By Amy Cooter

A dominant analytical frame has emerged in extremism studies that attributes nearly all right wing, far right, or nostalgic group ideology1 and action to white supremacy. Some versions of this narrative further posit that these extremist groups intentionally and consciously effect white supremacy through a “cohesive social network based on commonly held beliefs,” a “white power movement.”2 However, these conceptions sometimes lack definitions of social movements, white supremacy, and other key concepts that are central to their arguments.3 This has led to over-generalizations about nostalgic group actors’ motives and goals in a way that downplays both the power of white supremacy as a hegemonic system and the specific harms caused by overtly supremacist actors. This paper clarifies a social science understanding of the key, but sometimes taken-for-granted, terms necessary for understanding these dynamics and demonstrates how faulty or unclear usage of this terminology leads to both analytical problems and the perpetuation of power structures that the field of extremism studies hopes to address. Specifically, I argue that improper conceptualization of white supremacy and related terms creates risks falling into three categories: analytic accuracy and predictive capacity, preventing near-term harm, and perpetuating white supremacy’s power structure and radicalization.

Monterey, CA: Center on Terrorism, Extremism and Counterterrorism, Middlebury Institute of International Studies. 2024. 29p.

By Middlebury Institute of International Studies

Active Clubs make up a decentralized network of individually-formed organizations that are centered around the premise of a white supremacist fraternal brotherhood. First introduced in December of 2020 by Robert Rundo, the leader of the white supremacist Rise Above Movement (R.A.M), Active Clubs are intended to preserve and defend the white population and traditional European culture from a perceived global genocide by non-white ethnic and racial groups. 

Rundo was inspired to create the Active Club network—something he referred to as “white nationalism 3.0”—in response to the numerous arrests of R.A.M. members made in 2018. He wanted to create an organization that would be less perceptible to law enforcement, and thus less susceptible to disruption or destruction. From this, Active Clubs were born—small, decentralized organizations that would focus recruitment efforts on localized areas and thus garner less attention than traditional white nationalist organizations. This structure would also ensure that Active Clubs were not reliant on a particular physical entity or leadership figure for survival.

Active Clubs provide like-minded white men with physical spaces where they can train in mixed martial arts in preparation for war against their perceived enemies. Ideologically, Active Clubs adhere to neofascist and accelerationist principles, with the promotion of violence comprising a key theme in Active Club communication and propaganda. Located across the United States and in several countries transnationally, the Active Club network ensures that groups of men devoted to training for battle are available for mobilization in multiple locations across Western countries. 

Monterey, CA: Middlebury Institute of International Studies and Center on terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, 2024.

By  Michael Miller Yoder,  David West Brown &  Kathleen M. Carley 

Much research has focused on the role of the alt-right in pushing far-right narratives into mainstream discourse. In this work, we focus on the alt-right’s effects on extremist narratives themselves. From 2012 to 2017, we find a rise in alt-right, 4chan-like discourse styles across multiple communication platforms known for white supremacist extremism, such as Stormfront. This discourse style incorporates inflammatory insults, irreverent comments, and talk about memes and online “chan” culture itself. A network analysis of one far-right extremist platform suggests that central users adopt and spread this alt-right style. This analysis has implications for understanding influence and change in online white supremacist extremism, as well as the role of style in white supremacist communications. Warning: This paper contains examples of hateful and offensive language.

Comput Math Organ Theory Volume 31, pages 222–235, (2025)

By Luke Baumgartner

On July 22, 2011, 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik embarked on a threehour murder spree across Norway, killing seventy-seven in what would become the single largest loss of life in the country since the Second World War. Beginning that morning in central Oslo, Breivik’s terrorist attack claimed its first victims after detonating a van filled with nearly one ton of explosives outside of the Regjeringskvartalet complex, which housed the prime minister’s administrative offices. Disguised as a police officer, Breivik then boarded a ferry for the island of Utøya, where he proceeded to kill sixty-nine students attending a youth worker’s party summer camp in a mass shooting that lasted nearly ninety minutes. An hour before the bombing, Breivik emailed his manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, to more than 1,000 contacts, asking for their assistance in disseminating his magnum opus, which, according to him, took more than three years to complete. The 1,500-page compendium contained a litany of grievances and rails against political correctness, feminists, and “multiculturalist/cultural Marxists,” ultimately accusing them of complicity in a grand conspiracy orchestrated by political elites of the European Union and Arab states to destroy Western civilization through the gradual replacement of white Christian Europeans by way of increased Muslim immigration—in other words, a Great Replacement. Breivik’s actions that day would inspire a cascade of copycat attacks in the United States, New Zealand, and Germany. As part of their attacks, each perpetrator wrote a manifesto to explain the rationale for their actions. In doing so, the manifestos can–and often do–serve multiple purposes: air the personal and societal grievances that led them to kill, provide a blueprint for future attackers, and perhaps, most importantly, gain the public notoriety and infamy they so desperately crave. At its core, terrorism is an act of violence that seeks validation through its very nature as a public spectacle, and thus, manifestos can provide answers to the ever-present question of why an event of this magnitude occurs. While these attacks are separated from one another in both time and space, the ideological glue binding them together is the belief in a racially and culturally homogenous dystopian future, one in which white people gradually cease to comprise demographic majorities in traditionally white dominions such as the United States and Europe. Or, in the most dire circumstances, cease to exist at all. These manifestos contain several common themes central to replacement theory–the conspiracy that motivated their attacks. This paper attempts to build on the current body of academic literature that focuses on the thematic elements of the manifestos and the historical and theoretical foundations upon which the attackers’ justifications for their actions lie. Beginning with a detailed history of replacement sentiment in the United States and Europe, this section seeks to provide the necessary background and context for where replacement theory comes from and how it has motivated actors across time and space. Within the context of the United States, replacement theory finds its ideological roots in late-19th and early-20th century race science, or eugenics, beginning with the works of sociologist Edward A. Ross and anthropologist Madison Grant, both of whom popularized the notion of “race suicide.” Subsequent generations of post-war white supremacists, such as David Duke and David Lane, transformed race suicide into the explicitly anti-semitic conspiracy theory of “white genocide,” laying the groundwork for contemporary militant far-right extremists to coalesce around the idea of replacement theory. Meanwhile, European manifestations of parallel racist conspiracies emerged during an intellectual movement of the 1960s in France known as the Nouvelle Droite, championed by the likes of Jean Raspail. Raspail’s work would influence leading public figures such as Italian author Oriana Fallaci and British Historian Bat Ye’or, who were instrumental in sparking Renaud Camus’ coining of the “Great Replacement.”

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University , 2025. 32p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

By Moonshot and the Anti-Defamation League

Moonshot partnered with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to analyze US search traffic in July 2020 in response to the threats posed by white supremacist narratives and ideology in the US this past year. The dominant socio-political events of 2020-2021—the COVID-19 pandemic, the widespread BLM protests and counter-protests, and the presidential election—coalesced to create fertile ground for white supremacists and other violent extremist movements to mobilize and recruit. In 2020, racism and systemic racial inequality took center stage in the American public eye, with nationwide mass protests against recent police killings of Black people and historic evidence of racial injustice.1 In a nationwide reactionary mobilization, members of armed extremist groups made frequent appearances at BLM protests as self-appointed “protection” for property and counter-protesters.2 This high-profile direct action, combined with tacit and explicit support from local and national political figures, contributed to an increased interest in white supremacist and racist ideas by segments of the country.3 Protests and opposition to state lockdowns and other measures introduced in response to COVID-19 also provided opportunities for extremist movements to mobilize and engage with wider swathes of the public around shared grievances. While anti-lockdown protests were not related to white supremacy on the surface, these movements began to overlap in their joint opposition to the BLM movement, the defense of Confederate monuments, and general opposition to perceived government tyranny.4 Similarly, national protests alleging election rigging in the wake of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory were repeatedly co-opted and reinforced by white supremacist groups, culminating in the 6 January siege on the US Capitol. Extremist groups and individuals expressing support for white supremacist ideas were well-documented participants in the insurrection. White supremacist groups and other extremist organizations seized on the tensions and uncertainty in American life to promote racist beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to increase their recruitment. Extremist narratives related to the pandemic promoted the conspiracy theory alleging that COVID-19 is a hoax created by a Jewish-led cabal. This and related anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are mainstays of many QAnon narratives.5 Other groups, such as the Patriot Front, have used the past year’s societal upheavals to recruit new members by promoting an impending race war and the perceived persecution of white people—as indicated by conspiracy theories such as “white genocide” and “the great replacement”.6 Extremist groups also exploited wider tensions, perceived grievances and disinformation against the BLM movement, as well as popular disinformation alleging the election was rigged. The findings from this project provide valuable insights on the types of harmful narratives and content that appeal to individuals potentially at-risk of radicalization, including those first searching for extremist slogans and conspiracies out of curiosity. This report presents an overview of the search traffic data collected during the project, between 17 July 2020 - 7 March 2021, and our main findings on online white supremacist narrative trends during this time.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2021. 21p.

By The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence'

The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence (ESGV) has issued a report with five policy recommendations that states must implement immediately in order to protect democracy in the face of a growing armed insurrectionist movement. The insurrection at the Capitol last January 6th was the loudest expression of a continuing effort by armed insurrectionists to upend government The report offers new insight and analysis and serves as both an examination and a warning that, if left unaddressed, armed insurrectionism will continut to pose a threat to the country. It also examines the significant overlap between insurrectionist activity and White Supremacism and the deadly combination of guns and hate.

Washington, DC: Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, 2022. 31P.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

Extremists are using online crowdfunding platforms like GiveSendGo and GoFundMe to raise millions of dollars for their ideologically driven activities. Through crowdfunding, extremists have generated at least $6,246,072 from 324 campaigns between 2016 and mid-2022. Extremist campaigns found on these platforms espouse hateful rhetoric including antisemitism, white supremacy, QAnon conspiracies and anti-LGBTQ+ extremism, as well as rhetoric from antisemitic sects of Black Hebrew Israelites. Crowdfunding campaigns have been used by extremists to fund direct actions and attacks on their perceived enemies or marginalized communities; legal defenses for extremists who face consequences for these actions; propaganda efforts and other expenses.

New York: ADL, 2023. 42p.

By Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross

Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and rightwing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda. RWEs have utilized the lawless and unmoderated internet to reach broader audiences, disseminate literature, and target vulnerable people. They have done so quietly, pushing an ideological campaign that manifests itself under the surface of popular internet discourse, rather than the aggressive proselytizing of Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State. These efforts can be understood as a kind of subversive exposure, where memes and fake news dominate discourse. This paper will analyse the scope of the RWE threat, describe their latest modus operandi, and explore how the pandemic is being instrumentalized by such groups and how the internet has become their principal tool and battleground. The paper will then provide theory and evidence for how counter-narrative programs, especially through digital disruption, can help neutralise the threat.

Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2020. 27p.

By The Soufan Center

From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States. And while extremist groups operating on American soil are often labeled or categorized as domestic terrorist organizations, this report will demonstrate that they maintain links to transnational networks of like-minded organizations and individuals, from Australia, Canada, Russia, South Africa, and elsewhere. The danger of terrorism is growing in the United States, just as it is elsewhere in the world, with white supremacist extremists strengthening transnational networks and even imitating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). These networks share approaches to recruitment, financing, and propaganda, with Ukraine emerging as a hub in the broader network of transnational white supremacy extremism, attracting foreign recruits from all over the world.

Washington, DC: The Soufan Center, 2019. 79p.