By Mitchell L. Doucette, Alexander D. McCourt, Cassandra K. Crifasi, and Daniel W. Webster

The United States faces rapidly rising rates of violent crime committed with firearms. In this study, we sought to estimate the impact of changes to laws that regulate the concealed carrying of weapons (concealed-carry weapons (CCW) laws) on violent crimes committed with a firearm.We used augmented synthetic control models and random-effects meta-analysis to estimate state-specific effects andtheaverageeffectofadoptingshall-issue CCW permitting laws on rates of 6 violent crimes: homicide with a gun, homicide by other means, aggravated assault with a gun, aggravated assault with a knife, robbery with a gun, and robbery with a knife. The average effects were stratified according to the presence or absence of several shall-issue permit provisions. Adoption of a shall-issue CCW law was associated with a 9.5% increase in rates of assault with a firearm during the first 10 years after law adoption and was associated with an 8.8% increase in rates of homicide by other means. When shall-issue laws allowed violent misdemeanants to acquire CCW permits, the laws were associated with higher rates of gun assaults. It is likely that adoption of shall-issue CCW laws has increased rates of nonfatal violent crime committed with firearms. Harmful effects of shall-issue laws are most clear when provisions intended to reduce risks associated with civilian gun-carrying are absent. 

American Journal of Epidemiology 192(3) 2023.   

By Cassandra K. Crifasi, Julie Ward, Alex D. McCourt,  Daniel Webster & Mitchell L. Doucette 

 Background

Fatal and nonfatal shootings by police are a public health issue that warrants additional research. Prior research has documented associations between fatal shootings by police and gun ownership, legislative strength scores, and lax concealed carry weapons laws. Despite research on other firearm-related outcomes, little is known about the impact of permit-to-purchase (PTP) laws on shootings by police. We generated counts of fatal and nonfatal OIS from the Gun Violence Archive from 2015 to 2020. We conducted cross-sectional regression modeling with a Poisson distribution and robust standard errors. In addition to PTP, we included several state-level policies that may be associated with shootings by police: comprehensive background check only (CBC-only) laws, concealed carry licensing laws, stand your ground laws, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and extreme risk protection orders (ERPO). We controlled for state-level demographic characteristics and included a population offset to generate incidence rate ratios (IRR).

Findings

PTP laws were associated with a 28% lower rate in shootings by police [IRR = 0.72, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.64–0.81]. Shall Issue (IRR = 1.34, 95% CI 1.17–1.53) and Permitless (IRR = 1.61, 95% CI 1.35–1.91) concealed carry laws and CBC-only laws (IRR = 1.12, 95% CI 1.01–1.25) were associated with higher rates of shootings by police. Stand your ground, violent misdemeanor prohibitions, and ERPO laws were not associated with shootings by police.

Conclusions

Our study found that PTP laws were associated with significantly lower rates of shootings by police. Removing restrictions on civilian concealed carry was associated with significantly higher rates. State-level firearm policies may be a lever to address shootings by police.

Injury Epidemiology,  10, 28 (2023).

By Alysson Gatens

Illinois’ firearm restraining orders, known in other states as “red flag laws” or “extreme risk protection orders,” are civil orders that temporarily remove firearms from individuals who are a potential danger to themselves or others. These laws aim to prevent firearm injury through a removal of means from persons experiencing a temporary crisis. Data suggest firearm restraining orders have been infrequently employed in Illinois since the law’s enactment in 2019. Nationally, initial research suggests that these types of laws are associated with reductions in firearm suicide. However, national findings have not conclusively shown a significant reduction in firearm assaults attributable to these laws. As the majority of these laws have been passed relatively recently, more research is needed as data become available on their usage and outcomes.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2022. 14p.

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Stefan Schaufelbühl , Nicolas Florquin , Denis Werner , Olivier Delémont

3D-printed firearms, an emerging category of privately made firearms (PMF) produced beyond government control, have become increasingly prevalent due to technological advancements. They are now emerging as a cost-effective and reliable alternative to conventional firearms. Raised to public awareness following the 2013 release of the 3D-printed Liberator, these firearms are now more commonly encountered by police forces. This article analyses various reports involving 3D-printed firearms, reflecting the increasing encounters by law enforcement agencies. It examines 186 cases involving 3D-printed firearms, primarily from North America, Europe, and Oceania, highlighting a significant rise in incidents since 2021. These incidents include seizures, illicit uses, and online sales, with the firearms typically being hybrid models, Parts Kit Completions/Conversions (PKC), or firearm components such as auto sears. The study underscores the use of affordable equipment and materials for production, emphasizing the accessibility and potential risks of these firearms.

Forensic Sci Int Synerg. 2024 Mar 28:8:100464.

By Yulia Yarina and Nicolas Florquin

Dangerous Devices: Privately Made Firearms in the Caribbean—a new Situation Update by the Small Arms Survey and its partners CARICOM IMPACS, CARPHA, and GA-CDRC at the University of the West Indies—examines the latest trends and developments regarding PMFs, their production and circulation in the Caribbean region, and calls for more in-depth data collection on these types of weapons to help tackle this threat to security and public health. The Situation Update was launched at the side event ‘A Public Health Crisis: Small Arms Trafficking and Violence in the Caribbean,’ held on 18 June 2024 on the margins of the Fourth Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms. KEY FINDINGS • While privately made firearms (PMFs) represent a small proportion of all firearm seizures in the Caribbean region, the threat appears to be growing as police are recovering a range of different types of PMFs. • Significant seizures of partially finished frames and computer numerical control (CNC)-milled receivers used to assemble firearms have been recorded since April 2023. • The first reported seizure of 3D-printed firearms in the region occurred in August 2023. Seizures of 3D-printed firearms and components have taken place in at least three countries since, also leading to the dismantlement of workshops and recovery of 3D printers. • Seizures of so-called ‘conversion devices’ in several countries underscore the particular threat they pose to public health in the region, given that they can be used to convert semi-automatic pistols and rifles to fully automatic weapons, thus increasing the risk of multiple injuries. • Few seized PMFs are identified as such in the publicly available reports examined by the Survey, which suggests that efforts are needed to improve the detection, identification, and monitoring of these weapons. • Death certificates and other public health records currently do not always capture detailed information about the types of firearms used in shootings, including whether they might have been PMFs.   

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 24p

By Gergely Hideg

The household firearms possession rate in Ukraine has been stable since the 2022 Russian invasion. At that time, 6 percent of households reported possessing firearms, which is similar to the 5.6 per cent that did so in a more recent survey carried out at the end of 2023. In fact, in the sampled households the aggregate number of firearms kept at home decreased by 15 per cent during the same period. • During this period, crime victimization levels were only slightly above pre-2022 levels; however, when crimes occur, firearms are increasingly more likely to be used. In late 2023, 11 per cent of all victims said they encountered a firearm during the crime incidents they experienced during the previous 12 months, up from 6 per cent a year earlier. Findings from the latest survey reveal that at the end of 2023, nearly four out of ten firearm owning households were unaware of the Unified Register of Weapons (39 per cent), which was launched in June 2023.  About three-quarters (74 per cent) of respondents whose households owned firearms and knew about the register said all their weapons were registered. Among all survey respondents who reported firearms possession at home, however, only 45 per cent indicated that their firearms were registered. • The war is resulting in an increase in the population of soldiers and veterans, who as a whole tend to adopt distinct attitudes towards firearm ownership. For instance, 31 percent of respondents with combat experience (pre- or post-2022) reported a firearm at their home and 18 per cent declared owning a firearm personally— compared with only about 6 and 3 per cent, respectively, for the general population

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 11p. 

By Julien Joly and Aline Shaban

The sources of illicit small arms in West Africa are multiple and evolving, and not limited to the diversion of international transfers. In terms of local sources, the unlicensed artisanal production of firearms has been a recurrent challenge for member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To support governments in addressing this challenge, the Survey conducted a general assessment of artisanal arms production in the ECOWAS region and the main regulatory approaches adopted by states to address their proliferation. This paper aims to stimulate discussion and the exchange of information on good practices among stakeholders to counter the proliferation and illicit use of small arms in West Africa. Key findings - Craft firearm production has deep cultural and economic roots in West Africa and serves different societal needs— and different uses—than industrial firearm production. Demand for craft-produced weapons is dependent on local dynamics. Craft firearms are no longer exclusively rudimentary items. In some instances, their sophistication is comparable to industrially made weapons equipped with automatic and semi-automatic mechanisms. The current regulatory framework for firearm production in West Africa, mandated by the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, does not distinguish between industrial and craft production, contributing to poor enforcement by the authorities, as well as low awareness and regulation avoidance among craft producers. In addition, the legal provisions often fail to take into account the firing mechanism, which is essential for determining a firearm’s lethality and type of use. Despite the unclear regulatory environment, artisanal producers in West Africa have shown a willingness to professionalize and regularize their work. If national authorities can refine legislative frameworks to reflect actual craft production practices and products, this willingness could serve as a basis for improved cooperation, record-keeping, and marking practices that closely resemble factory-made firearms. Today, craft weapons in the region range from rudimentary hunting weapons to sophisticated copies of self-loading rifles (Assanvo, 2017; Nowak and Gsell, 2018, p. 3). In light of this, craft firearms can offer criminals, insurgent groups, and private citizens a viable alternative to industrial weapons (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018, p. 36). Due to the clandestine—and lucrative—nature of their production, however, regulating the sector presents considerable challenges. Although the ECOWAS Convention provides a basis for the control of local firearm production in West Africa, it does not determine whether the manufacture of craft firearms should be considered separately or together with the manufacture of indus trial weapons. In practice, most national legislation suggests that legal provisions relating to licensing, marking, and record-keeping apply to all manufacturers indiscriminately. Nevertheless, due to technical and financial limitations, craft producers often fail to comply with these provisions, and may be pushed further into the covert side of the arms trade. With a view to informing artisanal firearms control policy, this Briefing Paper provides an overview of craft production dynamics in West Africa and explores the different approaches taken by ECOWAS member states to regulate their production

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 16p.

By Jacob D. Charles

In popular and professional discourse, debate about the right to keep and bear arms most often revolves around the Second Amendment. But that narrow reference ignores a vast and expansive nonconstitutional legal regime privileging guns and their owners. This collection of non constitutional gun rights confers broad powers and immunities on gun owners that go far beyond those required by the Constitution, like rights to bring guns on private property against an owner’s wishes and to carry a concealed firearm in public with no training or background check. This Article catalogues this set of expansive laws and critically assesses them. Unlike the formal constitutional guarantee, this broad collection is not solely libertarian, concerned only with guaranteeing noninterference with a negative right. Instead, it is also aggressively interventionist, countermanding contrary policy judgments by employers, universities, property owners, and local government officials, conferring robust rights and privileges, and shifting the distribution of violence in society. This Article underscores the rhetorical and legal connection between this gun rights expansionism and the formal Second Amendment guarantee. These laws do not derive from a judicial interpretation of the scope of the Constitution, but they are expressed and advocated for in constitutional terms. The Article also highlights how broad gun rights can create unique harm to the body politic and to marginalized groups by fostering fear and mistrust and empowering sometimes-problematic private actors to proactively police their own communities. Finally, the Article shows how gun-rights expansionism influences constitutional doctrine in the context of the Second Amendment, as well as of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  

 Michigan Law Review Volume 120 Issue 4 2022  

By : Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

* Suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U03, X60–X84, and Y87.0. Firearm-involved suicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes X72–X74.† Homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01–U02, X85–Y09, and Y87.1. Firearm-involved homicide was identified using ICD-10 underlying cause-of-death codes U01.4 and X93–X95.

Top

In 2022, among persons aged ≥10 years, the percentage of suicide deaths involving a firearm was lowest among persons aged 25–44 years (47.4%) and highest among persons aged ≥65 years (70.6%). The percentage of homicide deaths that involved a firearm was highest among persons aged 10–24 years and then decreased with age, from 92.2% among those aged 10–24 years to 44.5% among those aged ≥65 years.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:828. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7337a3

By Jennifer L. Behrens & Joseph Blocher

At a time when Second Amendment doctrine has taken a strongly historical turn and gun rights advocates have increasingly argued that gun regulation itself is historically racist, it is especially important that historical claims about race and guns be taken seriously and vetted appropriately. In this short article, we evaluate the often-repeated claim that the nickname “Saturday Night Special” derives from the phrase “[n___er]-town Saturday night.” Based on a review of newspapers, legislative debates, dictionaries, slang compendiums, and other sources, we find no historical support for this claim. It apparently appeared for the first time, unsourced, in a 1976 article and has been repeated in dozens of briefs and scholarly sources since. Advocates and scholars should stop invoking this unsupported origin story, which if anything serves as a cautionary example of how citations can cascade. The most plausible origin of the nickname as it related to cheap firearms stemmed from the turn of the century when the phrase “Saturday night special” was already in common usage with connotations of cheapness and convenience. 

108 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 283 (2024) 

By Patrick Sharkey , Megan Kang

Background: The recent rise of gun violence may lead to the perception that the problem of gun mortality in the United States is intractable. This article provides evidence to counter this perception by bringing attention to the period spanning from 1991 to 2016 when most US states implemented more restrictive gun laws. Over this period, the United States experienced a decline in household gun ownership, and gun-related deaths fell sharply.

Methods: The main analysis examines the conditional association between the change in gun regulations at the state level and the change in gun mortality from 1991 to 2016. We include a range of robustness checks and two instrumental variable analyses to allow for stronger causal inferences.

Results: We find strong, consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that restrictive state gun policies reduce overall gun deaths, homicides committed with a gun, and suicides committed with a gun. Each additional restrictive gun regulation a given state passed from 1991 to 2016 was associated with -0.21 (95% confidence interval = -0.33, -0.08) gun deaths per 100,000 residents. Further, we find that specific policies, such as background checks and waiting periods for gun purchases, were associated with lower overall gun death rates, gun homicide rates, and gun suicide rates.

Conclusion: State regulations passed from 1991 to 2016 were associated with substantial reductions in gun mortality. We estimate that restrictive state gun policies passed in 40 states from 1991 to 2016 averted 4297 gun deaths in 2016 alone, or roughly 11% of the total gun deaths that year.

Epidemiology. 2023 Nov 1;34(6):786-792. 2023 Sep 26.

By Eugenio Weigend Vargas, Michelle Degli Esposti, Stephen Hargarten, Laura Vargas and Jason E. Goldstick

Background

Globally, Mexico is one of six countries with the highest level of firearm mortality. While previous studies have examined firearm mortality in Mexico before 2015, increases in violence since then highlight the need for an updated analysis. In this study, we examined changes in firearm-related deaths in Mexico from 2015 to 2022 and described these deaths by key demographic groups, incident location, and state of occurrence. Data came from Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI), a federal agency that collects and reports national population data. We used descriptive statistics to analyze rates, proportions, and percentage changes in firearm mortality, and we displayed temporal trends using time plots and special trends using maps.

Results

Firearm deaths increased in Mexico from 2015 to 2018 but slightly decreased from 2018 to 2022. Homicides presented the highest increase and the highest proportion of firearm-related deaths from 2015 to 2022. Victims were primarily males but rates among women increased at a higher proportion (99.5% vs 53.5%). One third of victims were 20–29y but rates among children and adolescents (10–9y) increased at a higher proportion. Most firearm-related deaths occurred in streets or public spaces but the percentage of incidents occurring in households have increased. State-level rates and percentage changes varied significantly. States with higher rates of firearm mortality coincide with those involving conflict among organized criminal organizations.

Conclusion

Firearm mortality in Mexico is a major public health burden. The epidemiology of firearm-related deaths in Mexico varies by intent, demographics, location, and states. To mitigate this challenge, multiple solutions are required.

Introduction

Previous studies have documented increases in firearm mortality in Mexico from 1990 to 2015 (Dare et al. 2019). Reports from nonprofit organizations and news outlets indicate further increases since 2015, (particularly firearm homicides associated with organized crime) (Calderon et al. 2020), but comprehensive characterization of those trends is lacking. Organized criminal groups continue to operate in Mexico and roughly 213 k firearms are trafficked from the US every year (McDougal et al. 2014). In this regard, further increases in firearm mortality would threaten the future economy and health of Mexico (Peters et al. 2020; Aburto et al. 2016), and yet the lack of precise epidemiological information limits the ability to address this growing national problem with evidence-based programs and policies. In this analysis, we document changes in firearm-related deaths in Mexico from 2015 to 2022 and describe these deaths by key demographic groups (e.g., sex, age, and urbanicity), incident location (e.g., households or public spaces) and states where they occurred.

Methods

Data on causes of death were collected from Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI), a national vital statistic database that has previously been used to examine firearm mortality in Mexico (Dare et al. 2019; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2023a). INEGI collects annual mortality data and provides information on year of occurrence (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2023b). We merged datasets from 2015 to 2022. We excluded deaths that occurred/registered before 2015 and those where year of occurrence was unknown (n = 432), as well as deaths that occurred outside of Mexico (n = 2).

In line with previous studies (Degli Esposti et al. 2023; Cunningham et al. 2018), we identified firearm deaths using the International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) codes for firearm homicide (X93–X95 and U01.4), firearm suicide (X72–X74), unintentional firearm deaths (W32–W34), and firearm deaths of undetermined intent (Y22–Y24). Firearm deaths were further disaggregated by sex and age group (< 10y; 10–19y; 20–29y; 30–39; 40–49y; 50–59y; 60–69y; 70y+) and geographic information (urbanicity, incident location, state of occurrence). Urbanicity was defined using INEGI’s predetermined categories of urbanicity (urban and rural). Similarly, incident location was defined using INEGI’s eight predetermined categories of where deaths occurred (household, school or office, sport fields, streets or public spaces, commercial areas, industrial areas, farms/ranches, and other).

We used descriptive statistics to examine pooled 2015–2022 rates, annual rates for 2015 and 2022 separately, as well as percentage changes (in rates) from 2015 to 2022 across categories of intent, sex, age groups, and state of occurrence. To obtain rates, we used population estimates (by year, sex, age group, and state) provided by Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO) (Consejo Nacional de Población 2024). We also examined the percentage of firearm related deaths within categories defined by urbanicity, location, intent, and demographics. We displayed these percentages for 2015, 2022, and the total pooled 2015–2022 period.

Results

We examined 188,397 firearm-related deaths in Mexico from 2015 to 2022. Rates of firearm-related deaths increased by 88.2% from 2015 to 2018 and decreased by 16.7% from 2018 to 2022 (Fig. 1). Homicide accounted for 92.2% of firearm deaths (Table 1) during this period and experienced the highest percentage increase (62.7%) from 2015 (10.37 per 100 k) to 2022 (16.87 per 100 k). Rates of undetermined firearm-related deaths and unintentional shootings also increased during this period (Table 1), while firearm suicide decreased by 23.4% (from 0.47 per 100 k in 2015 to 0.36 per 100 k in 2022).

Injury Epidemiology; 2024

By Chelsa Kenney

Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy: 2020 identified the trafficking of firearms from the U.S. into Mexico as a threat to the safety and security of both countries. The Mexican government has estimated that 200,000 firearms are smuggled from the United States each year. GAO was asked to report on U.S. efforts to counter firearms trafficking to Mexico. This report examines (1) the extent of U.S. agencies’ knowledge about firearms trafficking to Mexico and (2) U.S. agencies’ efforts to disrupt this trafficking and the extent to which they have assessed those efforts. GAO reviewed firearms tracing data, related analysis, and program information for fiscal years 2014 through 2020. GAO also interviewed U.S. and Mexican officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December 2020. What GAO Recommends GAO is making eight recommendations, including recommending that ATF and ICE analyze additional information about the trafficking of U.S.-sourced firearms to Mexico and that ATF, ICE, CBP, and State develop performance measures to assess the results of their efforts to disrupt this trafficking. The agencies concurred with GAO’s recommendations.   

Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office , 2021. 56p.

By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

By U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future. On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms. Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law enforcement officers were wounded. A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident. The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources and capabilities of responding officers and agencies. OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review: Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially further loss of life. CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.

OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked door. None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school. Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms 111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door). CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate medical treatment. In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future. CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations. OPR made the following recommendations based on its review: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so. All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols. CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events. CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’ ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence events, focusing on the healing involved.

Washington, DC: U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2024. 203p.

By Julia Korkman

Traffickers often use manipulation to tie their victims with what is sometimes called “invisible chains”. These, often subtle and large ly psychological means of controlling and manipulating victims are hard to detect and prove by the criminal justice system. The terms used for this phenomenon in the scientific literature are psychological coercion, psychological control and coercive control. IN THIS POLICY brief, we use the term psychological coercion, as it is widely used in the human trafficking literature. This policy brief pro vides a brief insight into psychological coercion as a phenomenon, what is known about the use of such coercion in the context of trafficking in human beings and how investigators can strive to address the issue of psychological coercion within criminal investigation

Helsinki: HEUNI, 2023. 4p.

By The Little Hoover Commision

California must improve and expand efforts to identify labor trafficking, the state’s independent government watchdog recommends in a new report.

In Labor Trafficking: Strategies to Uncover this Hidden Crime, the Little Hoover Commission calls for increased efforts to identify labor trafficking through better training, data collection, and public awareness. This is the Commission’s second report studying California’s response to human trafficking and builds upon the recommendation from its first report on the topic, released in June 2020, to create a statewide Anti-Human Trafficking Council.

“Too often, this heinous crime goes undetected, and those who have been preyed upon have nowhere to turn,” said Commission Chair Pedro Nava. “This horrible crime demands an aggressive response, and our recommendations will help California do just that.”

Labor trafficking occurs when employers use force, fraud or coercion to exert a level of control over workers that leaves them trapped in oppressive situations. It can occur in a variety of workplaces, including restaurants, construction sites, farm fields, and households, and is often very difficult to detect. Widespread unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic may contribute to the conditions necessary for labor trafficking to flourish.

The Commission’s report focuses on the obstacles that make it difficult to identify labor trafficking, including a lack of enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and a lack of familiarity about the issue among government officials and the public. The report also notes that the state’s primary focus has been on combatting sex trafficking, a focus that must continue but be expanded to include labor trafficking as well.

“We need to know where labor trafficking is occurring in California and who is being affected so we can direct resources to help victims and bring traffickers to justice,” explained Commissioner Cynthia Buiza, chair of the Commission’s subcommittee for the labor trafficking studies. “More information will mean a stronger state response.”

The report also notes the strides taken by state officials to combat and deter child sex trafficking and calls for similar investment in protections for child victims of labor trafficking.

“It is crucial that all children are protected,” said Commissioner Dion Aroner, a member of the study’s subcommittee. “Nothing is more important than ensuring that California’s youngest and most vulnerable residents do not fall prey to the evil of human trafficking.”

Report #251, September 2020; Sacramento: Little Hoover Commission, 2020. 30p.