Edited By James Cuno and Thomas G. Weiss

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage has a long history. Contemporary examples include the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, mosques in Xinjiang, China, mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, and Greco-Roman remains in Syria. Cultural heritage destruction invariably accompanies assaults on civilians, making heritage attacks impossible to disentangle from the mass atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Both seek to eliminate people and the heritage with which they identify. Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities assembles thirty-eight experts from the heritage, social science, humanitarian, legal, and military communities. Focusing on immovable cultural heritage vulnerable to attack, the volume’s guiding framework is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a United Nations resolution adopted unanimously in 2005 to permit international intervention against crimes of war or genocide. Based on the three pillars of prevent, react, and rebuild, R2P offers today’s policymakers a set of existing laws and international norms that can and—as this book argues—must be extended to the protection of cultural heritage. Essays consider the global value of cultural heritage and document recent attacks on people and sites in China, Guatemala, Iraq, Mali, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Comprehensive sections on vulnerable populations as well as the role of international law and the military offer readers critical insights and point toward research, policy, and action agendas to protect both people and cultural heritage. The table of contents along with a concise abstract of each chapter is offered online in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish to facilitate robust, global dissemination of the strategies and tactics offered in this pathbreaking call to action.

Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 2022. 649p.

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

By Sonia L. Robinson, Christopher D. McCort, Colette Smirniotis, Garen J. Wintemute & Hannah S. Laqueur

Background

Firearm violence is a major cause of death and injury in the United States. Tracking the movement of firearms from legal purchase to use in crimes can help inform prevention of firearm injuries and deaths. The last state-wide studies analyzing crime gun recoveries used data from over 20 years ago; thus, an update is needed.

Methods

We used data for 5,247,348 handgun and 2,868,713 long gun transactions and law enforcement recoveries from California crime gun recovery (2010–2021) and California’s Dealer Records of Sales records. Covariates included characteristics of dealership sales, firearms and their transactions, and purchaser’s demographic characteristics, purchasing history, criminal history (from firearm purchaser criminal history records), and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Analyses for handguns and long guns was conducted separately. In multivariable analysis, we included correlates into a Cox proportional hazard model accounting for left truncation and clustering between the same firearm, purchaser, dealerships, and geographic location. Covariates that remained significant (P < 0.05) were retained. For handguns, we evaluated associations of violent and weapons crimes separately. In supplementary analyses, we examined interactions by purchasers’ race and ethnicity.

Results

In total, 38,441 handguns (0.80%) and 6,806 long guns (0.24%) were recovered in crimes. A firearm dealer’s sales volume, percent of transactions that were denials, pawns, pawn redemptions, and firearms that became crime guns were each positively associated with firearm recovery in crime. Handguns that were inexpensive, larger caliber, and that had been reported lost or stolen were positively associated with recovery in crimes. Purchaser characteristics associated with crime gun recovery included: being younger, female, Black, Hispanic, Native American or Pacific Islander, or other race/ethnicity (vs white), having previous arrests, living in close proximity to the firearm dealership, and living in a more socially vulnerable census tract. Associations with race and ethnicity were modified by previous infraction-only arrests.

Conclusions

This study confirms that many previously studied correlates of firearm recovery are still relevant today. We were able to expand on previous research by examining novel associations including purchasers’ criminal history and previous firearm transaction history. These results provide evidence that can be used to disrupt firearm use in crimes.

Injury Epidemiology volume 11, Article number: 8 (2024)

Edited by Petra Terhoeven

How does terrorism affect our picture of the history of terrorism then, if the victims are moved centre stage? If the focus is put on their suffering? The contributions to this edition of the European History Yearbook will examine such questions in a broad range of historical case studies and methods, including visual history.

Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. 172p.

By Bashir Bello and Mustapaha Muhammad Abdullahi

The study examined farmers–herdsmen conflict, cattle rustling, and banditry in Anka and Maradun local government area of Zamfara State, Nigeria. The study examined the influence of farmers–herdsmen conflicts on cattle rustling and banditry, and vice versa. Exploratory research was employed; focus group discussion (FGD) and key informant interview (KII)were used to collect primary data from the respondents. The data generated were transcribed and recorded verbatim (word-for-word account of verbal interview) and they were converted into written form. Data were enumerated and thematic analysis and categorization were provided. Secondary data were sourced from internet and relevant books. This study adopted the environmental resources scarcity and frustration-aggression theory. The findings of the study revealed that farmers–herdsmen conflict precipitates the acts of cattle rustling and banditry. It also revealed that conversely cattle rustling and banditry contributed to the farmers–herdsmen conflict in the local government area of Zamfara State. The study discovered that the synthesis of farmers–herdsmen conflicts, cattle rustling, and banditry pose serious threat to the safety and security of the people. The researchers recommended that there should be an introduction of grazing reserves equipped with adequate social amenities and that there should be policies capable of enhancing herders’ transformation from traditional to the modern method of animal husbandry. They also suggested that various factors responsible for farmers–herdsmen conflict, cattle rustling, and banditry should be properly managed by traditional and religious leaders. The findings corroborate the gaps which the researchers intended to fill

Sage Open, 11(4). 2021.

By Nsirimovu Okwuwada

There have been several agitations in Nigeria, but none have degenerated into the current barbaric, horrendous, heinous, and despicable dimensions of carnage, massacres, and bloodletting orchestrated by terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, and other organized violent crime syndicates. This study takes a holistic approach using secondary data sources to examine the root causes of the modern-day prevalence of kidnapping, banditry, terrorist attacks, and other organized criminal activities in Nigeria. The study finds that unemployment, excess supply of young people, neglect of certain regions in the distribution of national wealth, lack of government visibility, lack of equal economic opportunity for all, uncontrolled influx of firearms, poverty, and religious fanaticism contributes to the increasing rate of violent crime in Nigeria. The article finds that the nature of banditry, kidnapping, and terrorist attacks are similar, and the modes of attacks on civilian and government installations are also related. The government should thus become proactively visible throughout the nation via its security agencies and economic development agenda. Additionally, the government should educate local officials and traditional councils on contemporary methods for reporting and addressing violent groups in their communities.

MPRA Paper No. 117671, Munich: MPRA, 2023. 46p.

By Cyril O. Ugwuoke, Benjamin Okorie Ajah, Linus Akor, Sunday Ojonugwa Ameh, Cletus A. Lanshima, Elias C. Ngwu, Ugomma Ann Eze, and Michael Nwokedi

This paper examined the vulnerability of travelers to kidnapping, abduction and armed robbery attacks and in some extreme cases, death along Nigeria's highways. Insecurity on the nation's highways became a contemporary criminological discourse following the emergence of new strands of criminality like militancy, terrorism, kidnapping, herdsmen-farmers violence, communal conflicts and banditry. Nigerian highways have become the major operational hotspots for criminals who harass, terrorize, and traumatize travelers at will. With the ever-rising insecurity on Nigerian highways, the military and paramilitary offensives deployed by the Federal Government have not yielded the desired results culminating in the description of government's inertia as a form of state slumber. Data for this study were sourced from a content analysis of reported violent highway crimes by credible mainstream Nigerian newspapers, spanning a period of one year, from July 2020 to July 2021. Adopting the Social Disorganization Theory, the study indicated that the worrisome nature of insecurity on Nigeria's highways resulting in the high rate of abduction and murder of people of diverse military, professional, socioeconomic and political backgrounds has engendered a sense of helplessness, trauma and vulnerability among Nigerian road travelers. The paper recommends the de-centralization of Nigeria Police Force structure to create State Police that will encourage and electrify effective and better people oriented patrolling and management of insecurities on the Nigerian highways.

Heliyon v.9(10); 2023 Oct PMC10551549

By: John Sunday Ojo

This article explores the dominant narrative of ill-governed or ungoverned territories in the northern region of Nigeria where informality and socioeconomic deficit fashioned the mannerism of everyday life. Reconnoitering ungoverned territories, positing that radical jihadist and non-jihadist movements and criminal-armed groups are ideologically driven by localism and informal networks, particularly in the areas unkempt by the state. The paper interrogates to what extent ungoverned spaces embolden the recruitment of criminal and terrorist groups in northern Nigeria. It explains the complex security paradoxes confronting the Nigerian state, it analyses the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani militancy and banditry within the context of ungoverned spaces that continuously breed terrorist organizations, and criminal networks, that pose an enormous risk to human security. It adopts a qualitative approach and spatial network analysis using Geographical Information System (GIS). The paper argues that the primordial negligence of ungoverned areas with limited state surveillance or unharmonized state presence, controlled by informal networks and hybrid arrangements creates an enabling environment for warlordism, religious fanaticism and tribal self-defense forces. It further demonstrates that governance failure in these regions stimulates illegal movement of arms and ammunition, the raw material for bombs, illegal drugs and foreign machines, and becomes abodes for Boko Haram jihadist and non-Boko Haram armed groups. The paper concludes that ungoverned spaces could be morphed into a production site for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the terrorists in the near future, thus, until the Nigerian state pays attention to the territories under-governed or poorly governed, it will become difficult to win the war against terrorism, Fulani militancy and banditry through military response. Therefore, good governance that transcends ethnic chauvinism remains a veritable weapon in conquering multilayered security quagmires facing the giant of Africa.

African Security, Volume 13, 2020 - Issue 1

By Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday Ojo & Samuel Oyewole

Insecurity has worsened in Northwest Nigeria, due to the threat of armed banditry, necessitating the deployments and operations of the military. While there is increasing academic attention on the origins, causes, and nature of this threat, the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military’s counter-banditism response in the region remains understudied. Accordingly, foregrounded by the need to close this gap, this qualitative study contributes to the literature through organised empirical research by examining the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military's Joint Task Force operation Hadarin Daji – its major internal security operation – against armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria. Data is obtained from secondary sources which include academic journal articles, books, official reports, press briefs by the military, reputable local and international news reportage. The study’s central argument holds that the nature and character of the military’s campaigns against armed banditry – a form of unconventional warfare, poses significant challenges to it as a conventional fighting force, consequentially contributing towards the conflict’s protractedness. Recalibrating the military’s readiness for and response to unconventional warfare remains critical to degrading and defeating armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria.

African Secuirty Review Volume 32, 2023 - Issue 4

Edited by Tanya Mehra, Thomas Renard and Merlina Herbach with contributions from Marc Hecker and Sofia Koller.

The involvement of women in terrorism is not new, but it has gained more attention with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which attracted many women to its so-called caliphate. Initially perceived as victims or harmless, these women progressively became a growing subject of attention and concern for security services. In 2017, the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) already indicated that the threat emanating from female jihadis should not be underestimated, while recognising knowledge gaps about the role(s) these women played in jihadi movements or the threat they posed.1 The same year, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) stressed that women who were affiliated with terrorist organisations “may have served in many different roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts” and urged states to pay special attention to this as women “require special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies.”2 Yet, in spite of more attention from counter-terrorism services, and a growing body of literature on female terrorists, there is still a considerable lack of data-driven, empirical research on female violent extremist offenders (VEOs). This book seeks to inform practitioners and policy-makers on how to manage female VEOs through the criminal justice system in a rule of law and human rights compliant manner through four case studies in Europe.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT: 2024. 223p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

By Justin Nix and John A. Shjarback

Objectives

To quantify nonfatal injurious police shootings of people and examine the factors associated with victim mortality.

Methods

We gathered victim-level data on fatal and nonfatal injurious police shootings from four states that have such information publicly available: Florida (2009–14), Colorado (2010–19), Texas (2015–19), and California (2016–19). For each state, we examined bivariate associations between mortality and race/ethnicity, gender, age, weapon, and access to trauma care. We also estimated logistic regression models predicting victim mortality in each state.

Results

Forty-five percent of these police shooting victims (N = 1,322) did not die. Black–white disparities were more pronounced in nonfatal injurious police shootings than in fatal police shootings. Overall, Black victims were less likely than white victims to die from their wound(s). Younger victims were less likely to die from their wound(s), as well as those who were unarmed.

Conclusions

Racial and age disparities in police shootings are likely more pronounced than previous estimates suggest.

Policy implications

Other states should strongly consider compiling data like that which is currently being gathered in California. Absent data on nonfatal injurious police shootings–which account for a large share of deadly force incidents–researchers and analysts must be cautious about comparing and/or ranking jurisdictions in terms of their police-involved fatality rates.

PLOS One,  November 10, 2021

By Daniel S. Nagin

Do states with more guns have higher rates of fatal police shootings? This article uses a validated measure of firearm availability (the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm) to examine the relationship between gun proliferation and fatal police shootings. It expands on existing research to include (1) measures of access to Level I and II trauma centers, (2) interpretation of the findings from the lenses of “statistical prediction,” and (3) tests for structural differences between models for black descendants versus nonblack decedents. Findings confirm the correlation between statewide prevalence of gun ownership and fatal police shootings for both all decedents and unarmed decedents. It provides partial support for “statistical prediction” by police and finds that greater access to trauma centers is associated with lower rates of citizen deaths. The analysis suggests a far broader range of policy options for saving lives, such as better enforcement of legal restrictions on firearm possession, than focusing solely on policing systems.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 687, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 49-57

By Charles C Lanfear , Rebecca Bucci , David S Kirk , Robert J Sampson

Importance: The past quarter-century has seen both sharp declines and increases in firearm violence in the United States. Yet, little is known about the age of first exposure to firearm violence and how it may differ by race, sex, and cohort.

Objective: To examine race, sex, and cohort differences in exposure to firearm violence in a representative longitudinal study of children who grew up in periods with varying rates of firearm violence in the United States and to examine spatial proximity to firearm violence in adulthood.

Design, setting, and participants: This population-based representative cohort study included multiple cohorts of children followed-up from 1995 through 2021 in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Participants included Black, Hispanic, and White respondents from 4 age cohorts of Chicago, Illinois, residents, with modal birth years of 1981, 1984, 1987, and 1996. Data analyses were conducted from May 2022 to March 2023.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm violence exposure, including age when first shot, age when first saw someone shot, and past-year frequency of fatal and nonfatal shootings within 250 m of residence.

Results: There were 2418 participants in wave 1 (in the mid-1990s), and they were evenly split by sex, with 1209 males (50.00%) and 1209 females (50.00%). There were 890 Black respondents, 1146 Hispanic respondents, and 382 White respondents. Male respondents were much more likely than female respondents to have been shot (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR], 4.23; 95% CI, 2.28-7.84), but only moderately more likely to have seen someone shot (aHR, 1.48; 95% CI, 1.27-1.72). Compared with White individuals, Black individuals experienced higher rates of all 3 forms of exposure (been shot: aHR, 3.05; 95% CI, 1.22-7.60; seen someone shot: aHR, 4.69; 95% CI, 3.41-6.46; nearby shootings: adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR], 12.40; 95% CI, 6.88-22.35), and Hispanic respondents experienced higher rates of 2 forms of violence exposure (seen someone shot: aHR, 2.59; 95% CI, 1.85-3.62; nearby shootings: aIRR, 3.77; 95% CI, 2.08-6.84). Respondents born in the mid-1990s who grew up amidst large declines in homicide but reached adulthood during city and national spikes in firearm violence in 2016 were less likely to have seen someone shot than those born in the early 1980s who grew up during the peak of homicide in the early 1990s (aHR, 0.49; 95% CI, 0.35-0.69). However, the likelihood of having been shot did not significantly differ between these cohorts (aHR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.40-1.63).

Conclusions and relevance: In this longitudinal multicohort study of exposure to firearm violence, there were stark differences by race and sex, yet the extent of exposure to violence was not simply the product of these characteristics. These findings on cohort differences suggest changing societal conditions were key factors associated with whether and at what life stage individuals from all race and sex groups were exposed to firearm violence.

JAMA Network Open 6(5); 2023

Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi,  Emma Cornell,  Sandeep Kapoor,  Laura Harrison,  Chethan Sathya, 

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: US pediatric firearm deaths increased in 2021, above the spike in 2020, with worsening disparities. Implementation of prevention strategies and policies among communities at highest risk is critical 

Pediatrics (2023) 152 (3): e2023061296.

By Bennett Clifford

By reviewing studies of how today’s terrorist and extremist groups operate on social media in conjunction with an overview of U.S. government regulation of terrorist content online, this report finds that stricter U.S. regulation of social media providers may not be the most effective method of combating online terrorist and extremist content.

Specifically:

• Direct governmental regulations that ignore other sources of regulation on content removal policies could disrupt growing intra-industry collaboration on countering terrorist content online.

• In many regards, the U.S. government defers to and depends on the private sector to conduct counterterrorism online. Many factors contribute to this arrangement, including limits on the government’s authorities, expertise, staffpower, dexterity and political will to manage online terrorist content with the same efficacy as major social media companies.

• Attempts by other governments to strictly regulate social media companies’ terrorist content removal policies hurt small companies, created double standards and redundancies, and raised concerns about censorship and free speech.

• Proposed regulations may only affect major U.S. social media providers; smaller and non-U.S. companies may be unable, unwilling, or not required to comply. Due to the proliferation of social media platforms exploited by terrorists and extremists, platforms that may be unaffected by U.S. government regulation currently host a large proportion of terrorist content online.

• In certain regards, major social media companies’ content removal policies have more flexibility than the U.S. government to be able to account for new terrorist and extremist groups and actors and their respective tactics, techniques, and procedures online.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 24p.

By Omar Mohammed

The Iraqi Parliament is poised to discuss a new amnesty bill that has generated significant controversy and debate. This legislation is intended to address the issue of wrongful detentions but raises profound ethical, judicial, and societal concerns. Advocates claim the bill will rectify unjust imprisonment, particularly in the post-ISIS era. Critics, however, argue that the bill's broad language could inadvertently release individuals affiliated with ISIS, undermining ongoing counterterrorism efforts and the pursuit of justice for victims. Complicating matters further is the recent decision by the United Nations Security Council to terminate the mandate of UNITAD, a team responsible for investigating crimes committed by ISIS. This article delves into the intricacies of the proposed bill, its implications for justice and national reconciliation, and its potential impact on counterterrorism efforts in Iraq.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 10p.

By Lorenzo Vidino 

Executive Summary • Hamas supporters have long operated in the United States. Internal Hamas documents and FBI wiretaps introduced as evidence in various federal criminal cases clearly show the existence of a nationwide Hamas network engaged in fundraising, lobbying, education, and propaganda dissemination dating back to the 1980s. • The network formalized its existence in 1988, when it created the Palestine Committee in the US. The Committee’s goals included “increasing the financial and the moral support for Hamas,” “fighting surrendering solutions,” and publicizing “the savagery of the Jews.” • The Palestine Committee spawned several public-facing organizations, most of which are based out of Chicago, Dallas, and Washington DC. They included the all-purpose Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the financial arm represented by the Occupied Land Fund (which later became the Holy Land Foundation, HLF), and the think tank United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). • In 1993, the FBI wiretapped a meeting of top Hamas activists in the US held in Philadelphia. The wiretaps show internal discussions on how to improve activities in support of Hamas within the US and how to shield them from the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. US-based Hamas activists agreed that hiding their affiliation and intentions was the best tactic to avoid negative consequences. “I swear by Allah that war is deception,” said one senior leader, “[d]eceive, camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy.” “Let's not hoist a large Islamic flag and let's not be barbaric-talking. We will remain a front so that if the thing [the U.S. government ban on Hamas] happens, we will benefit from the new happenings instead of having all of our organizations classified and exposed.” • Over the years, US authorities have conducted several activities to clamp down on the network, including deporting and prosecuting Hamas operatives and shutting down multiple front organizations. The 2001 designation of HLF and subsequent prosecution of part of its leadership for funneling approximately $12.4 million to Hamas constitutes to date the largest successful terrorism financing prosecution in US history. • Yet, US-based Hamas networks and individuals have displayed a remarkable resilience and many of the core activists of the Palestine Committee are still engaged in various forms of support (albeit at times purely political and not material) for Hamas. 

Washington DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Bennett Clifford and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

 As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitation.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 33p.