By ECLAC

The purpose of the Femicidal Violence in Figures Bulletin is to disseminate data on femicide/feminicide or gender-related killings of women in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to report on the methodological advances made by national institutions in generating statistics on this form of violence. Responsible entities:  Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the UNiTE to End Violence against Women campaign.

By Laurie Caron, Frank Crispino and Cyril Muehlethaler

Tobacco smuggling remains a widespread illegal activity in Canada, associated with important social and economic impacts, and often linked to organized crime. This study explores the application of forensic profiling as an intelligence tool to support the analysis of contraband cigarette production and distribution. Physical and chemical manufacturing characteristics of seized contraband cigarette packs, provided by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), were observed and coded using macroscopic, microscopic, and spectroscopic techniques. Multivariate statistical analyses were then conducted to compare manufacturing characteristics between packs and identify potential links. The analyses highlighted links between cigarette packs and seizures based on shared manufacturing characteristics. The results and the identified groups were also compared with seizure data provided by the CBSA. The results demonstrate the relevance of forensic profiling to formulate hypotheses regarding shared production processes or supply networks. These hypotheses provide information that contributes to understanding tobacco smuggling and aim to examine how forensic intelligence can support law enforcement and measures to prevent and disrupt this criminal activity. A preliminary optimal procedure for applying forensic profiling in operational contexts targeting contraband tobacco was finally proposed. Despite limitations in the dataset creation that were beyond our control, this study represents a starting point for applying this scientific approach to tobacco smuggling

By Tássio Franchi

The text discusses, in an exploratory way, how the environmental issue related to the Brazilian Amazon attracts international attention and potentially serves as a mechanism of external constraint in Brazil’s internal affairs. Complaints of environmental crimes and crimes against indigenous peoples are debated in the international political environment, without considering Brazilian sovereignty on these and other topics. In some cases, such debates are used, as pretexts, to halt negotiations of trade agreements beneficial to the country. In summary, the text explores the concept of national sovereignty in the face of global pressures and the impacts of international agendas on Brazilian government action, pointing out that there are complexities and nuances of this geopolitical interaction, in addition to the common good of environmental preservation or the protection of indigenous peoples. 

By

María Fernanda Rodríguez, Nicolás Espejo Yaksic

The IBA assumed the challenge of contributing to a profound and urgent transformation, under the conviction that protecting the rights of children is not only a legal and ethical obligation, but also an essential investment in strengthening the rule of law.

As such, this report highlights existing challenges as well as good practices and proposes a roadmap to advance toward a child-centered justice system, as part of the commitment to leave no one behind within the framework of the 2030 Agenda.

Likewise, the report seeks to be a tool for articulation. A meeting point for governments, the judiciary, ombudsmen, prosecutors, civil society, academia, international organizations, but most importantly, for the voices of children and adolescents.

The preparation of this report involved participants from the justice ecosystem across the region. In line with this collective effort, the report includes a detailed analysis of the drafting process of the Ibero-American Common Rules on Restorative Juvenile Criminal Justice, led by the main justice networks and regional bodies.

The report is divided up into the following sections:

Section 1–Regional Context

Section 2–Access to Justice and the Development Agenda: People-Centered and Child-Centered Justice

Section 3–Principles of Child-Centered Justice: Progress in the Region

Section 4–Vision and Regional Agenda

By Matthew Clair

Abstract: This paper reviews cultural sociological approaches to the study of law and how they may be applied to future research on law-related social crises. As the world faces myriad social crises, such as rising authoritarianism and police violence, the study of culture and the law has become an even more urgent intellectual and practical endeavor. Over the last decade, five concepts have dominated the cultural study of law: rules, norms, frames, cultural capital, and legal consciousness. While past research has provided generative insight, future research would benefit from more precise considerations of rules and norms in this unsettled moment. Moreover, future research could leverage the five cultural concepts to sharpen understandings of inequality and social control in understudied legal organizations, along understudied axes of social stratification, and with respect to the infusion of new technologies into the legal system.

By John Bradford and Aaron Jed Rabena

Key Takeaways

The maritime security situation in the southern Philippines and neighbouring areas of Malaysia and Indonesia has greatly improved in recent years, thanks to coordinated government action.

The threats from terrorism and kidnapping have been reduced, but other forms of maritime criminal activity have become even more prominent, with smuggling and human trafficking emerging as the foremost concerns.

The Philippines, its neighbours, and its partners should leverage the positive momentum to build upon the gains, rather than shifting resources away.

The Bangsamoro peace process in the southern Philippines has travelled a rocky road in the decade since the agreement was signed between the national government and the area’s largest armed group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in 2014. In October 2025, a series of court cases that derailed the first elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao presented the latest bump – possibly a very consequential one. However, in the same decade, the maritime security situation has significantly improved in this area’s seas, which, as a matter of geography, history, and culture, are directly linked to the larger Philippines–Malaysia–Indonesia tri-border area (TBA).

A decade ago, the waters around the TBA were awash with banditry. The kidnapping of mariners and coastal residents was one of the most lucrative forms of crime. When eleven kidnapping incidents (nine successful) were documented over a nine-month period during 2016, alarm bells rang in the shipping community.

The cresting waves of maritime violence prompted Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to begin coordinating air and maritime patrols under the auspices of the 2017 Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement. Since then, the Philippine government has arrested hundreds of suspects and engaged in clashes with members of maritime-savvy armed organisations, while also focusing on the region’s economic development. There have been no incidents of kidnapping at sea since January 2020.

Given the range of intense challenges the three nations face – especially in the maritime domain – it is both natural and appropriate that they may reorient resources towards other priorities. However, it would be a mistake to rest on their laurels. While the violence may have lessened, the TBA waters are still plagued by crime. It would be wiser to continue building on this success rather than easing the pressure, thereby allowing the criminals to reconstitute. 

By D.J. Summers

in the past five years, Colorado’s largest cities have had very different experiences of crime.

Colorado’s violent and property crime rates rose sharply in the early 2020s, prompting varying responses from leaders at state and local levels. Some have been more successful than others, according to the most recently available Colorado Bureau of Investigation data.

CSI analyzed the violent and property crime trends of Colorado’s ten largest cities: Denver, Colorado Springs, Aurora, Fort Collins, Lakewood, Thornton, Arvada, Westminster, Pueblo, and Centennial. These ten cities represent just under half the state’s total population, with a combined population of roughly 2.3 million residents. CSI analyzed the average violent and property crime rates per 100,000 people through the first two quarters of each year between 2016 and 2025. Pueblo’s police data is not current and could not be included in the analysis.

Property and violent crime cost the state $27 billion in economic losses in 2022 between the tangible and intangible effects of reported and unreported crime. It is imperative that public leaders continually examine and understand which policies best address crime rates.

Key Findings

Denver’s violent crime rate is the highest among Colorado’s largest cities, with 235 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

 Aurora’s is second highest, with 203 violent crimes per 100,000 people.

Aurora’s violent crime has remained beneath Denver’s for three years, breaking the trend of the late 2010s and early 2020s in which Aurora’s rates were higher.

Only Colorado Springs saw an increase in the violent crime rate between 2022 and 2025.

Among the largest cities, Aurora saw the sharpest decrease in violent crime rate.

Aurora saw the second highest decrease in violent crime rate, with a 36% decrease.

Denver has the highest property crime rate of Colorado’s largest cities, with 1,122 property crimes per 100,000 people.

Lakewood has the second highest rate, with 1,099 per 100,000 people.

Aurora and Centennial had the sharpest decreases in property crime rate since 2021, at 56%, 49%, and 44%, respectively. 

By Sarah Picard, Leah Nelson, Rae Walker, Kasey Eickmeyer, and Ellie Wilson

Every year, courts across the United States impose millions of dollars in fines, fees, and restitution on people convicted of traffic violations, misdemeanors, and felonies. Collectively, monetary sanctions and other criminal justice fees are referred to as legal financial obligations or simply court debt. Ostensibly, court debt is intended to sanction offenders, recover the costs of running a court system, raise revenue, and compensate victims of crime. In most jurisdictions, however, court debt is assessed without considering an individual’s ability to pay, and much of what is owed goes uncollected. Estimates suggest that there are approximately $27.6 billion in outstanding obligations. In addition to being an unreliable source of revenue, court debt can have severe and long-standing consequences for those who owe, exposing them to increasing debt, future incarceration related to unpaid debt, and the suspension of voting rights, among other collateral consequences. In jurisdictions across the country, court debt also has a disproportionate effect on the economically disadvantaged, as well as Black and Latino individuals and communities. Many of the equity and collateral consequences described above hold true for court debt assessment and collection in Jefferson County and across Alabama, as documented in a 2018 survey with over 800 Alabama residents who owed court debt. This research attracted the attention of judges in the Tenth Circuit Court in Jefferson County (home to Birmingham) who worked with Leah Nelson, lead researcher on the 2018 survey, and MDRC to develop the Jefferson County Equitable Fines and Fees (JEFF) Project, a multidisciplinary study of the scope and consequences of court debt in the county. With funding from Arnold Ventures, the JEFF Project began in 2022. The findings in this report reflect multiple lines of inquiry, including descriptive and inferential analyses of five years of case-level court data, in-depth interviews with court practitioners, and focus group discussions with individuals who have direct experience with court debt in Jefferson County. Taken together, these analyses point to a system that is neither effective in generating revenue for the court, nor fair, given its outsized impact on Black and indigent people living in poor communities. Over the five years of the study, just under half of the individuals who owed court debt paid in full, with many seeing their debt burden grow over time. The research team also isolated some of the major factors that contribute to debt growth, which include race and economic disadvantage, in addition to factors related to how debt is collected, most notably the practice of assessing a 30 percent late fee on those who do not submit a payment within 90 days. Both court practitioners and individuals who are directly affected viewed the current system as broken, with the latter describing serious financial, emotional, and collateral consequences. Findings from the JEFF Project have already prompted the reconsideration of current practices in Jefferson County, including a pilot project to reduce debt burdens and encourage payments, and the creation of a statewide task force that will examine fines and fees across Alabama. Finally, given that Jefferson County is home to a midsized  city situated in a fiscally and socially conservative state, its social and geographic characteristics make it a useful reference for many cities and counties looking to make changes in their fines and fees systems.

By Barbara Kelemen | Ján Slobodník

This CEIAS paper aims to shed light on cooperation between Chinese businesses and Mexican criminal groups. It specifically analyzes cases related to drug trafficking and the exploitation of natural resources in three states in Mexico. The topic is particularly relevant for countries in Latin America that have been expanding their commercial ties with China. This research suggests that the lack of state supervision in some of these countries could allow alternative structures—such as criminal groups and Chinese organized networks—to thrive and fill the security and economic void if not regulated properly.

Summary

Mexico’s macroeconomic stability and abundant natural resources have made the country into an attractive destination for Chinese businesses.

The country still suffers from a lack of internal security, most of it stemming from the Mexican Drug War, an ongoing multilateral low-intensity conflict between the Mexican government and a large number of criminal organizations.

In some of Mexico’s states, pervasive violence and instability have resulted in a power vacuum. With the government being unable to guarantee security, non-state actors such as criminal organizations and/or civilian militias seize the opportunity to establish their own rule.

When foreign companies operate in such troubled areas, they inevitably run into problems caused by Mexico’s security issues.

Within this trend of foreign companies operating in Mexico, some level of tacit cooperation has been observed between Chinese businesses and non-state actors. This cooperation is often an outcome of localized security vacuums that are exploited by alternative security providers, such as criminal organizations, that can fill them and provide operational safety for local businesses.

A growing body of research has identified the existence of Chinese illicit networks and their involvement in the trafficking of people, narcotics, and contraband goods, as well as money laundering and illegal arms trade in Mexico.

Concealed under the guise of legal commercial activity, networks of Mexican criminal organizations and their Chinese business partners exploit the dire security situation in some areas of Mexico.

Despite attempts by the Chinese and the Mexican governments to regulate certain sectors that contribute to the existence of the illicit networks in Mexico, there are still substantial opportunities that are ripe for exploitation by the criminal group-legitimate business partnerships

By Marilyn FREEMAN

Cross-border parental child abductions in the EU are governed by The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and (except for Denmark) the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Countries outside of the EU may or may not be Contracting States to ‘the Convention’, but will not be bound by Brussels II-ter. Research has found that the often negative, long-lasting impact of abduction may continue throughout the lifecycle of those who have been abducted. It may also affect future generations of society. This means that every effort to deter abduction should be made. Where that is not possible, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention should be nurtured to support its application in contemporary society. Specialist mediation should be encouraged in relation to international child abduction generally, and specifically in relation to Third Countries which are not Contracting States to ‘the Convention’. This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee.

By Tobias Auer and Tom Kirchmaier

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

In this paper we focus on how the criminal history of a household affects juvenile reoffending. Using detailed administrative data from Greater Manchester Police for 2007-2018, we construct a matched sample of 15,548 juvenile first-time offenders. We show causally that juveniles from a household with a previous criminal record are 26.4 to 29.8 percentage points more likely to reoffend within three years, with the greatest additional risk being in the first year after the initial offence. We show that social learning, co-offending by siblings, and differential processing contribute to this effect. Our findings highlight household criminality as an important driver of criminal persistence, underscoring the need to move beyond individual-level predictors and address the criminogenic dynamics within the home.

By Leah Ouellet, Daphne M. Brydon, Laura S. Abrams, Jeffrey T. Ward, Dylan B. Jackson, Rebecca Turner, J. Z. Bennett, Reese Howard, Ashley Xu

Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana restricted states’ ability to impose life without parole for youth under age 18 (henceforth JLWOP). Since Miller, 46 pieces of legislation across 34 states and the District of Columbia have altered JLWOP sentencing policies. The current study provides the first comprehensive and scientific review of this legislation. Using policy surveillance as a methodological guide, we found that a majority of statutes (N = 28) ban JLWOP sentencing, above and beyond the Supreme Court's requirement. Many statutes also extended sentencing reforms and post-conviction relief eligibility to other types of sentencing beyond JLWOP. However, all but one statute still allows either JLWOP or life with parole as a sentencing option for minors convicted of homicide crimes and requires between 15 and 40 years, at minimum, to be served before being eligible for release. Grounding our analysis in institutional theory, we argue that the relative punitivity of the JLWOP reforms enacted was associated with measures of JLWOP institutionalization across states (i.e., pre-Miller JLWOP population and pre-Miller sentencing schema), suggesting that states where JLWOP was more routinely used were more resistant to policy reform.

Policy Implications

The current study provides implications for future decarceration efforts. Findings suggest that state legislatures are willing to enact post-conviction relief measures (e.g., judicial review or “second look” measures) for individuals convicted of violent crimes to address over-incarceration, deviating from previous decarceration efforts focused on non-violent, low-level offenses. In spite of the promising window for juvenile justice reform that Miller provided, however, these reforms have taken a relatively modest, incremental approach toward altering extreme youth sentencing practices in the United States. Policy makers and advocates seeking to promote sentencing reform efforts should factor in how highly institutionalized a sentencing practice is in each state, as this might inform effective strategies for policy change.

By Sarah Ferencz, Alissa Greer, Amanda Butler

This qualitative study examines how frontline police officers in British Columbia experienced and adapted to Canada's first formal drug decriminalization policy 1 year after implementation. Drawing on 30 semi-structured interviews and using thematic analysis with a policy alienation and street-level bureaucracy lens, we analyzed how officers felt alienated from the policy process and coped with this experience as frontline implementers. Key themes show that frontline officers experienced processes of policy alienation in various ways: they felt that the policy was misaligned with their frontline perspectives; the Policy undermined their ability to help people in their communities; and legal ambiguity surrounding the Policy was challenging to navigate. Their coping strategies revealed that officers interpreted and executed decriminalization in divergent ways.

Policy Implications

These findings have important implications for policymakers and police leadership considering drug policy reforms. Officers’ feelings of disempowerment and policy meaninglessness, especially in contexts of legal ambiguity, may lead to inconsistent or inequitable enforcement. Strengthening communication across police ranks is critical. Middle managers may help translate reform goals, identify resource gaps, and support effective coping strategies. Legal clarity should extend beyond policy updates to help officers reconcile overlapping laws and reduce liability concerns. While there are limits to policy consultation with frontline officers within the hierarchical structure of police institutions, reform efforts should still engage with frontline officers’ working logics. Training should address harmful attitudes and misunderstandings of drug use, clarify legal boundaries, and mitigate unintended harms of enforcement. Ultimately, effective drug policy reform in a multi-jurisdictional system requires acknowledging how frontline officers interpret and shape 

 policy within institutional constraints.

By Alagie Jinkang

Italy’s illegal commercialised sex industry is estimated to be worth 90 million Euro and involves up to 9 million clients annually. The industry depends on migrants from Nigeria, Romania and Albania, many of whom are victims of human trafficking, abuse, exploitation, oppression, extreme educational and economic poverty, and non-integration in Italy. But despite legal and policy interventions, sexual exploitation of migrants is highly tolerated, goes largely unpunished and is increasingly threatening to migrant women's wellbeing throughout the peninsula, as in the case of migrant women from Nigeria. This brief focuses on the NigerianItalian HTSE for two main reasons: (a) Italy’s proximity to the central Mediterranean route serving as key irregular route for migrant smugglers and human traffickers; (b) Italy’s dysfunctional and emergencial asylum systems coupled with its insufficient, untimely and inefficient policy intervention on migrants' sexual exploitation, and; (c) perceptions and misinformation about Europe as source of economic and social opportunities and prestige, which all provide a fertile ground for mafia activities and organised crime to flourish. Therefore, coupled with PERCEPTIONS findings, this brief draws political attention to the intersections between irregular migration and asylum, mafia activities and organised crime, targeted deception and misinformation, abject poverty and traditional practices within the discourse of NigerianItalian HTSE.

By The International Organization for Migration

This report, Climate Chains: Mapping the Relationship between Climate, Trafficking in Persons and Building Resilience in Ethiopia, explores the complex links between climate change, livelihood, vulnerability, migration and human trafficking in Ethiopia. Commissioned by IOM under the Climate Resilience Against Trafficking and Exploitation (CREATE) project, this study forms part of a broader research focusing on Ethiopia and the Philippines – two countries facing distinct climate challenges: slow-onset droughts and sudden-onset typhoons, respectively.  

The research used a mixed-methods approach including household surveys, interviews and focus group discussions. The report puts forward a conceptual model that links climate events and trafficking through a series of intertwined steps. It identifies a causal chain where climate events disrupt livelihood, increase vulnerability and heighten migration intentions, which can lead to exploitation and trafficking. The research explores how factors linking climate and trafficking operate in Ethiopia. 

This study provides critical insights and recommendations for policymakers, donors and organizations in Ethiopia and internationally that are working to combat human trafficking and exploitation, while strengthening resilience to climate change.

By Alice Fereday

Chad’s role as a departure and transit country for northbound migration to North Africa and Europe is often overlooked, particularly in comparison to neighbouring Niger and Sudan. However, the country’s position at the crossroads of routes connecting central and eastern Africa to Libya and Niger makes it a significant transit corridor for regional migration, and its role as a bastion of relative stability in an increasingly volatile region has further increased its importance in recent years. Since 2023, the conflict in Sudan and a major influx of refugees into Chad have further shaped these mobility dynamics, making the country a major destination and transit point for Sudanese refugee displacement in the region. At the same time, Chad is navigating a fractious and contested political transition. Political violence escalated in 2024 and remains an important source of tension and political instability. The combination of these complex internal and regional dynamics, and their impact on human smuggling dynamics, make Chad a key country to monitor. A major component of human smuggling dynamics in Chad is internal movements to the country’s northern goldfields. These mobility patterns have typically been shaped by internal factors, including political instability, rebel activity and gold mining.1 This changed in 2023 with the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan and the massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. Though northbound movements were temporarily hindered by this shift, which resulted iI emerged as the dominant model of migration in Libya in 2021 and remained so in 2024. Hybrid smuggling refers to the system whereby migrants initially travel to Libya through regular or semi-regular routes, such as flights into airports, and then are moved overland to coastal departure points for the sea crossing to Europe. This system is adaptable to local changes and delivers a consistently high level of attempted departures, despite some localized improvements in security. Critically, the Government of National Unity (GNU), which rules western Libya, continued to struggle with internal division and weak control over crucial areas, especially on the west coast, a key region for human smuggling stretching from the Tunisian border to the city of Zawiya. Political infighting and disputes over state resources 

By Mia Savicevic and Ethan Miner

This report is a focused look at the growing use of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) by law enforcement agencies across Iowa—a surveillance tool that poses serious risks to Iowans’ privacy and civil liberties. ALPRs are not speed cameras. They are not “red light” cameras. Instead, they are cameras used along roadways throughout Iowa that quickly take thousands of snapshots of license plates as vehicles drive by. That information can then be fed into a network of nationally shared databases that has too few privacy protections and is subject to abuse. More details about ALPRs generally can be found on the ACLU of Iowa website. Unlike other traffic cameras, ALPRs aren’t activated because you violated a law. They record you and every other person who drives by, simply to build a database of vehicle information. ALPRs can take hundreds of photos in a matter of minutes. And unlike ordinary surveillance cameras, where data is either not shared or shared in a more limited manner, the main purpose of ALPRs is to feed this information into a database. To investigate how this technology is being used, the ACLU of Iowa engaged the Technology Law Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law to conduct independent research on the use of ALPRs in Iowa. We sent open records requests to a broad cross-section of 48 law enforcement agencies across the state, to larger towns, to smaller communities, and to Iowa’s college towns. The study was not comprehensive of all ALPRs in Iowa. Of the 48 agencies that were selected, 5 did not respond to our records request before publication: the Des Moines Police Department, the Clinton Police Department, the Fayette Police Department, the Fremont Police Department, and the Mills Police Department.While researching this project, the clinic also identified agencies (see Appendix D) that have accessed other Iowa cities’ or counties’ ALPR databases, whether they have their own ALPRs or not.

Technology Law Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law and ACLU of Iowa, 2025. 63p.

By William Downs

Police misconduct is behaviour by a police officer that falls below the standards of professional behaviour for the police.

Cases of police misconduct can arise from concerns raised by police officers or staff, or following incidents where members of the public have been harmed by the actions of the police.

What are the laws on police misconduct?

Legislation specifies how allegations of police misconduct should be handled, though the framework is complex. In short, most allegations of police misconduct are handled in line with rules set out in the Police Act 1996 and Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. This legislation is designed to support the police in maintaining a disciplined force. The Home Office provides statutory guidance on implementing this legislation.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2025. 23p. 

By William Downs

Police disciplinary proceedings are brought in cases where it is agreed, following an investigation, that a police officer has a case to answer for: • misconduct (meaning a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that justifies disciplinary action of at least written), or • gross misconduct (meaning a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious to justify dismissal) A decision on whether there is a case to answer is based on whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a misconduct panel “could make a finding on the balance of probabilities” that an officer’s behaviour amounted to misconduct or gross misconduct. The Commons Library briefings Police standards: Complaints and Police Standards: Conduct explain in more detail how allegations of police wrongdoing are investigated.

London: UK Parliament. House of commons Library.. 2025. 19p.

By Stephen Farrall, Jason Warr, Abigail Shaw, Kanupriya Sharma

This paper reviews what is known about ethnic identity and the processes by which people cease offending. Whilst the past 30 years have seen dramatic growth in what is known about desistance, in many jurisdictions, there is a paucity of research which examines this in terms of ethnicity or ethnic variations. We therefore review what is empirically known about ethnicity and desistance. Whilst this review draws from the global literature, our focus is on what this literature tells us about ethnicity and desistance from a British perspective. We find that the majority of these have been undertaken in the United States (although there are some European and Australasian studies). Few studies, however, have fully unpacked the role of racism (in terms of institutional processes or overt prejudice and hostility) and that there have been very few studies of the roles played by ethnicity in processes of desistance.

The Howard Journal of Crime and JusticeVolume 64, Issue 3Sep 2025