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Posts tagged financial crime
Examining emerging fraud facilitated by the internet through crime scripts

By Benoit Leclerc and Elena Morgenthaler

The rise of the internet or, more specifically, of services offered and conducted online has led to a dramatic rise in frauds and scams. This study is a systematic review of the literature on the use of crime script analysis in the field of fraud facilitated by the internet to identify stages of the crime commission process across different forms of fraud and examine ways to disrupt those crimes. The scripts for different forms of fraud shared three common elements: communicating with the victim, recruiting enablers, and using money mules. These common elements suggest possible prevention measures. Future applications of crime scripts in the field of fraud and financial crime more broadly are discussed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 680.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 28p.

Financial Crime Scripting: an Analytical Method to Generate, Organise and Systematise Knowledge on the Financial Aspects of Profit-Driven Crime

By Thom Snaphaan and Teun van Ruitenburg

This article presents a further development of the existing crime scripting framework to enhance insight in the financial aspects of profit-driven crime: financial crime scripting. By drawing on the foundations of crime script analysis, financial crime scripting allows to generate, organize and systematize knowledge about the financial aspects of the crime commission processes of a variety of crime types, and accounts for linking the dots with financial crimes, such as bribery, bankruptcy fraud and money laundering. Viewing these financial crimes as supporting or succeeding offences in light of profit-driven crimes, and at the same time providing guidance to analyze these offences as profit-driven crimes in itself, opens the door for detailed analyses without losing sight of the bigger picture, i.e., the interconnectedness with other crimes. This analytical method helps crime researchers to take into account the financial aspects of crime-commission processes in crime script analyses and could help law enforcement agencies and other crime prevention partners to go beyond a proceeds-of-crime approach and put a follow-the-money approach in practice. Financial crime scripting takes full account of the financial aspects of profit-driven crime and puts relevant concepts in broader perspective, enhancing understanding with conceptual clarity. In addition to outlining the framework, the relevance for policy and practice is unraveled and avenues for future research are discussed.)

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 2024.

Does Entry Remedy Collusion? Evidence from the Generic Prescription Drug Cartel

By Amanda Starc and Thomas G. Wollmann

Entry represents a fundamental threat to cartels engaged in price fixing. We study the extent and effect of this behavior in the largest price fixing case in US history, which involves generic drugmakers. To do so, we link information on the cartel’s internal operations to regulatory filings and market data. We find that collusion induces significant entry, which in turn reduces prices. However, regulatory approvals delay most entrants by 2-4 years. We then estimate a structural model to assess counterfactual policies. We find that reducing regulatory delays by just 1-2 years equates to consumer compensating variation of $597 million-$1.52 billion.

Chicago: Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, 2022. 54p.

A Report of Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies in Illegal Betting:

By The Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-illegal Betting & Related Financial Crime

The purpose of this report is to explain how blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies are being used in the illegal betting industry in Asia. Blockchain and cryptocurrencies have been widely adopted in the betting industry in the form of payments, betting applications built on blockchain technology and to move funds. The emergence of this technology is a threat to legal betting because of the intrinsic features of many cryptocurrencies, such as: facilitating avoidance of anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) procedures by betting operators; circumvention by operators of international betting regulatory and licensing requirements; and instantaneous and anonymous cross-border transactions from bettors and operators. All of these features are attractive to bettors and operators in jurisdictions where online betting is illegal and/or restricted. Regulators in many jurisdictions have also been slow to keep up with the growth of blockchain,1 creating loopholes exploited by organised crime. International law enforcement and anti-money laundering bodies have highlighted that blockchain and cryptocurrencies facilitate illicit activities including illegal betting and money laundering. 2 As a measure of the growth of cryptocurrency in betting, Bitcoin is now accepted on at least 127 offshore sports betting websites and 284 online casinos, which is a seven- and 13-fold increase respectively since 2018.3 In addition to Bitcoin, at least 780 offshore websites accept one or more of the five biggest cryptocurrencies,4 and most of these websites accept players from jurisdictions such as Hong Kong (83%), Australia (78%), Japan (92%) and Singapore (82%). 5 Cryptocurrencies further facilitate illegal betting by giving the operators of illegal bookmaking syndicates and related entities such as Macau casino junket operators a means of transferring money without detection in order to offshore the criminal proceeds of their illegal betting operations, settle payments with customers, and pay employees in overseas illegal betting hubs such as the Philippines. For these reasons they have also been enthusiastically adopted by entities linked to the junket industry.

The Asian Racing Federation Council. 2021. 12p.

Financial Crime and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis

By Laure de Batza and Evžen Kočendab

We provide the first quantitative synthesis of the literature on how financial markets react to the disclosure of financial crimes committed by listed firms. While consensus expects negative stock price returns, the exact size of the effect is far from clear. We surveyed 111 studies published over three decades, from which we collected 480 estimates from event studies. Then, we perform a thorough meta-analysis based on the most recent available techniques. We show that the negative abnormal returns found in the literature seem to be exaggerated by more than three times. Hence, the “punishment” effect, including a reputational penalty, suffers from a serious publication bias. After controlling for this bias, negative abnormal returns suggest the existence of an informational effect. We also document that accounting frauds, crimes committed in common-law countries such as the United States, and allegations are particularly severely sanctioned by financial markets, while the information channels and types of procedures do not influence market reactions.

Munich : Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo, 2023. 82p.

Action Plan to Address Illicit Financing Risks of Digital Assets

By United States. Department of the Treasury

From the Introduction: "This action plan responds to Section 7(c) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14067, 'Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets,' which calls for the development of a coordinated interagency action plan for mitigating the digital-asset-related illicit finance and national security risks as identified in the U.S. government's National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (Illicit Financing Strategy). [...] E.O. 14067 recognizes that digital assets may pose significant illicit financing risks and commits the U.S. government to mitigating these and any other national security risks. This action plan identifies priority and supporting actions to support this commitment in line with the priorities and supporting actions identified in the Illicit Financing Strategy specific to uncovering and mitigating the misuse of digital assets by illicit actors. These priority actions include monitoring risks, working with international partners to improve cooperation on and implementation of international AML/CFT [anti-money-laundering/countering-the-financing-of-terrorism] standards, strengthening our regulations and operational frameworks, and improving private sector compliance and information sharing, among others. The action plan begins with an overview of the illicit financing risks and U.S. government efforts to mitigate these risks before laying out these priority actions."

United States. Department of the Treasury. 2022-09-16. 20p.

Following the Money: Compendium of Resources and Step-by-step Guide to Financial Investigations Into Trafficking in Human Beings

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

The paper aims to leverage off of the strengths and successes of established but disparate anti-THB financial investigatory practices, developed across the OSCE participating States, to raise awareness of the strategic value of financial investigations and the resources available, and to help create a more harmonised approach that can contribute to mainstreaming of financial investigations across the OSCE region.

Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 2019. 68p.

Corporate Responses to Financial Crime: From Exposure to Investigation

By Petter Gottschalk

This brief extends studies on how corporations respond to scandals by examining the evolution of the accounts that corporate agents develop after a scandal becomes public. Guided by the theory of accounts and a recently developed perspective on crisis management, its examines how the accounts developed by thirteen corporations caught up in highly publicized scandals changed from the time of initial exposure to the issuance of an investigative report. This brief continues the discussion of the broader managerial and social implications of the analysis of accounts, and analyses their effect on our understanding of the ability of corporations to weather serious scandals. It includes four case studies; from Switzerland, Moldova, Denmark, and Norway respectively.

Cham: Springer, 2020. 147p

International Handbook of White-collar and Corporate Crime

Edited by Diane Vaughan, Henry N. Pontell and Gilbert Geis

Corporate crimes were once thought of as victimless offenses, but now—with billions of dollars and an increasingly global economy at stake—this is understood to be far from the truth.

The International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime explores the complex interplay of factors involved when corporate cultures normalize lawbreaking, and when organizational behavior is pushed to unethical (and sometimes inhumane) limits. Featuring original contributions from a panel of experts representing North America, Asia, Europe, and Australia, this timely volume presents multidisciplinary views on recent corporate wrongdoing affecting economic and social conditions worldwide.

New York: Springer, 2007. 702p.

Encyclopedia Of White-collar and Corporate Crime

Edited by Lawrence M. Salinger

With more than 500 entries (including up-to-date information on such high profile cases as Martha Stewart and Enron), the <strong>Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime gathers history, definitions, examples, investigation, prosecution, assessments, challenges, and projections into one definitive reference work on the topic. This two-volume encyclopedia incorporates information about a variety of white-collar crimes, and provides examples of persons, statutes, companies, and convictions. Each entry offers a thorough and thoughtful summary of the topic. Rather than a simple definition, users are given a satisfying and sophisticated synopsis with references for further study.

London; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2004p. 1016p.

Negotiated Justice and Corporate Crime: The Legitimacy of Civil Recovery Orders and Deferred Prosecution Agreements

By Colin King and Nicholas Lord

This book argues that there is a strong normative argument for using the criminal law as a primary response to corporate crime. In practice, however, corporate crimes are rarely dealt with through criminal sanctioning mechanisms. Rather, the preference – for both prosecutors and corporates – appears to be on negotiating out of the criminal process. Reflecting this emphasis on negotiation, this book examines the use of Civil Recovery Orders and Deferred Prosecution Agreements as responses to corporate crime, and discusses a variety of UK case studies. Drawing upon legal and criminological backgrounds, and with an emphasis on the conceptual frameworks of ‘negotiated justice’ and ‘legitimacy’, the authors examine the law, policy and practice of these enforcement responses. They offer an original, theoretically-informed analysis which is accessible to practitioners and researchers.

Cham: Springer, 2018. 167p.

Unchecked Corporate Power: Why the Crimes of Multinational Corporations are Routinized Away and What We Can Do About It

By Greg Barak

Why are crimes of the suite punished more leniently than crimes of the street? When police killings of citizens go unpunished, political torture is sanctioned by the state, and the financial frauds of Wall Street traders remain unprosecuted, nothing succeeds with such regularity as the active failures of national states to obstruct the crimes of the powerful.

Written from the perspective of global sustainability and as an unflinching and unforgiving exposé of the full range of the crimes of the powerful, Unchecked Corporate Power reveals how legalized authorities and political institutions charged with the duty of protecting citizens from law-breaking and injurious activities have increasingly become enablers and colluders with the very enterprises they are obliged to regulate. Here, Gregg Barak explains why the United States and other countries are duplicitous in their harsh reactions to street crimes in comparison to the significantly more harmful and far-reaching crimes of the powerful, and why the crimes of the powerful are treated as beyond incrimination.

London; New York: Routledge, 2017. 213p.

Crime School: Money Laundering: True Crime Meets the World of Business and Finance

By Chris Mathers

In Crime School: Money Laundering, a twenty-year law enforcement veteran of financial crime explains this felony in simple terms. Written anecdotally, the book describes what money laundering is and how the crimes behind it fit together.

Organized criminals operating both domestically and internationally corrupt bankers and subvert national economies through the use of drug money.

This book examines the history of money laundering from ancient times to the cocaine craze of the 1970s to the sophisticated, brutal techniques employed by today's terrorists and organized crime.

Lively and detailed, this book chronicles the stark realities and deadly dynamics of the lynchpin between organized crime and modern terrorism. It's a rare and fascinating look at a deadly world few have ever witnessed and lived to tell the story.

Buffalo, NY: Firefly Books, 2004. 244p.

The Limits of the Fight against Money Laundering in the European Union : State of Play, Challenges and Perspectives.

By Davin Nina and Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

IEP Aix-en-Provence - Sciences Po Aix - Institut d'études politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, 2022. 22p.

Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering

By Jack A. Blum; Michael Levi; R. T. Naylor; and Phil Williams

While there has been a general trend towards enacting money-laundering laws that provide for the lifting of financial secrecy in appropriate cases, such secrecy remains a barrier in many jurisdictions, including some of those that have come to be known as 'financial havens'. The advances in technology and communication have made the three F's - finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets all the more difficult. This publication discusses these issues and other related problems in depth. The law enforcement success stories presented convey a sense of imaginative ways in which financial havens are used. The cases also highlight the advantages, from the point of view of criminals, of collusion with bank employees and the use of professional launderers.

Vienna: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998, 117p.

Blue-Collar Crime and Finance

By Allepandro Bernales, Diether Beuermann, Douglas Cumming. and Christiaan Olid

Relatively little is known about the effects of blue-collar crime (theft, robbery, vandalism or arson) on financial decisions. Previous literature has focused its attention either on 'regional' crime rates or the 'perception' of crime as business obstacles. Instead, we examine financing terms of 'individual' firms that 'effectively' experimented blue-collar crime events. We show that blue-collar crime worsens the access and conditions to external financing, which is unexpected since firms do not have to reveal to lenders that they suffered such crime incidents. We also find evidence that firm-information leakages may explain the negative effects of blue-collar crime on financing terms.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2022. 785p.

Money Laundering through the Football Sector

By Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The aim of this project is to study one specific sport which could reveal money laundering schemes that may also be occurring in other sports. As one of the largest sports in the world, football1 was chosen. Both professional and amateur football were to be examined. Although the scale of vulnerabilities to money laundering is potentially different, risks in both areas were considered likely to be similar.

Paria: FATF, 2009. 42p.

Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009

By Elleman, Bruce A. and Paine, S.C.M

The sixteen case studies in this book reflect the extraordinary diversity of experience of navies attempting to carry out, and also to eliminate, commerce raiding. Because the cases emphasize conflicts in which commerce raiding had major repercussions, they shed light on when, how, and in what manner it is most likely to be effective. The authors have been asked to examine the international context, the belligerents, the distribution of costs and benefits, the logistical requirements, enemy countermeasures, and the operational and strategic effectiveness of these campaigns.

Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College Press, 2010. 277p.

The limits of the fight against money laundering in the European Union : state of play, challenges and perspectives.

By Davin Nina 1 Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

Sciencespo.aix. ND. ca. 2021.p.12.