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TERRORISM

TERRORISM-DOMESTIC-INTERNATIONAL-RADICALIZATION-WAR

The modern day consequences, causes, and nature of kidnapping, terrorism, banditry, and violent crime in Nigeria: A comprehensive analysis.

By Nsirimovu Okwuwada

There have been several agitations in Nigeria, but none have degenerated into the current barbaric, horrendous, heinous, and despicable dimensions of carnage, massacres, and bloodletting orchestrated by terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, and other organized violent crime syndicates. This study takes a holistic approach using secondary data sources to examine the root causes of the modern-day prevalence of kidnapping, banditry, terrorist attacks, and other organized criminal activities in Nigeria. The study finds that unemployment, excess supply of young people, neglect of certain regions in the distribution of national wealth, lack of government visibility, lack of equal economic opportunity for all, uncontrolled influx of firearms, poverty, and religious fanaticism contributes to the increasing rate of violent crime in Nigeria. The article finds that the nature of banditry, kidnapping, and terrorist attacks are similar, and the modes of attacks on civilian and government installations are also related. The government should thus become proactively visible throughout the nation via its security agencies and economic development agenda. Additionally, the government should educate local officials and traditional councils on contemporary methods for reporting and addressing violent groups in their communities.

MPRA Paper No. 117671, Munich: MPRA, 2023. 46p.

Violent crimes and insecurity on Nigerian highways: A tale of travelers’ trauma, nightmares and state slumber

By Cyril O. Ugwuoke, Benjamin Okorie Ajah, Linus Akor, Sunday Ojonugwa Ameh, Cletus A. Lanshima, Elias C. Ngwu, Ugomma Ann Eze, and Michael Nwokedi

This paper examined the vulnerability of travelers to kidnapping, abduction and armed robbery attacks and in some extreme cases, death along Nigeria's highways. Insecurity on the nation's highways became a contemporary criminological discourse following the emergence of new strands of criminality like militancy, terrorism, kidnapping, herdsmen-farmers violence, communal conflicts and banditry. Nigerian highways have become the major operational hotspots for criminals who harass, terrorize, and traumatize travelers at will. With the ever-rising insecurity on Nigerian highways, the military and paramilitary offensives deployed by the Federal Government have not yielded the desired results culminating in the description of government's inertia as a form of state slumber. Data for this study were sourced from a content analysis of reported violent highway crimes by credible mainstream Nigerian newspapers, spanning a period of one year, from July 2020 to July 2021. Adopting the Social Disorganization Theory, the study indicated that the worrisome nature of insecurity on Nigeria's highways resulting in the high rate of abduction and murder of people of diverse military, professional, socioeconomic and political backgrounds has engendered a sense of helplessness, trauma and vulnerability among Nigerian road travelers. The paper recommends the de-centralization of Nigeria Police Force structure to create State Police that will encourage and electrify effective and better people oriented patrolling and management of insecurities on the Nigerian highways.

Heliyon v.9(10); 2023 Oct PMC10551549

Governing “Ungoverned Spaces” in the Foliage of Conspiracy: Toward (Re)ordering Terrorism, from Boko Haram Insurgency, Fulani Militancy to Banditry in Northern Nigeria

By: John Sunday Ojo

This article explores the dominant narrative of ill-governed or ungoverned territories in the northern region of Nigeria where informality and socioeconomic deficit fashioned the mannerism of everyday life. Reconnoitering ungoverned territories, positing that radical jihadist and non-jihadist movements and criminal-armed groups are ideologically driven by localism and informal networks, particularly in the areas unkempt by the state. The paper interrogates to what extent ungoverned spaces embolden the recruitment of criminal and terrorist groups in northern Nigeria. It explains the complex security paradoxes confronting the Nigerian state, it analyses the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani militancy and banditry within the context of ungoverned spaces that continuously breed terrorist organizations, and criminal networks, that pose an enormous risk to human security. It adopts a qualitative approach and spatial network analysis using Geographical Information System (GIS). The paper argues that the primordial negligence of ungoverned areas with limited state surveillance or unharmonized state presence, controlled by informal networks and hybrid arrangements creates an enabling environment for warlordism, religious fanaticism and tribal self-defense forces. It further demonstrates that governance failure in these regions stimulates illegal movement of arms and ammunition, the raw material for bombs, illegal drugs and foreign machines, and becomes abodes for Boko Haram jihadist and non-Boko Haram armed groups. The paper concludes that ungoverned spaces could be morphed into a production site for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the terrorists in the near future, thus, until the Nigerian state pays attention to the territories under-governed or poorly governed, it will become difficult to win the war against terrorism, Fulani militancy and banditry through military response. Therefore, good governance that transcends ethnic chauvinism remains a veritable weapon in conquering multilayered security quagmires facing the giant of Africa.

African Security, Volume 13, 2020 - Issue 1

Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and the prospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria

By Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday Ojo & Samuel Oyewole

Insecurity has worsened in Northwest Nigeria, due to the threat of armed banditry, necessitating the deployments and operations of the military. While there is increasing academic attention on the origins, causes, and nature of this threat, the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military’s counter-banditism response in the region remains understudied. Accordingly, foregrounded by the need to close this gap, this qualitative study contributes to the literature through organised empirical research by examining the conduct, achievements, prospects, and challenges of the military's Joint Task Force operation Hadarin Daji – its major internal security operation – against armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria. Data is obtained from secondary sources which include academic journal articles, books, official reports, press briefs by the military, reputable local and international news reportage. The study’s central argument holds that the nature and character of the military’s campaigns against armed banditry – a form of unconventional warfare, poses significant challenges to it as a conventional fighting force, consequentially contributing towards the conflict’s protractedness. Recalibrating the military’s readiness for and response to unconventional warfare remains critical to degrading and defeating armed banditry in Northwest Nigeria.

African Secuirty Review Volume 32, 2023 - Issue 4

A VILLAGE IN THE THIRD REICH: HOW ORDINARY LIVES WERE TRANSFORMED BY THE RISE OF FASCISM

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Julia Boya & Angelika Patel

Hidden deep in the Bavarian mountains lies the picturesque village of Oberstdorf—a place where for hundreds of years people lived simple lives while history was made elsewhere. Yet even this remote idyll could not escape the brutal iron grip of the Nazi regime.

From the author of the international bestseller Travelers in the Third Reich comes A Village in the Third Reich, shining a light on the lives of ordinary people. Drawing on personal archives, letters, interviews and memoirs, it lays bare their brutality and love; courage and weakness; action, apathy and grief; hope, pain, joy, and despair.

Within its pages we encounter people from all walks of life – foresters, priests, farmers and nuns; innkeepers, Nazi officials, veterans and party members; village councillors, mountaineers, socialists, slave labourers, schoolchildren, tourists and aristocrats. We meet the Jews who survived – and those who didn’t; the Nazi mayor who tried to shield those persecuted by the regime; and a blind boy whose life was judged "not worth living."

This is a tale of conflicting loyalties and desires, of shattered dreams—but one in which, ultimately, human resilience triumphs. These are the stories of ordinary lives at the crossroads of history.

London. Elliott and Thompson. 2022. 420p.

Female Jihadis Facing Justice: Comparing Approaches in Europe,

Edited by Tanya Mehra, Thomas Renard and Merlina Herbach with contributions from Marc Hecker and Sofia Koller.

The involvement of women in terrorism is not new, but it has gained more attention with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which attracted many women to its so-called caliphate. Initially perceived as victims or harmless, these women progressively became a growing subject of attention and concern for security services. In 2017, the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) already indicated that the threat emanating from female jihadis should not be underestimated, while recognising knowledge gaps about the role(s) these women played in jihadi movements or the threat they posed.1 The same year, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) stressed that women who were affiliated with terrorist organisations “may have served in many different roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts” and urged states to pay special attention to this as women “require special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies.”2 Yet, in spite of more attention from counter-terrorism services, and a growing body of literature on female terrorists, there is still a considerable lack of data-driven, empirical research on female violent extremist offenders (VEOs). This book seeks to inform practitioners and policy-makers on how to manage female VEOs through the criminal justice system in a rule of law and human rights compliant manner through four case studies in Europe.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT: 2024. 223p.

Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

By Anti-Defamation League

Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, to further a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities. In 2023, domestic extremists killed at least 17 people in the U.S., in seven separate incidents. This represents a sharp decrease from the 27 extremist-related murders ADL has documented for 2022—which itself was a decrease from the 35 identified in 2021. It continues a trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five-year span of 47-79 extremist-related murders per year (2015- 2019). One reason for the trend is the decrease in recent years of extremist-related killings by domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists. The 2023 murder totals include two extremist-related shootings sprees, both by white supremacists, which together accounted for 11 of the 17 deaths. A third shooting spree, also by an apparent white supremacist, wounded several people but luckily did not result in fatalities. All the extremist-related murders in 2023 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, with 15 of the 17 killings involving perpetrators or accomplices with white supremacist connections. This is the second year in a row that right-wing extremists have been connected to all identified extremist-related killings. Two of the incidents from 2023 involved women playing some role in the killing or its aftermath. This report includes a special section that examines the role played by women in deadly extremist violence in the United States by analyzing 50 incidents from the past 20 years in which women were involved in some fashion in extremist-related killings. Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2023

New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 36p.

ONLINE EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM RESEARCHERS’ SECURITY, SAFETY, AND RESILIENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

Violent Extremism: A handbook of risk assessment and management

By Caroline Logan, Randy Borum, and Paul Gill

Violent extremism has galvanized public fear and attention. Driven by their concerns, the public has pushed for law enforcement and mental health systems to prevent attacks rather than just respond to them after they occur. The prevention process requires guidance for practitioners and policymakers on how best to identify people who may be at risk, to understand and assess the nature and function of the harm they may cause, and to manage them to mitigate or prevent harm. Violent Extremism provides such guidance.

Over 10 chapters, prepared by leading experts, this handbook illuminates the nature of violent extremism and the evolution of prevention-driven practice. Authors draw on the literature and their experience to explain which factors might increase (risk factors) or decrease (protective factors) risk, how those factors might operate, and how practitioners can prepare risk formulations and scenario plans that inform risk management strategies to prevent violent extremist harm.

Each chapter is crafted to support thoughtful, evidence-based practice that is transparent, accountable and ultimately defensible. Written for an international audience, the volume will be of interest to law enforcement and mental health professionals, criminal justice and security personnel, as well as criminologists, policymakers and researchers.

London, UCL Press. 2023, 319pg

Transphobic discourse and moral panic convergence: A content analysis of my hate mail

By Michelle Sydes, Lorelei Hine, Angela Higginson, James McEwan, Laura Dugan, Lorraine Mazerolle

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map

(EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.

Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and nongovernment websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022.

Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location.

Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool.

United States, Campbell Collaboration. 2023, 53pg

Dollars for Daesh: Analyzing the Finances of American ISIS Supporters

By Lorenzo Vidino, Jon Lewis, and Andrew Mines

Dollars for Daesh analyzes both the tactics ISIS supporters in the U.S. used to raise and move funds, as well as the various types of networks from which individuals drew financial support. The authors drew on thousands of pages of court documents covering criminal proceedings dating from 2013 to the end of August 2020. 

Overall, the report shows that U.S.-based ISIS supporters left a small and unsophisticated financial footprint, with a few notable exceptions. Furthermore, individuals tended to operate as lone financial actors or in small clusters, which has mitigated the effectiveness of counter-terrorism financing policies and tools that have successfully targeted the larger and more sophisticated financing mechanisms of groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The low-level and largely inconspicuous nature of these actors will likely pose a unique challenge to law enforcement efforts going forward. This report is part of a new Program on Extremism stream of research into terrorism financing, which aims to assess and explore these trends across a range of various extremist groups and ideologies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2020. 48p.

The Long Jihad: The Islamic State's Method of Insurgency- Control, Meaning, & the Occupation of Mosul in Context

By Haroro J. Ingram

This study examines the Islamic State movement’s method of insurgency in both its theory (as articulated in the group’s internal and publicly disseminated documents) and its practice via an analysis of its capture and occupation of Mosul. Drawing on a variety of primary source materials including interviews, this paper presents a conceptual model of insurgency arguing that the Islamic State emerges as an exemplar case study of many key strategic mechanisms and psychosocial dynamics that are crucial for understanding modern insurgencies.

To these ends, this study has three key aims. First, it presents a conceptual framework for understanding modern insurgency as a dual contest of control and meaning. This model of insurgency, which builds on a range of sources including a global cross-section of insurgency doctrines, is then applied to the Islamic State. Second, this study analyses fourteen primary source documents that constitute the Islamic State’s insurgency canon. It then examines the Islamic State’s method of insurgency in practice with a particular focus on the years following its near decimation in 2007-08 through to its occupation of Mosul (circa 2014-17). Third, this study concludes by outlining a suite of research and policy recommendations based on its key conceptual and analytical findings. Overall, it hopes to contribute to not only literature examining the Islamic State but ongoing scholarly and practitioner debates on how best to understand modern insurgencies and its counter-strategy implications.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 59p.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Reaction to the Taliban's Return to Power

By Sergio Altuna  

For the last several months, Islamists around the world have monitored the events in Afghanistan with great interest. The Taliban’s successful military offensive and subsequent return to power galvanized public displays of support from the movement’s regional allies, and especially from aligned Al-Qaeda supporters. While much attention has been paid to the reactions among various jihadist groups, there has not been much focus on the broader effects of the Taliban takeover on global Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood. While a significant degree of uncertainty still surrounds the Taliban’s international agenda, prominent players within the Muslim Brotherhood have already signaled their unambiguous support for the group. This paper compiles those declarations of support by Muslim Brotherhood members, documenting various quotes, official statements, publications, media appearances, and more. The collection starts from the fall of Kabul and proceeds to the present, dividing quotes into two distinct categories according to their origin: 1) those made by members or groups of the global Muslim Brotherhood, and 2) those made by members or institutions specifically of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. On the whole, the collection below provides evidence not only of the ideological affinities shared by the Taliban and the Muslim Brotherhood, but also reveals how the Brotherhood is adapting its discourse to incorporate and accommodate new narratives of the fall of Kabul to the Taliban.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 12p.

Social SciencesGuest User
Moderating Extremism: The State of Online Terrorist Content Removal Policy in the United States

By Bennett Clifford

By reviewing studies of how today’s terrorist and extremist groups operate on social media in conjunction with an overview of U.S. government regulation of terrorist content online, this report finds that stricter U.S. regulation of social media providers may not be the most effective method of combating online terrorist and extremist content.

Specifically:

• Direct governmental regulations that ignore other sources of regulation on content removal policies could disrupt growing intra-industry collaboration on countering terrorist content online.

• In many regards, the U.S. government defers to and depends on the private sector to conduct counterterrorism online. Many factors contribute to this arrangement, including limits on the government’s authorities, expertise, staffpower, dexterity and political will to manage online terrorist content with the same efficacy as major social media companies.

• Attempts by other governments to strictly regulate social media companies’ terrorist content removal policies hurt small companies, created double standards and redundancies, and raised concerns about censorship and free speech.

• Proposed regulations may only affect major U.S. social media providers; smaller and non-U.S. companies may be unable, unwilling, or not required to comply. Due to the proliferation of social media platforms exploited by terrorists and extremists, platforms that may be unaffected by U.S. government regulation currently host a large proportion of terrorist content online.

• In certain regards, major social media companies’ content removal policies have more flexibility than the U.S. government to be able to account for new terrorist and extremist groups and actors and their respective tactics, techniques, and procedures online.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2021. 24p.

Hezbollah's Operations and Networks in the United States: Two Decades in Review

By Anyssia S. Kokinos, Nakissa P. JahanbaniJon LewisDevorah Margolin,

Executive Summary ● This report aims to provide a comprehensive examination of Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America by examining all publicly-known federal criminal cases from 1997 to 2020 in the United States with a concrete link to Hezbollah. The authors found evidence of 128 individuals that meet these criteria. ● The majority of cases involve small, centralized hubs of Hezbollah operatives, who engage in illegal activities in conjunction with wider criminal enterprises to create an array of networks across America. These relationships of convenience have resulted in Hezbollah operatives collaborating with financially-motivated individuals, criminals, and other nonideological actors, in furtherance of a broader operational mission. These arrangements, in turn, have allowed Hezbollah to profit financially and deepen its influence in the United States, even as many such cases display minimal direct connective links to the terrorist organization itself. ● Based on analysis of the cases, the authors identified two distinct categories of participation in Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America: individuals who provided financial support to Hezbollah (109 individuals), and those who provided operational support (19 individuals). ○ 87% of individuals provided financial or material support to Hezbollah as money launderers, bundlers, fraudsters, and goods smugglers, with many raising funds from others to be provided to Hezbollah or directly providing funds to the group themselves. This finding supports existing assessments that Hezbollah’s primary aspirations in the United States are to use it as a financial support hub. ○ 13% of individuals in the dataset engaged in operational conduct in support of Hezbollah, including as human smugglers, weapons procurers, pre-operational surveillance, and travelers who sought to join the group. Despite the prominence of Hezbollah’s financing activities in the United States, elements within Hezbollah remain intent on developing the capacity and capability to plot attacks on U.S. soil. ● The vast majority (92%) of cases involved network activities between two or more individuals. Larger geographic hubs operated out of Michigan (55 cases), California (19 cases), North Carolina (16 cases), and New York (15 cases). 90% of individuals operating in these four states and 76% of all cases in this dataset were a part of just six networks. ○ Large parts of network activity involved individuals with limited evidence to suggest a direct link to Hezbollah. As discussed above, these individuals actively collaborated with persons with an evidenced connection to the terrorist organization, and in many cases appear to be driven primarily by financial rather than ideological motivations. This in and of itself is a manifestation of Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, which sought to use local criminal actors in furtherance of their illegal activities. Further, in several significant instances, network activity often involved friends or family members engaged in organized conspiracies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.

Verbatim: What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

By Lorenzo Vidino

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe is a controversial topic, frequently subjected to misinterpretations and manipulations. Opinions on it vary from those who argue that it does not exist and that it is bigoted and conspiratorial thinking to argue otherwise, to those who claim that it does and it is, in substance, similar to groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State; from those who believe that it is a force that has evolved over time and now embraces democracy and the positive integration of Muslims in European society, to those who argue that it is a complex movement that, while showing a moderate façade, is in reality engaged in non-violent but nonetheless highly problematic activities (a position held by this author).  

Much of the confusion stems from the opaque and secretive nature of the Brotherhood and, consequently, the difficulty of obtaining clear and unequivocal information. As the Brotherhood was founded and operates mostly in Middle Eastern countries where local regimes have enacted various forms of repression against it, the movement has always seen dissimulation of many aspects of its structure and goals as a necessary tactic to survive. Organizations belonging to the Brotherhood’s family in the Arab world have therefore gone to great lengths to hide various aspects of their inner workings. It is a tactic that, given the context, is understandable and has ensured the movement’s survival in tough political environments for almost a century.  

Somewhat counterintuitively, the secrecy that shrouds Brotherhood networks is somewhat greater in the West, where the Brotherhood is not considered a terrorist organization and can generally operate freely within a democratic framework. Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, as said, have historically kept secret many aspects of their activities, but they have never denied their own existence. That denial is common in the West where most Brotherhood-linked activists and organizations not only shroud in secrecy their inner workings but even refuse to admit any Brotherhood connection. Brotherhood activists and sympathizers also tend to attack those who highlight the existence of Brotherhood-linked networks in Europe and their problematic nature with charges of shoddy research, conspiratorial views, and bigotry. 

Given these dynamics, it is important to observe what entities across Europe, whose institutional mandate is to monitor potential threats to their countries, think about the movement, from its very existence to its tactics and goals. The Brotherhood is not designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union or by any individual European country. At the same time, however, the security services of virtually all European countries have long monitored the movement---a fact that is per se telling.

European security services have kept the movement under watch with different degrees of intensity. Those that have a broad institutional mandate that leads them to monitor all potential threats to their countries’ democratic and constitutional order, like Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz, both at the federal level and in all 16 German states), have done so more extensively than some of their counterparts throughout Europe whose mandate is narrower and law enforcement-like. And in each country the degree of scrutiny of the Brotherhood varies with time, depending on factors such as the existence of more immediate security threats or input from political decisionmakers.

Yet, without exception, all European security services adopt a highly negative view of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Continent. All European security services which have publicly expressed views on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe over the last twenty years have clearly and consistently stated that:

  1. An extensive and sophisticated network linked to the Brotherhood operates covertly in Europe, both at the national and pan-European level (through its umbrella organization, FIOE/CEM, and spinoffs like FEMYSO);

  2. European-based Brotherhood-linked activists have created front organizations that allow them to operate within society and advance their agenda without being easily recognizable as being part of the Brotherhood; and

  3. Brotherhood networks in Europe are not engaged in terrorism but have views and goals that are problematic, subversive, undemocratic, and incompatible with basic human rights and Western society.

These views have been expressed in various terms by European security services, and some have reached more pessimistic conclusions than others. But all those that have gone on the record over the last two decades about the movement have been extremely negative and concerned about its impact on European society.

This short report has collected all publicly available statements from annual and occasional reports, testimonies in parliamentary hearings, and formal statements in court cases from the various European security services that have addressed the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. They include all the statements the author could find, with no selections or omissions, save for repetitions (as in the case of annual reports from German security services, which in substance repeat what was reported in previous years). All documents are publicly available and unclassified. All are herewith reported with references (so that the reader can read the context) and without commentary. The report does not include media interviews by representatives of security services, as they do not constitute a direct representation of their views and manipulation/misinterpretations might have occurred.     

The assessments here reported come from the security services of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The author is not aware of any security service from any other European country having gone on the record on the matter. The main reason for this is arguably the varying levels of comfort of different security services when it comes to going on the record on any matter unless strictly necessary. In general, for example, the security services of most Southern and Eastern European countries are culturally less prone to revealing much of their views on any matter than their Central and Northern European counterparts. Moreover, issues related to Islamism in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular do not constitute a major issues in Eastern European countries, given their small Muslim population.

In substance, the security services of basically all the largest Western European countries (with the notable exception of Italy) have gone on the records expressing very negative views on the Muslim Brotherhood. The author is not aware of any European security service having stated anything that even slightly contradicts the assessments on the Brotherhood made by the services of the seven countries here mentioned. To the contrary, interviews conducted by the author with most European security services over the last twenty years confirm that even those that have not gone on the record (Italian security services, for example) adopt extremely negative views of the Brotherhood, in line with those that do appear on record.  

The inevitable conclusion of this reading is that the European security community has reached a firm consensus over the presence, structure, tactics, aims, and ultimately, problematic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. That consensus has been consistent over the last twenty years and has no known deviations, and this consensus should be the basis for well-informed policymaking on the subject.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 20p.

The Perilous Intersection of Amnesty and Accountability: Iraq's Legal Quandary and its Global Counterterrorism Ramifications

By Omar Mohammed

The Iraqi Parliament is poised to discuss a new amnesty bill that has generated significant controversy and debate. This legislation is intended to address the issue of wrongful detentions but raises profound ethical, judicial, and societal concerns. Advocates claim the bill will rectify unjust imprisonment, particularly in the post-ISIS era. Critics, however, argue that the bill's broad language could inadvertently release individuals affiliated with ISIS, undermining ongoing counterterrorism efforts and the pursuit of justice for victims. Complicating matters further is the recent decision by the United Nations Security Council to terminate the mandate of UNITAD, a team responsible for investigating crimes committed by ISIS. This article delves into the intricacies of the proposed bill, its implications for justice and national reconciliation, and its potential impact on counterterrorism efforts in Iraq.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 10p.

The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History

By Lorenzo Vidino 

Executive Summary • Hamas supporters have long operated in the United States. Internal Hamas documents and FBI wiretaps introduced as evidence in various federal criminal cases clearly show the existence of a nationwide Hamas network engaged in fundraising, lobbying, education, and propaganda dissemination dating back to the 1980s. • The network formalized its existence in 1988, when it created the Palestine Committee in the US. The Committee’s goals included “increasing the financial and the moral support for Hamas,” “fighting surrendering solutions,” and publicizing “the savagery of the Jews.” • The Palestine Committee spawned several public-facing organizations, most of which are based out of Chicago, Dallas, and Washington DC. They included the all-purpose Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the financial arm represented by the Occupied Land Fund (which later became the Holy Land Foundation, HLF), and the think tank United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). • In 1993, the FBI wiretapped a meeting of top Hamas activists in the US held in Philadelphia. The wiretaps show internal discussions on how to improve activities in support of Hamas within the US and how to shield them from the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. US-based Hamas activists agreed that hiding their affiliation and intentions was the best tactic to avoid negative consequences. “I swear by Allah that war is deception,” said one senior leader, “[d]eceive, camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy.” “Let's not hoist a large Islamic flag and let's not be barbaric-talking. We will remain a front so that if the thing [the U.S. government ban on Hamas] happens, we will benefit from the new happenings instead of having all of our organizations classified and exposed.” • Over the years, US authorities have conducted several activities to clamp down on the network, including deporting and prosecuting Hamas operatives and shutting down multiple front organizations. The 2001 designation of HLF and subsequent prosecution of part of its leadership for funneling approximately $12.4 million to Hamas constitutes to date the largest successful terrorism financing prosecution in US history. • Yet, US-based Hamas networks and individuals have displayed a remarkable resilience and many of the core activists of the Palestine Committee are still engaged in various forms of support (albeit at times purely political and not material) for Hamas. 

Washington DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2023. 16p.

Imitators or Innovators? Comparing Salafi-Jihadist and White Supremacist Attack Planning in the United States

By Bennett Clifford and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

 As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitation.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 33p.

Mayhem, Murder, and Misdirection: Violent Extremist Attack Plots Against Critical Infrastructure in the United States, 2016-2022

By Ilana Krill & Bennett Clifford   

  In the United States, critical infrastructure, or “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, [that] are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” are prime targets in violent extremist attack plots.1 While a variety of violent extremist movements have attempted to assault American critical infrastructure throughout modern history, the Department of Homeland Security and other national security authorities have recently sounded the alarm that U.S.-based violent extremists have developed “credible, specific plans” to attack critical infrastructure.2 To understand the current dimensions of this threat, this paper reviews 94 cases of individuals charged in the U.S. federal court system from 2016 to 2022 with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, 35 of whom attempted to attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of these cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement; 16 are associated with white supremacist groups. Evaluating these cases, the report finds: ● Salafi-jihadist attack planners were significantly more likely to consider critical infrastructure systems as targets for attack than their white supremacist counterparts. ● Salafi-jihadist and white supremacist attack planners attempted to target different critical infrastructure sectors, with the former focusing on the commercial facilities, government facilities, and emergency services sectors, and the latter predominantly focusing on the energy sector. ● Since 2019, white supremacist attacks plots against critical infrastructure systems have distinctly increased. ● Between 2016 and 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems dramatically increased in frequency. 13 individuals associated with the movement were arrested and charged in federal court with planning attacks on the energy sector; 11 of these attack planners were charged after 2020. ● The rise of accelerationist ideology and doctrine during the past decade likely fueled the increased risk of attack plots within white supremacist milieus targeting critical infrastructure, and the energy sector in particular.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.