By DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NEW ZEALAND

“…The study includes statistical information to the extent that it is available. The law and administrative procedures are described and where appropriate psychological and sociological factors are discussed. This factual background is essential for informed consideration of the criminal scene. Inevitably interpretations are made and a variety of opinion is offered. It was not the purpose of the Department to produce a colourless official document devoid of all contentious matter. Although there has been a measure of co-ordination, diversity of opinion and spontaneity remain. It would therefore be difficult to agree with everything that is said or suggested.”

Ministry of Justice. New Zealand. 1968. 410p.

By Rumbi Matamba and Chwayita Thobela

Over the past decade, the GI-TOC has documented a staggering 108% increase in targeted killings in South Africa. While South Africa has long grappled with high levels of violence, as evidenced by a per capita murder rate of 45 per 100,000 in 2022/23, or approximately 70 murders a day, targeted killings have notably escalated, particularly political killings at local municipal level. Hitmen have become more daring, incidents more public and victims more high-profile. Coupled with the deficiencies in South Africa’s overburdened criminal justice system, where only about 15% of all murders are solved, the picture that emerges is one of a situation that is barely contained.

GI-TOC recorded 131 targeted killings in South Africa in 2023, just ten fewer than in 2022. The 131 cases were grouped into four categories: organized-crime related (46 cases or 35% of incidents), minibus taxi-industry related (45 incidents, or 34%), political assassinations (31 incidents, or nearly 24%) and personal assassinations (9 incidents, or nearly 7%). While every effort is made to ensure that the data is robust and accurate, this is almost certainly an undercount as the database draws on publicly available information such as press reports, media statements from affected families, court records, and media statements by the criminal justice sector.

This report is framed in the context of South Africa’s 2024 general elections. Previous analysis has shown that there are always spikes in political assassinations during election years, particularly in long-contested provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal. The 2024 elections, the sixth national election in the country’s 30 years of democracy, have been earmarked as a potential watershed moment.

Political violence and assassinations pose a very real threat to the country’s democracy. They are not an isolated phenomenon and they intersect with organized crime and criminal networks. The intertwining of criminal networks and political assassinations in South Africa underscores the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to tackle organized crime and stop targeted killings.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 32p.

BY Lyn Mikel Brown

For some time, reality TV, talk shows, soap-operas, and sitcoms have turned their spotlights on women and girls who thrive on competition and nastiness. Few fairytales lack the evil stepmother, wicked witch, or jealous sister. Even cartoons feature mean and sassy girls who only become sweet and innocent when adults appear. And recently, popular books and magazines have turned their gaze away from ways of positively influencing girls' independence and self-esteem and towards the topic of girls' meanness to other girls. What does this say about the way our culture views girlhood? How much do these portrayals affect the way girls view themselves?

In Girlfighting, psychologist and educator Lyn Mikel Brown scrutinizes the way our culture nurtures and reinforces this sort of meanness in girls. She argues that the old adage “girls will be girls”—gossipy, competitive, cliquish, backstabbing— and the idea that fighting is part of a developmental stage or a rite-of-passage, are not acceptable explanations. Instead, she asserts, girls are discouraged from expressing strong feelings and are pressured to fulfill unrealistic expectations, to be popular, and struggle to find their way in a society that still reinforces gender stereotypes and places greater value on boys. Under such pressure, in their frustration and anger, girls (often unconsciously) find it less risky to take out their fears and anxieties on other girls instead of challenging the ways boys treat them, the way the media represents them, or the way the culture at large supports sexist practices.

Girlfighting traces the changes in girls' thoughts, actions and feelings from childhood into young adulthood, providing the developmental understanding and theoretical explanation often lacking in other conversations. Through interviews with over 400 girls of diverse racial, economic, and geographic backgrounds, Brown chronicles the labyrinthine journey girls take from direct and outspoken children who like and trust other girls, to distrusting and competitive young women. She argues that this familiar pathway can and should be interrupted and provides ways to move beyond girlfighting to build girl allies and to support coalitions among girls.

By allowing the voices of girls to be heard, Brown demonstrates the complex and often contradictory realities girls face, helping us to better understand and critique the socializing forces in their lives and challenging us to rethink the messages we send them.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2003. 259p.

By Cindy D. Ness

In low-income U.S. cities, street fights between teenage girls are common. These fights take place at school, on street corners, or in parks, when one girl provokes another to the point that she must either “step up” or be labeled a “punk.” Typically, when girls engage in violence that is not strictly self-defense, they are labeled “delinquent,” their actions taken as a sign of emotional pathology. However, in Why Girls Fight, Cindy D. Ness demonstrates that in poor urban areas this kind of street fighting is seen as a normal part of girlhood and a necessary way to earn respect among peers, as well as a way for girls to attain a sense of mastery and self-esteem in a social setting where legal opportunities for achievement are not otherwise easily available.
Ness spent almost two years in west and northeast Philadelphia to get a sense of how teenage girls experience inflicting physical harm and the meanings they assign to it. While most existing work on girls’ violence deals exclusively with gangs, Ness sheds new light on the everyday street fighting of urban girls, arguing that different cultural standards associated with race and class influence the relationship that girls have to physical aggression.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2010. 198p.

By Folahanmi Aina and John Sunday Ojo

Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) use social media platforms to promote extremist content and coordinate agendas.  The use of digital platforms to disseminate information and coordinate activities by VEOs in Nigeria has grown considerably in recent years. This report analyses the adoption of social media before and after attacks by Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru. In the post-attack environment, Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru use platforms to claim responsibility and display their strengths against the state’s security forces. By demonstrating their capacity to attack state security forces, the three groups aim to erode the public’s confidence in the state military’s capacity to safeguard national security. The key findings of this report are as follows: Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru previously leveraged popular social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, Telegram and Instagram. These platforms were used to promote propaganda and create awareness regarding upcoming attacks. However, all three groups have now had their use of these platforms restricted or banned. ISWAP has switched to using WhatsApp as a secure platform for communication before, during and after attacks. Rocket.Chat and Telegram have also been instrumental in ISWAP’s information dissemination. Boko Haram uses Telegram to share its activities in the pre-attack and post-attack environments. Ansaru has yet to appear on social media platforms due to its underground activities, which are hard to monitor. The recent acquisition of high-speed satellite internet has enhanced ISWAP’s communication with its audience and enabled coordinated attacks. Combating the exploitation of social media platform by VEOs requires a multidimensional approach. Effective collaboration with technology companies becomes imperative to identify extremist content. Building technological infrastructure for the state requires synergistic collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies to enable the removal of extremism from social media platforms. Devising multilingual and specialised algorithms to detect coded extremism messages and audio-visual content is essential for effective counter-extremism digital architecture. Investing in current technology through research and algorithm development must be prioritised to identify violent extremist content in Nigeria and beyond.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 30p.

By Muhammad Amien Ibrahim, Samsul Arifin and Eko Setyo Purwanto

Social media moderation is a crucial component to establish healthy online communities and ensuring online safety from hate speech and offensive language. In many cases, hate speech may be targeted at specific gender which could be expressed in many different languages on social media platforms such as Indonesian Twitter. However, difficulties such as data scarcity and the imbalanced gender-based hate speech dataset in Indonesian tweets have slowed the development and implementation of automatic social media moderation. Obtaining more data to increase the number of samples may be costly in terms of resources required to gather and annotate the data. This study looks at the usage of data augmentation methods to increase the amount of textual dataset while keeping the quality of the augmented data. Three augmentation strategies are explored in this study: Random insertion, back translation, and a sequential combination of back translation and random insertion. Additionally, the study examines the preservation of the increased data labels. The performance result demonstrates that classification models trained with augmented data generated from random insertion strategy outperform the other approaches. In terms of label preservation, the three augmentation approaches have been shown to offer enough label preservation without compromising the meaning of the augmented data. The findings imply that by increasing the amount of the dataset while preserving the original label, data augmentation could be utilized to solve issues such as data scarcity and dataset imbalance.

United States, Journal Of Computer Science. 2023, 9pg

Editor(s): D. Asher Ghertner, Hudson McFann, Daniel M. Goldstein

Security is a defining characteristic of our age and the driving force behind the management of collective political, economic, and social life. Directed at safeguarding society against future peril, security is often thought of as the hard infrastructures and invisible technologies assumed to deliver it: walls, turnstiles, CCTV cameras, digital encryption, and the like. The contributors to Futureproof redirect this focus, showing how security is a sensory domain shaped by affect and image as much as rules and rationalities. They examine security as it is lived and felt in domains as varied as real estate listings, active-shooter drills, border crossings, landslide maps, gang graffiti, and museum exhibits to theorize how security regimes are expressed through aesthetic forms. Taking a global perspective with studies ranging from Jamaica to Jakarta and Colombia to the U.S.-Mexico border ;Futureproof expands our understanding of the security practices, infrastructures, and technologies that pervade everyday life.

Contributors: Victoria Bernal, Jon Horne Carter, Alexandra Demshock, Zaire Z. Dinzey-Flores, Didier Fassin, D. Asher Ghertner, Daniel M. Goldstein, Rachel Hall, Rivke Jaffe, Ieva Jusionyte, Catherine Lutz, Alejandra Leal Martínez, Hudson McFann, Limor Samimian-Darash, AbdouMaliq Simone, Austin Zeiderman

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020. 312p.

By Amber Evans, Strategy & Insight Manager | Fernanda Reynoso-Serna, Analyst | Freya Smith, Analyst | Dr Ellie Brown, Head of Strategy | Sophie Davis

Most people are more worried about being affected by online fraud than other crimes, such as knife crime, burglary and sexual offences, according to a new large-scale survey – which also highlights the emotional impact of being an online fraud victim. The research, funded by the Dawes Trust, was based on a nationally representative sample of over 3,313 adults across England and Wales as part of a survey conducted by data organisation WALR. The vast majority of those polled, 92%, said online fraud was a very big or quite big problem in the UK. When asked what crimes they were most worried about being affected by, 55% said online fraud, 44% burglary and 47% knife crime. The poll also found that younger people (aged 18-34) were most likely to be affected by online fraud, with 32% reporting having been a victim in the last twelve months compared to 16% of over-35s. However, half of those questioned believed the elderly were most at risk. Of those who had been victims of online fraud: 20% said their physical health had suffered, 32% reported a psychological impact, 42% were affected financially, 47% experienced an emotional impact, including feeling embarrassed, angry or ashamed. 23% of all victims said they had experienced anxiety, 12% experienced disturbed sleep and 11% experienced depression as a result of the online fraud. The survey also shows that just over half of victims reported the fraud to either the police or Action Fraud. Victims were more likely to contact their bank (41%) than to go to the police (32%) or Action Fraud (28%), the UK’s national fraud reporting centre.

London: Crest Advisory, 2023. 32p.

By: Ksenia Ermoshina and Francesca Musiani

Concealing for Freedom: The Making of Encryption, Secure Messaging and Digital Liberties sets out to explore one of the core battlegrounds of Internet governance: the encryption of online communications. Current debates around encryption have fundamental implications for our individual liberties and collective presence on the Internet. Encryption of communications at scale and in increasingly usable ways has become a matter of public concern, especially since Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations. A new cryptographic imaginary is taking hold, which sees encryption as a necessary precondition for the formation of networked publics. At the same time, there have been major evolutions and accelerations in the field of secure communications, prompted in part by the cryptography community’s renewed efforts to create next-generation secure messaging protocols and applications. It is vital that we unveil the very recent, and sometimes less recent history of these protocols and their key applications. The book takes on this task, in order to show how the opportunities and constraints they provide to Internet users came about, and how both developer communities and institutions are working towards making them available for the largest possible audience. It explores how efforts towards this goal are built upon interwoven stories about technical development and architectural choices, about community-building – and about Internet governance and politics. In doing so, the book focuses on the experience of encryption in a wide variety of contemporary secure messaging protocols and tools, and looks at the implications of these endeavors for the “making of” digital liberties on the Internet. Concealing for Freedom provides two key empirical and theoretical contributions. Firstly, it enriches a social sciences-informed understanding of encryption. It does so by examining how different solutions of cryptography for secure communications are created, developed, enacted, and governed, and what this diverse experience of encryption, operating across many different sites, means for online civil liberties. Secondly, it contributes to understanding the social and political implications of particular design choices when it comes to the technical architecture of digital networks, in particular their degree of (de-)centralization. The book explores developers’ actions and their interactions with other stakeholders, for instance users, security trainers, standardising bodies, and funding organizations. It also examines their interactions with the technical artifacts they develop, in which a core common objective is to create tools that “conceal for freedom” even as how this objective is met differs according to technical architectures, the user publics being targeted and the tools’ underlying values and business models.

Manchester, UK: Mattering Press, 2022. 274p.

By Thomas Christoff, Benjamin Carleton, Margarita Parker, Kaitlin Moloney, Alexa Blondin, and Bill Taylor

Traffic enforcement encounters represent one of the most common interactions that the public has with law enforcement, with more than 20 million people pulled over for a traffic stop in the US each year (Baumgartner et al., 2021). Police officers make at least three important decisions during a traffic stop encounter, including whether to initiate a traffic stop, whether to conduct a search of persons or the vehicle, and how the officer will sanction the driver (Schafer et al., 2006). Similarly, traffic enforcement is also one of the primary responsibilities of the Michigan State Police (MSP), with MSP having conducted 287,065 traffic stops in 2022.1 In January of 2021, MSP took proactive steps to begin a partnership with researchers from the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University (MSU) to understand whether racial/ethnic disparities exist in traffic stop behavior by MSP patrol members. As part of MSP’s partnership with MSU, MSU researchers examined data for MSP traffic stops conducted during the year 2020. Overall, MSU’s analysis found that “African-American drivers experienced significant disparities with respect to MSP traffic stops.” In addition, MSU’s analysis found that “Hispanic drivers were significantly more likely than White drivers to be searched or arrested after traffic stops.” MSU conducted a second round of traffic stop data analysis using MSP data for traffic stops conducted during 2021. In this second round, MSU added a Post-by-Post analysis, which revealed that “a small proportion of MSP posts accounted for the racial and ethnic disparities observed statewide.” The analysis also revealed disparities in traffic stops for African-American drivers in Secure Cities Partnership (SCP) locations. Upon receiving MSU’s initial findings, MSP leadership responded in January 2022 with the unveiling of a multifaceted Five-Point Plan intended to address racial disparities in traffic enforcement. The five points focused on understanding the contributors to disparities in traffic stops and exploring ways in which MSP could effectively reduce such disparities. The point most relevant to this assessment is the first one, which involves the hiring of an independent consulting firm to review MSP policies and make recommendations that will address racial disparities. MSP issued a request for proposals in March 2022 seeking an independent consulting firm to conduct this work, and the CNA Corporation (CNA) was awarded the contract to assess MSP traffic enforcement policies and program initiatives over the course of 18 months, starting in June 2022. CNA’s approach to this assessment focused on the full lifecycle of a trooper, including how MSP recruits and hires its troopers, instructs and trains its troopers, and supervises its troopers. We also considered organizational factors that are relevant to traffic enforcement and equitable policing. To assess MSP’s traffic enforcement policies and program initiatives, we used a variety of sources, including document review, targeted interviews, focus groups, ride-alongs, and quantitative data analysis. This report details the findings and recommendations of this focused assessment and consists of the following five main sections: 1. Methodology and Approach 2. Recruitment and Hiring Policies, Trainings, and Practices 3. Trooper Policies, Trainings, and Practices 4. Supervisor Policies, Trainings, and Practices 5. Organizational Processes and Initiatives   

Arlington VA: CNA, 2023. 95p.

By Robert J. Sampson† and Brian L. Levy

A longstanding tradition of research linking neighborhood disadvantage to higher rates of violence is based on the characteristics of where people reside. This Essay argues that we need to look beyond residential neighborhoods to consider flows of movement throughout the wider metropolis. Our basic premise is that a neighborhood’s well-being depends not only on its own socioeconomic conditions but also on the conditions of neighborhoods that its residents visit and are visited by—connections that form through networks of everyday urban mobility. Based on the analysis of large-scale urban-mobility data, we find that while residents of both advantaged and disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago travel far and wide, their relative isolation by race and class persists. Among large U.S. cities, Chicago’s level of racially segregated mobility is the second highest. Consistent with our major premise, we further show that mobility-based socioeconomic disadvantage predicts rates of violence in Chicago’s neighborhoods beyond their residence-based disadvantage and other neighborhood characteristics, including during recent years that witnessed surges in violence and other broad social changes. Racial disparities in mobility-based disadvantage are pronounced—more so than residential neighborhood disadvantage. We discuss implications of these findings for theories of neighborhood effects on crime and criminal justice contact, collective efficacy, and racial inequality

University of Chicago Law Review, U Chi L Rev > Vol. 89 (2022) > Iss. 2

By The Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-illegal Betting & Related Financial Crime

The purpose of this report is to explain how blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies are being used in the illegal betting industry in Asia. Blockchain and cryptocurrencies have been widely adopted in the betting industry in the form of payments, betting applications built on blockchain technology and to move funds. The emergence of this technology is a threat to legal betting because of the intrinsic features of many cryptocurrencies, such as: facilitating avoidance of anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) procedures by betting operators; circumvention by operators of international betting regulatory and licensing requirements; and instantaneous and anonymous cross-border transactions from bettors and operators. All of these features are attractive to bettors and operators in jurisdictions where online betting is illegal and/or restricted. Regulators in many jurisdictions have also been slow to keep up with the growth of blockchain,1 creating loopholes exploited by organised crime. International law enforcement and anti-money laundering bodies have highlighted that blockchain and cryptocurrencies facilitate illicit activities including illegal betting and money laundering. 2 As a measure of the growth of cryptocurrency in betting, Bitcoin is now accepted on at least 127 offshore sports betting websites and 284 online casinos, which is a seven- and 13-fold increase respectively since 2018.3 In addition to Bitcoin, at least 780 offshore websites accept one or more of the five biggest cryptocurrencies,4 and most of these websites accept players from jurisdictions such as Hong Kong (83%), Australia (78%), Japan (92%) and Singapore (82%). 5 Cryptocurrencies further facilitate illegal betting by giving the operators of illegal bookmaking syndicates and related entities such as Macau casino junket operators a means of transferring money without detection in order to offshore the criminal proceeds of their illegal betting operations, settle payments with customers, and pay employees in overseas illegal betting hubs such as the Philippines. For these reasons they have also been enthusiastically adopted by entities linked to the junket industry.

The Asian Racing Federation Council. 2021. 12p.

By KPMG

This report of key findings (the 'Report') has been prepared by KPMG LLP. The Report was commissioned by Philip Morris Limited and Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited, described in this Important Notice and in this Report as together the 'beneficiaries', on the basis set out in a private contract agreed between the beneficiaries and KPMG LLP dated 29 November 2021 . This report has been prepared on the basis of fieldwork carried out between 01 December 2021 and 14 April 2022. The Report has not been updated for subsequent events or circumstances. Information sources, the scope of our work, and scope and source limitations are set out in the footnotes and methodology contained within this Report. The scope of our work, information sources used, and any scope and source limitations were fixed by agreement with the beneficiaries. We have satisfied ourselves, where possible, that the information presented in this Report is consistent with the information sources used, but we have not sought to establish the reliability of the information sources by reference to other evidence. We relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of information available from public and third party sources. This Report is not written for the benefit any other party other than the beneficiaries. In preparing this Report we have not taken into account the interests, needs, or circumstances of any specific party, other than the beneficiaries. This Report is not suitable to be relied on by any party (other than· the beneficiaries), Any person or entity ( other than the beneficiaries) who chooses to rely on this Report (or any part of it) will do so at their own risk. To the fullest extent permitted by law, KPMG LLP does not assume any responsibility and will not accept any liability in respect of this Report other than to the beneficiaries. Without limiting the general statement above, although we have prepared this Report in agreement with the beneficiaries, this Report has not been prepared for the benefit of any other manufacturer of tobacco products nor for any other person or entity who might have ari interest in the matters discussed in this Report, including for example those who work in_ or monitor the tobacco or public health sectors or those who provide goods or services to those who operate in those sectors.

KPMG: 2022. 70p.

By BIS OXFORD ECONOMICS

The consumption of Illicit tobacco has become a substantial problem for Australia in recent years. With illicit tobacco offering higher profit margins than illegal drugs such as cocaine, it presents several significant problems for government and society, including: - depriving the government of tax revenues, reducing its ability to deliver basic services and valuable social programmes; - displacing legal activity within the retail, wholesale and logistics industries; and - corrupting institutions, enabling money laundering, and providing revenues for organised crime, including potentially financing terrorist activities. This study by BIS Oxford Economics, commissioned by British American Tobacco Australia (BATA), provides information on several key issues, namely: - assessment of the value of the legal supply chain; - estimation of the tax and industry; - legal economy losses to illicit operators; and - examination of the harms caused by illicit tobacco trade

Sydney: BIS Oxford Economics, 2021. 43p.

By Saana Rikkilä, Pirjo Jukarainen, Vesa MuttilainenNordic Council of Ministers

Nordic countries are viewed as having low levels of corruption. However, Nordic businesses can be exploited in corruption or money laundering schemes. The KORPEN project (Korruption i samband med näringsverksamhet i Norden) was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, Finland and implemented by the Police University College. The project concludes that anti-corruption and anti-money laundering (AML) efforts share the same features and actors but are still rather separated. Some shared methods could be utilised in combatting both crimes. In general, the AML frameworks are more structured, whereas corruption and bribery are not viewed as such a serious issue in the Nordic countries. There are incidents in the Nordic region of interconnected corruption and money laundering. New risk assessment approaches and technology solutions could be of help.

Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2022. 104p.

By Kay Cook, Adrienne Byrt, Rachael Burgin, Terese Edwards, Ashlea Coen, Georgina Dimopoulos

This report draws on post-separation lived experience to demonstrate the ways that the Australian Child Support Scheme can be used and abused to jeopardise the financial safety of recipient parents and their children. This abuse primarily affects women, who continue to carry the burden of unpaid care work in Australia (and internationally) and are overrepresented as victim-survivors of family violence.

In this report, the authors explore the ways that the Child Support Scheme can be used to financially abuse women, and the devastating impacts of this abuse on mothers’ and children’s lives. The findings show that separated mothers endure lasting impacts to their financial security, emotional and mental wellbeing, food security and housing safety through child support-facilitated financial abuse, sometimes long after separation.

Swinburne University of Technology, 2023. 75p.

By Richard Walton, Sophia Falkner and Benjamin Barnard

Research by Policy Exchange finds that fraud and error during the COVID-19 crisis will cost the UK Government in the region of £4.6 billion. The lower bound for the cost of fraud in this crisis is £1.3 billion and the upper bound is £7.9 billion, in light of total projected expenditure of £154.3 billion by the Government (excluding additional expenditure announced in the 8th July 2020 Economic Update). The true value may be closer to the upper bound, due to the higher than usual levels of fraud that normally accompany disaster management.

London: Policy Exchange, 2020. 78p.

By Kaitlyn Sill and Paul A. Haskins.

This article originally appeared in Police Chief and is reposted here with permission from the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Hate crimes harm whole communities. They are message crimes that tell all members of a group—not just the immediate victims—that they are unwelcome and at risk.

The damage that bias victimization causes multiplies when victims and justice agencies don’t recognize or report hate crimes as such. In addition, in cases for which law enforcement agencies fail to respond to or investigate hate crimes, relationships between law enforcement and affected communities can suffer, and public trust in police can erode.[1]

While it is known that hate crimes are underreported throughout the United States, there is not a clear understanding of exactly why reporting rates are low, to what extent, and what might be done to improve them. An even more elementary question, with no single answer, is: What constitutes a hate crime? Different state statutes and law enforcement agencies have different answers to that question, which further complicates the task of identifying hate crimes and harmonizing hate crime data collection and statistics.

By Adam Baird

Belize has one of the highest homicide rates in the world; however, the gangs at the heart of this violence have rarely been studied. Using a masculinities lens and original empirical data, this article explores how Blood and Crip “gang transnationalism” from the United States of America flourished in Belize City. Gang transnationalism is understood as a “transnational masculinity” that makes cultural connections between local settings of urban exclusion. On one hand, social terrains in Belize City generated masculine vulnerabilities to the foreign gang as an identity package with the power to reconfigure positions of subordination; on the other, the establishment of male gang practices with a distinct hegemonic shape, galvanized violence and a patriarchy of the streets in already marginalized communities. This article adds a new body of work on gangs in Belize, and gang transnationalism, whilst contributing to theoretical discussions around the global to local dynamics of hegemonic masculinities discussed by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messerschmidt (2018).

Men and Masculinities Volume 24, Issue 3. 1-21 , 2019

2021 Durham Community Gang Assessment

By Michelle Young

Beginning in 2021, the Durham Gang Reduction Strategy Steering Committee (GRSSC) commissioned an updated community gang assessment for Durham. The GRSSC community gang assessment used the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model Guide to Assessing Your Community’s Youth Gang Problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009). This report presents five key findings and related recommendations arising from that exercise. Key finding 1: What is the most acute problem related to gangs/violence in Durham and where is it most acute? At least 12 census tracts/neighborhoods in Durham are currently affected by extremely high rates of violent person incidents (aggravated assault and homicide) that are up to 7.5 times higher than Durham’s overall rate per capita of these crimes. Eight of these census tracts have experienced high rates of violence since the last community gang assessment was conducted in Durham. Violence exposure in these areas is exacerbated by extreme poverty and exposure to other social vulnerabilities that have remained mostly unchanged since 2014. Key finding 2: Why are youth in Durham joining gangs? What risk factors locally must be addressed to keep youth out of gangs? Young people in Durham experience an elevated level of exposure to risk factors for gang involvement, including substance use, delinquency, the presence of gangs in their neighborhood and at school, family gang involvement, victimization, and exposure to violence. This level of risk exposure is higher for youth who enter the juvenile justice system and highest for gang involved individuals. Key finding 3: What is keeping young people in gangs? What must be addressed to help gang-involved individuals exit gangs? Research indicates that young people who join gangs become disconnected from mainstream pursuits. Gang involved individuals in Durham have difficulty exiting gangs because of high rates of school dropout, unemployment/underemployment, substance use, gang activity in the neighborhood, and a need to replace the social and emotional needs currently met by their gang. Key finding 4: How is this issue affecting the wider community? What should motivate policymakers to address the problem? People who live and work in Durham experience the gang issue very differently depending on their role and location. In some neighborhoods, gangs are deeply imbedded in the neighborhood’s culture which plays a key role in the decision to join a gang in Durham. Other neighborhoods experience gang issues indirectly. However, surveys across constituency groups indicates that the widespread nature of gang activity and community violence in Durham reduces quality of life for residents across the community. Key finding 5: How well is the current response to gangs working? What should be done differently in the future? All constituency groups that participated in this study described low levels of satisfaction with the current response to gangs and identified specific deficits that have caused this dissatisfaction. These issues include a failure to address the underlying conditions that give rise to gangs, a lack of awareness about the current responses to gangs across constituency groups, lack of information about the results of current strategies, and concerns about criminal justice policies. Recommendations Recommendation 1: Implement intensive, place-based strategies to address underlying social conditions that increase the vulnerability of children and youth in the most violence affected census tracts to gang involvement Recommendation 2: Implement comprehensive, intensive, and neighborhood-based service delivery specifically for gang-involved individuals in the highest violence neighborhoods. Recommendation 3: Because of the elevated level of gang exposure/involvement and youth risk exposure locally, Durham policymakers should expand available gang prevention and intervention programming, localize these services in the most violence/gang affected census tracts, and prioritize these services for children and youth who are at the highest level of risk of involvement in violence and gangs Recommendation 4: More regularly collect and report data that reflects the progress of the community’s gang violence reduction efforts. Recommendation 5: Institute standardized performance measures to track reductions in violence and improve existing criminogenic social conditions at the census tract level and more regularly report the outcomes attained by gang prevention, intervention and desistance strategies to policymakers and the community at the census tract level.

Wake Forest, NC: Michelle Young Consulting, 2022. 257p.