By the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lauren Richards, Peter Molinaro, John Wayne. et al.

Operationally defining the lone offender terrorist is challenging, as the nature of terrorism is both highly political and contextually dependent. Over the years, there has been disagreement over the classification of violent acts under the label of “terrorism.” While an argument can be made that the infliction of fear upon a targeted group or the public is sufficient to classify an act as terrorism, the FBI definition of terrorism requires a purported motivation that goes beyond exclusively personal motivations and attempts to influence change in furtherance of extremist ideologies of a social, political, religious, racial or environmental nature. The focus of the current study examined offenders who carried out their attacks independent of any direction from a terrorist group or organization.Lone offender terrorism continues to pose a threat as violent ideological groups and terrorist organizations place emphasis on inspiring lone offender-style attacks. Additionally, individuals who view violence as an accessible and justified method for advancing their own ideological goals can independently mobilize toward violent action. While attacks directly coordinated by terrorist organizations are generally more lethal globally, the United States departs from this trend: lone offender attacks in the United States are more deadly, possibly due to strong U.S. counterterrorism capacity for disrupting.The current report provides an overview of the data, exploring the various topics encompassed within the coding protocol, including bystander observations, offenders’ backgrounds, family and social networks, behavioral characteristics, radicalization, and attack planning. Predicting lone offender terrorism incidents is not possible, but prior research and operational experience support the conclusion that acts of targeted violence, including lone offender terrorist attacks, may be preventable through early recognition and reporting of concerning behavior. The report aims to inform broader goals of enhancing bystander education and awareness, as well to aid the prevention efforts of law enforcement and multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams working to counter targeted violence threats every day. To work toward this objective, the authors examine relevant contextual factors and analyze the statements and behaviors offenders exhibited before carrying out their attacks.

Washington, DC: U.S. FBI, 2019. 80p.

By The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

From the document: "In 2013, the president signed into law the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, which led the FBI to examine active shooter incidents since 2000. The findings in this report are intended to provide an overview of active shooter incidents to help law enforcement, other first responders, and the public better understand the levels of threats associated with active shooter incidents. In 2022, the FBI designated 50 shootings as active shooter incidents. Although incidents decreased by 18% from 2021 (61 incidents), the number of active shooter incidents increased by 66.7% compared to 2018 (30 incidents). The 50 active shooter incidents in 2022 occurred in 25 states and the District of Columbia and represent seven location categories, including open spaces, commerce, residences, education, government, houses of worship, and a health care facility. [...] Data cited in this report for active shooter incidents that occurred in 2022 is valid as of February 10, 2023; however, incident data from prior published reports was not updated. If additional incidents meeting FBI criteria are identified after the publication of this document, every effort will be made to factor those incidents into future reporting."

Washington, DC: FBI, 2023. 33p.

By the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Office of Homeland Security

From the Executive Summary: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. The greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders, often radicalized online, who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and our investigations."

By Michael German and Kaylana Mueller-Hsia

The failure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies to anticipate and prepare for the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol by far-right insurrectionists has elicited proposals to expand the bureau’s authority to investigate domestic terrorism.1 The FBI already received expansive new powers after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and its current guidelines place few limits on agents’ ability to search broadly for potential threats. Confusion about the current scope of the bureau’s powers is understandable, however, as FBI leaders have regularly misstated their authorities in public testimony.2 These misstatements deflect FBI accountability by focusing overseers on filling perceived gaps in its authority rather than examining how the bureau uses, misuses, or fails to use the tools it already has.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2022. 21p.

By United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security

From the document: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors 3 and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets. This report provides our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations."

United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security . 2023. 46p.

By Gary Peters

From the document: "At the direction of U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), and following the Committee's initial review of the security, planning, and response failures in advance of and during the January 6th attack, Majority Committee staff conducted a subsequent review focused on the intelligence failures leading up to the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. This review included assessments of documents and information provided to the Committee pursuant to its original February 2021 request for information from relevant agencies, as well as documents, interview transcripts, and supporting materials related to the House Select Committee's investigation and final report. This report assesses federal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes and interagency coordination in advance of January 6th. The report finds that FBI and I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] obtained large amounts of intelligence indicating the potential for violence on January 6th. However, neither FBI nor I&A issued sufficient warnings to their law enforcement partners based on that intelligence, partially because these agencies were biased toward discounting the possibility of such an unprecedented event. Federal agencies also suffered from a lack of coordination as they prepared for January 6th."

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2023. 106p.