By Ilana Krill & Bennett Clifford   

  In the United States, critical infrastructure, or “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, [that] are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” are prime targets in violent extremist attack plots.1 While a variety of violent extremist movements have attempted to assault American critical infrastructure throughout modern history, the Department of Homeland Security and other national security authorities have recently sounded the alarm that U.S.-based violent extremists have developed “credible, specific plans” to attack critical infrastructure.2 To understand the current dimensions of this threat, this paper reviews 94 cases of individuals charged in the U.S. federal court system from 2016 to 2022 with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, 35 of whom attempted to attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of these cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement; 16 are associated with white supremacist groups. Evaluating these cases, the report finds: ● Salafi-jihadist attack planners were significantly more likely to consider critical infrastructure systems as targets for attack than their white supremacist counterparts. ● Salafi-jihadist and white supremacist attack planners attempted to target different critical infrastructure sectors, with the former focusing on the commercial facilities, government facilities, and emergency services sectors, and the latter predominantly focusing on the energy sector. ● Since 2019, white supremacist attacks plots against critical infrastructure systems have distinctly increased. ● Between 2016 and 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems dramatically increased in frequency. 13 individuals associated with the movement were arrested and charged in federal court with planning attacks on the energy sector; 11 of these attack planners were charged after 2020. ● The rise of accelerationist ideology and doctrine during the past decade likely fueled the increased risk of attack plots within white supremacist milieus targeting critical infrastructure, and the energy sector in particular.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.

By Brady United Against Gun Violence

Understanding the source of America’s gun violence epidemic is essential to building effective solutions to prevent it. For decades, laws passed at the behest of the gun industry have shielded important information from public view, making it nearly impossible to understand how, and from where, guns are funneled into the criminal market. Brady has used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover information in an attempt to better understand how guns make their way from the legal marketplace to ultimately being used in crime. This report examines federal records that identify gun dealers subject to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) Demand Letter 2 program — a program created to identify firearms dealers that sell the most crime guns and to aid law enforcement investigations. Only 2% of gun dealers nationwide are subject to this program, which includes dealers who have sold at least 25 guns that were recovered in crime during the past year that were found to have taken less than three years to make it from point of sale to being recovered in that crime. The ATF had identified that this low “time-to-crime” is a strong indicator of gun trafficking. This report, and its underlying national data, are the clearest look we’ve had in two decades as to which gun dealers sell the most crime guns. Absent complete transparency into the gun industry’s role in supplying firearms that fuel our nation’s gun violence epidemic, this data is the best indicator we have as to which gun dealers are fueling crime.

Washington, DC: Brady Campaign, 2024. 20p

By Sulaiman Lebbe Rifai

Nothing puts the human conscience on trial as does the Genocide in Gaza. Nothing illustrates the political hypocrisy of some Western leaders as does the war in Gaza. Nothing exemplifies the double standard of Western political leaders as their complicity in the Gazan war. Moreover, this war has put the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court in a somewhat difficult and precarious position. It has also put the UNHR in a difficult situation and it is alarmed with the seriousness of atrocities in Gaza. These courts and international organizations are instituted to establish justice and fairness in all international conflicts. They cannot discriminate between countries in their application of justice. They cannot apply one set of laws to the State of Zionist Israel and another set of laws to the people of Palestine. They must do unconditional justice to all parties equally without any prejudice, racial religious, or political discrimination. They must do this to protect the integrity and reputation of these international institutions and yet, the Zionist State of Israel and its supporters are standing between these institutions and their official responsibilities to apply laws equally to all. Take, for instance, the South African lawsuit against the state of Israel for its genocide in the Gaza Strip. Many countries in the Global South welcomed and supported South Africa’s initiative to file a case against Israel and yet, many Western countries blindly dismissed the legal complaint of South Africa in support of Israel as if there was no genocide committed in the Gaza by the State of Israel. To understand the gravity of the political discrimination of some Western leaders on the problem of the Gaza Genocide, we should revisit the contents of the UN’s convention on the prevention of the Crime of Genocide.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By David Lochhead, Tidiani Diakité, Roberto Sollazzo, Saikou Sow, Raoul Sumo Tayo, Leonard Tettey

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in West Africa expanded dramatically between 2014 and 2022. As of 2022, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria were heavily affected by these weapons, while Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo suffered from their use as an emerging threat. IED-building networks have established material and training links across conflict theatres in West and Central Africa, including the Lake Chad Basin, where armed groups have used IEDs extensively. IED designs have remained constant and inexpensive throughout the West Africa region, making them attractive for use in attacks against domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The Small Arms Survey collected data on more than 2,200 IED-related incidents between March 2013 and September 2022, including the type, date, and location of these events. Information on perpetrators, their targets, and more than 6,600 casualties from deaths and injuries was also collected (Small Arms Survey, 2022). The data was collected through research undertaken in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, as well as desk research and remote interviews concerning Benin, Chad, and Nigeria. Where relevant from a comparative perspective, discussion of other regions that have countries with IED incidents or components occurs throughout the Report, such as those in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East. Most IED incidents analysed during this study involved IEDs containing explosive components or precursors specifically manufactured for the commercial extractive and construction sectors. Chemical products such as ammonium nitrate (AN), manufactured and supplied for bulk mining explosive emulsions, have entered IED-building networks, and are sourced principally from Ghana and Nigeria. Commercial explosives in bulk, including their precursors and accessories such as electric initiators and detonating cords, are diverted from the legal to illicit markets. This diversion primarily fulfils demand from the largely unregulated artisanal gold mining sector across West and Central Africa. A small subset of this diverted material also provisions IED construction. Captured, stolen, and recovered explosive ordnance—including legacy anti-vehicle mines trafficked from Chad, Libya, and possibly Sudan—also constitutes a source of IED components. Coordinated action among affected, source, and transit states is required to prevent armed groups and criminals from accessing commercial explosive materials and other IED components. Such action can involve: national stocktaking exercises; the development of national and regional counter-IED (C-IED) strategies; monitoring, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms; regulatory modernization and harmonization;  engagement with artisanal mining associations, the mining and explosives industry, states, and regional trade blocs in pursuit of regulatory reform; and efforts to establish minimum standards for bulk and individual traceability of commercial explosives. Reducing the recovery of explosive ordnance requires renewed programmatic investment in clearing minefields and explosive remnants of war across the Sahe   

Geneva, SWIT:  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies , 2023.  124p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition. 

KEY FINDINGS • Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied. • Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes. • A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU. • The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.

By Rachel A. Kane; Basia E. Lopez; Paul A. Haskins

This Special Report of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) presents a synthesis of select findings from over 60 publications on 18 NIJ-supported research projects on public mass shootings, including school mass shootings, since 2014. It also identifies areas of need and interest for future research and recommendations. For the purpose of this report, we define public mass shooting as a shooting event in a public setting that causes at least four fatalities in a single event. Excluded from our definition are events that occur in the course of a separate felony or domestic incident. However, the definition of a mass shooting varies among sources; for more information see “The Challenges of Defining ‘Mass Shooting’” in Part I of this report.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice , 2023. 42p.

By: Jonathan P. Caulkins, Philippe C. Schicker, H. Brinton Milward & Peter Reuter

Overdose deaths in North America have soared, primarily because of the spread of illegally manufactured fentanyl. This paper uses detailed qualitative and transaction-level data to analyse an early and prominent dark web fentanyl-selling operation. The data record the date, drug, quantity, and selling price for 5,589 transactions comprising 872,659 items sold for a little over $2.8 million through AlphaBay. Findings include that the organisation sustained an impressive sales growth rate of approximately 15% per week, com-pounded. Increasing order sizes by a factor of ten reduced the price per pill by approximately 25% for Oxycodone and 50% for Xanax. Those steep quantity discounts imply large price markups when selling further down the distribution chain. Such high growth rates and price markups suggest that it might be difficult to constrain supply by shutting down individual organisations, since any remain-ing organisations may be able to quickly grow to fill unmet demand.

Glob. Crime 2023

By Catrina Doxsee, Alexander Palmer, and Riley McCabe

Terrorism is no longer the leading international threat to the United States or its top defense priority, but challenges related to violent extremism remain. The threat from Salafi-jihadist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State has declined, and ethnonationalist threats are largely contained. However, a broader patchwork of violent far-right and far-left extremist ideologies has become more prominent on the global stage. Meanwhile, terrorism continues to overlap in significant ways with strategic competition, especially via Iran's support to terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. 138p.

By  Vincenzo Bove,  Georgios Efthyvoulou,  and Harry Pickard

Numerous studies demonstrate that terrorism causes strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Yet, are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a quasi-experimental design and data on three successful and three foiled terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of successful attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 130 days after the attacks. We also find that, whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Interestingly, foiled attacks can also affect public perceptions, which, however, quickly return to normal levels. We argue that the extent of media coverage is partly responsible for the duration of these effects.

United Kingdom: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2022, 19p.

By Jens F. Binder and Jonathan Kenyon

This work is concerned with the extent and magnitude of threat related to online radicalization in the context of terrorist acts and related offending. Online influences have been depicted as major drivers for the propagation and adoption of extremist ideologies, which often contain an element of collective grievance, and subsequent acts of violence. This is most pronounced in the discussion of so-called lone actor terrorism, but extends to all forms of extremist offending, and beyond. The present work situates online radicalization leading to terrorist acts within the wider context of grievance-based beliefs and attitudes. Further, it addresses current positions and debates surrounding the relevance and mechanisms of online radicalization in terrorist offending. Recent evidence from quantitative studies is reviewed to estimate prevalence of online radicalization and the level of threat that results from it. This is followed by a discussion of plausible, but opposing, interpretations of the estimates presented. While online radicalization does occur, with and without reference to offline processes, the resulting threat is not overly high. This assessment, however, refers to the present only and is unlikely to hold for the future, given the general growth and acceleration of online activity among terrorist actors

United Kingdom: Forensic and Legal Psychology, 2022, 10p.

By Jonathan Kenyon

The overarching aim of this doctoral research was to investigate the role of the Internet in radicalisation pathways and offending of convicted extremists in England and Wales. The empirical study was unique because it benefitted from access to closed source risk assessment reports within His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). These reports were authored by Psychologists and Probation Officers with access to restricted case documentation and in the majority of cases, direct interviews with the individuals concerned. Findings were based on 235 convicted extremists, all of whom were considered to have radicalised prior to committing their offence. Variables of interest, including offender demographics, offence characteristics and online activities were extracted from risk reports completed from October 2010 to December 2017. Since completion of the doctorate, the analysis has been expanded to 437 convicted extremists, which includes all those subject to risk reports from October 2010 to December 2021. This accounts for close to every convicted extremist in England and Wales considered to have radicalised prior to their conviction.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 4p.

By Hanna Paalgard Munden, Sarah Marsden, MD Kamruzzaman Bhuiyan, Lotta Rahlf, Hanna Rigault Arkhis, Aimee Taylor

This report sets out the findings of research to understand the potential of the Good Lives Model (GLM) to interpret trajectories into and out of violent extremism and considers the implications for policy and practice. The Good Lives Model (GLM) is a well-developed manifestation of a strength-based approach to rehabilitation. The model argues that focusing on developing strengths and enhancing protections, rather than solely managing and controlling risk factors, offers a more fruitful route to preventing (re)offending. The GLM has become an increasingly prominent part of efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders, however its potential with respect to the violent extremist population has not been fully exploited. This report is informed by a review of research on protective factors set out in an earlier report: Conceptualising Protective Factors: Strength-Based Approaches (Marsden and Lee, 2022) that established the theoretical foundation for the empirical research set out here.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 30p.

By Rosamund Mutton, James Lewis, and Sarah Marsden

This guide sets out the evidence base for ‘online radicalisation’, examining how individual use of the Internet, in conjunction with offline influences, can facilitate radicalisation processes. The UK is the main context of concern, however comparable evidence is found in studies with samples from the USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Israel. Radicalisation remains a contentious concept and few studies explicitly define ‘online radicalisation’. For the purposes of this guide, ‘radicalisation’ is understood as leading to cognitive outcomes reflected in changes in beliefs and ideas, and/or behavioural outcomes which manifest in changes in behaviour. Two systematic literature reviews (Hassan et al., 2018; Carthy et al., 2020) directed initial searches for relevant research. Further literature was identified through forward and backward citation searching, and narrower key word searches conducted in Google Scholar. Literature searches were completed between June and August 2022. The guide primarily examines literature published between January 2017 and July 2022. Although the evidence base remains modest in size, the research underpinning this guide is assessed to be good quality. There is a growing body of evidence that uses qualitative and quantitative methods to examine a range of factors which are relevant to online radicalisation.

Scotland: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2023, 42p.

By Joanna Dawson

This paper describes the recent history and present status of proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 (the “2000 Act”). Prior to the 2000 Act, proscription was exclusively concerned with terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. Under the 2000 Act, proscription was extended to include organisations concerned with both domestic and international terrorism. The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is “concerned in terrorism”. If the Home Secretary believes that an organisation meets this statutory test, they must then decide whether to proscribe the organisation. In doing so, they must take into account various policy considerations. Consequences of proscription The 2000 Act sets out a number of proscription offences. These include belonging to or inviting support for a proscribed organisation; arranging or assisting with the arrangement of a meeting that supports a proscribed organisation; addressing such a meeting; or wearing clothing or displaying articles in public which arouse suspicion of membership or support of a proscribed organisation. It is also possible to impose financial sanctions on proscribed organisations.   Current proscribed organisations As of September 2023 there were 79 international terrorist groups proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland proscribed under previous legislation. In November 2021 the Home Secretary announced that the Government had laid an instrument to proscribe Hamas in its entirety, ending the distinction between different wings of the organisation. In September 2023 the Government laid an instrument to proscribe Wagner Group, a private military organisation which has acted as a proxy for the Russian state. The Government considers it to involved in committing acts of terrorism, including in relation to its involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Annex to this paper includes a current list of proscribed organisations and a description of their activities. Criticisms of the proscription regime Proscription has been characterised as a powerful deterrent, a way of tackling lower-level support for terrorism, and a signal of rejection by society. But questions have also been raised as to its utility in combating terrorism and its compatibility with the rule of law. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Lord David Anderson KC, repeatedly recommended the introduction of time limits for proscription orders, as have his successors, Max Hill QC and the current IPTL, Jonathan Hall KC. However, the Government has so far declined to follow these recommendations and currently deproscription is done by way of application only. As a consequence, groups that no longer meet the statutory requirements for proscription continue to be proscribed, a situation described by Lord Anderson as “an affront to the rule of law”.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024, 70p.

By: Eric L. Piza; George O. Mohler; Jeremy G. Carter; David N. Hatten; Nathan T. Connealy; Rachael Arietti; Jisoo Cho; Emily Castillo

This report presents a study on the impact of gunshot detection technology (GDT) on gun violence. The authors leverage over a decade of data from Kansas City, MO, and Chicago, IL, to measure how GDT contributes to policing and public safety. Both cities installed ShotSpotter GDT systems in 2012, allowing for a long-term quasi-experiment of program effects. Kansas City Police Department installed GDT in October 2012, with the target area covering approximately 3.5 square miles of the city and remaining unchanged to this day. Chicago Police Department installed GDT over approximately 3.0 square miles of the city in August 2012 with the coverage area expanding to 22 additional police districts between February 2017 and May 2018. This expansion led to approximately 100 square miles being covered by GDT in Chicago. The GDT system in Kansas City detected 11,517 gunfire incidents through the end of the study period (12/31/2019). The GDT system in Chicago detected 85,572 gunfire incidents over the full installation period from 2/6/17 – 12/31/19.1 Based upon ShotSpotter’s reported annual subscription costs of between $65,000 and $90,000 per square mile2, GDT coverage costs between $227,500 and $315,000 per year in Kansas City and between $8.8M and $12.3M per year in Chicago.

Final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, 2023. 114p.

By the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lauren Richards, Peter Molinaro, John Wayne. et al.

Operationally defining the lone offender terrorist is challenging, as the nature of terrorism is both highly political and contextually dependent. Over the years, there has been disagreement over the classification of violent acts under the label of “terrorism.” While an argument can be made that the infliction of fear upon a targeted group or the public is sufficient to classify an act as terrorism, the FBI definition of terrorism requires a purported motivation that goes beyond exclusively personal motivations and attempts to influence change in furtherance of extremist ideologies of a social, political, religious, racial or environmental nature. The focus of the current study examined offenders who carried out their attacks independent of any direction from a terrorist group or organization.Lone offender terrorism continues to pose a threat as violent ideological groups and terrorist organizations place emphasis on inspiring lone offender-style attacks. Additionally, individuals who view violence as an accessible and justified method for advancing their own ideological goals can independently mobilize toward violent action. While attacks directly coordinated by terrorist organizations are generally more lethal globally, the United States departs from this trend: lone offender attacks in the United States are more deadly, possibly due to strong U.S. counterterrorism capacity for disrupting.The current report provides an overview of the data, exploring the various topics encompassed within the coding protocol, including bystander observations, offenders’ backgrounds, family and social networks, behavioral characteristics, radicalization, and attack planning. Predicting lone offender terrorism incidents is not possible, but prior research and operational experience support the conclusion that acts of targeted violence, including lone offender terrorist attacks, may be preventable through early recognition and reporting of concerning behavior. The report aims to inform broader goals of enhancing bystander education and awareness, as well to aid the prevention efforts of law enforcement and multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams working to counter targeted violence threats every day. To work toward this objective, the authors examine relevant contextual factors and analyze the statements and behaviors offenders exhibited before carrying out their attacks.

Washington, DC: U.S. FBI, 2019. 80p.

By The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

From the document: "In 2013, the president signed into law the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, which led the FBI to examine active shooter incidents since 2000. The findings in this report are intended to provide an overview of active shooter incidents to help law enforcement, other first responders, and the public better understand the levels of threats associated with active shooter incidents. In 2022, the FBI designated 50 shootings as active shooter incidents. Although incidents decreased by 18% from 2021 (61 incidents), the number of active shooter incidents increased by 66.7% compared to 2018 (30 incidents). The 50 active shooter incidents in 2022 occurred in 25 states and the District of Columbia and represent seven location categories, including open spaces, commerce, residences, education, government, houses of worship, and a health care facility. [...] Data cited in this report for active shooter incidents that occurred in 2022 is valid as of February 10, 2023; however, incident data from prior published reports was not updated. If additional incidents meeting FBI criteria are identified after the publication of this document, every effort will be made to factor those incidents into future reporting."

Washington, DC: FBI, 2023. 33p.

By the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Office of Homeland Security

From the Executive Summary: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. The greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders, often radicalized online, who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and our investigations."

By Hanna Börgmann

This report provides a summary of the expert conference “In the Blind Spot – Right-Wing Extremists on Alternative and Established Platforms“, which took place in Berlin in September 2023 as part of the “Countering Radicalisation in Right-Wing Extremist Online Subcultures” programme funded by the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ). The third conference of the programme served to present current research projects from digital right-wing extremism research and to discuss various perspectives from research, regulation and law enforcement.

The report emphasises the social and political relevance of the research field and current trends in right-wing extremism research, underpinned by welcoming addresses from Benjamin Strasser, State Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ), and Huberta von Voss, Executive Director of ISD Germany, among others. Dr Julia Ebner, extremism expert and ISD Senior Research Fellow, and Dr Matthias Becker, project manager of the interdisciplinary research project “Decoding Antisemitism”, also provided keynote speeches.

The conference was divided into several panels that focused primarily on discursive and strategic developments, far-right financing, research into right-wing online activities, deradicalization and online regulation. In the discussion panel, a panel of experts focused on the effects of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA).

Berlin: ISD - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 19p.

By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition.

Illicit firearms ammunition and other explosive munitions in the European Union—a new paper from the Small Arms Survey, as part of the INSIGHT project—provides a regional analysis and overview of the types, sources, and end users of these items, and addresses the need for detailed, policy-relevant data on illicit munitions in Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.