By Michael J. Frith  , Kate J. Bowers  , Shane D. Johnson 

Introduction: In response to COVID-19, governments imposed various restrictions on movement and activities. According to the routine activity perspective, these should alter where crime occurs. For burglary, greater household occupancy should increase guardianship against residential burglaries, particularly during the day considering factors such as working from home. Conversely, there should be less eyes on the street to protect against non-residential burglaries. Methods: In this paper, we test these expectations using a spatio-temporal model with crime and Google Community Mobility data. Results: As expected, burglary declined during the pandemic and restrictions. Different types of burglary were, however, affected differently but largely consistent with theoretical expectation. Residential and attempted residential burglaries both decreased significantly. This was particularly the case during the day for completed residential burglaries. Moreover, while changes were coincident with the timing and relaxation of restrictions, they were better explained by fluctuations in household occupancy. However, while there were significant decreases in non-residential and attempted non-residential burglary, these did not appear to be related to changes to activity patterns, but rather the lockdown phase. Conclusions: From a theoretical perspective, the results generally provide further support for routine activity perspective. From a practical perspective, they suggest considerations for anticipating future burglary trends 

Journal of Criminal Justice, v. 82, 2022

By Tracit

In pursuit of various social, religious, health, or economic objectives governments have imposed a long history of regulatory controls on the producers and consumers of alcoholic beverages. Minimum age purchase restrictions are probably the most renowned and common. Dry laws and other forms of supply restrictions are probably the most notorious. For the most part, the failure of America’s experiment with Prohibition has discouraged governments from imposing them. That is until the onset of the global COVID19 pandemic, when several countries opted for some form of dry law on alcoholic beverages as a tool to mitigate the impact of the virus. Whether or not dry laws were effective in addressing the pandemic itself is not the purpose of this report. The ambition here is to analyze the economic and social impacts of dry laws beyond public health objectives, specifically those consequences associated with illicit trade. The findings are intended to yield valuable lessons from the experience with COVID19 prohibitions, which can be applied to shaping future policymaking at the intersection of alcohol regulation, illicit trade and public welfare.   

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (Tracit), 2021. 34p.

By Tracit

In pursuit of various social, religious, health, or economic objectives governments have imposed a long history of regulatory controls on the producers and consumers of alcoholic beverages. Minimum age purchase restrictions are probably the most renowned and common. Dry laws and other forms of supply restrictions are probably the most notorious. For the most part, the failure of America’s experiment with Prohibition has discouraged governments from imposing them. That is until the onset of the global COVID19 pandemic, when several countries opted for some form of dry law on alcoholic beverages as a tool to mitigate the impact of the virus. Whether or not dry laws were effective in addressing the pandemic itself is not the purpose of this report. The ambition here is to analyze the economic and social impacts of dry laws beyond public health objectives, specifically those consequences associated with illicit trade. The findings are intended to yield valuable lessons from the experience with COVID19 prohibitions, which can be applied to shaping future policymaking at the intersection of alcohol regulation, illicit trade and public welfare.   

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (Tracit), 2021. 34p.