By David Spencer

A new report from Policy Exchange demonstrates how London is in the grip of a street crime epidemic and makes seventeen recommendations to show how the Metropolitan Police, City Hall and the Government can turn the tide.  

The report shows that:

• Knife crime in London increased by 58.5% in only three years between 2021 and 2024;

• Only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 “theft person” crimes in the capital were solved last year.

• 60% of the knife crimes committed in the capital were robberies – with over 81,000 mobile phones stolen in robberies and thefts last year.

• In 2024 one small geographic area of around 20 streets in London’s West End near Oxford Circus and Regent Street had more knife crime than nearly 15% of the rest capital combined; in 2023 these streets had more knife crime than 23% of the capital combined.

 The report identifies the top 20 neighbourhoods (technically known as Lower Layer Super Output Areas or LSOAs of about 15-20 streets each) in London which had the highest levels of knife crime in 2024. One in 15 of every knife crime offence in the capital in 2024 occurred in one of these 20 neighbourhoods (908 knife crimes). In 2024 only 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of all knife crime offences in the capital (3,615 knife crimes) and 15% of neighbourhoods accounted for half of all knife crime offences (7055 knife crimes).

The report identifies that within the Metropolitan Police there are least 850 police officers currently in non-frontline posts which could be redeployed to the policing frontline to tackle knife crime, robbery and theft in the areas where criminals are most prolific. This includes police officers currently posted to the following departments: Transformation (142 officers), Human Resources (24 officers), Culture, Diversity and Inclusion (20 officers) and Digital, Data & Technology (34 officers).  

Policy Exchange rejects the suggestion that stop and search is being deployed in a “racist” way. While only 39.5% of those stopped and searched by the police are black, 43.6% of those charged with murder are black, 45.6% of non-domestic knife-crime murder victims are black and 48.6% of robbery suspects are black. 13.5% of London’s population are black. Policy Exchange asserts that it is not “racist” when the police are merely responding to the demographic breakdown of serious and violent offending in the capital.  

Policy Exchange analysis shows that the courts are taking a dangerously lax approach to the most prolific criminals. Despite already having 46 or more previous convictions, “Hyper-Prolific Offenders” are sent to prison on less than half of all occasions (44.5%) on conviction for a further indictable or either-way offence – 4,555 such criminals walked free from court in 2024. For “Super-Prolific Offenders” (those with 26 to 45 previous offences) this falls to 42.1% with 9,483 such criminals walking free from court in 2024. Despite there being mandatory sentencing provisions for repeat knife-carriers to be sent to prison over a third are not sentenced to a term of immediate custody

By Tinenenji Banda and Marja Hinfelaar

Zambia is a significant source of critical minerals including copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel and graphite. Interest in Zambia’s minerals is growing, particularly from Western countries and China. Unfortunately, due to governance weaknesses, there is ample corruption and illicit financial flows at several transaction levels in the value chain. This U4 Issue therefore identifies government interventions Zambia can use to curtail corruption considering existing political pressures.

Main points

• Intense competition for critical mineral value chains results in an increased risk of revenue leakage due to corruption and tax evasion. Illicit financial flows (IFF) threaten Zambia’s economic development and undermine its fiscal systems.

• Zambia has formal commitments in place, such as laws, regulatory institutions and international commitments, to battle corruption and IFFs, but the institutional architecture is fragmented and inadequately enforced. Inter-agency collaboration is required to address these challenges.

• Through a literature review, including a law and policy review, and a stakeholder mapping exercise with 21 key informant interviews with government, civil society, academic and industry representatives, we constructed a qualitative understanding of the key risk factors for corruption and IFFs.

• Significant factors are the lack of a transparent, coherent and disciplined mining licensing system; a non-transparent bidding process; public-private collusion across value chains; abuse of intermediaries and agents; and weak regulation in the sector.

• Opportunities for interventions are enhanced systems for disclosure and due diligence, reform of the Mining Cadastre, support for evidence-based policymaking, support for the organisation of the artisanal mining sector, enhanced quality of civil society organisation public discourse, and enhanced collaboration in anti-corruption agencies, while keeping political pressures in mind.

By Naomi Roht-Arriaza

Courts in several jurisdictions have recognised corruption as a direct human rights violation, enabling broader legal standing, integrating international law and focusing on victims. Case studies, predominantly from Latin America, illustrate different legal theories used to hold officials accountable and expand access to justice in anti-corruption proceedings. Consequently, the formulation of a stand-alone right has merit despite limitations.

By ECLAC

The purpose of the Femicidal Violence in Figures Bulletin is to disseminate data on femicide/feminicide or gender-related killings of women in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to report on the methodological advances made by national institutions in generating statistics on this form of violence. Responsible entities:  Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign.

By Laurie Caron, Frank Crispino and Cyril Muehlethaler

Tobacco smuggling remains a widespread illegal activity in Canada, associated with important social and economic impacts, and often linked to organized crime. This study explores the application of forensic profiling as an intelligence tool to support the analysis of contraband cigarette production and distribution. Physical and chemical manufacturing characteristics of seized contraband cigarette packs, provided by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), were observed and coded using macroscopic, microscopic, and spectroscopic techniques. Multivariate statistical analyses were then conducted to compare manufacturing characteristics between packs and identify potential links. The analyses highlighted links between cigarette packs and seizures based on shared manufacturing characteristics. The results and the identified groups were also compared with seizure data provided by the CBSA. The results demonstrate the relevance of forensic profiling to formulate hypotheses regarding shared production processes or supply networks. These hypotheses provide information that contributes to understanding tobacco smuggling and aim to examine how forensic intelligence can support law enforcement and measures to prevent and disrupt this criminal activity. A preliminary optimal procedure for applying forensic profiling in operational contexts targeting contraband tobacco was finally proposed. Despite limitations in the dataset creation that were beyond our control, this study represents a starting point for applying this scientific approach to tobacco smuggling

By Dan Anderberg. Line Hjorth Andersen,  N.Meltem Daysal, Mette Ejrnæs

We examine the impact of a 2002 Danish parental leave reform on intimate partner violence (IPV) using administrative data on assault-related hospital contacts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that extending fully paid leave increased mothers’ leave-taking and substantially reduced IPV, with effects concentrated among less-educated women. The reform also lengthened birth spacing, while separations remained unchanged and earnings effects were modest. The timing and heterogeneity of impacts point to fertility adjustments—rather than exit options or financial relief—as the key mechanism. Parental leave policy thus emerges as an underexplored lever for reducing IPV.

By

Sara Valdebenito, Hannah Gaffney, Maria Jose Arosemena-Burbano, Sydney Hitchcock, Darrick Jolliffe, Alex Sutherland

School exclusion—commonly referred to as suspension—is a disciplinary response employed by school authorities to address student misbehaviour. Typically, it involves temporary removal from regular teaching or, in more serious cases, complete removal from the school premises. A substantial body of research has associated exclusion with adverse developmental outcomes. In response, various school-based interventions have been developed to reduce exclusion rates. While some programmes have shown promising effects, the evidence on their effectiveness remains inconclusive. This mixed-methods systematic review and multi-level meta-analysis updates the previous review by Valdebenito et al. (2018), which included literature published between 1980 and 2015. The present update extends the evidence base by including studies until 2022. The primary aim of this review was to assess the effectiveness of school-based interventions in reducing disciplinary exclusions, with secondary aims focused on related behavioural outcomes including conduct problems, delinquency, and substance use. Systematic searches conducted between November and December 2022 yielded over 11,000 references for quantitative studies. Following title and abstract screening, 777 records were reviewed at full text by two independent coders. Thirty-two studies met the inclusion criteria for meta-analysis, comprising 2765 effect sizes from 67 primary evaluations (1980–2022) and representing approximately 394,242 students. Meta-analysis was conducted using a multilevel random-effects model with robust variance estimation to account for the nested structure of the data. Quantitative impact evaluations were eligible if they used a randomised controlled or quasi-experimental design, included both a control group and pre/post-test data, and used statistical methods to minimise selection bias (e.g., propensity score matching or matched cohort design). Studies were excluded if they exhibited substantial baseline differences between treatment and control groups. The qualitative synthesis explored implementation barriers and facilitators based on nine UK-based process evaluations, identified through searches completed in September 2023. Process evaluations were included if they focused on the perceptions of stakeholders—teachers, students, or school leadership—within UK schools. Data collection followed two stages: initial selection based on titles, abstracts, and keywords, followed by full-text review. Two independent coders applied inclusion criteria, extracted data, and resolved discrepancies with the principal investigators. All steps were documented to inform the PRISMA flow chart. To evaluate interventions reducing school exclusions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis using robust variance estimation. We explored heterogeneity via meta-regression (e.g., gender, intervention type), conducted sensitivity analyses for outliers and correlation structures, and assessed quality data using the EPOC, ROBIN-I and CASP checklist for methodological quality. Findings indicated that school-based interventions were associated with a small but statistically significant reduction in school exclusion (standardised mean difference [SMD] = 0.104; 95% CI: 0.04 to 0.17; p < 0.001). Compared with the original 2018 review, which reported a slightly larger effect size, this update benefits from a broader evidence base and more advanced statistical modelling. However, the results for secondary behavioural outcomes were more limited: effects on conduct problems and delinquency were negligible or non-significant, and the impact on substance use was small and not statistically significant. Risk of bias was assessed using the Cochrane EPOC 2 tool (Higgins and Green 2011) for randomised controlled trials and ROBINS-I (Sterne et al. 2016) for quasi-experimental designs. Randomised studies generally exhibited lower risk of bias, while quasi-experimental studies showed greater variability in quality. Four major themes emerged from the analysis. First, intervention format mattered: flexible, collaborative, and well-structured interventions facilitated implementation, while outdated materials or content misaligned with local context impeded delivery. Second, consistency in school policies and practice enabled smoother implementation, whereas inconsistency acted as a barrier. Third, staff buy-in—particularly among senior leaders—was essential for successful implementation, although resistance from more experienced staff was noted. Finally, perceived effectiveness played a motivational role: visible improvements in pupil behaviour supported continued engagement with the intervention. In summary, the updated review finds that school-based interventions can modestly but significantly reduce school exclusions. While more serious disciplinary sanctions such as permanent exclusions and out-of-school suspensions appear less responsive, in-school exclusion shows greater potential for reduction. Impacts on other behavioural outcomes remain limited. These findings suggest that targeted, context-sensitive interventions supported by strong implementation strategies and whole-school engagement are most likely to achieve sustained reductions in school exclusion.

By D.J. Summers

in the past five years, Colorado’s largest cities have had very different experiences of crime.

Colorado’s violent and property crime rates rose sharply in the early 2020s, prompting varying responses from leaders at state and local levels. Some have been more successful than others, according to the most recently available Colorado Bureau of Investigation data.

CSI analyzed the violent and property crime trends of Colorado’s ten largest cities: Denver, Colorado Springs, Aurora, Fort Collins, Lakewood, Thornton, Arvada, Westminster, Pueblo, and Centennial. These ten cities represent just under half the state’s total population, with a combined population of roughly 2.3 million residents. CSI analyzed the average violent and property crime rates per 100,000 people through the first two quarters of each year between 2016 and 2025. Pueblo’s police data is not current and could not be included in the analysis.

Property and violent crime cost the state $27 billion in economic losses in 2022 between the tangible and intangible effects of reported and unreported crime. It is imperative that public leaders continually examine and understand which policies best address crime rates.

Key Findings

Denver’s violent crime rate is the highest among Colorado’s largest cities, with 235 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

 Aurora’s is second highest, with 203 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

Aurora’s violent crime has remained beneath Denver’s for three years, breaking the trend of the late 2010s and early 2020s in which Aurora’s rates were higher.

Only Colorado Springs saw an increase in the violent crime rate between 2022 and 2025.

Among the largest cities, Aurora saw the sharpest decrease in violent crime rate.

Aurora saw the second highest decrease in violent crime rate, with a 36% decrease.

Denver has the highest property crime rate of Colorado’s largest cities, with 1,122 property crimes per 100,000 people.

Lakewood has the second highest rate, with 1,099 per 100,000 people.

Aurora and Centennial had the sharpest decreases in property crime rate since 2021, at 56%, 49%, and 44%, respectively. 

By Sarah Picard, Leah Nelson, Rae Walker, Kasey Eickmeyer, and Ellie Wilson

Every year, courts across the United States impose millions of dollars in fines, fees, and restitution on people convicted of traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies. Collectively, monetary sanctions and other criminal justice fees are referred to as legal financial obligations or simply court debt. Ostensibly, court debt is intended to sanction offenders, recover the costs of running a court system, raise revenue, and compensate victims of crime. In most jurisdictions, however, court debt is assessed without considering an individual’s ability to pay, and much of what is owed goes uncollected. Estimates suggest that there are approximately $27.6 billion in outstanding obligations. In addition to being an unreliable source of revenue, court debt can have severe and long-standing consequences for those who owe, exposing them to increasing debt, future incarceration related to unpaid debt, and the suspension of voting rights, among other collateral consequences. In jurisdictions across the country, court debt also has a disproportionate effect on the economically disadvantaged, as well as Black and Latino individuals and communities. Many of the equity and collateral consequences described above hold true for court debt assessment and collection in Jefferson County and across Alabama, as documented in a 2018 survey with over 800 Alabama residents who owed court debt. This research attracted the attention of judges in the Tenth Circuit Court in Jefferson County (home to Birmingham) who worked with Leah Nelson, lead researcher on the 2018 survey, and MDRC to develop the Jefferson County Equitable Fines and Fees (JEFF) Project, a multidisciplinary study of the scope and consequences of court debt in the county. With funding from Arnold Ventures, the JEFF Project began in 2022. The findings in this report reflect multiple lines of inquiry, including descriptive and inferential analyses of five years of case-level court data, in-depth interviews with court practitioners, and focus group discussions with individuals who have direct experience with court debt in Jefferson County. Taken together, these analyses point to a system that is neither effective in generating revenue for the court, nor fair, given its outsized impact on Black and indigent people living in poor communities. Over the five years of the study, just under half of the individuals who owed court debt paid in full, with many seeing their debt burden grow over time. The research team also isolated some of the major factors that contribute to debt growth, which include race and economic disadvantage, in addition to factors related to how debt is collected, most notably the practice of assessing a 30 percent late fee on those who do not submit a payment within 90 days. Both court practitioners and individuals who are directly affected viewed the current system as broken, with the latter describing serious financial, emotional, and collateral consequences. Findings from the JEFF Project have already prompted the reconsideration of current practices in Jefferson County, including a pilot project to reduce debt burdens and encourage payments, and the creation of a statewide task force that will examine fines and fees across Alabama. Finally, given that Jefferson County is home to a midsized  city situated in a fiscally and socially conservative state, its social and geographic characteristics make it a useful reference for many cities and counties looking to make changes in their fines and fees systems.

By Joshua Rovner

Youth arrests and incarceration increased dramatically in the closing decades of the 20th century but have fallen sharply since. Public opinion often wrongly assumes that crime (and incarceration) is perpetually increasing. In fact, the 21st century has seen significant declines in both youth arrests and incarceration. Despite positive movement on important indicators, far too many youth—disproportionately youth of color—are incarcerated. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2023, the number of youth held in juvenile justice facilities, adult prisons, and adult jails fell from 120,200 to 31,800—a 74% decline.

By Olivia Naugle

The youth justice system was created because youth are different from adults.1 State departments of juvenile justice have purpose clauses affirming that rehabilitation is their primary goal. In the youth justice system, youth have access to developmentally appropriate services that are not available in the adult criminal legal system. Sending youth to the adult criminal justice system, for any offense, harms youth wellbeing and community safety.

By Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Marilyn Ibarra-Caton

Background

Mexico rolled out state-led criminal justice reforms between 2000 and 2017 to modernize procedures and improve rule of law. Whether these changes reduced violent crime—especially in cartel-affected areas—remains uncertain.

Aims

Estimate the impact of reform implementation on homicides and arrests, and assess mechanisms related to enforcement capacity and public cooperation with law enforcement.

Materials & Methods

We build a municipality–year panel (2000–2017) from death certificates (homicides) and administrative records (arrests). Because states adopted reforms at different times, we use difference-in-differences estimators designed for staggered adoption and heterogeneous treatment effects, with rich fixed effects and controls. To probe mechanisms, we analyze nationally representative survey measures of crime reporting, institutional trust, and perceived police/prosecutorial integrity.

Results

Reform implementation is associated with a ~25% increase in homicide rates. Over the same horizon, arrest rates fall by >50%. As homicides are less prone to underreporting than other crimes, the homicide increase is unlikely to be a reporting artifact. Survey evidence shows reduced crime reporting, declining trust in institutions, and more negative views of police and prosecutors; effects are strongest in cartel-affected regions.

Discussion

The pattern is consistent with an erosion of effective enforcement capacity at rollout: fewer arrests and lower public cooperation raise expected returns to violent crime. In high-violence settings, reforms that change procedures without parallel boosts to investigative and prosecutorial capacity—and without safeguards for witnesses—can weaken deterrence.

Conclusion

Mexico’s staggered judicial reforms coincided with higher homicides and sharply lower arrests. Successful reform in violent contexts likely requires coordinated institutional strengthening (policing, prosecution, witness protection), phased implementation with measurable benchmarks, and strategies to sustain public trust and reporting.

By The International Organization for Migration

This report, Climate Chains: Mapping the Relationship between Climate, Trafficking in Persons and Building Resilience in the Philippines, explores the complex links between climate change, livelihood, vulnerability, migration and human trafficking in the Philippines. Commissioned by IOM under the Climate Resilience Against Trafficking and Exploitation (CREATE) project, this study forms part of a broader research focusing on Ethiopia and the Philippines – two countries facing distinct climate challenges: slow-onset droughts and sudden-onset typhoons, respectively.  

The research used a mixed-methods approach including household surveys, interviews and focus group discussions. The report puts forward a conceptual model that links climate events and trafficking through a series of intertwined steps. It identifies a causal chain where climate events disrupt livelihood, increase vulnerability and heighten migration intentions, which can lead to exploitation and trafficking. The research explores how factors linking climate and trafficking operate in the Philippines. 

This study provides critical insights and recommendations for policymakers, donors and organizations in the Philippines and internationally that are working to combat human trafficking and exploitation, while strengthening resilience to climate change

By Alice Fereday

Chad’s role as a departure and transit country for northbound migration to North Africa and Europe is often overlooked, particularly in comparison to neighbouring Niger and Sudan. However, the country’s position at the crossroads of routes connecting central and eastern Africa to Libya and Niger makes it a significant transit corridor for regional migration, and its role as a bastion of relative stability in an increasingly volatile region has further increased its importance in recent years. Since 2023, the conflict in Sudan and a major influx of refugees into Chad have further shaped these mobility dynamics, making the country a major destination and transit point for Sudanese refugee displacement in the region. At the same time, Chad is navigating a fractious and contested political transition. Political violence escalated in 2024 and remains an important source of tension and political instability. The combination of these complex internal and regional dynamics, and their impact on human smuggling dynamics, make Chad a key country to monitor. A major component of human smuggling dynamics in Chad is internal movements to the country’s northern goldfields. These mobility patterns have typically been shaped by internal factors, including political instability, rebel activity and gold mining.1 This changed in 2023 with the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan and the massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. Though northbound movements were temporarily hindered by this shift, which resulted iI emerged as the dominant model of migration in Libya in 2021 and remained so in 2024. Hybrid smuggling refers to the system whereby migrants initially travel to Libya through regular or semi-regular routes, such as flights into airports, and then are moved overland to coastal departure points for the sea crossing to Europe. This system is adaptable to local changes and delivers a consistently high level of attempted departures, despite some localized improvements in security. Critically, the Government of National Unity (GNU), which rules western Libya, continued to struggle with internal division and weak control over crucial areas, especially on the west coast, a key region for human smuggling stretching from the Tunisian border to the city of Zawiya. Political infighting and disputes over state resources 

By Kristina Amerhauser | Audrey Thill 

  Cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia rely heavily on information and communications technology, financial fraud, trafficking for forced criminality, corruption and elite capture. This creates what can be described as ‘compound crimes’, reflecting how cyber scam operations are both based in physical compounds and involve multiple criminal markets. While estimates vary, the scale of funds defrauded from scam victims each year is in the tens of billions of US dollars and trending upward. In addition, illicit proceeds are generated from exploitation of trafficked persons, illegal gambling and corruption. The scale of illicit financial flows represents a clear threat to national economies, governance and international security. Cyber scam operations and their enabling networks operate at scale across Southeast Asia and beyond. They have reportedly trapped hundreds of thousands of people inside compounds where they are forced to conduct scams. Some operations retain workers through debt bondage, psychological coercion and financial incentives. Significant diversity in operational models – from high-security compounds to thousands of smaller operations located in apartments and other small premises – creates varied patterns of financial flows across jurisdictions. The money laundering process is part of a sophisticated financial service ecosystem. Most concerning is how networks of actors operate at scale and at the intersection of legitimate and illegitimate economies by using licensed crypto exchanges, registered fintech platforms and traditional banking services. Some are ‘crime as a service’ providers, explicitly providing money laundering services to cyber scam operations and doing so with corporate efficiency. This means that moving and laundering money has evolved into a marketplace-type structure where actors remain anonymous to others within the network. Governments, the private sector and civil society actors have sought innovative responses to disrupt the illicit industry. These include initiatives that ‘follow the money’ and disrupt the money laundering networks used by cyber scam operations. While some work has begun to explore illicit financial flows stemming from scam operations, notably related to cryptocurrencies, important gaps persist. Less is known about the wider set of financial flows, the mechanisms used to transfer proceeds in and out of the region and the networks involved. This policy brief seeks to help fill this gap by mapping wider related payments and providing insights into how money is moved and where it ultimately ends up. It concludes by providing actionable policy recommendations for Southeast Asian governments as well as regional and global financial service providers. Crucially, these recommendations identify entry points for disrupting the operations of the transnational organized crime groups that run cyber scam operations. The key findings include: Actors involved in cyber scams and trafficking for forced criminality often use cryptocurrency to move illicit money. They also use cash, fintech – such as peer-to-peer (P2P) payment apps – gaming or gambling platforms, bank transfers, shell and front companies, credit cards and pre-paid cards. The role of the formal banking sector in these financial flows appears significant, as many scam-related transfers are initiated by the victim from their own bank accounts before being converted into cryptocurrencies at different steps of the laundering process. While most financial institutions likely process these transactions unwittingly, evidence suggests they may be enabled by regulatory loopholes such as weak know-your-customer (KYC) requirements and/or excessively high minimum thresholds for reporting suspicious transactions. After being laundered and converted back into fiat currency4 from cryptocurrency, illicit funds are also likely to be moved again through the formal financial system.

Many of the fintech and cryptocurrency platforms that money laundering networks use to convert cryptocurrencies back into fiat are registered companies and hold financial service licences. Some owners of these platforms have close connections to the political and business elites in the countries of registration, suggesting influence over financial regulation and an interest in maintaining a policy environment amenable to the large-scale laundering of criminal proceeds. Transnational organized crime groups in Southeast Asia generate highly lucrative profits. This creates a vicious cycle: greater profits enable these groups to expand their influence, including over public officials and the financial sector, which in turn reduces scrutiny of cyber scam compounds and related suspicious financial transactions. With their growing wealth, these criminal networks invest further into other types of crime and crime-as-a-service infrastructure, generating additional profits that allow them to strengthen their influence and market position   
Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 44p.

By Katalin Parti, Thomas Dearden

Purpose: Historically, cybercrime has been seen as a near exclusively male activity. We were interested to learn whether the relationship between strain and crime holds for both males and females.

Methods: We utilized an online survey instrument to collect data from a national sample of individuals (n=2,121) representing the US population by age, gender, race and ethnicity. We asked offending related questions regarding various cybercrimes. In the current study, we use data from 390 individuals who reported a cybercrime activity within the past 12 months.

Results: We find strong support for prior strains correlating with both specific (e.g., illegal uploading) and general cyber-offending. We further examine whether gender interacts with strain. While general strain theory (GST) correlates with cyber-offending for both males and females, we did find a few important differences. Except for lack of trust in others and receiving unsatisfactory evaluation at school or work, there are different variables responsible for online offending for men and women. Parents’ divorcing, anonymity, and online video gaming increase cybercrime offending in women, whereas falling victim to a crime, breaking up with a significant other, and darkweb activity are correlated with cyber-offending for men.

Conclusion: Although GST functions differently by gender when it comes to engaging in cyber-offending, the theory is indeed gender-specific, as different strain variables are responsible for engaging in cyber-offending in women and men. Components of general strain responsible for cyber-offending need to be further studied concerning gender. According to our results, GST is gender-specific, and these variables need to be further studied.

International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 13, 211–226

By GALEOTTI, MARK

From the webpage description: "'Since 2012, Russia has strategically used criminal networks to evade sanctions, conduct intelligence, and destabilize the West. Under Putin's 'mobilization state,' illegal activities--from smuggling to cyberattacks--are seen as essential tools of warfare. This report delves into the Kremlin's alarming integration of organized crime into statecraft.' Russia's transition from a 'conscription state' to a full 'mobilization state', after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has intensified the involvement of criminal groups in operations tied to sanctions-busting, cyber warfare, and intelligence. Organized crime networks provide Russia with access to restricted goods, such as advanced electronics for its military, and facilitate money laundering and illegal financial flows. Notably, Russian intelligence services have relied on criminal syndicates to supplement their espionage activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations. The report also highlights Russia's weaponization of migration, using smuggling networks to create political instability across Europe. Meanwhile, Putin's regime has blurred the lines between state and criminal actors, using them as tools to evade international sanctions and expand Russian influence globally. 'Gangsters at War' reveals how Russian-based organized crime operates as a tool of Kremlin foreign policy, focusing not just on profits but on weakening geopolitical rivals. From sanctions evasion to destabilizing societies, criminal networks have become a key element in Russia's geopolitical arsenal. The report calls for increased vigilance, international cooperation, and stronger countermeasures to address this growing threat to global stability."

GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. November. 2024. 82p.

By Claudia Wiehler and Medinat Malefakis

Nigeria has functioned as an anchor of stability in West Africa, a region that has been shaken by seven coups in three years. Yet, Nigeria is also grappling with several internal security crises including a violent-extremist insurgency and large-scale banditry, putting into question Nige ria’s ability to maintain this role. Reports about collaborations between bandit groups and Boko Haram extremists create fear about an unholy alliance across the country’s Northern region, potentially linking violent extremist groups in Mali and Niger with those in the Lake Chad region. It is against this backdrop of severe civilian suffering and potential transnational ripple effects that we argue for a pragmatic and rapid intervention in the banditry crisis. At this point, it is time to make ‘peace’ with the bandits.  

  Policy Perspectives Vol. 12/1. April 2024, 4pg