysis on the broader relationships between and within extremist groups.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 2020. 27p.

By Mathias Bak, Kristoffer Nilaus Tarp, and Christina Schori Liang

During the last few decades, the concept of violent extremism (VE) has played an increasingly prominent role in policies and development programming on a global level. Having gone through several incarnations, the current focus for most actors deals with preventing and countering violent extremism. This terminology was constructed in an effort to repackage the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in a manner that shifted the focus away from the over-militarised responses of the 90s and early 2000s, to methods linked to social support and prevention. Where counterterrorism focuses on countering terrorists through physical means, the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) approach aims to prevent the rise of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) through less militarised methods. P/CVE programs therefore aim at developing resilience among communities that may be prone to violent extremism.

According to the 2015 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, such interventions aim to address the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, which often include: socio-economic issues; discrimination; marginalization; poor governance; human rights violations; remnants of violent conflict; collective grievances; and other psychological factors. The concept of violent extremism has also become increasingly mainstream in the international community, with both the UN Security Council (UNSC 2014)2 and the UN General Assembly3 (UNGA 2015) calling for member states to address VE.

Geneva Paper 24/19, Geneva, SWIT: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2019. 40p.

By Nina Wilén and Kwesi Aning

Over the past decade, Western and multilateral security interventions in the Sahel have failed to stabilize the region, while national and local efforts, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, have remained largely militarized. These approaches have proven ineffective in addressing the underlying causes of instability, such as food insecurity, lack of basic services, and limited economic opportunities. The key lesson learned is that military action alone cannot resolve the Sahel’s security crisis—political engagement from local, national, and regional actors is crucial.

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2 COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, 2025// 28p.

By Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer

Over the years, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) funding for research has provided important opportunities to advance our understanding of topics related to crime and justice within the United States. Drawing from this portfolio, this synthesis paper compares and contrasts the data and findings from NIJ-sponsored research projects on violent extremism, mass shootings, and bias crimes. This comparison focuses both on the content of the data and on the creation and coverage of the data, examining findings from four research projects: ■ The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database of 2,226 individuals who demonstrated at least 1 of 5 extremist or radicalized behaviors. ■ The Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) database of 966 adults arrested or indicted for bias crimes. ■ The National Hate Crime Investigation Study (NHCIS) database of 1,230 hate crime cases. ■ The Violence Project dataset of 172 mass shootings. This synthesis first reviews the creation of each dataset and the types of information that are collected to better understand their generalizability and the ability to make comparisons across separate datasets. There are significant differences in the size, time span, and information of the four datasets, which limits the comparisons that can be made between the individuals described in each dataset and necessitates caution in drawing strong conclusions from such comparisons. With that caution in mind, the datasets suggest some similarities in the individuals who commit bias crimes and mass shootings and display violent extremist behavior. These individuals are primarily males in their 20s and 30s and unmarried at the time of their offenses. They may exhibit higher rates of unemployment than the general population and often have prior criminal histories. However, that is not to say that these characteristics should be used as a profile to determine who is at risk of or more likely to commit any of these types of offenses or behaviors. Rather, it calls into question what other factors may be impacting individuals with these characteristics who go on to commit these types of offenses. The datasets also suggest some differences in the individuals who commit each type of offense or behavior. Individuals associated with violent extremism tend to be more educated than those who commit mass shootings or bias crimes. Individuals who commit mass shootings exhibit higher rates of mental health issues than those who commit bias crimes or participate in violent extremism offenses. The comparison of individuals across categories also highlighted differences among individuals who committed the same type of offense. Among individuals who supported violent extremism, for example, those acting in support of far-right ideologies were more likely to have military experience than those following other ideologies. Comparing these datasets highlights their potential and their limitations, suggesting paths forward for future research. The different collection methods show the importance of precisely describing the data collection method, discussing which behaviors are missed by that method, and triangulating among data with different methods to understand what is missing. The differences in the types of information that each dataset collects about each individual and action suggest that future collections could have greater overlap and comparability. The establishment of potential similarities in demographics and life experiences also allows for more targeted data collection focusing on why most individuals who fit that profile do not commit an offense, while others do. In this way, these projects not only contribute to our current understanding of these types of offenses and behaviors but also allow future research and programming to be conducted more effectively.

Washington, DC : U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2024. 43p.

By Noémie Bouhana | Caitlin Clemmow | With contributions from Philip Doherty

Post 9/11, research on radicalisation and involvement in terrorism and violent extremism (henceforth, ITVE) has focussed on the role of individual-level attributes, such as the psychological characteristics, socio-economic background, demographic features, experiences, beliefs, past behaviours and criminality, and the social embeddedness of radicalised individuals and people involved in acts of terrorism (Borum, 2011; Stern, 2016; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Sageman, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Likewise, existing processes, methods and tools to identify and evaluate the risk of ITVE operate largely at the individual level. The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) used in the context of Channel is the best example of this. Comparatively less attention has been devoted to identifying and evaluating the characteristics of the socio-physical contexts which may contribute to the emergence of the risk of ITVE, or, conversely, to its suppression. Yet research on crime, arguably a closely related problem space, makes a strong case that many of the causes and enabling conditions of criminal development (of which ITVE is an instantiation) are found in the environment: crime and criminals concentrate in space and time. Modifying the environment in which crime occurs and the specific settings in which criminals develop and act has been shown at length to be an effective approach to crime prevention and disruption (Weisburd et al., 2012). In crime prevention, as in other areas of behavioural change, one size does not fit all: to design effective programs, the ability to tailor interventions to the socio-physical context is paramount, which means that the effect of key contextual features on the outcome of interest must be understood (Sampson et al., 2013); notably, the effect of exposing (susceptible) individuals with particular kinds of characteristics to (criminogenic) places with particular kinds of features. Situational Action Theory [SAT] is a theory of crime causation, which, as its name suggests, puts context at the centre of the explanation of crime (P.- O. H. Wikström et al., 2009). In 2010, ahead of the revision of the Prevent Strategy, the UK Home Office commissioned a Rapid Evidence Assessment of the cause of al-Qaeda-influenced radicalisation seen through the lens of SAT (Bouhana & Wikström, 2011), which identified the key levels of analysis in a causal model of radicalisation as relating to individual vulnerability to radicalising influence, exposure to radicalising settings, and the mechanisms of emergence of said settings. In the decade since, this theoretical model has been refined and now underpins a research programme concerned chiefly with going beyond "who" and "why" to the "where" of terrorism involvement. It has inspired, notably, the EU FP7-funded international PRIME project on lone actor terrorism, which, among other findings, has shown that individual-level risk indicators are multifinal (i.e., their meaning determined by the context in which they arise), and has provided support for a formulation of individual vulnerability which encompasses susceptibility to exposure to radicalising settings, as well as cognitive susceptibility to moral change with significant implications for prevention efforts (Corner et al., 2018). It has also produced evidence for distinct configurations of individual/ context interaction patterns leading to the emergence of lone actor risk, with further implications for risk assessment (Clemmow et al., 2019). To better support policy strategy and counter-terrorism practice, the theoretical SAT model of radicalisation was reformulated and expanded into a risk analysis framework for lone actor terrorism [PRIME RAF] (Bouhana et al., 2016, 2018) and a systemic inference framework to inform counter-extremism strategies [S5], commissioned by the UK Counter-Extremism Commission (Bouhana, 2019). Both of these integrate SAT with the broader behavioural and socio-cognitive knowledge-base to refine our understanding of personenvironment interaction. While the RAF is concerned specifically with the effect of situational interaction on the motivation and capability of lone actors to act (behaviour), S5 is more broadly focused on explaining the acquisition of extremist propensities (beliefs). Both frameworks are analytically related and can be logically integrated. However, these remain general frameworks. Inherent in their interactionist logic is the fact that, while environmental processes of risk can be set out in generic terms, specific risk (or protective) factors and – crucially – their observable indicators must be elicited with regards to a particular context. This is because indicators are subject to change over space and time (P. O. H. Wikström & Bouhana, 2017) and because risk assessment is most effective when calibrated to context (Hamilton et al., 2021). A recently completed, Home Office-funded project guided by S5 (State of the Union [SOTU]; Bouhana and Schumann, 2021), which aimed to assess the observability of key analytical concepts of mainstream models of terrorism involvement, demonstrated the difficulty, yet also the necessity of translating said concepts into observable indicators, inasmuch as any model is intended to guide risk assessment or intervention design and evaluation. It also suggested that environmental indicators may be more reliably observed than susceptibility-related indicators using commonly available sources of information, and it tentatively provided further support for the notion that susceptibility and exposure interact in specific ways, leading to the emergence of risk. This project investigated the feasibility of developing a framework to assess the risk of involvement in terrorism and violent extremism at the level of place, with a view towards – further down the line – designing an assessment tool along the lines of the Vulnerability Assessment Framework, intended to assess environments instead of individuals. As a first step towards establishing this feasibility, this project investigated whether the mechanisms articulated in the S5 framework could be operationalised; in other words, to what extent they could be associated with a set of observable indicators relevant to the UK ITVE context. Given the relative scarcity of empirical research into the characteristics of extremist social ecologies and settings in the UK (and largely elsewhere) – which would be prerequisite to the conduct of a systematic review – the researchers elected to carry out an e-Delphi exercise with U.K. Prevent practitioners, the results of which are presented at length in this report.

London: CREST - Centre for Research and Evidence in Security Threats (CREST), 2025. 50p.

By Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

  Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

Key findings Understanding the circumstances that lead people to join and leave violent extremist groups, and their experiences in those groups, is key to crafting incentives for disengagement. The willingness to leave violent extremist groups is often clouded by uncertainty, as well as long waiting periods between disengagement and enrolment in programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Waves of defection from Boko Haram caught Lake Chad Basin (LCB) states unprepared. DDRRR processes were thus implemented under pressure, hindering early coordination at a regional level. Women are treated mainly as victims, despite some voluntarily joining and playing active roles in Boko Haram, including volunteering as suicide bombers. DDRRR implementation in the LCB has revealed gaps in legal frameworks that require revisions. DDRRR lacks public support in some LCB countries, as many people view it as blanket amnesty for Boko Haram members. 

Recommendations Non-military means of countering violent extremism should incorporate incentives and opportunities for associates to leave these armed groups. By depleting these groups’ human resources, their fighting capacity is reduced. To encourage defection, clear processes for screening, prosecution and integration are needed. National ownership of these processes, inclusivity, adaptation to local context and adequate resourcing are key, from inception to implementation. National ownership should not lead to isolated approaches, but rather create bridges between countries to enable a cohesive regional approach. Organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Liptako-Gourma States Integrated Development Authority, the G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative could offer relevant regional frameworks for this. Authorities in charge of DDRRR programmes should consider the diverse needs and backgrounds of ex-associates. Distinguishing individuals according to why they joined and their roles within the groups is important for providing appropriate treatment. The specific needs of women and children should be taken into account. Affected West African countries should proactively formulate relevant legal and institutional frameworks. International and regional provisions and standards should be taken into account, including the need for transparent and predictable screening, prosecution and rehabilitation processes. Due to their position connecting the LCB and West Africa, Niger and Nigeria could play a key role in sharing lessons learned from DDRRR implementation. Community organisations, platforms, and media should be used by the DDRRR authorities to raise public awareness of the reintegration process. This would help prevent perceptions of general amnesty for Boko Haram members and preconceived ideas about the disengaged from undermining the process. 

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

The conflicts in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria will have a generational impact. The 7 October 2023 attack against Israel in Gaza and its consequences have set back the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and may attract a new wave of foreign fighters to embark on terrorist activities like what was seen following the military debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. What can be done to stem another rise of the terrorist fighters?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 3p.

By Michael Jensen, Sheehan Kane, and Elena Akers

Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) is a database of 3,203 Islamist, far-left, far-right, and single-issue extremists who have radicalized to violent and non-violent extremism in the United States from 1948 through 2021. This update adds 955 subjects to the database who were charged with committing extremist crimes in the United States from 2019-2021.1 The database is freely available for download on START’s webpage at https://www.start.umd.edu/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus-keshif. The analysis for this research brief draws on the full dataset and illustrates the important differences that exist across ideological groups and highlights recent trends in the data.

College Park, MD: START , 2023. 10p.

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.

By Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi

As the infiltration of communities in northern Benin by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) has intensified since 2021, the number of kidnapping incidents has surged. This research identifies four main types of kidnapping by VEOs – forced recruitment, intelligence gathering, punishment and intimidation – all of which are closely linked to conflict dynamics and group expansion. Kidnapping is used as a strategic tool for infiltration into new territories. Key findings l An effective protection programme for defectors, key targets for abductions, should be developed. This would preserve an important source of intelligence while also incentivising further defections. l Explore amnesty programmes for individuals who have joined the ranks of the VEOs. Dialogue should be made an important feature in counterterrorism strategy. l Reinforce local infrastructure to bolster community resilience towards kidnapping and other forms of violence. This should include telephone network coverage and road infrastructure, among others. l Kidnapping incidents should be incorporated into ECOWAS and national early warning mechanisms. The pervasiveness of kidnapping can be used as a barometer of VEO entrenchment in a given area. l Rebuilding international cooperation structures with neighbouring countries is crucial. The Benin government should immediately seek a resolution to current diplomatic stand-offs.

Pretoria: South Africa: OCWAR-T: Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking , 2024. 34p.

By Danny Klinenberg

Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper from Danny Klinenberg, an IGCC nonresident fellow, examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. Klinenberg studies how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, he finds that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but is more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.

La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, WORKING PAPER NO. 10, 2024. 42p.

By JASON BLAZAKIS & MEGAN RENNEBAUM

This paper seeks to examine the array of terrorist designations undertaken by “Five-Eye” (FVEY) countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against violent far-right terrorists, often also referred as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) actors. While not a focus of the papers, non-FVEY countries, most notably Germany, have also implemented measures to restrict the activities of violent far-right actors. Thus, this paper will evaluate whether non-FVEY measures can help inform broader policy determinations related to violent far-right terrorism designations. What lessons learned, if any, can the FVEY countries draw from other national experiences? Furthermore, are there multilateral regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime (henceforth, 1267 regime), that can inform FVEY policies within the field of terrorist designations?

Issue Brief, New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 22p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.2024, 186p. https://doi.org/10.17226/27159.

ByMaura Conway, Ashley A. Mattheis, Sean McCafferty, and Miraji H. Mohamed.

The report describes and discusses developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2023. It accomplishes this by surveying, synopsizing, and integrating the findings of relevant articles and reports produced by academics, think tanks, civil society, and governmental organizations; high-quality press reports; and the first-hand online experience and primary research of the authors.

Dublin: Vox Pol, 2023. 43p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.