By Cyril O. Ugwuoke, Benjamin Okorie Ajah, Linus Akor, Sunday Ojonugwa Ameh, Cletus A. Lanshima, Elias C. Ngwu, Ugomma Ann Eze, and Michael Nwokedi

This paper examined the vulnerability of travelers to kidnapping, abduction and armed robbery attacks and in some extreme cases, death along Nigeria's highways. Insecurity on the nation's highways became a contemporary criminological discourse following the emergence of new strands of criminality like militancy, terrorism, kidnapping, herdsmen-farmers violence, communal conflicts and banditry. Nigerian highways have become the major operational hotspots for criminals who harass, terrorize, and traumatize travelers at will. With the ever-rising insecurity on Nigerian highways, the military and paramilitary offensives deployed by the Federal Government have not yielded the desired results culminating in the description of government's inertia as a form of state slumber. Data for this study were sourced from a content analysis of reported violent highway crimes by credible mainstream Nigerian newspapers, spanning a period of one year, from July 2020 to July 2021. Adopting the Social Disorganization Theory, the study indicated that the worrisome nature of insecurity on Nigeria's highways resulting in the high rate of abduction and murder of people of diverse military, professional, socioeconomic and political backgrounds has engendered a sense of helplessness, trauma and vulnerability among Nigerian road travelers. The paper recommends the de-centralization of Nigeria Police Force structure to create State Police that will encourage and electrify effective and better people oriented patrolling and management of insecurities on the Nigerian highways.

Heliyon v.9(10); 2023 Oct PMC10551549

By: John Sunday Ojo

This article explores the dominant narrative of ill-governed or ungoverned territories in the northern region of Nigeria where informality and socioeconomic deficit fashioned the mannerism of everyday life. Reconnoitering ungoverned territories, positing that radical jihadist and non-jihadist movements and criminal-armed groups are ideologically driven by localism and informal networks, particularly in the areas unkempt by the state. The paper interrogates to what extent ungoverned spaces embolden the recruitment of criminal and terrorist groups in northern Nigeria. It explains the complex security paradoxes confronting the Nigerian state, it analyses the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani militancy and banditry within the context of ungoverned spaces that continuously breed terrorist organizations, and criminal networks, that pose an enormous risk to human security. It adopts a qualitative approach and spatial network analysis using Geographical Information System (GIS). The paper argues that the primordial negligence of ungoverned areas with limited state surveillance or unharmonized state presence, controlled by informal networks and hybrid arrangements creates an enabling environment for warlordism, religious fanaticism and tribal self-defense forces. It further demonstrates that governance failure in these regions stimulates illegal movement of arms and ammunition, the raw material for bombs, illegal drugs and foreign machines, and becomes abodes for Boko Haram jihadist and non-Boko Haram armed groups. The paper concludes that ungoverned spaces could be morphed into a production site for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the terrorists in the near future, thus, until the Nigerian state pays attention to the territories under-governed or poorly governed, it will become difficult to win the war against terrorism, Fulani militancy and banditry through military response. Therefore, good governance that transcends ethnic chauvinism remains a veritable weapon in conquering multilayered security quagmires facing the giant of Africa.

African Security, Volume 13, 2020 - Issue 1

By Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday Ojo & Samuel Oyewole

Insecurity has worsened in Northwest Nigeria, due to the threat of armed banditry, necessitating the deployments and operations of the military. While there is increasing academic attention on the origins, causes, and nature of this threat, the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military’s counter-banditism response in the region remains understudied. Accordingly, foregrounded by the need to close this gap, this qualitative study contributes to the literature through organised empirical research by examining the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military's Joint Task Force operation Hadarin Daji – its major internal security operation – against armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria. Data is obtained from secondary sources which include academic journal articles, books, official reports, press briefs by the military, reputable local and international news reportage. The study’s central argument holds that the nature and character of the military’s campaigns against armed banditry – a form of unconventional warfare, poses significant challenges to it as a conventional fighting force, consequentially contributing towards the conflict’s protractedness. Recalibrating the military’s readiness for and response to unconventional warfare remains critical to degrading and defeating armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria.

African Secuirty Review Volume 32, 2023 - Issue 4

By Jordan B. Cohen

In the 1980s, the production of guns made with polymer (industrial plastic) stoked concerns that firearms were becoming undetectable by metal detectors in places like airports and federal buildings. In response, Congress passed, and President Ronald W. Reagan signed into law, the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (UFA; P.L. 100-649).

The UFA was codified as 18 U.S.C. §922(p) and prohibits owning, purchasing, importing, receiving, and selling firearms that do not include at least 3.7 ounces of stainless steel. The UFA also prohibits handguns where the barrel, slide or cylinder, or the frame or receiver do not generate an image that accurately depicts the shape of the component when under inspection by the type of x-ray machine commonly used at airports.

The UFA included a sunset clause, after which its provisions will be repealed. The UFA’s sunset has been delayed multiple times, most recently through March 22, 2024 (P.L. 118-40).

History of Undetectable Firearms Act

The impetus for the UFA stemmed from fears that polymer-framed firearms could slip past airport metal detectors. For example, the Glock was invented in the 1980s and is a polymer-framed, semi-automatic pistol. Initially designed for the Austrian military, the Glock’s frame weighs much less than traditional steel-framed firearms and the polymer allows it to better absorb recoil than other handguns.

Some observers framed the Glock as a hijacker’s special, referring to the potentiality that it could pass through airport security undetected. Additionally, in 1986 media reports claimed that the Glock, when dismantled, “is frighteningly easy to smuggle past airport security” and that “one Pentagon security expert decided to demonstrate just how easy it would be to sneak a Glock 17 aboard an airliner.” Though not mentioned in these articles, these same metal detectors and their operators were also often not recognizing pistols made exclusively out of metal.

Beyond concerns over polymer guns, some feared that individuals may attempt to board aircrafts or enter federal buildings with nondescript, gadget firearms or firearms that, when broken into component parts, do not look like traditional firearms—such as “a James Bond-like pen gun.”

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2024. 3p.

By Melissa W. Burek,  & Julia C. Bell

On June 13, 2022, Ohio enacted a permitless carry law (PCL), allowing Ohioans to carry a firearm without a concealed-carry license. The Center for Justice Research was tasked to explore the relationship between permitless carry and crime involving a firearm before and after the enactment of the PCL in the eight largest cities of Ohio. This exploratory study considers crime incidents involving a firearm, validated gunshot detection incidents, and the impact of PCL on law enforcement from June 2021 to June 2023. Major findings, study limitations, and future research recommendations are presented in the full report. In brief, we observed: • Results from a trend analysis indicated a significant decrease in crime incidents involving a firearm for Akron, Columbus, and Toledo, and across all 8 cities combined from June 2021- June 2023. • As displayed in the figure above, most cities’ crime rates decreased after the PCL was enacted. Unlike the other six cities, rates in Dayton and Cincinnati increased slightly, however. • Toledo, Parma, and Akron each experienced an average of 19% decrease in summed rates of crimes involving a firearm post-PCL. • Based on data from June 2021-June 2023, the enactment of the PCL does not appear to have any appreciable effect on law enforcement injuries or deaths by firearm in the cities of interest. • Data on gunshot detection technology for Toledo and Columbus also captured a decrease in validated crime incidents post-PCL by 23.2% and 20.6%, respectively. • Increases in crime rates in the spring-summer months appear both before and after the PCL went into effect for most cities (see Figure 1 in full report), but this observation could be due to the influence of other factors such as time of year or structural population characteristics. This slight acceleration in crimes involving firearms was also temporary

United States, Center for Justice Research. 2023, 22pg

By Tae-Young Pak

Surges in firearm sales after mass shootings have been well documented in the United States. This study presents three main findings regarding the impact of mass shootings on firearm demand and the moderating roles played by political and regulatory climates. First, mass shootings led to an immediate but temporary increase in gun sales. This effect continued for approximately 3–6 months after the incidents and was larger for shootings with a greater number of fatalities. Second, the association between mass shootings and gun sales was significant only under Democratic presidents. The party affiliation of the state legislature and state-level gun control did not moderate this association. Third, the increased firearm sales after mass shootings did not result in a higher level of firearm ownership. It appeared most purchases were made by current gun owners stockpiling additional firearms, thus indicating the fear of stricter gun control as a likely motivation. This study offers the following policy implications: (a) the public debates concerning gun violence could have the unintended consequence of raising gun demand among current owners, (b) the message of tightening gun control could increase the total stock of firearms in circulation, and (c) the regulations to prevent future mass shootings may be better addressed by the state government as a state-level regulation does not trigger demand response among potential consumers. 

Germany, Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 2022, 33pg

By Rebecca F. Wilson, Sasha Mintz, Janet M. Blair, Carter J. Betz, Abby Collier, and Katherine A. Fowler

In the United States, unintentional injury is the fourth leading cause of death among infants (i.e., children aged <1 year) and is the top cause of death among children and adolescents aged 1–17 years; firearms are a leading injury method. Unsecured firearms (e.g., unlocked and loaded) are associated with risk for unintentional childhood firearm injury death. Data recorded during 2003–2021 by the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) from 49 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were used to characterize unintentional firearm injury deaths of U.S. infants, children, and adolescents aged 0–17 years (referred to as children in this report). NVDRS identified 1,262 unintentional firearm injury deaths among children aged 0–17 years: the largest percentage (33%) of these deaths were among children aged 11–15 years, followed by 29% among those aged 0–5 years, 24% among those aged 16–17 years, and 14% among persons aged 6–10 years. Overall, 83% of unintentional firearm injury deaths occurred among boys. The majority (85%) of victims were fatally injured at a house or apartment, including 56% in their own home. Approximately one half (53%) of fatal unintentional firearm injuries to children were inflicted by others; 38% were self-inflicted. In 9% of incidents, it was unknown whether the injury was self- or other-inflicted. Approximately two thirds (67%) of shooters were playing with or showing the firearm to others when it discharged. Overall, firearms used in unintentional injury deaths were often stored loaded (74%) and unlocked (76%) and were most commonly accessed from nightstands and other sleeping areas (30%). Unintentional firearm injury deaths of children are preventable. Secured firearm storage practices (e.g., storing firearms locked, unloaded, and separate from ammunition) have been identified as protective factors against child firearm injuries and deaths, underscoring the importance of policymakers, health care professionals (e.g., pediatricians), and others partnering with parents, caregivers, and firearm owners to promote secure firearm storage.  

United States, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 2023, 8pg

By Greg Berman

HFG’s ‘At the Crossroads’ series concludes with the publication of  “Behind the Rise in Gun Violence in New York and Other American Cities,” a compilation of the twelve interviews conducted by Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Fellow of Practice Greg Berman with an essay illuminating common themes and practical approaches to ending such violence.

United States, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. 2022, 152pg

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Julia Boya & Angelika Patel

Hidden deep in the Bavarian mountains lies the picturesque village of Oberstdorf—a place where for hundreds of years people lived simple lives while history was made elsewhere. Yet even this remote idyll could not escape the brutal iron grip of the Nazi regime.

From the author of the international bestseller Travelers in the Third Reich comes A Village in the Third Reich, shining a light on the lives of ordinary people. Drawing on personal archives, letters, interviews and memoirs, it lays bare their brutality and love; courage and weakness; action, apathy and grief; hope, pain, joy, and despair.

Within its pages we encounter people from all walks of life – foresters, priests, farmers and nuns; innkeepers, Nazi officials, veterans and party members; village councillors, mountaineers, socialists, slave labourers, schoolchildren, tourists and aristocrats. We meet the Jews who survived – and those who didn’t; the Nazi mayor who tried to shield those persecuted by the regime; and a blind boy whose life was judged "not worth living."

This is a tale of conflicting loyalties and desires, of shattered dreams—but one in which, ultimately, human resilience triumphs. These are the stories of ordinary lives at the crossroads of history.

London. Elliott and Thompson. 2022. 420p.

Edited by Tanya Mehra, Thomas Renard and Merlina Herbach with contributions from Marc Hecker and Sofia Koller.

The involvement of women in terrorism is not new, but it has gained more attention with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which attracted many women to its so-called caliphate. Initially perceived as victims or harmless, these women progressively became a growing subject of attention and concern for security services. In 2017, the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) already indicated that the threat emanating from female jihadis should not be underestimated, while recognising knowledge gaps about the role(s) these women played in jihadi movements or the threat they posed.1 The same year, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) stressed that women who were affiliated with terrorist organisations “may have served in many different roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts” and urged states to pay special attention to this as women “require special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies.”2 Yet, in spite of more attention from counter-terrorism services, and a growing body of literature on female terrorists, there is still a considerable lack of data-driven, empirical research on female violent extremist offenders (VEOs). This book seeks to inform practitioners and policy-makers on how to manage female VEOs through the criminal justice system in a rule of law and human rights compliant manner through four case studies in Europe.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT: 2024. 223p.

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

By Justin Nix and John A. Shjarback

Objectives

To quantify nonfatal injurious police shootings of people and examine the factors associated with victim mortality.

Methods

We gathered victim-level data on fatal and nonfatal injurious police shootings from four states that have such information publicly available: Florida (2009–14), Colorado (2010–19), Texas (2015–19), and California (2016–19). For each state, we examined bivariate associations between mortality and race/ethnicity, gender, age, weapon, and access to trauma care. We also estimated logistic regression models predicting victim mortality in each state.

Results

Forty-five percent of these police shooting victims (N = 1,322) did not die. Black–white disparities were more pronounced in nonfatal injurious police shootings than in fatal police shootings. Overall, Black victims were less likely than white victims to die from their wound(s). Younger victims were less likely to die from their wound(s), as well as those who were unarmed.

Conclusions

Racial and age disparities in police shootings are likely more pronounced than previous estimates suggest.

Policy implications

Other states should strongly consider compiling data like that which is currently being gathered in California. Absent data on nonfatal injurious police shootings–which account for a large share of deadly force incidents–researchers and analysts must be cautious about comparing and/or ranking jurisdictions in terms of their police-involved fatality rates.

PLOS One,  November 10, 2021

By Daniel S. Nagin

Do states with more guns have higher rates of fatal police shootings? This article uses a validated measure of firearm availability (the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm) to examine the relationship between gun proliferation and fatal police shootings. It expands on existing research to include (1) measures of access to Level I and II trauma centers, (2) interpretation of the findings from the lenses of “statistical prediction,” and (3) tests for structural differences between models for black descendants versus nonblack decedents. Findings confirm the correlation between statewide prevalence of gun ownership and fatal police shootings for both all decedents and unarmed decedents. It provides partial support for “statistical prediction” by police and finds that greater access to trauma centers is associated with lower rates of citizen deaths. The analysis suggests a far broader range of policy options for saving lives, such as better enforcement of legal restrictions on firearm possession, than focusing solely on policing systems.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 687, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 49-57

By Charles C Lanfear , Rebecca Bucci , David S Kirk , Robert J Sampson

Importance: The past quarter-century has seen both sharp declines and increases in firearm violence in the United States. Yet, little is known about the age of first exposure to firearm violence and how it may differ by race, sex, and cohort.

Objective: To examine race, sex, and cohort differences in exposure to firearm violence in a representative longitudinal study of children who grew up in periods with varying rates of firearm violence in the United States and to examine spatial proximity to firearm violence in adulthood.

Design, setting, and participants: This population-based representative cohort study included multiple cohorts of children followed-up from 1995 through 2021 in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Participants included Black, Hispanic, and White respondents from 4 age cohorts of Chicago, Illinois, residents, with modal birth years of 1981, 1984, 1987, and 1996. Data analyses were conducted from May 2022 to March 2023.

Main outcomes and measures: Firearm violence exposure, including age when first shot, age when first saw someone shot, and past-year frequency of fatal and nonfatal shootings within 250 m of residence.

Results: There were 2418 participants in wave 1 (in the mid-1990s), and they were evenly split by sex, with 1209 males (50.00%) and 1209 females (50.00%). There were 890 Black respondents, 1146 Hispanic respondents, and 382 White respondents. Male respondents were much more likely than female respondents to have been shot (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR], 4.23; 95% CI, 2.28-7.84), but only moderately more likely to have seen someone shot (aHR, 1.48; 95% CI, 1.27-1.72). Compared with White individuals, Black individuals experienced higher rates of all 3 forms of exposure (been shot: aHR, 3.05; 95% CI, 1.22-7.60; seen someone shot: aHR, 4.69; 95% CI, 3.41-6.46; nearby shootings: adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR], 12.40; 95% CI, 6.88-22.35), and Hispanic respondents experienced higher rates of 2 forms of violence exposure (seen someone shot: aHR, 2.59; 95% CI, 1.85-3.62; nearby shootings: aIRR, 3.77; 95% CI, 2.08-6.84). Respondents born in the mid-1990s who grew up amidst large declines in homicide but reached adulthood during city and national spikes in firearm violence in 2016 were less likely to have seen someone shot than those born in the early 1980s who grew up during the peak of homicide in the early 1990s (aHR, 0.49; 95% CI, 0.35-0.69). However, the likelihood of having been shot did not significantly differ between these cohorts (aHR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.40-1.63).

Conclusions and relevance: In this longitudinal multicohort study of exposure to firearm violence, there were stark differences by race and sex, yet the extent of exposure to violence was not simply the product of these characteristics. These findings on cohort differences suggest changing societal conditions were key factors associated with whether and at what life stage individuals from all race and sex groups were exposed to firearm violence.

JAMA Network Open 6(5); 2023

Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi,  Emma Cornell,  Sandeep Kapoor,  Laura Harrison,  Chethan Sathya, 

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: US pediatric firearm deaths increased in 2021, above the spike in 2020, with worsening disparities. Implementation of prevention strategies and policies among communities at highest risk is critical 

Pediatrics (2023) 152 (3): e2023061296.

By Caroline Logan, Randy Borum, and Paul Gill

Violent extremism has galvanized public fear and attention. Driven by their concerns, the public has pushed for law enforcement and mental health systems to prevent attacks rather than just respond to them after they occur. The prevention process requires guidance for practitioners and policymakers on how best to identify people who may be at risk, to understand and assess the nature and function of the harm they may cause, and to manage them to mitigate or prevent harm. Violent Extremism provides such guidance.

Over 10 chapters, prepared by leading experts, this handbook illuminates the nature of violent extremism and the evolution of prevention-driven practice. Authors draw on the literature and their experience to explain which factors might increase (risk factors) or decrease (protective factors) risk, how those factors might operate, and how practitioners can prepare risk formulations and scenario plans that inform risk management strategies to prevent violent extremist harm.

Each chapter is crafted to support thoughtful, evidence-based practice that is transparent, accountable and ultimately defensible. Written for an international audience, the volume will be of interest to law enforcement and mental health professionals, criminal justice and security personnel, as well as criminologists, policymakers and researchers.

London, UCL Press. 2023, 319pg

By Michelle Sydes, Lorelei Hine, Angela Higginson, James McEwan, Laura Dugan, Lorraine Mazerolle

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map

(EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.

Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and nongovernment websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022.

Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location.

Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool.

United States, Campbell Collaboration. 2023, 53pg

By Lorenzo Vidino, Jon Lewis, and Andrew Mines

Dollars for Daesh analyzes both the tactics ISIS supporters in the U.S. used to raise and move funds, as well as the various types of networks from which individuals drew financial support. The authors drew on thousands of pages of court documents covering criminal proceedings dating from 2013 to the end of August 2020. 

Overall, the report shows that U.S.-based ISIS supporters left a small and unsophisticated financial footprint, with a few notable exceptions. Furthermore, individuals tended to operate as lone financial actors or in small clusters, which has mitigated the effectiveness of counter-terrorism financing policies and tools that have successfully targeted the larger and more sophisticated financing mechanisms of groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The low-level and largely inconspicuous nature of these actors will likely pose a unique challenge to law enforcement efforts going forward. This report is part of a new Program on Extremism stream of research into terrorism financing, which aims to assess and explore these trends across a range of various extremist groups and ideologies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 48p.

By Haroro J. Ingram

This study examines the Islamic State movement’s method of insurgency in both its theory (as articulated in the group’s internal and publicly disseminated documents) and its practice via an analysis of its capture and occupation of Mosul. Drawing on a variety of primary source materials including interviews, this paper presents a conceptual model of insurgency arguing that the Islamic State emerges as an exemplar case study of many key strategic mechanisms and psychosocial dynamics that are crucial for understanding modern insurgencies.

To these ends, this study has three key aims. First, it presents a conceptual framework for understanding modern insurgency as a dual contest of control and meaning. This model of insurgency, which builds on a range of sources including a global cross-section of insurgency doctrines, is then applied to the Islamic State. Second, this study analyses fourteen primary source documents that constitute the Islamic State’s insurgency canon. It then examines the Islamic State’s method of insurgency in practice with a particular focus on the years following its near decimation in 2007-08 through to its occupation of Mosul (circa 2014-17). Third, this study concludes by outlining a suite of research and policy recommendations based on its key conceptual and analytical findings. Overall, it hopes to contribute to not only literature examining the Islamic State but ongoing scholarly and practitioner debates on how best to understand modern insurgencies and its counter-strategy implications.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 59p.