Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

DREXEL, BILL; WITHERS, CALEB

From the document: "Since ChatGPT [Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer] was launched in November 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have captured public imagination across the globe. ChatGPT's record-breaking speed of adoption--logging 100 million users in just two months--gave an unprecedented number of individuals direct, tangible experience with the capabilities of today's state-of-the-art AI systems. More than any other AI system to date, ChatGPT and subsequent competitor large language models (LLMs) have awakened societies to the promise of AI technologies to revolutionize industries, cultures, and political life. [...] This report aims to help policymakers understand catastrophic AI risks and their relevance to national security in three ways. First, it attempts to further clarify AI's catastrophic risks and distinguish them from other threats such as existential risks that have featured prominently in public discourse. Second, the report explains why catastrophic risks associated with AI development merit close attention from U.S. national security practitioners in the years ahead. Finally, it presents a framework of AI safety dimensions that contribute to catastrophic risks."

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY. UN, 2024. 42p.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

From the document: "Eruptions of violence during the events of January 6th 2021 exemplified the need to understand how conspiracy theories and extremism interact to create security threats. Social media presents as a key player in this exchange, and this project sought to respond to that dynamic by exploring and seeking to understand the intra-actions in groups which discuss both conspiracy beliefs and extreme ideas. To achieve this, it synthesises techniques from computer science and social science to analyse data from platforms which enable and promote unguarded speech. [...] This report seeks to understand how conspiracy theories and extreme ideologies impact one another. [...] This report will introduce a new method analysis of conspiracy and politically motivated groups named the SHIFT analysis. This analysis combines data science and social research techniques within a broadly abductive approach to develop new understanding of dynamic events. SHIFT analysis, which is mutable and robust to examine a singular group or between group interactions in this context, is applied to examine the QAnon movement, in the context of the lead up to and aftermath of January 6th, which espoused both extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs." "SHIFT" comes from the beginning letters of the following five analysis procedures: 1. 'S'ocial network analysis and identification; 2. 'H'one extracted sample and coding; 3. 'I'nvestigative netnography; 4. 'F'rame analysis; and 5. 'T'ext analytics.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS. JUN, 2024. 36p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Bàrbara Molas, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rękawek, andThomas Renard

Anti-Government Extremism (AGE) presents a complex and evolving security challenge, particularly in the transatlantic space. AGE is characterised by anti-system sentiments, and adherents propagate notions of an evil elite controlling societal mechanisms, adapting global conspiracy theories to local grievances. While predominantly non-violent, it harbours the potential for violence, posing a significant policy challenge. This report contributes a comprehensive exploration of AGE by utilising original data, including interviews with security officials and an exploration of AGE spaces online, focusing on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Through thematic comparative analysis, it unveils the nature of anti-government groups and individuals, elucidating their transnational linkages both online and offline. By shedding new light on AGE’s manifestations, severity, and responses across jurisdictions, this research illuminates whether AGE constitutes a standalone security concern. Furthermore, it offers insights into practical strategies for addressing AGE, especially in the context of existing policies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The recommendations provided are tailored to the differing characteristics of AGE groups, individuals, and networks, ensuring a nuanced and effective response to this emerging threat, both online and offline.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 48pg