By Lauren Lyons  

  he alarming recurrence of unjustified killings by police highlights systemic issues that should be deeply concerning to us all. Beyond excessive use of force, the police treat marginalized people in disproportionately harmful ways that reflect and perpetuate endemic injustice; they respond inappropriately to complex social and public health problems like homelessness, addiction, and mental illness, risking harmful escalation and exacerbating underlying issues. Police culture tends towards cynical authoritarianism, adopting an “us-versus-them” mentality that positions (at least a subset of) citizens as adversaries. All of this has resulted in severely diminished public trust in the police, fraught police-community relations, and rising skepticism of the legitimacy of policing institutions. Public outcry over these problems has catalyzed the ongoing Black Lives Matter movement. The police murder of George Floyd was followed by mass protests in the summer of 2020, and since then, there has been widespread public debate on how to mitigate police violence and the distrust it engenders. Some call for incremental reforms, like changing laws and policies governing police use of force or strengthening misconduct reporting and decertification processes. Others demand that we reimagine the role of policing in our institutional landscape, reallocating powers, resources, and responsibilities from the  police to other institutions. The goal of this paper is to refine and defend this reallocative demand, which I refer to as the unbundling proposal. There has been a promising uptick in philosophical discussions of policing in recent years. Some focus on principles to guide police conduct, often drawing on theories of self-defense and professional ethics. Philosophers also propose measures to address police misconduct such as expanding legal statutes to outlaw harmful tactics, revoking the licenses of bad actors, providing reparations to victims of police violence, implementing self-evaluation and evidence-based improvements to departmental policy, restructuring police departments, broadening police participation in harm reduction and other forms of nonviolent order maintenance, and avoiding tactics that heighten the risk of illegitimate policing. These strategies, especially when combined, can improve policing. Rather than a discussion of their comparative merits and disadvantages, I present and defend an alternative ameliorative approach. The unbundling proposal asks not how police should act but rather what the scope of policing should be: Which situations require police presence? In the ethics of war, we distinguish between jus in bello (the ethics of conduct in war) and jus ad bellum (the ethics of whether war is justified). The unbundling proposal addresses an issue that is analogous to jus ad bellum considerations: when police should be deployed (instead of how they should behave). This approach complements rather than conflicts with many proposed reforms, but it also addresses a broader and less examined issue. Moreover, despite substantial public support, there has been no sustained discussion of unbundling in analytic ethics and political philosophy, and the attention the proposal has received is largely critical. The unbundling proposal is connected closely to movements to defund and eventually abolish the police. The slogan “defund the police” really means “defund and refund,” with activists calling for cutting police funding and reallocating it to other nonpolice institutions and community organizations. As such, “defund, refund” is one public finance-focused component of the broader unbundling proposal. For abolitionists, unbundling and other measures that reduce the scope and power of the police are critical steps toward ultimately dismantling the institution. Though I am not defending abolition here, the discussion should (1) clarify the practical action strategy of police abolitionists and (2) offer a more robust and appealing picture of the defund demand. The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I present the unbundling proposal, identifying the specific dimensions of policing that proponents argue should be unbundled and reallocated. There I also discuss the definition of policing upon which unbundling is based. Then, I present a novel set of normative arguments for unbundling that reflect various rationales emanating from policing-critical social movements. The case for unbundling is strongest if we take them in tandem. The first two arguments (section 2) draw on principles of institutional design. I argue first that we should unbundle policing because public institutions with violent capacities should have narrow mandates; nonviolent, noncoercive responses to social problems should be the default. I then claim that unbundling constitutes a better distribution of epistemic labor. Catchall order-maintenance policing is epistemically overdemanding, while more narrowly defined roles foster better expertise and outcomes. The argument in section 3 centers on the effects of policing in unequal societies with historical injustice—specifically, how policing disproportionately burdens Black people, other people of color, and members of marginalized groups, driving structural injustice. I aim to reconstruct one argumentative thread that leads us from (1) these unfair effects to (2) the unbundling proposal. In doing so, I address the broader question of what forms of solutions are appropriate when institutions are infected with injustice, suggesting that in this case and others, justice-undermining effects require us to turn towards extra-institutional, reallocative measures. My hope is that the paper will be interesting for skeptics and advocates of unbundling and related proposals, adding some clarity to divisive debates and expanding the library of solutions to the pressing problems with policing defended within philosophy 

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy