By Colette Ashton

Strengthening existing institutions, prioritising prevention and engaging the private sector are needed to end corruption.

This report analyses South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions in relation to international good practice. It highlights problems with their functional independence and organisational culture. It identifies a serious gap in the area of prevention. Among the recommendations are that South Africa undertake feasible, incremental improvements to existing institutions and engage the private sector to help prevent and detect corruption.

Key findings There is insufficient empirical research on corruption in South Africa to inform context sensitive policy reform. Anti-corruption institutions are governed by a parallel informal system of social norms held in place by incentives such as promotion and disincentives such as bullying. This organisational culture prioritises obedience to authority over ethics, eroding integrity. A culture of mistrust and competition exists between law enforcement agencies, hampering collaboration. Feasible, incremental reforms of anti-corruption institutions are needed in the short term, focusing on organisational culture. Recommendations Strengthen existing agencies Amend the National Prosecuting Authority Act so that: the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is the accounting officer; the budget is allocated by Parliament; there are merit-based appointment processes and security of tenure for senior leaders; and the NDPP has control over human resources. Develop context-sensitive prosecutorial prioritisation policy that focuses on the criteria of redress for economic harm and is mindful of the need for political stability. Revise performance targets of law enforcement agencies to incentivise cooperation, not competition. Build cultures of integrity, trust and cooperation in and among anti-corruption agencies. Prioritise prevention Work towards an independent anti-corruption prevention agency. Urgently provide the Public Administration Ethics Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with increased funding and independence. 2 The NPA should be given control over its own budget and human resources, which are currently controlled by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Effective anti-corruption agencies in developing countries may trigger political instability. Political stability is a precondition for economic growth, which in the long term creates conditions for more effective anti-corruption institutions. Equitable economic development is a precondition for the transformation of more economically harmful types of corruption, e.g. plunder, into less harmful types, e.g. lobbying. The private sector is a key partner for government in the prevention and detection of corruption. Prioritise integrity in government by promoting ethical employees. Prioritise corruption prevention in the South African Police Service. Change the incentive structure for the private sector Introduce a statute providing for non-trial resolutions of corporate corruption cases to incentivise companies to self-police corruption. Develop capacity in the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to support companies to develop effective anti corruption compliance programmes. Partner with the private sector to run collective action programmes in key sectors such as health, construction and shipping. Research Conduct a risk analysis for a proposed Chapter 9 anti-corruption super-agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conduct research into a two-track criminal and administrative anti-corruption enforcement system. Conduct more empirical, sector-specific research into corruption

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 28p,

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Overall criminalization of activities that harm the environment

• No single international legal instrument comprehensively protects the environment, criminalizes all behaviours that harm the environment, nor defines crimes that affect the environment. The legal protection of the environment is a complicated patchwork of international and regional agreements ratified and transposed to varying degrees into national legislative frameworks. Such complex and unharmonized regulations create a landscape where criminal and/or economic interests can take advantage of loopholes and gaps in legislation and its enforcement as well as a landscape conducive to criminal infiltration of legitimate sectors.

• Today, many countries make use of the law and criminal penalties to protect the environment, although with some differences across environmental areas. In most countries in the world, prison sentences can be imposed for violating laws regulating deforestation and logging, mining, air pollution, noise pollution, soil pollution, water pollution, fishing, waste, and wildlife. A high rate of criminalization of harmful behaviours exists across these nine environmental areas. Wildlife and waste are the areas where most countries have at least one related criminal offence in their national legislation. Soil and noise pollution are the areas where the fewest countries have criminal provisions.

• The level of protection afforded to the environment is related to the conditions of each country. For example, all the countries of Southern Africa regard fences related to air pollution, deforestation and logging, mining, waste and wildlife as criminal acts. In contrast, no countries among the small island states of Micronesia regard violations of deforestation and logging legislation as a crime, perhaps because

Activities that harm the environment considered as serious crime

• At least 85% of United Nations Member States criminalize offences against wildlife and at least 45% punish some of these offences with four years or more in prison, which constitutes a serious crime under the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). For example, in Eastern Africa, 12 out of 18 countries regard wildlife offences as serious crimes, with the potential for long prison sentences, while illegal fishing is considered most grave in Oceania, where 43% of the countries regard it as a serious crime.

• Waste offences are taken even more seriously, with almost half of the countries regarding these offences as serious crimes, including half the African countries (perhaps due to the Bamako Convention) and 62% of countries in Western Europe. Waste offences is also an area where the liability of legal persons (such as corporations) is recognized in over three-quarters of countries.

• Africa and the Americas have the highest proportions of countries with criminal offences related to all nine environmental areas analysed, while Africa and Asia have the highest average percentage of Member States with penalties meeting the serious crime definition across the nine crimes (30 percent respectively). Where there are no criminal offences, countries typically use the administration of fences (see Figure 1).

• The highest average percentage of Member States with penalties meeting the serious crime definition are in Africa and Asia, indicating not that legislation there may be ‘weak’, as is commonly stated, but that there is a lack of enforcement of the legislation. etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 41p.

By Sally M. Evans, Bethany A. Jones, Daragh T. McDermott

Literature regarding trans and gender diverse (TGD) prisoners’ experiences of prison custody is limited. Reviewing international literature enables a better understanding of these experiences and how effectively TGD policies are implemented. This systematic review employed PRISMA and ENTREQ guidelines to enhance transparency in reporting the synthesis of qualitative and mixed-methods research. Seventeen papers were included and through meta-ethnographic synthesis three overarching themes emerged: structural, interpersonal and intrapersonal. Recommendations include reducing reliance on survival strategies by TGD prisoners through implementation of policies which meet TGD prisoners’ needs and to enabling better informed decision making regarding housing. Further research into lived experiences would allow for a better understanding of what currently works, how services could be improved, and identify potential training needs

Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume63, Issue3, September 2024, Pages 321-349

By Thomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study investigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring decisions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource (HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records: male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counterparts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their criminal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 63, Issue 3, Pages: 272-285 | Oct.2024

José Carlos Hernández-Gutiérrez

The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico is not new. However, it is no less true that, for a few years now, violence caused by or related to criminal organizations has been registering higher levels than ever. This has caused, from different spheres, to wonder if indeed the problem facing the country can still be called organized crime. Can non-state armed actors in Mexico qualify as terrorists? Have they evolved into some form of insurgency? The author of these pages, after conducting a bibliographic review on the variants of terrorism and insurgency used by some authors to refer to the Mexican case, affirms that Mexican criminal organizations are not terrorists or insurgents, but rather profit-making organizations that make a tactical use of terrorism and / or insurgency to achieve economic benefits or the goals of their organizations.

2021, Los desafíos de la globalización: respuestas desde América Latina y la Unión Europea

By Michael McLaggan

The South African public transport sector is facing a critical crisis, marked by escalating violence and extortion within the taxi industry. This report delves into the dynamics behind these troubling incidents, shedding light on the severe impact they have on bus companies and the broader public transport ecosystem.

Since 2015, the Intercape Ferreira Mainliner bus company has experienced over 176 attacks, highlighting the pervasive nature of violence linked to the taxi industry. These attacks include stonings, shootings, and acts of intimidation, creating a climate of fear and insecurity for passengers and operators alike. The violence is not isolated, but part of a broader campaign of economic coercion and extortion aimed at controlling the transport market.

The taxi industry’s aggression towards long-distance bus companies stems from intense competition over routes and pricing. Taxi operators argue that bus companies, with their extensive networks and competitive pricing, are undermining their business. In response, some actors within the taxi industry resort to violent tactics to enforce their demands, including dictating where buses can stop and what prices they can charge. This extortion threatens economic freedom and disrupts the stability of the public transport system.

The report reiterates that the violence and extortion tactics employed by the taxi industry amount to organized crime. Despite numerous court orders and high-profile cases, the state’s response has been inadequate. Law enforcement and political bodies often show reluctance to intervene, partly due to complex relationships with the taxi industry. This lack of decisive action perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines the rule of law.

To combat this crisis, the report recommends several critical actions:

Prosecution of Coordinated Attacks: Treating violent incidents as organized crime under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA).

Comprehensive Investigations: Multi-organizational task forces should investigate extortion in the public transport sector.

Engagement and Dialogue: Convening high-level panels involving all stakeholders to find peaceful resolutions to disputes.

The report underscores the urgent need for a coordinated, robust response to the violence and extortion plaguing South Africa’s public transport sector. By addressing these issues head-on, the state can restore safety, uphold economic freedom, and reinforce the rule of law, ensuring a secure and stable environment for all public transport users.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 52p.

By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.

By Simon A. Cole Maurice Possley Ken Otterbourg Jessica Weinstock Paredes , Barbara O’Brien, Meghan Cousino, & Samuel R. Gross,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. THE CASES

• This report analyzes 151 cases in which defendants were exonerated between 1989 and 2023 in the United States and medicolegal death investigation (“death investigation” for short) contributed to the false conviction.

• The 151 exonerees lost a total of 1,837 years in prison, an average of 12.2 years per exoneree. That is less than the average of 14.6 years for exonerees convicted of comparable crimes but for whom death investigation did not contribute to the false conviction.

B. CASE CHARACTERISTICS

• Not surprisingly, 140 (93%) of the 151 cases in which death investigation contributed to the false conviction were homicides. However, death investigators did contribute to eleven non-homicide cases, all involving abuse of vulnerable people: children or dependent adults. Eight of these eleven were cases involving the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) diagnosis, in which the top charge was child abuse.

• In more than one-third of the cases, the death investigation evidence consisted of a claim that the medical evidence was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the crime, e.g., that the victim’s wounds were consistent with a weapon linked to the defendant.

• In another third of the cases the death investigation evidence concerned the cause of death.

• Manner of death and time of death evidence contributed to fewer cases.

C. DEMOGRAPHICS

• Women were overrepresented among the defendants for whom the death investigation contributed to their false conviction. Thirty-nine (26%) of the defendants in the 151 cases were female, more than three times the 8% of all exonerees who were female. Only around 5% of exonerees convicted of comparable crimes were female.-

• Relatedly, cases involving child victims were particularly vulnerable to contributions by death investigation. Nearly half (47%) of the 151 cases involved child victims. That compares to only 19% of all non-death-investigation exonerations and 34% of non-death-investigation exonerations for comparable crimes.

• Although concerns have been raised about racial bias in death investigation, the exonerees in death investigation exoneration cases were whiter than exonerees in general. One third of death investigation exonerees were Black compared to 53% of all exonerees. Similarly, 8% of death investigation exonerees were Hispanic, compared to 12% of all exonerees. The higher representation of whites diminishes somewhat if women are removed from the analysis.

D. DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS

• The United States has a patchwork death investigation system with variations among and within states. The two primary types are medical examiner and coroner systems. Most, but not all, experts perceive medical examiner systems to be superior and call for them to replace coroner systems. We did not find that more false convictions occurred under coroner systems. Instead, false convictions generally occurred in proportion to where more people live: their occurrence correlated with those counties’ and states’ proportions of the US population.

• Nor did we find that more false convictions occurred in systems with elected (rather than appointed) coroners and death investigators.

• In 22% of cases, the death investigation office that contributed to the false conviction was accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). Only 17% of US death investigation facilities are accredited.

E. QUALIFICATIONS OF DEATH INVESTIGATORS

• The highest qualification for death investigators in the US is generally considered to be board certification in the subspecialty of forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology. However, for decades there have not been enough board-certified pathologists in the US to meet the need for death investigation services and autopsies. Therefore, many death investigations and autopsies are performed by less qualified personnel, such as pathologists without board certification, physicians with specialties other than pathology, and even, in some cases, non-physicians such as funeral directors. We did not find that most false convictions occurred in cases with underqualified death investigators. In fact, board-certified forensic pathologists contributed to 61% (92) of the 151 cases in this study.

National Registry of Exonerations (2024), 90p

By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.

By Pamela B. Teaster; Erica Wood; Sally B. Hurme; E. Carlisle Shealy

This is the full report resulting from a four-part environmental scan of the issues of abuse by guardians and systemic guardianship abuse, requested in 2021 by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), showing that more work and reform related to abuse and fraud by individual guardians and the guardianship system are required. The scan consisted of a literature review of research; a scan of the data landscape; a scan of legal, policy, and practice context; and considerations for data collection. This paper is the full report of the scan and its findings. On June 30, 2021, the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services received a request for information from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Robert Casey about the roles of the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services concerning the collection of data on adult guardianship — particularly data on abuse and fraud by guardians. Part 1 was an extensive literature review. Part 2 examined how states collect data on adult guardianship. Part 3 highlighted the difficulties in determining the number of adults with guardians as well as the prevalence of abuse by guardians. Building on this research, the authors recommended federal actions to help states detect and address abuse.

Unpublished report, 2022. 146p.

By John K. Roman, Anthony Washburn; Sofia Rodriguez; Caterina G. Roman; Elena I. Navarro; Jesse T. Brey; Benjamin M. Reist

This final report of the HAVEN Project (Harms After Victimization: Experience and Needs), which was launched in 2020 as an update to the 1996 National Institute of Justice study, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look. This document reports on the HAVEN Project’s use of data, measurement, and analytic tools that were not originally available in 1996; it also examines the HAVEN Project’s expansion of the taxonomy of harms from victimization and development of a survey instrument and methodology to facilitate the collection of self-reported data on the harms from violent victimization across multiple dimensions that are typically excluded from violent crime harms measurement. The HAVEN Project also introduced a regression-based cost-benefit model that may be integrated into causal models. The key research questions discussed in this final report are: if regression models of victimization harms, including estimates of the variance in harms experienced by victims, are feasible; how integrated data systems (IDS) can be employed to estimate trajectories of harms using the harm taxonomy developed, and what the strengths and limitations of those data systems; if those new definitions of direct and indirect harms to victims change estimated costs of victimizations, and if those new definitions are applicable to all crimes; if household survey data can generate estimates of the incidence of each victimization trajectory, and what can be learned from the analyses about those harms that may not require hospitalization; if new cost benefit analysis (CBA) methodologies can improve the quality of program evaluations that include harms to victims; and which types of victimization are most harmful.

Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago, 2023. 37p.

By Benjamin Artz and  David M. Welsch:

We employ a unique 10-year panel dataset from California to examine both the effect crime has on homelessness as well as the effect homelessness has on crime. Our main estimator accounts for endogeneity by incorporating dynamics, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and relaxing the strict homogeneity assumption for our key variables of interest. We find strong evidence that regions experiencing increases in property crime, but not violent crime, should expect a practically significant, 2024. 69p..in homelessness, whereas increases in homelessness increase the number of violent crimes, but not property crimes. Robustness and falsification checks confirm the results.

Bonn:  Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 49p.

By NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team

This report is the most comprehensive data analyses the Domestic Violence Death Review Team has undertaken to date, presenting detailed findings from over two decades of domestic violence homicides in NSW. It provides crucial insights to guide policymakers, service providers and advocates in preventing, responding to, and aiding recovery from domestic violence.

The dataset has continued to grow year-on-year, not only in the number of cases— now over 1,800— but also in relation to the breadth and complexity of the data captured. The analysis in this report identifies a range of key findings and themes to direct the Team’s work as it recommences its in-depth case review analyses over the next reporting period.

Key findings

• Almost one-third of all homicides in NSW occurred in a context of domestic violence.

• While most homicides overall involved the deaths of males, females were far more likely to be killed in a domestic violence-context homicide.

• Approximately 80% of intimate partner violence homicides involved men killing women.

• Men who killed their female intimate partner were almost always the domestic violence abuser in the relationship, while women who killed men were almost always the victim of their partner’s violence.

• Over 25% of people killed in a context of domestic violence were born outside of Australia.

• Almost 19% of people killed in the context of domestic violence identified as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.

• For 90% of children killed there was a history of intimate partner violence between their parents.

• Over 80% of relative/kin domestic violence-context homicide offenders had a history of experiencing mental health issues.

Sydney: Government of New South Wales, 2024.

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Elena Campbell, Todd Fernando, Leigh Gassner, Jess Hill, Zac Seidler, Anne Summers

The purpose of this review was to draw together advice and identify opportunities to strengthen prevention efforts and approaches across all forms of violence against women and children, including a particular focus on homicides. The report provides specific and practical advice to strengthen prevention approaches, and builds on work currently underway in the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-2032.

The Rapid Review highlighted a number of areas of priority including:

• responding to children and young people’s experiences of domestic, family and sexual violence

• engaging with men and boys in violence prevention, including meeting them where they are at

• better understanding pathways into perpetration to improve targeting of early intervention initiatives, with the aim of preventing violence from occurring.

The report makes 21 recommendations across 6 key areas of:

• A national emergency – and an ongoing national priority

• The prevention potential

• Prevention through people

• Prevention through responses

• Prevention through systems and industries

• Prevention through learning and data.

Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia), 2024. 97p.

By The Young Women’s Alliance

This report examines young people’s relationships, sex lives and experiences of disrespect and violence. The evidence reveals:

• Statistically significant disparities between young women and men. For women, heightened vulnerability snowballs into disadvantage in other life areas; for men, early sexist views compound in educational and workplace settings, and can manifest in violent behaviour.

• YWA's original psychological risk profile of young men is more highly correlated with GBV perpetration than the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), a validated indicator of likelihood to engage in violent behaviour.1

• A stark reality exists where 90% of interviewed women see sexual violence and/or assault as inevitable in their lifetime (if it had not already occurred); a matter of ‘when’ not ‘if,’ expressing that violence is synonymous with womanhood.

• Significant gender disparities in perceptions of sexuality-related education, with men rating the education they received on sex and consent as significantly better than women, a concerning gap in preparedness prior to formative sexual experiences.

• YWA’s original Gender and Relationship Distress Score, a 12-item measure, indicates that more than 1 in 5 young women (21.8%) experience significant gendered distress in their intimate relationships.

Australia: Young Women's Alliance, 2024. 96p.

By Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Jasmine McGowan, Rebecca Stewart

This study privileges the voices of children and young people with lived experience of family violence. It seeks to extend current understandings of how child-specific risk identification, assessment and management practices can best be developed, implemented and embedded across Victoria.

Melbourne, VIC: Monash University, 2023. 52p.