By Andrew Gilligan and Paul Stott

  • The Government’s “Rapid Analytical Sprint” to determine its policy on extremism has been leaked to Policy Exchange. • It says the UK’s approach to extremism should no longer be based on “ideologies of concern” but on a very wide range of “behaviours,” including violence against women and girls, “spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories,” an interest in gore or extreme violence, misogyny, or involvement in “an online subculture called the manosphere.” It admits itself that many who display such behaviours are not extremist. • This approach could swamp already stretched counter-extremism staff and counter-terror police with thousands of new cases, increasing the risk that genuinely dangerous individuals are missed. It risks addressing symptoms, not causes. • The Sprint de-centres and downplays Islamism, by far the greatest threat to national security. It acknowledges “left-wing, anarchist and single issue (LASI) extremism,” “environmental extremism” and Hindu extremism as distinct phenomena that counter-extremist policy should tackle. The left may object to the first two; others will welcome it. • The Sprint will raise concerns over freedom of speech. It says claims of two-tier policing are a “right-wing extremist narrative.” It recommends the reversal of moves to cut police use of “non-crime hate incidents.” A new crime of making “harmful communications” online – rejected by the previous government on freedom of speech grounds - is floated. • The Sprint may have been influenced by the events of Southport. But as in the Prime Minister’s remarks after the killer’s guilty pleas last week, it risks confusing extreme violence with extremism, or extremism with any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried. • What happened in Southport was more an operational than a policy failing. The murderer had shown he was dangerous many times over several years before he killed anyone. In a more operationally effective policing and justice system, action would have been taken against him sooner, even without having to first label him an extremist. • There is a case, as the former counter-terror policing chief Neil Basu has said, for creating a “non-extremist” version of Prevent aiming to interdict people, such as the Southport killer, with an interest  in violence but no obvious ideological or political motivation. The recommendation by a previous reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross, that the current programme is the wrong place for dealing with the psychologically unstable has been ignored, even repudiated, in the Sprint. It should be acted on. • There are several sensible proposals, including the creation of a new Ministerial Counter-Extremism Board to coordinate policy.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Alana Ford

An examination of the threat of disinformation and cognitive warfare in the Indo-Pacific, the brief unpacks how these tactics are reshaping national security and undermining democratic institutions. Drawing on global examples, it highlights the implications for regional stability and democratic resilience.

The briefing paper outlines Australia’s multipronged approach, including legislative reforms, international partnerships, and public education efforts, offering practical insights to counter these evolving security threats and safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.

Key messages

Disinformation and cognitive warfare are evolving security threats that undermine democratic institutions, polarise societies, and manipulate public trust at a global scale.

The digital revolution has amplified the speed, precision, and scale of disinformation campaigns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how cognitive warfare is deployed to legitimize unlawful acts of aggression and manipulate international narratives.

Democracies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, face heightened risks of disinformation and cognitive warfare due to their open information environments and the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics.

Effective countermeasures require coordinated domestic and international efforts, leveraging regulation and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Australia: Perth USAsia Centre, 2025.

By Alexander Palmer, Skyeler Jackson, and Daniel Byman

Despite the recent attack in New Orleans, longer-term trends suggest that jihadist terrorism in the United States is not resurgent. The number of jihadist plots and attacks in the United States has been low since the territorial defeat of ISIS. The average lethality of jihadist terrorist attacks has also fallen since the peak of the caliphate. International groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda have filled more of an inspirational role rather than directly orchestrating attacks on the United States. Although formal links between attackers and plotters in the United States appear to be rare, this has not prevented individuals from carrying out lethal “lone wolf” attacks. Overall, jihadist terrorism in the United States does not merit additional resources at this time; however, international terrorism organizations continue to merit counterterrorism efforts.

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) , 2025. 12p.

By Rohan Gunaratna

SYNOPSIS As we enter the new year, armed conflicts continue to rage across the globe, destabilising nations, regions, and even the global order. Terrorist attacks and state responses create ripple effects, which not only shape the battlefields but redefine states, fragment societies, and radicalise communities. What does the terrorism threat landscape look like in 2025?

COMMENTARY Global terrorism will remain a persistent and pervasive threat to the stability and peace of the world. The Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and Iran-sponsored Shiite and Sunni militia have exacerbated instability around the globe, while geopolitical competitions have polarised and fragmented the community of nations. Unless governments work together to mitigate common security challenges, threat actors will exploit the gaps, loopholes, and weaknesses in global security systems. All nations need to be steadfast in preventing and preempting threats from taking root and facing up to threats from state and non-state actors including lone wolf attackers. In addition to disinformation operations, threat actors will attack information infrastructure. Nations will need to secure the online domain as hostile states increase their cyberattacks, sabotage infrastructure, assassinate public officials, and engage in espionage.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore 2025. 5p.

By Camden Carmichael, Brooke Buxton, Seamus Hughes, and Clara Braun

Despite a rapid increase in domestic terrorism investigations in the United States, the threat that domestic terrorism poses to the homeland remains unclear. This is due to a lack of a comprehensive domestic terrorism legal framework that fully encompasses the variety of ideological groups present in the US. Using a sample of twenty-six QAnon and eighteen incel cases that have been federally prosecuted, our team examined how the US prosecutorial system utilises non-terrorism-related charges in addressing domestic violent extremism (DVE) cases. We propose a more inclusive DVE legal framework that expands the categorisation of VE ideologies, identifies specific DVE charges, and requires the engagement of the prosecutorial and probationary offices. By recognising Misogyny Motivated Violent Extremists (MMVEs) and Conspiracy Theory Motivated Violent Extremists (CTMVEs) as their own threat categories, it would allow researchers and practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of how pervasive the threat posed by these ideologies is.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2024. 21p.

By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

By The Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024, 209 pages