By European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs

The study’s overarching aim is to understand the phenomenon of online identity theft and its societal and regulatory implications in the EU. It assesses the nature and scale of the identity theft problem in the EU, describing the prevalent criminal schemes and estimating the number of victims and costs. The study also maps and analyses current legislative, regulatory, and non-regulatory measures to combat online identity theft and identity-related crime across the 27 EU Member States. Based on this mapping it identifies best practices and possible gaps in the identified measures. The findings of the study supported the drafting of recommendations for future measures and actions at EU level

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022. 231p.

By Russell Brewer, Tyson Whitten, Morgan Sayer, Colette Langos

Little systematic attention has been given to the specific digital settings and contexts in which cyberdeviance occurs. As a result, many of the preventative programs developed or recommendations made are not necessarily evidence based. Identifying and articulating evidence-based approaches to developing effective interventions for young people is critical due to the serious social and economic harms associated with increasing levels of cyber-deviance (Brewer et al. 2018; Cale et al. 2019; Livingstone et al. 2010; 2011). Importantly, much research suggests the development of effective interventions relies on the accurate identification of factors known to contribute to delinquency (Andrews & Bonta 2010; Dowden & Andrews 1999; Koehler et al. 2013). A substantial body of research has identified risk factors associated with deviance in offline settings. Dynamic risk factors that are relatively stable across time (including those relating to behavioural functioning, propensity for risk-taking and parenting practices) tend to have a strong influence on the risk of 2 delinquency in offline settings, and may also be a precursor for serious and persistent anti-social behaviours (Farrington, 2010; Moffitt et al. 1996). Fortunately, given that these stable risk factors often first manifest at an early age, vulnerable youth can be prospectively identified early in life, and subsequently prioritised for indicated prevention programs. When it comes to cyber-deviance, however, the evidence base regarding its prevention is far less developed, particularly as it pertains to young people. In addition to not knowing the impact of such risk factors on cyber-deviance, in recent years, researchers have hypothesised that there may be distinctive and divergent criminogenic factors at play whilst online, when compared to offline forms of deviance. This work argued that features of online environments can have profound implications for how adolescent delinquency arises and can therefore make the digital environment a hazardous place from a risk management and mitigation perspective (Goldsmith & Brewer, 2015). Recent studies have begun to account for these criminogenic properties and understand cyber-deviance as driven not only by individual (i.e. dynamic) attributes, but also as a function of exposure to digital technologies, sites and services, and the interactional opportunities afforded as a consequence (e.g. Brewer et al. 2018; Cale et al. 2019). This body of work suggests that in order to fully understand the risk factors online, both idiosyncratic and exposure measures must be accounted for. This report aims to identify whether time-stable dynamic risk factors are associated with adolescent cyber deviance in Australia, as well as better understand the risks associated with exposure across digital environments. This research was conducted for the purposes of developing an evidence base from which researchers can draw upon to design more effective interventions. This was achieved by conducting a cross-sectional study in a South Australian secondary school (n=327) that assessed the factors associated with adolescent engagement in eight forms of cyber-deviance: cyber-hate, cyberviolence, digital piracy, unauthorised access (hacking), cyber-bullying and abuse, online fraud, sexting, and imagebased sexual abuse.

Adelaide: University of Adelaide, 2020. 34p.

By Ofcom

On 14 May 2022, an attack was carried out in Buffalo, New York, which resulted in the death of ten individuals and the wounding of three others. The attack was live-streamed online and versions of the footage were disseminated on multiple online services, potentially exposing UK users to content related to terrorism. As the regulator of UK established video-sharing platforms (VSPs) and the prospective UK Online Safety regulator, we sought to learn from the tragic event by reviewing industry responses to the live-streamed attack and cross-industry collaboration to prevent dissemination of associated content. The Buffalo attack showed that terrorist, violent and hateful content online can play a significant role in radicalising vulnerable users. The attacker was reportedly inspired by, and used a similar modus operandi to, the Christchurch mosque attacks in New Zealand, where 51 individuals lost their lives. Large sections of the Christchurch attacker’s manifesto were copied and numerous references were made to him in the Buffalo attacker’s diary. Such an attack highlights the complexity and challenges associated with terrorist content online. It has been reported that the attacker was radicalised in part through exposure to racist content on the message board 4chan. He also appears to have acted alone and did not belong to any terrorist or other related organisation. Links to his online diary were shared in private servers and through direct messages approximately 30 minutes before the attack; 15 individuals clicked on the link to the diary. The livestream of the attack lasted less than 2 minutes and there were 28 viewers, or fewer, who watched the livestream of the channel at some point during broadcast. Despite this low figure, footage of the attack was spread across platforms and seen by millions of people, and copies of the diary and manifesto were shared mainly through smaller platforms. The potential of harm from such an exploitation of online services is multifaceted: the disturbing and graphic nature of the footage, the (re)traumatisation of communities who have been affected by similar incidents and the risk of radicalisation of vulnerable online users.

London: Ofcom, 2022. 32p.

By Ria Ivandić, Tom Kirchmaier and Neus Torres-Blas  

 We study the role of alcohol and emotions in explaining the dynamics in domestic abuse following major football games. We match confidential and uniquely detailed individual call data from Greater Manchester with the timing of football matches over a period of eight years to estimate the effect on domestic abuse. We first observe a 5% decrease in incidents during the 2-hour duration of the game suggesting a substitution effect of football and domestic abuse. However, following the initial decrease, after the game, domestic abuse starts increasing and peaks about ten hours after the game, leading to a positive cumulative effect. We find that all increases are driven by perpetrators that had consumed alcohol, and when games were played before 7pm. Unexpected game results are not found to have a significant effect.  

London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 2021. 66p.

By Andrés Ham, Darío Maldonado, Michael Weintraub, Andrés Felipe Camacho, Daniela Gualtero

This paper studies whether bartenders that adopt standardized practices can promote responsible alcohol consumption and subsequently reduce alcohol-attributable violence. We conducted a randomized experiment in four localities of Bogotá in cooperation with Colombia's largest brewery and Bogotá's Secretariat of Security, Coexistence, and Justice. Ourdesign allows estimating direct and spillover effects on reported incidents within and around bars. Results show that bartenders in treatment locations sell more water and food, thus contributing to more responsible alcohol consumption by patrons. We find no direct or spillover effects of these changes in consumption on brawls, but some improvement on other alcohol-related incidents.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2019. 61p.

By The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD)  

Alcohol production and trade exist both within and outside of government regulation; the relative size of each depends on the region of the world and social, cultural, and economic factors. Both segments are well established and people often – knowingly and unknowingly – interact fluidly with both of them. The regulated alcohol market is recorded in government statistics; unregulated alcohol, which is largely illegal, is more difficult to assess and falls into the “unrecorded” sphere (see Taxonomy of Unregulated and Unrecorded Alcohol). This segment is complex and diverse and includes everything from high-quality artisanal homebrew to illicit drinks that may contain methanol or other toxic ingredients. In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued its Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health and estimated, based on 2010 figures, that unrecorded alcohol made up an average 25% of all alcohol consumed worldwide [2]. Alcohol produced and sold illegally outside of government regulation is the most problematic part of unrecorded alcohol; it is untaxed, circumvents restrictions around availability, is of inconsistent quality, and, depending on the ingredients used to make it, is even potentially toxic. This report considers these wide-reaching implications and brings together recent data on the illicit market, compiled by the global market research firm Euromonitor International. While illicit alcohol is also widespread across Asia and parts of Europe, this report focuses on data from Africa and Latin America. Unregulated alcohol is more widespread in lower-income countries than in more affluent ones. Yet, whether in mature or emerging economies, it is largely consumed in some of the world’s poorest communities and, because it lacks quality and production standards, may contribute to an already significant problem of ill health. While home-produced artisanal alcohol may be part of cultural heritage and largely unproblematic, the illicit sector is not only large but also comes at a significant cost. HUMAN COST: The deaths in early 2018 of almost 150 people in Indonesia from poisoning by adulterated alcohol serve as a reminder that unregulated alcohol can cost lives   

Washington, DC: The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD),  2018. 16p.

By Louise Manning and Aleksandra Kowalska

Illicit (unrecorded) alcohol is a critical global public health issue because it is produced without regulatory and market oversight with increased risk of safety, quality and adulteration issues. Undertaking iterative research to draw together academic, contemporary and historic evidence, this paper reviews one specific toxicological issue, methanol, in order to identify the policy mitigation strategies of interest. A typology of illicit alcohol products, including legal products, illegal products and surrogate products, is created. A policy landscape matrix is produced that synthesizes the drivers of illicit alcohol production, distribution, sale and consumption, policy measures and activity related signals in order to inform policy development. The matrix illustrates the interaction between capabilities, motivations and opportunities and factors such as access, culture, community norms and behavior, economic drivers and knowledge and information and gives insight into mitigation strategies against illicit alcohol sale and consumption, which may prove of value for policymakers in various parts of the world.

Foods 10(7), 2021. 17p.

By Tracit

In pursuit of various social, religious, health, or economic objectives governments have imposed a long history of regulatory controls on the producers and consumers of alcoholic beverages. Minimum age purchase restrictions are probably the most renowned and common. Dry laws and other forms of supply restrictions are probably the most notorious. For the most part, the failure of America’s experiment with Prohibition has discouraged governments from imposing them. That is until the onset of the global COVID19 pandemic, when several countries opted for some form of dry law on alcoholic beverages as a tool to mitigate the impact of the virus. Whether or not dry laws were effective in addressing the pandemic itself is not the purpose of this report. The ambition here is to analyze the economic and social impacts of dry laws beyond public health objectives, specifically those consequences associated with illicit trade. The findings are intended to yield valuable lessons from the experience with COVID19 prohibitions, which can be applied to shaping future policymaking at the intersection of alcohol regulation, illicit trade and public welfare.   

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (Tracit), 2021. 34p.

By Euromonitor International

Alcoholic beverages are deeply ingrained in most societies worldwide, with global consumption in 2017 generating US$1.6 trillion in legally registered sales of 222.8 million hectolitres of pure alcohol (“hectolitres of alcohol equivalent”, or hl lae). However, despite the efforts of policy-makers, law enforcement officials, and legitimate alcohol manufacturers, illicit alcoholic beverages still account for a significant share of the total volume of alcohol consumed in many countries. This white paper explores critical issues affecting the problem of illicit alcohol in today’s global alcohol industry. To this end, the paper analyses research conducted in 24 countries in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and examines the major factors shaping their illicit alcohol markets. Illicit alcohol is prevalent in these countries: Of the 42.3 million hl lae of total alcohol consumed each year, approximately 25.8% is illicit. In other words, nearly 10.9 million hl lae of illicit alcohol is consumed annually in these 24 countries alone. This suggests they represent an effective sample for exploring this important topic. Illicit alcoholic beverages are defined as those not complying with the regulations and taxes in the countries where they are consumed, resulting in serious health risks to consumers, revenue loss, and brand degradation for legitimate manufacturers, as well as reduced tax revenue for governments. These products are responsible for hundreds of cases of death and illness due to accidental methanol intoxication, millions of dollars used to fund other criminal activities, and the fiscal loss of billions of dollars in unpaid taxes. Health risks affect the poorest and most vulnerable consumers by contributing to widening health inequalities. The most significant risks and costs for each country depend on the characteristics of the local market for illicit alcohol. The landscape of illicit alcohol is varied and complex, ranging from homemade artisanal beverages sold without the proper sanitary permits to legitimately branded bottles of alcohol smuggled illegally into a country. However, although market characteristics differ across countries, the problem of illicit alcohol exists in every region, in developed and developing countries, urban and rural areas, and higher-income and lower-income neighbourhoods alike.

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (Tracit),     42p.

By The Asia Pacific International Spirits & Wines Alliance. et al.

Illicit trade in alcohol is widespread, representing significant percentages of alcohol consumption worldwide and stripping governments of billions of dollars in tax revenues. According to Euromonitor’s 2018 Global Study on Illicit Alcohol, 1 in 4 alcohol bottles are illicit, representing 25.8% of all global consumption.

In addition to the serious health risk for consumers, the illicit trade in alcohol results in substantial losses in tax and duty revenue for governments. According to the Euromonitor report, the fiscal loss to governments in these countries is as much US$ 3.6 billion every year. These findings correspond to a 2016 report by the EU Intellectual Property Office that estimated counterfeit spirits and wine drain €1.2 billion (US$1.4 billion) in government revenues in Europe, of which €739 million (US$843 million) are excise duties. For industry, the main impact relates to lost market shares, costs related to intellectual property theft, reputational damage and lost consumer trust.

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade, 27p

By World Economic Forum

From the Preface: "The 2023 edition of the 'Global Risks Report' highlights the multiple areas where the world is at a critical inflection point. It is a call to action, to collectively prepare for the next crisis the world may face and, in doing so, shape a pathway to a more stable, resilient world."

World Economic Forum: www.weforum.org/. 2023. 98p.

By Rosenfeld, Richard; Boxerman, Bobby; Lopez, Ernesto, Jr.

From the Introduction: "This report updates CCJ's [Council on Criminal Justice's] previous studies [hyperlink] of crime changes during the coronavirus pandemic, extending the analyses with data through December of 2022. The current study finds a drop in homicide, aggravated assaults, and gun assaults and a rise in robbery and most property crimes. The authors' conclusions have not changed: to achieve substantial and sustainable reductions in violence and crime, cities should adopt evidence-based crime-control strategies and long-needed reforms to policing. The 35 cities included in this study were selected based on data availability [...] and range from Richmond, VA, the smallest, with 227,000 residents, to New York, the largest, with more than 8.4 million residents. The mean population of the cities for which crime data were available is approximately 1.1 million, while the median population is roughly 652,000. This report assesses monthly changes between January of 2018 and December of 2022 for the following 10 crimes: homicide, aggravated assault, gun assault, domestic violence, robbery, residential burglary, nonresidential burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and drug offenses. As in the previous reports, this analysis focuses special attention on the trend in homicides. It also examines in greater detail than in prior reports the substantial increase in motor vehicle thefts and carjacking since the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020."

Council On Criminal Justice. 2023. 29p.

By Safe Tennessee Project

In 2017, nearly 40,000 Americans died from gun violence — 109 every single day. In 2017, 1,246 Tennesseans died from gun violence, 3.4 people every day. Americans are 25 times more likely to die by firearm-related homicide and eight times more likely to die by firearmrelated suicide compared to other economically developed nations. If an illness were killing our friends, family, and neighbors at such an alarming rate, we would not hesitate to label it a crisis. And that’s what gun violence is. It’s a public health crisis. Public health encompasses any threats to a person’s life and wellbeing that can be prevented, contained or treated. For far too long, gun violence has been a leading cause of injury and death in our country, our state and our city, but it can be prevented through focused interventions for individuals who need them the most. This approach is not new; the U.S. dramatically decreased injury rates from car accidents for adults, children and babies by engaging in robust study of the issue, and ultimately making vehicles safer, making car seats safer, passing laws requiring seat belts, lowering speed limits, and passing DUI laws. The public health approach to gun violence reduction does not replace nor is it at odds with law enforcement. Its focus is just different: not deterrence but prevention by addressing the root causes of gun violence. Communities around the country and world integrate public health into public policy challenges. Our country - and our state - should do the same.

Nashville: Safe Tennessee Project, 2019. 72p.

By James Alan Fox

Recent mass public shootings in venues as diverse as a school, a church, and a concert, have alarmed policymakers and the public alike. The massive amount of media attention given these tragedies has convinced many observers that such incidents are on the rise—that we are experiencing a virtual epidemic of bloodshed. Notwithstanding this widely-held perception, shootings in which four or more victims are killed in a public place unrelated to other criminal activity remain rare events, especially when adjusted for population growth. While there has been some increase in the number of cases, the severity—in terms of the number killed and wounded— has spiked over the past several years, with seven of the ten deadliest occurring since 2007. Because of this, and the associated news and social media obsession, the most pronounced increase has been in fear. Despite mounting interest among journalists and academics, questions regarding the nature and prevention of mass shootings remain. For example, to what extent do mass shooters have histories of mental illness, substance abuse, or violence? Does strengthening or weakening gun control laws have an impact on the incidence or severity of mass public shootings? Are mass shooters influenced by media coverage of these events? To address these questions and more, we embarked on a research initiative starting with the creation of a database of mass public shooting incidents, offenders, and victims that occurred in the United States from 1976 forward. Notwithstanding the date range contained in the project title, we updated the data as the work progressed and used the most up-to-date data for analyses and associated publications as they became available. We defined mass public shootings as any event in which four or more individuals, not including the assailant(s), were killed by gunfire in a public setting within a 24-hour period, absent any associated criminal activity (such as robbery, gang conflict, or illicit drug trade). With this as the starting point, we then carried out a series of analyses using these and other data.

Boston: Northeastern University, 2021. 48p.

By U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an evaluation to determine whether Department of Defense law enforcement organizations, such as the U.S. Army Military Police, Naval Security Forces, and Pentagon Force Protection Agency, had established effective active shooter response policies, plans, and training. The report revealed a problematic lack of an active shooter response and training standard, which officials worry may “result in a delayed and uncoordinated response that could increase casualties” at military facilities and installations. According to the report, there are five existing policies related to active shooter situations, but no consistent, overall protocol. The five current policies, “although related to emergency management, arming of personnel, lessons learned, incident response plans, and training, only provide minimal active shooter incident response requirements.” This concerning absence of a strong strategy, particularly regarding the use of force, contributed to law enforcement officers not meeting the expectations set forth in the policies already in place. As part of the evaluation, the OIG proposed several recommendations to address these deficiencies, including updating the preexisting guidelines for active shooter response procedures, as well as standardizing the current directives for the use of force, arming, training, and equipment requirements for law enforcement organizations. Furthermore, the report suggested to publish lessons learned in the aftermath of active shooter incidents, such as those at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, and Naval Air Station Pensacola, into a centralized Joint Lessons Learned Information System. The OIG notes that management officials have not fully agreed with or resolved their recommendations and strongly encourages them to take action as soon as possible.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defence, 2022. 56p.

By David Hureau, Theodore Wilson

We depicted the episodic nature of illegal gun carrying and tested its co-occurrence with gun violence victimization and exposure. We tested differences in differences using data from the Pathways to Desistance Study, originally collected between 2000 and 2010 (Phoenix, Arizona, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), on young people adjudicated for serious involvement in crime. We then tested the changes in gun victimization experiences attending gun-carrying changes for this sample. We found gun victimization to be highest during periods of gun carrying, and this correspondence held regardless of future or past gun-carrying behavior. This manifests both in direct victimization and witnessing gun violence. Even among gun carriers, episodes of non-carrying are common, with 76.4% of gun carriers in a 1-year period also reporting a pause in their carrying behavior of at least 6 months. Gun carrying and gun violence exposure co-occur at a high rate. During any period of gun carrying, the carrier has at least a 2% chance of getting shot versus near 0% for periods of non-carrying. Our results suggest that illegal gun carrying is malleable, and public health efforts to reduce the incidence of gun carrying could yield meaningful reductions in violence.

Am J Epidemiol. 2021;190(12):2544–2551

By Sophia Falkner

Policy Exchange’s report, Knife Crime in the Capital , reveals the real injustice that at least four out of five gang related homicide victims and perpetrators in London are black or ethnic minority. 5 It confirms that the Metropolitan Police is losing a battle against knife crime that is out of control in some parts of London, with young black and ethnic minority men by far the most likely to be stabbed or commit knife crime. Black people in London, it shows, are five times more likely to be hospitalised than white people due to a stabbing. The report analyses a decade of knife crime data, revealing how a combination of drill music, social media, tit-for-tat revenge attacks and a failure in police strategy are causes of dozens of deaths and hundreds more injuries every year.

London: Policy Exchange, 2021. 63p.

By Jake Phillips, Kate Whitfield, Paula Hamilton, Fiona de Hoog and Charlotte Coleman

‘Knife crime’, which here we use as shorthand for children and young people using and carrying bladed weapons in public places, has been increasing in recent years. Current evidence suggests that knife crime is driven by a combination of poverty, marginalisation, adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), trauma, fear and victimisation, including exploitation. Youth offending teams (YOTs), amongst their other duties, are responsible for working with children (aged 10-17 years) who are at risk of involvement with knife crime, or who have been found guilty of a knife crime. YOTs are interdisciplinary teams which provide multi-agency input based on local need. They provide supervision and intervention programmes which focus on desistance from crime, and support children to avoid offending and reoffending, and to live a healthy and positive life. Although YOTs are increasingly sharing or co-commissioning services across local government boundaries, greater understanding of effective YOT activity is needed to allow for improved practice sharing, and potentially to deliver financial savings.

Manchester, UK: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2022. 49p.

By Aase Villadsen and Emla Fitzsimons

At age 17, 6.4% of young people self-reported carrying or using a weapon in the past year. For males the figure was 8.8% and for females 3.9%. • Carrying or using a weapon at age 17 intersected with other types of offences at the same age. Of those who had carried or used a weapon in the past year, 66% reported assault, 32% had shoplifted, 20% committed neighbourhood crime, 50% were involved in criminal damage, 30% reported cybercrime, and 5.3% had participated in online bullying. A high proportion (26%) of those who had carried or used a weapon were currently or 4 previously members of a gang. • Weapon carrying or use at age 17 was associated with a wide range of prior factors, when examined bivariately with no other variables controlled for. Factors related to a higher prevalence of carrying or using a weapon included individual characteristics, socioeconomic background, family environment, school factors, child and adolescent mental health, leisure activities, peer factors, substance use, and previous involvement in offending behaviours. • In multivariate examinations of weapon carrying or use at age 17, controlling for other variables, many bivariate associations dissipated. Significant associations remained for being male, use of substances at age 14, spending a lot of time on computer/electronic gaming at age 14, being excluded from school between age 11 and 14, and having peers who use multiple substances at age 14. Furthermore, these age 14 experiences and behaviours appeared to be mediators between childhood experiences (low household income, domestic abuse between parents, externalising problems, and self-harm in adolescence) and carrying or using a weapon at age 17. Finally, cohort members carrying or use of a weapon previously at age 14 was highly predictive of continuity at age 17. There were no differences between males and females in terms of variables associated with this age 17 outcome.

London: UCL Centre for Longitudinal Studies, 2021, 117p.

By Mallory O’Brien and Michael F. Totoraitis

In 2005, the Mayor of Milwaukee, the Milwaukee Police Department’s Chief of Police, and the Milwaukee County District Attorney formed the Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission (MHRC) to address lethal violence in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Modeled after other review processes such as child death or crime incident reviews, homicide reviews were rare and information about them was scarce. Since then, the MHRC has been a central component of the City of Milwaukee’s violence prevention efforts. The MHRC strives to reduce homicides and nonfatal shootings through a multilevel, multidisciplinary, and multi-agency homicide review process. The commission was designed to achieve the following goals: 1 . Gain a better understanding of homicide through strategic problem analysis. 2 . Develop innovative and effective responses and prevention strategies. 3 . Help focus available prevention and intervention resources. Guiding the creation of MHRC were four tenets that would inform the entire initiative and affect its governance, leadership, and staffing structure; partnership development; collection and use of real-time data; and preference for multilevel and multi-agency decision-making. These four tenets were 1 . Homicide is preventable; 2 . Only a collaborative and well-coordinated effort of community, nonprofit, business, government, academic, legal, and medical partnerships will lead to lasting change; 3 . Data-driven strategies are essential; 4 . Multi-level responses help ensure meaningful, robust, and sustainable results over the long term.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2021. 18p.