By Jack A. Blum; Michael Levi; R. T. Naylor; and Phil Williams

While there has been a general trend towards enacting money-laundering laws that provide for the lifting of financial secrecy in appropriate cases, such secrecy remains a barrier in many jurisdictions, including some of those that have come to be known as 'financial havens'. The advances in technology and communication have made the three F's - finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets all the more difficult. This publication discusses these issues and other related problems in depth. The law enforcement success stories presented convey a sense of imaginative ways in which financial havens are used. The cases also highlight the advantages, from the point of view of criminals, of collusion with bank employees and the use of professional launderers.

Vienna: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998, 117p.

By Tomas Williams, Pablo Slutzky, and Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas

We explore how anti-money laundering (AML) policies affect banks and credit provision to firms. For identification we exploit the enactment of a financial regulation in Colombia. Aimed at controlling the flow of money from drug trafficking into the financial system, we find that after implementation bank deposits in municipalities with high drug trafficking decline. This negative liquidity shock has consequences for credit in other municipalities. Banks sourcing their deposits from areas with high drug trafficking cut lending relative to other banks. Using a proprietary database containing data on bank-firm credit relationships, we show that small firms that rely on credit from affected banks experience a negative shock to sales, investment, and profitability. Furthermore, we use night-lights data to show that these results are not due to a reallocation of activity across firms nor between the formal and informal sectors. Our evidence uncovers a hidden to be considered when implementing AML policies.

Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2020. 62p.

By Pacelli, Joseph, Janet Gao, Jan Schneemeier, and Yufeng Wu.

Bank employees face discretion in investigating and reporting money laundering activities via suspicious activity reports (SARs), a primary tool to combat financial crimes. We investigate the incentives banks face to initiate SARs and the implications for criminal activity. Our theoretical and empirical analyses document that banks with more profit-seeking pressure adopt lax reporting policies to attract criminal customers, ultimately leading to more suspicious activity reports. A structural estimation approach helps us uncover the relation between bank profitability, reporting stringency, and the demand from criminal customers. Our results also suggest an assortative matching between lax banks and criminal clientele.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 61p.,