By Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

  Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

Key findings Understanding the circumstances that lead people to join and leave violent extremist groups, and their experiences in those groups, is key to crafting incentives for disengagement. The willingness to leave violent extremist groups is often clouded by uncertainty, as well as long waiting periods between disengagement and enrolment in programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Waves of defection from Boko Haram caught Lake Chad Basin (LCB) states unprepared. DDRRR processes were thus implemented under pressure, hindering early coordination at a regional level. Women are treated mainly as victims, despite some voluntarily joining and playing active roles in Boko Haram, including volunteering as suicide bombers. DDRRR implementation in the LCB has revealed gaps in legal frameworks that require revisions. DDRRR lacks public support in some LCB countries, as many people view it as blanket amnesty for Boko Haram members. 

Recommendations Non-military means of countering violent extremism should incorporate incentives and opportunities for associates to leave these armed groups. By depleting these groups’ human resources, their fighting capacity is reduced. To encourage defection, clear processes for screening, prosecution and integration are needed. National ownership of these processes, inclusivity, adaptation to local context and adequate resourcing are key, from inception to implementation. National ownership should not lead to isolated approaches, but rather create bridges between countries to enable a cohesive regional approach. Organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Liptako-Gourma States Integrated Development Authority, the G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative could offer relevant regional frameworks for this. Authorities in charge of DDRRR programmes should consider the diverse needs and backgrounds of ex-associates. Distinguishing individuals according to why they joined and their roles within the groups is important for providing appropriate treatment. The specific needs of women and children should be taken into account. Affected West African countries should proactively formulate relevant legal and institutional frameworks. International and regional provisions and standards should be taken into account, including the need for transparent and predictable screening, prosecution and rehabilitation processes. Due to their position connecting the LCB and West Africa, Niger and Nigeria could play a key role in sharing lessons learned from DDRRR implementation. Community organisations, platforms, and media should be used by the DDRRR authorities to raise public awareness of the reintegration process. This would help prevent perceptions of general amnesty for Boko Haram members and preconceived ideas about the disengaged from undermining the process. 

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Andrew Gilligan and Paul Stott

  • The Government’s “Rapid Analytical Sprint” to determine its policy on extremism has been leaked to Policy Exchange. • It says the UK’s approach to extremism should no longer be based on “ideologies of concern” but on a very wide range of “behaviours,” including violence against women and girls, “spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories,” an interest in gore or extreme violence, misogyny, or involvement in “an online subculture called the manosphere.” It admits itself that many who display such behaviours are not extremist. • This approach could swamp already stretched counter-extremism staff and counter-terror police with thousands of new cases, increasing the risk that genuinely dangerous individuals are missed. It risks addressing symptoms, not causes. • The Sprint de-centres and downplays Islamism, by far the greatest threat to national security. It acknowledges “left-wing, anarchist and single issue (LASI) extremism,” “environmental extremism” and Hindu extremism as distinct phenomena that counter-extremist policy should tackle. The left may object to the first two; others will welcome it. • The Sprint will raise concerns over freedom of speech. It says claims of two-tier policing are a “right-wing extremist narrative.” It recommends the reversal of moves to cut police use of “non-crime hate incidents.” A new crime of making “harmful communications” online – rejected by the previous government on freedom of speech grounds - is floated. • The Sprint may have been influenced by the events of Southport. But as in the Prime Minister’s remarks after the killer’s guilty pleas last week, it risks confusing extreme violence with extremism, or extremism with any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried. • What happened in Southport was more an operational than a policy failing. The murderer had shown he was dangerous many times over several years before he killed anyone. In a more operationally effective policing and justice system, action would have been taken against him sooner, even without having to first label him an extremist. • There is a case, as the former counter-terror policing chief Neil Basu has said, for creating a “non-extremist” version of Prevent aiming to interdict people, such as the Southport killer, with an interest  in violence but no obvious ideological or political motivation. The recommendation by a previous reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross, that the current programme is the wrong place for dealing with the psychologically unstable has been ignored, even repudiated, in the Sprint. It should be acted on. • There are several sensible proposals, including the creation of a new Ministerial Counter-Extremism Board to coordinate policy.   

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 30p.

By Irfan Idris and Kusumasari Ayuningtyas

The ideological influence of Jemaah Islamiyah continues to be a threat to security even after its disbandment in June 2024. Some of its former members may align with other extremist groups, while others may seek to operate as lone-wolf terrorists. The possibility of JI’s former members transitioning into lone wolf actors stems from the enduring power of its ideology and indoctrination process.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025, 3p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

Faced with a persistent terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an increasingly ambitious role in counter-terrorism. While primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, awareness of the connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond Union borders. EU spending on counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years focus, among other things, on harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, sharing information and data, protecting borders, countering terrorist financing and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task. The European Parliament has played an active role not only in shaping legislation, but also in evaluating existing tools and gaps through the work accomplished by its Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) in 2018. In line with the Parliament's recommendations, as well as the priorities set by the European Commission and its counter-terrorism agenda presented in December 2020, EU counter-terrorism action has focused on doing more to anticipate threats, counter radicalisation, and reduce vulnerabilities by making critical infrastructures more resilient and improving the protection of public spaces. The EU will also continue to address the online dimension of various forms of extremism, in line with the regulations on dissemination of terrorist content online and on the provision of digital services in the EU. This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy, published in 2023.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 12p.

By Alana Ford

An examination of the threat of disinformation and cognitive warfare in the Indo-Pacific, the brief unpacks how these tactics are reshaping national security and undermining democratic institutions. Drawing on global examples, it highlights the implications for regional stability and democratic resilience.

The briefing paper outlines Australia’s multipronged approach, including legislative reforms, international partnerships, and public education efforts, offering practical insights to counter these evolving security threats and safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.

Key messages

Disinformation and cognitive warfare are evolving security threats that undermine democratic institutions, polarise societies, and manipulate public trust at a global scale.

The digital revolution has amplified the speed, precision, and scale of disinformation campaigns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how cognitive warfare is deployed to legitimize unlawful acts of aggression and manipulate international narratives.

Democracies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, face heightened risks of disinformation and cognitive warfare due to their open information environments and the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics.

Effective countermeasures require coordinated domestic and international efforts, leveraging regulation and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Australia: Perth USAsia Centre, 2025.

By Iftekharul Bashar

In 2024, Bangladesh faces a growing threat of radicalism fuelled by political instability, security vacuums, and weakened counterterrorism infrastructure. Unless the interim government adopts a zero-tolerance policy and strengthens law enforcement and intelligence efforts, extremist groups may gain further ground, leading to long-term instability. COMMENTARY Bangladesh is facing an increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism. The political violence and instability of 2024 have worsened the situation, with extremist elements exploiting the security vacuum created by the regime change. Weakened law enforcement and intelligence agencies, along with the rise of armed groups and radical ideologies, pose a serious threat to the country’s stability. Bangladesh risks long-term insecurity with broader regional implications without swift and decisive action.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU , 2024. 4p.

By Yannick Deepen and Sabine Kurtenbach

Non-state armed actors (NSAAs) come in a variety of shapes and sizes, including warlordled groups, insurgencies, militias, and organised-crime syndicates to name just the most prominent examples hereof. In war or lower-level armed conflict, as well as violence-prone contexts, these groups pose acute problems for peacebuilding, democratic governance, and sustainable development. They control resources and territories, as well as compete, cooperate, or align with political and economic elites both within and beyond the state to promote the unstable status quo that serves their interests. Various challenges arise when dealing with NSAAs. Prevailing strategies vary between repression, co-optation, and submission to the rule of law. This analysis maps cross-regional trends regarding NSAAs based on available datasets. On this basis we develop a typology for NSAAs and a conceptual frame for their transformation. We then apply this to three paradigmatic case studies – Colombia, Mali, the Philippines – and formulate recommendations for the designing of improved strategies vis-à-vis development cooperation and other external actors.

GIGA Working Papers, No. 337,

By Europol

  The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) 2024 is a situational overview, presenting figures, major developments and trends in the terrorism landscape in the EU in 2023. The report is based on qualitative and quantitative data provided by the Member States on terrorist attacks, arrests and convictions and penalties for terrorist offences. Additionally, Europol’s cooperation partners provided valuable qualitative information and assessments, to facilitate reflection on developments beyond the EU that affect the security of the Union and its citizens. Information on convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences, as well as on amendments to national legislation on terrorism provided by Eurojust and based on data shared by Member States, complements the report. According to EU Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism , which Member States had an obligation to transpose into their national legislation by 8 September 2018, terrorist offences are criminal acts carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The EU TE-SAT identifies and elaborates on various forms of terrorism motivated by specific ideologies . These include jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, and other forms of terrorism. Notwithstanding the existence of different legislative frameworks at the national level, Directive (EU) 2017/541 establishes minimum EU rules concerning the definitions of offences and related sanctions in counter-terrorism and provides a harmonised definition of terrorist offences. On this basis, the EU TE-SAT provides statistical data on terrorist attacks, arrests and convictions in Member States. At a national level, the legislation pertaining to terrorism varies within the limits set by the aforementioned Directive, as Member States are afforded a certain degree of flexibility in their legislative processes. Consequently, the quantitative analysis presented in the EU TE-SAT reflects Member States’ definitions of terrorist offences according to their national legislation. It should be noted that these definitions may be broader in scope than the definitions set out in Directive (EU) 2017/541, although they cannot have a narrower scope. While the primary scope of the EU TE-SAT is to present the situational picture on terrorism, the report also presents specific violent extremist incidents, acts, activities and developments, reported by the Member States. While the quantitative overview of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties does not include instances of violent extremism, the latter is included in the report for contextualisation purposes and to provide a more comprehensive picture of the security threats to the Union.   

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 2024. 72p.

By Piotr Bąkowski  

In 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). One of them, a proposal on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing, became Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, adopted on 31 May 2024. Its detailed, directly applicable provisions will replace the minimum rules of the existing EU AML directives. Most provisions will apply from 10 July 2029. The package was adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to enhance the EU's AML/CFT regulatory framework. The aim is for the framework to become more coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining in line with international standards in the area. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs were jointly responsible for the file. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024, 10p.