By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandise, recruit and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods) and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analysed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1) and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organisations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi and jihadist organisations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends.

Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report, but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviours and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard. a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies and civil society organisations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognising the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well designed community guidelines, moderation policies and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). 2024. 40p.

By Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi

As the infiltration of communities in northern Benin by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) has intensified since 2021, the number of kidnapping incidents has surged. This research identifies four main types of kidnapping by VEOs – forced recruitment, intelligence gathering, punishment and intimidation – all of which are closely linked to conflict dynamics and group expansion. Kidnapping is used as a strategic tool for infiltration into new territories. Key findings l An effective protection programme for defectors, key targets for abductions, should be developed. This would preserve an important source of intelligence while also incentivising further defections. l Explore amnesty programmes for individuals who have joined the ranks of the VEOs. Dialogue should be made an important feature in counterterrorism strategy. l Reinforce local infrastructure to bolster community resilience towards kidnapping and other forms of violence. This should include telephone network coverage and road infrastructure, among others. l Kidnapping incidents should be incorporated into ECOWAS and national early warning mechanisms. The pervasiveness of kidnapping can be used as a barometer of VEO entrenchment in a given area. l Rebuilding international cooperation structures with neighbouring countries is crucial. The Benin government should immediately seek a resolution to current diplomatic stand-offs.

Pretoria: South Africa: OCWAR-T: Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking , 2024. 34p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

The fall of Damascus to Syrian rebels has sparked a ripple effect in Southeast Asia, with figures like Indonesia’s Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid using apocalyptic prophecies to fuel extremism. However, the region's diverse Islamic practices, shaped by unique historical and socio-political contexts, show that a universal eschatological (end of the world) narrative does not resonate everywhere. Religious scholars can counter extremist ideologies and reclaim prophetic teachings for peace in Southeast Asia’s pluralistic society by offering inclusive interpretations of prophecy and addressing local grievances.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2024. 4p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan

Using a large, national survey of online Australians, we measured unintentional and intentional exposure to fringe or radical content and groups online.

Two in five respondents (40.6%) reported being exposed to material they described as fringe, unorthodox or radical. One-quarter of these respondents (23.2%) accessed the content intentionally. One-third (29.9%) said the content they had seen depicted violence.

Fringe or radical content was often accessed through messages, discussions and posts online. Mainstream social media and messaging platforms were the platforms most frequently used to share fringe or radical content. Being a member of a group promoting fringe or radical content was associated with increased sharing of that content with other internet users.

Efforts to restrict access to radical content and groups online, especially on mainstream platforms, may help reduce intentional and unintentional exposure to and sharing of that content.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 17p.

By Danny Klinenberg

Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper from Danny Klinenberg, an IGCC nonresident fellow, examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. Klinenberg studies how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, he finds that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but is more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.

La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, WORKING PAPER NO. 10, 2024. 42p.

By Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth Yates , Sheehan Kane

This project expands the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database with information on the nexus of criminal extremism and U.S. military service. The expanded database includes 461 individuals with U.S. military backgrounds who committed criminal acts in the United States from 1990 through 2021 that were motivated by their political, economic, social, or religious goals. Findings from these data are detailed in three results sections of a report that can be accessed here.

The first section explores the scope and nature of criminal extremism in the ranks, detailing the rates of military service among criminal extremists and analyzing their military branch, ideological, and extremist group affiliations. This section also provides a closer look at the individuals with military backgrounds who have been charged with criminal offenses related to the Capitol breach of January 6, 2021.

Section two provides a closer look at risk factors for radicalization, comparing subjects with military backgrounds to those without records of military service. This section explores the rates of substance use disorders, anti-social relationships, and social mobility challenges among past U.S. service members who committed extremist crimes and situates these radicalization risk factors within the larger extremist context in the United States.

The final section of results examines the risk factors and vulnerabilities for radicalization that are unique to subgroups of criminal extremists with U.S. military backgrounds. Using hierarchical clustering methods, the results in this section show how the radicalization pathways of extremists with military backgrounds are likely to differ depending on whether individuals are active in the military at the time of their involvement in extremism or if they have military-specific risk factors for radicalization, such as previous deployments to combat zones or diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This report concludes with recommendations for policy and future research, paying particular attention to the potential benefits of applying a public health model to countering the spread of extremism in the U.S. military.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2022. 45p.

By Alice Marwick, Benjamin Clancy, Katherine Furl

This literature review examines cross-disciplinary work on radicalization to situate, historicize, frame, and better understand the present concerns around online radicalization and far-right extremist and fringe movements. We find that research on radicalization is inextricably linked to the post-9/11 context in which it emerged, and as a result is overly focused on studying the other. Applying this research to the spread of far-right ideas online does not account for the ways in which the far-right’s endorsement of white supremacy and racism holds historical, normative precedent in the United States. Further, radicalization research is rife with uncertainties, ranging from definitional ambiguity to an inability to identify any simplistic, causal models capable of fully explaining the conditions under which radicalization occurs. Instead, there are multiple possible pathways to radicalization, and while the internet does not cause individuals to adopt far-right extremist or fringe beliefs, some technological affordances may aid adoption of these beliefs through gradual processes of socialization. We conclude that the term “radicalization” does not serve as a useful analytical frame for studying the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online. Instead, potential analytical frameworks better suited to studying these phenomena include theories prominent in the study of online communities, conversion, mainstreaming, and sociotechnical theories of media effects.

A summary of key take-aways includes:

The adoption of extremist, far-right, and fringe beliefs is often referred to as “radicalization,” a term formulated post-9/11 to understand jihadi terrorism, a very different context from the far-right.

Radicalization research is full of uncertainty.

• No specific type of person is vulnerable to radicalization, and most people who commit political violence are not mentally ill or alienated from society.

• Radicalization is not caused by poverty, oppression, or marginalization.

• There is no one way in which people are “radicalized.”

• Viewing extremist media does not necessarily lead to adopting extremist beliefs or committing political violence.

In contrast to the “red pill” model, radicalization is gradual. Recruits slowly adopt the identities, emotions, and interpretations shared by a community. They conceptualize their problems as injustices caused by others, and justify using political violence against them.

The internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.

"Radicalization” is not a useful frame for understanding the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online.

• It is analytically imprecise and morally judgmentalIt doesn’t help us understand the role of media and digital technologies.

• It is inextricably tied to a global security infrastructure targeting Islam.

• It doesn’t account for the fact that fringe or far-right beliefs may change what people think is “true” and “false,” making it hard to find common ground.

• The focus on violence ignores other worrying effects of mainstreaming far-right and fringe ideas.

Publisher: Bulletin of Technology & Public Life, 2022. 83p.

By Moonshot

Over a one year period from April 2021 - March 2022, Moonshot partnered with three violence prevention organizations to deliver an online interventions pilot in two Canadian provinces. The pilot advertised psychosocial support services to individuals engaging with extremist content online. Access to these services was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous by design. Our goal was to offer a secure pathway for at-risk individuals to contact a trained therapist or social worker. We built this approach around offering integrated care. Together with our intervention partners, we crafted our advertising messages and service websites to emphasize the confidential, non-judgemental support that callers would receive. Individuals who reached out were connected to an interdisciplinary team, which included a therapist, youth engagement workers, a psychiatrist, and other intervention staff who could offer services like counseling, employment support, addiction support, or simply a space to talk. Our partners were the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) team in Ontario, and Recherche et Action sur les Polarisations Sociales (RAPS) in Quebec. The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPNPREV) acted as a convening and best practice provider, and supported our pilot evaluation. A description of each organization is at the end of this report. Moonshot’s intervention campaigns ran for a total of six months, and reached individuals consuming incel and violent far-right extremist content on Google Search and YouTube. Our online interventions focused on meeting individuals’ psychosocial needs, and appealed to vulnerabilities and grievances, such as anger, frustration, exhaustion, and isolation. Executive summary Key outcomes Moonshot redirected 786 at-risk individuals to our intervention partners’ websites. 22 initiated a conversation with a counselor. Four individuals formally registered and engaged with a service provider for several months, in addition to those who accessed virtual counselling without going through the registration process. At least one person who initially shared violent impulses has been able to find positive, hopeful alternatives for the future. Moonshot’s ads reached users engaging with harmful content on Google and YouTube 44,508 times. Among the hundreds of users redirected to ETA and RAPS’ websites, 26 were watching influential incel YouTube channels and 39 had searched Google for high-risk keywords related to incel and violent far-right ideology (“looksmax org”; “1488 tattoos”). Moonshot, ETA, RAPS, and CPN-PREV established an effective multi-sectoral partnership. During our pilot program, we co-designed support pathways and risk escalation procedures for each service area, built teams’ capacity to deliver online interventions safely and effectively, and engaged at-risk audiences online. This pilot provides a blueprint for future interventions to reach and engage at-risk internet users. New iterations of this work can reach larger audiences by expanding advertising beyond the pilot platforms, strengthening and expanding cross-sectoral partnerships, and testing new ways to reach often-isolated internet users.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023. 13p.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2023. 22p.

By William Allchorn, Andreas Dafnos and Francesca Gentile

  Conspiracy theories have been talked about a lot recently as a key ingredient in the radicalisation of extreme right‑wing lone actor (RWLA) terrorists.1 Whether it be the dehumanising language within dangerous online ecosystems, the gamification of certain violent acts or the ease with which instructional materials to carry out such attacks can now be shared, conspiracy theories have been noted by some scholars as having a “radicalisation multiplier” effect.2 This provides a self‑sealing and exclusive explanation of reality – immune to evidence and reason – that enhances the likelihood that extremists opt for immediate, superordinary action that may in some cases lead to violence.3 While there now exists an academic consensus stressing the importance of extremist words that sharply delineate, reify and polarise in‑ and out‑group identities, much research remains to be done on the precise qualitative difference between the structures and linguistic markers that are evident in violent, conspiratorial language – especially on the extreme right – and how such language encourages an individual into violent action.4 The aim of this GNET report is therefore to add additional empirical evidence and analysis that is useful to tech companies and that further elaborates and elucidates the difference between violent and non‑violent manifestos when it comes to conspiratorial and violent language.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2022 , 47p.

Edited by Leen d’Haenens and Abdelwahed Mekki-Berrada

Foundations and mechanisms of Islamophobia in the West. Islamophobia as a Form of Radicalisation discusses the scope and fragmented boundaries of Islamophobia as a concept and a sociopolitical reality. The fifteen chapters of this collection cover and connect interdisciplinary research, media content analysis, media discourse analysis, ethnographic research, intersectoral advocacy work, and action research conducted in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. Confronted with an Islamophobia that is growing as a symptom of broader societal malaise in the West, a resistance against it is also arising. It is now a question of better understanding the foundations and mechanisms of this meta-solidarity and resistance. Islamophobia as a Form of Radicalisation offers recommendations for urgent consideration by Muslim citizens of Canada and Europe, media professionals, civil society and academic stakeholders, policymakers at the municipal, provincial and federal levels

Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2023. 273p.

Edited by Thierry Balzacq and Elyamine Settoul  

Radicalization is a major challenge of contemporary global security. It conjures up images of violent ideologies, “homegrown” terrorists and jihad in both the academic sphere and among security and defense experts. While the first instances of religious radicalization were initially limited to second-generation Muslim immigrants, significant changes are currently impacting this phenomenon. Technology is said to amplify the dissemination of radicalism, though there remains uncertainty as to the exact weight of technology on radical behaviors. Moreover, far from being restricted to young men of Muslim heritage suffering from a feeling of social relegation, radicalism concerns a significant number of converted Muslims, women and more heterogeneous profiles (social, academic and geographic), as well as individuals that give the appearance of being fully integrated in the host society. These new and striking dynamics require innovative conceptual lenses. Radicalization in Theory and Practice identifies the mechanisms that explicitly link radical religious beliefs and radical actions. It describes its nature, singles out the mechanisms that enable radicalism to produce its effects, and develops a conceptual architecture to help scholars and policy-makers to address and evaluate radicalism—or what often passes as such. A variety of empirical chapters fed by first-hand data probe the relevance of theoretical perspectives that shape radicalization studies. By giving a prominent role to first-hand empirical investigations, the authors create a new framework of analysis from the ground up. This book enhances the quality of theorizing in this area, consolidates the quality of methodological enquiries, and articulates security studies insights with broader theoretical debates in different fields including sociology, social psychology, economics, and religious studies.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 297p.

By Macdonald, Stuart Keith, 1979-; Staniforth, Andrew

From the Executive Summary: "Cooperation between law enforcement and tech companies is widely regarded as necessary to tackle online terrorist content. Both sectors have publicly stated their commitment to working together and there are examples of mutual cooperation. Yet there are also impediments to such collaboration, including different cultures and operating practices, and there have been high-profile instances of non-cooperation. The informality of existing collaborations has also led to concerns about censorship, mission creep and a lack of accountability and oversight. The focus of this report is on how to resolve the impediments to closer cooperation between law enforcement and the tech sector in order to realise the benefits of mutual collaboration, while simultaneously addressing concerns about due process and accountability. The report utilises an interview-based methodology to examine the experiences and opinions of personnel from both sectors who have first-hand experience of mutual cooperation. It provides empirically grounded insights into this under-researched topic."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (Gnet). 2023. 38P.

Edited ny Updesh Kumar and Manas K. Mandal

In the recent years, more so after the 9/11 twin towers and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, there have been numerous discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. Terrorism as a phenomenon does not originate in isolation; rather it is, generally, a reaction to certain specific social and contextual circumstances leading to grievances among people. Therefore, in order to understand the roots and basis of terrorism, there is a pressing need to analyze specific social, cultural, political, and psychological contexts in which it flourishes. Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies works on this premise and penetrates into this psycho-socio-cultural milieu that serves as a context for the proliferation of violence through acts of terror. With contributions from experts from the developed as well as developing countries of the world, the book has ecumenical focus on terrorism from all possible angles and covers the multiplicity of perceptions and interpretations on the issue. The volume will ignite the mind of the reader toward latent variables that may be considered while carrying out research in this area. This book brings together the minutest aspects related to the burning issue of terrorism, which exploits the precious resources of nations and scars the minds of the people.

New Delhi. Sage Publications.2012. 450p.

Edited by Jordan Landes and Richard Espley

Do archivists ‘curate’ history? And to what extent are our librarians the gatekeepers of knowledge? Libraries and archives have a long and rich history of compiling ‘radical collections’- from Klanwatch Project in the States to the R. D. Laing Archive in Glasgow, but a re-examination of the information professions and all aspects of managing those collections is long overdue. This new book shines a light on pressing topical issues within library and information services (LIS)- to encompass selection, appraisal and accession, through to organisation and classification, and including promotion and use. Will libraries survive as victims of neoliberal marketization? Do we have a responsibility to collect and document ‘white hate’ in the era of Trump? And how can a predominantly white (96.7%) LIS workforce effectively collect and tell POC histories?

London: University of London,  Senate House Library, 2018. 94p.

By Christina Parolin

Radical Spaces explores the rise of popular radicalism in London between 1790 and 1845 through key sites of radical assembly: the prison, the tavern and the radical theatre. Access to spaces in which to meet, agitate and debate provided those excluded from the formal arenas of the political nation–the great majority of the population–a crucial voice in the public sphere. Radical Spaces utilises both textual and visual public records, private correspondence and the secret service reports from the files of the Home Office to shed new light on the rise of plebeian radicalism in the metropolis. It brings the gendered nature of such sites to the fore, finding women where none were thought to gather, and reveals that despite the diversity in these spaces, there existed a dynamic and symbiotic relationship between radical culture and the sites in which it operated. These venues were both shaped by and helped to shape the political identity of a generation of radical men and women who envisioned a new social and political order for Britain.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2010. 352p.

By Public Safety Canada

Canada faces the threat of violence by a small number of individuals who have become radicalized for political, religious or other ideological reasons. The Government of Canada is concerned with all forms of violent extremism, not associating this phenomenon with any particular religious, political, national, ethnic, or cultural group. While Canada has faced a variety of threats stemming from violent extremism in recent decades, the main terrorist threat to Canada continues to be violent extremists inspired by terrorist groups such as Daesh and al-Qaeda. However, individuals espousing and engaging in violence can be inspired by any extremist group promoting such behaviour. For example, some individuals within the far-right movement have espoused, glorified, promoted, and even engaged in violence. As well, historically, some far-left extremists have taken part in violent acts such as pipeline bombings. The Government of Canada is also alerted to the dangers of lesser-known forms of violent extremism. In its ongoing efforts to keep Canadians safe, the Government of Canada is expanding how it responds to violent extremism. Specifically, the federal government is investing in the prevention of radicalization to violence as articulated through the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. Prevention aims to thwart violent radicalization from happening in the first place and to intervene as early as possible when it is occurring. Preventing and countering violent extremism is an effective complement to security agencies’ traditional methods of safeguarding national security.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2018. 46p.

By Michele St-Amant, David Jones, Michael King, and John McCoy

There have been significant changes in the three years since the Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV) published its first report about hatemotivated violence, extremism and terrorism in Alberta, Building Awareness, Seeking Solutions. The Covid-19 pandemic, protests against public health measures, tense elections in the United States, and the backlash to racial justice movements, among other events, have had broad social repercussions. Some of which have changed the composition and scale of the threat of extremism and terrorism – which has become more diffuse and comprised of a broader set of grievances and ideologies. This report is organized using the nomenclature developed by the Government of Canada to categorize different forms of extremist ideologies. As such, the findings related to ideologically motivated violent extremism and religiously motivated violent extremism are summarized first.i Next, we summarize our findings about conspiracy theories and hate incidents, including crimes, within Alberta and across Canada.

Edmonton, Alberta: Organization for the Prevention of Violence, 2022. 115p.

By Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann

Over the last three years Europe and North America have been hit by an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology. The roots of this development are largely to be found in two, deeply intertwined phenomena: the military successes achieved by the Islamic State and its declaration of a Caliphate along with the large number of followers the group has managed to attract in the West. This report identified 51 successful attacks throughout Europe and North America from June 2014, when the Caliphate was declared, until June 2017. From coordinated operations causing large numbers of casualties like the November 2015 Paris attacks, to the many acts of violence carried out by lone attackers, the attacks vary significantly in terms of sophistication, lethality, targets and connectivity to the Islamic State and other groups. Similarly, the profile of the 65 identified involved in the 51 attacks is extremely heterogeneous from both demographic and operational perspectives.

Milano, Italy: Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p.