by A British Statesman (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction) Format: Kindle Edition

Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders brings E. Alexander Powell’s gripping eyewitness account of the First World War into sharp contemporary focus, reframing one of the earliest narratives of the conflict through the lens of civilian suffering and the ethics of modern warfare.

Written in 1914 at the very outbreak of hostilities, Powell’s Fighting in Flanders remains one of the most immediate and vivid journalistic records of the German invasion of Belgium and the rapid, chaotic campaigns that swept across Flanders. As an American war correspondent moving with Allied forces, Powell witnessed firsthand the destruction of historic towns, the flight of refugees, and the transformation of peaceful European landscapes into scenes of devastation. His reporting captures not only the movement of armies, but the profound human cost borne by civilians caught in the path of industrial war.

This new Read-Me.Org edition, retitled Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders, highlights a central and enduring theme in Powell’s work: the deliberate and incidental targeting of civilian populations during wartime. From the burning of Louvain to the mass displacement of Belgian families, Powell documents events that helped shape early international outrage and contributed to the evolving laws of war. His account stands at the intersection of journalism, moral witness, and wartime narrative—revealing how the First World War blurred the boundaries between combatant and non-combatant in ways that continue to resonate today.

Carefully prepared for modern readers, this edition preserves Powell’s powerful prose while offering a clean, accessible text suitable for contemporary publication standards. It is an essential volume for readers interested in World War I history, the origins of total war, and the enduring question of how civilians become targets in conflicts across time.

A compelling blend of reportage and historical insight, Targeting Civilians and the War in Flanders invites readers to revisit the opening chapter of the Great War—not as distant history, but as a warning that remains urgently relevant

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.143.

by Friedrich Von Bernhardi (Author), Allen Powles (Translator), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

On the eve of global catastrophe, Friedrich von Bernhardi set down one of the most provocative and unsettling arguments of the modern age.A German Catastrophe: On the Brink of World War I previously publised as Germany and the Next War (1912) is not simply a study of military preparedness—it is a bold and uncompromising declaration that war is inevitable, necessary, and even morally justified.

Written in the tense years before World War I, this controversial work offers a rare window into the mindset of pre-war Europe. Bernhardi rejects the ideals of international peace and diplomacy, arguing instead that struggle between nations is the driving force of history. Drawing on the language of Social Darwinism, he presents war as the means by which stronger nations assert their destiny and shape the future.

For readers today, this book is both a historical document and a warning. It reveals the intellectual currents that helped propel Europe toward one of the deadliest conflicts in human history, while raising enduring questions about power, nationalism, and the ethics of war.

This Read-Me.Org edition, under its revised title, invites a reading that is at once critical and reflective. The new title—A German Catastrophe: On the Brink of World War I—captures the tragic irony of Bernhardi’s argument: a confident assertion of national destiny that, in retrospect, stands at the threshold of devastation. It encourages us to approach the text not as a guide, but as a warning.

In making this work accessible to a contemporary audience, Read-Me.Org reaffirms its commitment to presenting historically significant texts in a form that promotes careful engagement and informed interpretation. Bernhardi’s book endures not because it offers solutions, but because it compels us to confront enduring questions about power, morality, and the choices that shape the course of history.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.217.

by Talbot Mundy (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

Of Colonial Pride: When India Fought in Flanders presents a vivid and compelling account of one of the most overlooked chapters of the First World War—the arrival and service of Indian troops on the Western Front. Originally published as When India Came to Fight in Flanders, Talbot Mundy’s work brings readers directly into the early months of the war, when soldiers from across the Indian subcontinent were deployed to the muddy, mechanized battlefields of Belgium and northern France.

Blending frontline observation with narrative intensity, Mundy captures the shock, endurance, and courage of these men as they confronted a new kind of warfare far removed from their homeland. From trench conditions to battlefield engagements, the book offers a rare contemporary perspective on the experiences of Indian regiments who played a critical role in holding the line during some of the war’s most desperate moments.

This newly titled edition, Of Colonial Pride, invites modern readers to reconsider the story within its broader historical context. It highlights not only the bravery of Indian soldiers, but also the complex realities of empire, identity, and loyalty that shaped their service. Mundy’s account reflects the attitudes of his time—admiring, yet often filtered through the lens of imperial thinking—making this volume both a gripping wartime narrative and an important historical document.

For readers of military history, colonial studies, and World War I, this book offers a powerful and thought-provoking look at the global dimensions of the conflict. It stands as a testament to the contributions of Indian soldiers whose role in the war deserves far greater recognition.

This Read-Me.Org edition has been carefully prepared for contemporary audiences, preserving the original text while presenting it in a clear, accessible format for today’s reader.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.216..

by A British Statesman (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction) Format: Kindle Edition

Behind every war lies a story not told in headlines, speeches, or patriotic slogans. How Diplomats Make War lifts the veil on the hidden machinery of international conflict, exposing the calculated maneuvers, secret agreements, and political intrigues that turn disputes into devastation.

Written in 1915 by an anonymous insider known only as “A British Statesman,” this remarkable work offers a rare, unflinching examination of the diplomatic system at the height of the First World War. Drawing on deep knowledge of European politics, the author dismantles the comforting myths that wars are fought for the people, revealing instead how they are engineered by a small circle of officials, financiers, and power brokers operating far from public scrutiny.

With sharp wit and devastating clarity, the book traces the role of treaties, alliances, and the so-called “balance of power” across a century of European history—from the aftermath of Napoleon to the crises that plunged the world into modern industrial warfare. It exposes how secrecy, propaganda, and the relentless expansion of armaments create a self-perpetuating cycle in which preparation for war becomes its very cause.

This new Read-Me.Org edition, edited and introduced by Graeme R. Newman, situates the text within both its historical moment and its continuing relevance. More than a century later, its insights remain strikingly contemporary, challenging readers to reconsider the relationship between governments, diplomacy, and the human cost of global conflict.

At once a historical document and a powerful critique of political power, How Diplomats Make War is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just why wars happen—but who truly makes them.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2026. p.257.

By Renushka Madarie, Marleen Weulen Kranenbarg&Christianne de Poot

Previous quantitative studies applying Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to cybercrime victimization produced mixed results. Through semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity experts, the current study aims to qualitatively reevaluate the applicability of RAT to cyber-dependent crime, specifically data theft from organizations. An in-depth assessment of environmental factors appearing to affect data thieves’ actions resulted in concrete operationalizations of theoretical concepts. Importantly, we highlight the distinction between target selection and strategic choices made during the attack. Furthermore, RAT appeared to be as relevant, if not more, for explaining offender actions during an attack as for the initial convergence of offenders and digital targets.

DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025

By Daniella J. Ferrante & Thomas J. Holt

There is little research considering the ways that local events in physical space trigger responses from ideological groups in online spaces. This study attempted to address this gap in the literature through the analysis of information from the Extremist Cybercrime Database (ECCD), a unique open-source repository of cyberattacks performed against U.S. targets from 1998to 2020. This qualitative study focused on the language used during cyber-attacks against police agencies by the hacker collective Anonymous.Evidence suggested that the attackers’ language reflected values observed in the hacker subculture to justify their attacks and incorporated negative language regarding law enforcement. This was particularly evident in cases of police excessive use of force against minority groups and emphasized theneed for public protest and social change.
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 2025, VOL. 46, NO. 9, 1125–1

by C. Nabokoff (Author), Graeme Newman (Introduction)

The Ordeal of a Diplomat is a vivid and penetrating memoir by Constantin Nabokoff, a senior Russian diplomat who served in India and London during the final years of the Russian Empire and the First World War. Writing with candor and intellectual clarity, Nabokoff recounts his experiences at the heart of imperial diplomacy as long-established political structures gave way to revolution, war, and the collapse of old alliances. His narrative blends personal observation with acute political insight, illuminating the misunderstandings, rivalries, and illusions that shaped international relations on the eve of the modern world. At once a historical document and a timeless meditation on power, loyalty, and misjudgment, the book offers a rare insider’s view of diplomacy conducted amid global crisis and enduring relevance for readers interested in international affairs today.

By John J. Donohu, Samuel V. Cai, Matthew V. Bondy, Philip J. Cook

While the recent state panel data literature has broadly concluded that “right-to-carry” (RTC) concealed handgun regimes increase violent crime, there is little empirical evidence on the precise mechanisms that drive this increase. Using data from 217 US cities, we find that the effect of RTC on violent crime is concentrated to large urban centers. In cities with an average population of over 250,000 between 1979 and 2019, we find that the introduction of RTC increases violent crime by 20 percent. We then present novel estimates that RTC increases gun theft by 50 percent and lowers violent crime clearance rates by 9 percent in these large cities. Leveraging city-level heterogeneity in RTC-induced violent crime effects, we demonstrate that these two mechanisms explain a substantial portion of the RTC-induced increase in violent crime.

Working Paper 30190, 2023, 21p.

By John R. Lott, and John E Whitley

It is frequently assumed that safe storage gun laws reduce accidental gun deaths and total suicides, while the possible impact on crime rates are ignored. However, given existing work on the adverse impact of other safety laws, such as safety caps for storing medicine, even the very plausible assumption of reduced accidental gun deaths cannot be taken for granted. Our paper analyzes both state and county data spanning nearly twenty years, and we find no support that safe storage laws reduce either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides. Instead, these storage requirements appear to impair people?s ability to use guns defensively. Because accidental shooters also tend to be the ones most likely to violate the new law, safe storage laws increase violent and property crimes against low risk citizens with no observable offsetting benefit in terms of reduced accidents or suicides. During the first five full years after the passage of the safe storage laws, the group of fifteen states that adopted these laws faced an annual average increase of over 300 more murders, 3,860 more rapes, 24,650 more robberies, and over 25,000 more aggravated assaults. On average, the annual costs borne by victims averaged over $2.6 billion as a result of lost productivity, out-of-pocket expenses, medical bills, and property losses.

Yale Law School, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237, 72p.

By Carlisle E. Moody, John R. Lott

A review of the literature studying the effect of right-to-carry laws shows that the weight of evidence indicates that such laws reduced violent crime. However, more recent studies, using more recent data, tend to find that these laws cause increases in various kinds of violent crime, raising the possibility that circumstances have changed since 2000, causing these laws to become detrimental. We suggest that these recent studies, which do not use all the available data, are seriously compromised because they compare states that only recently have adopted right-to-carry laws with states that have had these laws for many years, instead of comparing against states with more restrictive laws. Early adopting states experienced relatively large reductions in crime corresponding to large increases in the number of right-to-carry permits. Late adopting states passed rules making it difficult to obtain permits and exercise the right to carry concealed weapons. Ignoring the fact that these late adopting states with stricter rules on obtaining permits issue relatively few permits can produce perverse results where coefficients imply an increase in crime even though the opposite is true. We demonstrate this effect with a simple statistical test.

Academia Letters, February 2022, 6p.

By  The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)  

The 2025 Illicit Trade Index provides governments, policymakers, and enforcement agencies with actionable insights to tackle the challenges of illicit trade. Covering 158 countries—from emerging markets to advanced economies—the Index highlights vulnerabilities, strengths, and trends across national systems. Its data-driven analysis and practical recommendations aim to strengthen policies, enhance enforcement, and promote international collaboration.

Evaluating countries across six key categories and 37 benchmarks, the Index provides a comprehensive framework for assessing resilience. In addition to rankings, it offers regional and economic group analyses, identifying shared challenges and performance trends.

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade  2025. 67p.. 

By Amnesty International

A wide variety of electric shock devices are specifically designed for and marketed to law enforcement. These range from electric shock stun guns, batons and shields, and body-worn electric shock devices which deliver electric shocks through direct contact with the body; to projectile electric shock weapons (PESWs) which can be fired from a distance. Despite the clear human rights risks associated with this equipment, there are no global regulations controlling what type of electric shock law enforcement equipment is permitted to be manufactured and used, or where equipment which can have a legitimate role in law enforcement can be traded. There is an urgent need for legally-binding, global regulations – a Torture-Free Trade Treaty - which prohibits the production of and trade in inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading devices, such as direct contact electric shock equipment, and strictly controls the trade in PESWs to law enforcement agencies to ensure

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 72p..  

By Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

  Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

Key findings Understanding the circumstances that lead people to join and leave violent extremist groups, and their experiences in those groups, is key to crafting incentives for disengagement. The willingness to leave violent extremist groups is often clouded by uncertainty, as well as long waiting periods between disengagement and enrolment in programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Waves of defection from Boko Haram caught Lake Chad Basin (LCB) states unprepared. DDRRR processes were thus implemented under pressure, hindering early coordination at a regional level. Women are treated mainly as victims, despite some voluntarily joining and playing active roles in Boko Haram, including volunteering as suicide bombers. DDRRR implementation in the LCB has revealed gaps in legal frameworks that require revisions. DDRRR lacks public support in some LCB countries, as many people view it as blanket amnesty for Boko Haram members. 

Recommendations Non-military means of countering violent extremism should incorporate incentives and opportunities for associates to leave these armed groups. By depleting these groups’ human resources, their fighting capacity is reduced. To encourage defection, clear processes for screening, prosecution and integration are needed. National ownership of these processes, inclusivity, adaptation to local context and adequate resourcing are key, from inception to implementation. National ownership should not lead to isolated approaches, but rather create bridges between countries to enable a cohesive regional approach. Organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Liptako-Gourma States Integrated Development Authority, the G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative could offer relevant regional frameworks for this. Authorities in charge of DDRRR programmes should consider the diverse needs and backgrounds of ex-associates. Distinguishing individuals according to why they joined and their roles within the groups is important for providing appropriate treatment. The specific needs of women and children should be taken into account. Affected West African countries should proactively formulate relevant legal and institutional frameworks. International and regional provisions and standards should be taken into account, including the need for transparent and predictable screening, prosecution and rehabilitation processes. Due to their position connecting the LCB and West Africa, Niger and Nigeria could play a key role in sharing lessons learned from DDRRR implementation. Community organisations, platforms, and media should be used by the DDRRR authorities to raise public awareness of the reintegration process. This would help prevent perceptions of general amnesty for Boko Haram members and preconceived ideas about the disengaged from undermining the process. 

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Andrew Gilligan and Paul Stott

  • The Government’s “Rapid Analytical Sprint” to determine its policy on extremism has been leaked to Policy Exchange. • It says the UK’s approach to extremism should no longer be based on “ideologies of concern” but on a very wide range of “behaviours,” including violence against women and girls, “spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories,” an interest in gore or extreme violence, misogyny, or involvement in “an online subculture called the manosphere.” It admits itself that many who display such behaviours are not extremist. • This approach could swamp already stretched counter-extremism staff and counter-terror police with thousands of new cases, increasing the risk that genuinely dangerous individuals are missed. It risks addressing symptoms, not causes. • The Sprint de-centres and downplays Islamism, by far the greatest threat to national security. It acknowledges “left-wing, anarchist and single issue (LASI) extremism,” “environmental extremism” and Hindu extremism as distinct phenomena that counter-extremist policy should tackle. The left may object to the first two; others will welcome it. • The Sprint will raise concerns over freedom of speech. It says claims of two-tier policing are a “right-wing extremist narrative.” It recommends the reversal of moves to cut police use of “non-crime hate incidents.” A new crime of making “harmful communications” online – rejected by the previous government on freedom of speech grounds - is floated. • The Sprint may have been influenced by the events of Southport. But as in the Prime Minister’s remarks after the killer’s guilty pleas last week, it risks confusing extreme violence with extremism, or extremism with any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried. • What happened in Southport was more an operational than a policy failing. The murderer had shown he was dangerous many times over several years before he killed anyone. In a more operationally effective policing and justice system, action would have been taken against him sooner, even without having to first label him an extremist. • There is a case, as the former counter-terror policing chief Neil Basu has said, for creating a “non-extremist” version of Prevent aiming to interdict people, such as the Southport killer, with an interest  in violence but no obvious ideological or political motivation. The recommendation by a previous reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross, that the current programme is the wrong place for dealing with the psychologically unstable has been ignored, even repudiated, in the Sprint. It should be acted on. • There are several sensible proposals, including the creation of a new Ministerial Counter-Extremism Board to coordinate policy.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Silvia Villarreal, Amy Barnhorst, Richard Bonnie, Kami Chavis, Cassandra Crifasi, Shannon Frattaroli, Kelly Roskam, Jeffrey Swanson, Sylvia Washington, and Joshua Horwitz.  

  Firearm purchaser licensing (FPL) laws (sometimes referred to as permit-to-purchase) require an individual to obtain a license through an application process before purchasing a firearm. They are among the most effective policies at reducing gun violence. FPL laws create robust mechanisms of accountability among both prospective gun owners and sellers to ensure that those disqualified from firearm ownership can’t legally obtain a gun. This report compiles existing research to inform state policy. It includes an overview of state FPL laws and recommends core components of FPL laws to maximize public health benefits.

The authors recommend that state gun licensing laws include five core components to maximize public health benefits:

• Firearms safety training

• Fingerprinting

• In-person application

• Comprehensive background checks

• Waiting periods between application and possession of a firearm

Currently 11 states—Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon—and Washington, D.C., have active firearm purchasing licensing laws. Of these, five states—Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon—and Washington, D.C., have the five components recommended in the report.

“There is solid evidence from public health research suggesting that when states adopt firearm purchaser licensing laws with measures such as mandatory safety training, comprehensive background checks, and waiting periods, reductions in gun-related homicides and suicides follow,” says study lead author Silvia Villarreal, MPP, director of research translation at the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions.

Gun violence is a significant cause of mortality for Americans, and the leading cause of death for children and young people ages 1 to 17. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 46,728 people died from gunshots in the U.S. in 2023, the most recent year for which final statistics are available. The 2023 CDC data shows firearms were used in seven out of 10 homicides and 55% of suicides.

U.S. federal law requires background checks for would-be gun buyers at federally licensed gun stores but does not cover private sales or gun shows. Moreover, federal law generally allows a gun sale to proceed if the background check is still pending after three business days. 

The report cites evidence—in many cases generated by the report’s co-authors—that firearm purchaser licensing reduces gun violence. A 2018 study linked gun purchaser licensing laws to an 11% reduction in gun homicides in urban counties across the U.S. from 1984 to 2015. A 2020 study found that gun purchaser licensing laws were associated with 56% fewer mass shooting incidents and 67% fewer mass shooting victims on average. Another 2020 study linked Connecticut’s 1995 handgun purchaser licensing law to a 28% drop in the state’s gun homicide rate and a 33% drop in its gun suicide rate from 1996 to 2017.

Similarly, a 2014 study found that Missouri’s 2007 repeal of its handgun-buyer licensing law was followed by 25% increase in its gun homicide rate in the five years following enactment. A 2015 study found a 16% increase in Missouri’s gun suicide rate in the five years following the repeal.

“This report is an important resource that brings together the research, policy, and legal considerations about firearm purchasing laws,” says Josh Horwitz, JD, co-director of the Center for Gun Violence Solutions. “Our intent is to give policymakers and advocates all the guidance and evidence they need to bring these policies to fruition.” 

The researchers hope that the report will encourage state policymakers to maintain or strengthen existing firearm-purchaser licensing laws and enact firearm purchasing laws in states that don’t yet have them.

Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions 2025. 30p.

By Irfan Idris and Kusumasari Ayuningtyas

The ideological influence of Jemaah Islamiyah continues to be a threat to security even after its disbandment in June 2024. Some of its former members may align with other extremist groups, while others may seek to operate as lone-wolf terrorists. The possibility of JI’s former members transitioning into lone wolf actors stems from the enduring power of its ideology and indoctrination process.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025, 3p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

Faced with a persistent terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an increasingly ambitious role in counter-terrorism. While primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, awareness of the connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond Union borders. EU spending on counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years focus, among other things, on harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, sharing information and data, protecting borders, countering terrorist financing and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task. The European Parliament has played an active role not only in shaping legislation, but also in evaluating existing tools and gaps through the work accomplished by its Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) in 2018. In line with the Parliament's recommendations, as well as the priorities set by the European Commission and its counter-terrorism agenda presented in December 2020, EU counter-terrorism action has focused on doing more to anticipate threats, counter radicalisation, and reduce vulnerabilities by making critical infrastructures more resilient and improving the protection of public spaces. The EU will also continue to address the online dimension of various forms of extremism, in line with the regulations on dissemination of terrorist content online and on the provision of digital services in the EU. This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy, published in 2023.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 12p.

By Alana Ford

An examination of the threat of disinformation and cognitive warfare in the Indo-Pacific, the brief unpacks how these tactics are reshaping national security and undermining democratic institutions. Drawing on global examples, it highlights the implications for regional stability and democratic resilience.

The briefing paper outlines Australia’s multipronged approach, including legislative reforms, international partnerships, and public education efforts, offering practical insights to counter these evolving security threats and safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.

Key messages

Disinformation and cognitive warfare are evolving security threats that undermine democratic institutions, polarise societies, and manipulate public trust at a global scale.

The digital revolution has amplified the speed, precision, and scale of disinformation campaigns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how cognitive warfare is deployed to legitimize unlawful acts of aggression and manipulate international narratives.

Democracies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, face heightened risks of disinformation and cognitive warfare due to their open information environments and the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics.

Effective countermeasures require coordinated domestic and international efforts, leveraging regulation and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Australia: Perth USAsia Centre, 2025.

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

In 2024, Bangladesh faces a growing threat of radicalism fuelled by political instability, security vacuums, and weakened counterterrorism infrastructure. Unless the interim government adopts a zero-tolerance policy and strengthens law enforcement and intelligence efforts, extremist groups may gain further ground, leading to long-term instability. COMMENTARY Bangladesh is facing an increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism. The political violence and instability of 2024 have worsened the situation, with extremist elements exploiting the security vacuum created by the regime change. Weakened law enforcement and intelligence agencies, along with the rise of armed groups and radical ideologies, pose a serious threat to the country’s stability. Bangladesh risks long-term insecurity with broader regional implications without swift and decisive action.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU , 2024. 4p.