By Kristian Alexander

The September 11, 2001, attacks highlighted significant US vulnerabilities and led to major counterterrorism reforms. Post-9/11, the US government implemented institutional changes, enhanced international cooperation, and expanded its use of technology and drone warfare. However, public fatigue from prolonged wars and shifting US focus towards geopolitical rivalries and domestic issues has reduced the centrality of counterterrorism in US policy over the last two decades. COMMENTARY The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, remain one of the most devastating strategic surprises in modern history. Despite being the world’s preeminent superpower with an extensive intelligence apparatus, the United States failed to anticipate and prevent the hijacking and subsequent crashing of four commercial airliners, killing almost 3,000 people.

Singapore: The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) , 2024. 4p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory counter-narrative, and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given but should it The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism CVE programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p,

By HM Inspectorate of Probation, Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (UK)

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation has led an inspection, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – looking at the work of the Probation Service’s National Security Division (NSD) and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks.

In response to terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision, the NSD was created as a separate division of the Probation Service, working alongside police Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) arrangements. Together with existing prison and probation services, these bodies are responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or suspected of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

What we found

• This inspection looked at the management and progress of the strategy to supervise these offenders. It found:

• NSD, probation, police and prison services worked well together and are approaching managing counter terrorism cases collectively

• supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management

• probation practitioners within NSD were well trained specialist officers, holding a small and restricted caseload, delivering high quality case assessment and supervision

• terrorist offenders were subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences

• the arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective

• there has been significant financial investment to improve services dealing with counter terrorism, and staffing levels were appropriate

• prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their prisons and were actively managing this

• leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Manchester: His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2023. 65p.

By Riza Kumar

Protracted insurgencies and the growing threat by local affiliates of the global terrorism networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) throughout Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have transformed on-the-ground responses to violent extremism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia continues to grapple with the unrelenting force of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab; Burkina Faso contends with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam; and Nigeria remains encumbered by Boko Haram’s 14-year insurgency and the increasingly violent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). As serious and sustained militant and terrorist movements continue to kill thousands and displace millions, the three respective governments have altered their responses to violent extremists and terrorism, integrating civilian-led, community-based security strategies into their national counterterrorism programs. National armies and their international partners have offered some reprieve from enduring violent conflicts, but in many cases have failed to offer comprehensive protections to all civilians. Civilian counterterrorism militias emerged to provide security to vulnerable communities and were quickly recognized as an alternative to state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns. However, once these counterterrorism militias were enlisted and absorbed into the national security apparatus, new—albeit long-established—challenges quickly emerged. Localized counterterrorism campaigns have at times devolved into vengeful operations against ethnic rivals as well as opportunities to carry out illicit activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, and looting. The benefits and drawbacks of civilian counterterrorism militias remain consistent across different regions. The strategy is cost-effective and practical as civilian defense forces are often cheaper than formal security units, such as the national army and the police. There is a ready pool of potential local recruits to safeguard vulnerable communities, and they are knowledgeable about the communities they protect. Most importantly, civilian troops establish a level of community loyalty that can be difficult to achieve with national armies. Significant drawbacks of civilian forces are that troops can become unreliable and difficult to control if not properly managed. Furthermore, without strong and effective oversight mechanisms, civilian troops are capable of undermining government authority, rule of law, and governance. Unfortunately, if not carefully executed, civilian forces could deteriorate into armed criminal networks,1 transforming from vanguards of safety into long-term sources of instability and insecurity.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2023. 24p.